WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BRAZIL: THE SELECTION OF A PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 12, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved F&,r2 ase0 OjY? t 1Ct -R 1g5TOy4 1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Brazil: The Selection of a President
CIA
DgCLI3L
~-, ' ..7.i 41 r ~.e? .i.i 6 w:i ?~~?~'~
a7 V'a L.? ~r.,w i
V
Secret
N? 676
25X1
12 January 1973
No. 0352/73A
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
The major political challenge facing President Emilio Medici in coming months
is the need to arrange for a successor. Although his term does not end until March
1974, potentially divisive behind-the-scenes maneuvering by ambitious generals has
already begun and may prompt Medici to name his man long before then.
Succession is a probiem as the military-backed governments since 1964 have
not institutionalized the presidential selection process. This means that the President
and the most senior military officers, whose views and attitudes differ, must
somehow agree on a choice. Failure to reach agreement or the selection of a man
who proves inadequate to the job could disrupt the country's political stability.
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
President Medici
1969-
President Castelo Branco
1964-66
President Costa e Silva
1966-69
Approved For Release 2005/01/16FREW85T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
SECRET
25X1
It is almost certain that only an active duty
or retired general will get the nod. Moreover, he
must have four stars, at least by the time he takes
office, to avoid the hierarchical strains of full
generals being commanded by lesser generals. The
military are convinced that only one of their own
can carry out the development and national
integration programs they have started. They
firmly belitve that only a man with a military
background will possess the integrity, technical
know-how, and discipline to do the job. The
officers are still not ready to return the decision-
making machinery to civilians, whom they blame
for the ccrruption, inflation, and economic fail-
ures that helped prompt their intervention in
1964. Moreover, since the m.Iitary have a mo-
nopoly on the disposition of force and have
severely curtailed all civilian institutions, there is
no way for a civilian to launch a liable candidacy.
When the military assumed power in 1964,
they sought among their ranks a leader who was
uncompromised politically and was both re-
spected by and acceptable to diverse military fac-
tions. They found such a man in Humberto
Castelo Branco, army chief of staff, who had led
the Brazilian contingent in Italy in World War II
and was known as a military intellectual. He was
among the leaders of the 1964 revolution and had
worked successfully with generals who held
widely differing views. The Supreme Revolu-
tionary Command had little difficulty in agreeing
on Castelo Branco, who was then formally elected
by Congress.
His successor, War Minister Costa e Silva,
actively sought the presidency. He maneuvered
skillfully to line up support, while remaining
outwardly loyal to Castelo Branco. Costa e Silva
was evidently astute enough to perceive a delicate
balance within the army between his supporters
and those of the President and studiously avoided
taking a stand on most issues. Costa e Si!va
managed to emerge as the unity candidate of the
armed forces, and he was elected by Congress in
October 1966.
Special Report
In August 1969, Costa e Silva suffered a
stroke. A junta of the three armed forces cabinet
ministers took over, bypassing the civilian vice
president. When it became clear that the President
would not be able to resume his duties, the junta
convoked the military high command, dominated
by the army, to choose a successor. The high
command agreed on Medici, than commander of
the Third Army and former chief of the National
Intelligence Service. Medici reportedly neither
sought the office nor encouraged anyone else to
seek it for him. His selection was largely due to an
excellent military record and his reserved person-
ality, which made him acceptable to a broad
sector of the armed forces. The early agreement
also avoided the threat to military unity that
would have been posed by prolonged maneu-
vering among generals ambitious for the top job.
There are inaications that Medici, when he sensed
less than total support among the generals, has
not hesitated to remind them that he accepted
the post reluctantly and only to preserve military
unity.
Medici, remembering Castelo Branco's fail-
ure to plan the succession, is determined not to
repeat that mistake. He is also aware that there is
much behind-the-scenes maneuvering by generals
who desire the presidency for themselves or for
favored colleagues. Months ago, he moved to
prevent open debate that might promote or
exacerbate divisions within the military or harm
the chances of any candidate. He also wanted to
postpone a decision that would, in effect, make
him a "lame duck" with a year of his term still
left.
Medici has the confidence of the senior
commanders and is, therefore, in firm control of
the succession :nd likely to remain so. He is
widely respected in the military and among the
public. He is seen as highly competent and effec-
tive in achieving important national goals; his
term of office has brought a reduction of in,*"W"
tion, sustained economic growth, and a,i apparent
end of terrorism. H- !;;,, consistently kept
decision-making w:ithiri a small group and has not
-3- 12 January 1973
Approved For Release 2005@ 4TRDP85T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01 / S1~I~ 1P85T00875R001500050002-5
tolerated ineffectual subordinates. The President,
through his army minister, moved the military
commanders frequently enough to prevent their
establishing power bases from which to maneuver
politically. He promoted officers who supported
the regime. Ever conscious of the need to main-
tain military unity, Medici has carefully balanced
25X1the various factions; e.g., he has appointed fol-
lowers of Castelo Branco to high positions.
Most often mentioned as the successor to
Medici is retired General Ernesto Geisel, brother
of Army Minister Orlando Geisel. Ernesto Geisel
has headed the state petroleum enterprise,
Petrobra5, since his retirement from active duty in
1969. Geisel, more than any other figure, seems
to embody the qualities that the military wants in
the next president of Brazil. Basic to these is a
long and distinguished military career, spent in a
wide variety of command positions that led
eventually to the rank of full general. His com-
petence as an officer is acknowledged even by
those who oppose his presidential candidacy.
Since the military take-over in 1964, Geisel has
shown ability in a number of positions of national
Special Report
25X1
importance, first as chief military adviser to Presi-
dent Castelo Branco, then as a member of the
Supreme Military Tribunal, the nation's highest
military court. Geisel, like presidents Medici and
Costa e Silva, as well as many of Medici's top
advisers, is a native of the state of Rio Grande do
Sul.
At Petrobras, Geisel has demonstrated again
that he is an able administrator and talented
manager. Heading that company has undoubtedly
given him intimate insights into the nation's
development problems and considerable experi-
ence in dealing with complicated technical
matters.
Like Medici, Geisel is reserved, personally
honest, and politically acceptable. Medici is said
to regard Geisel highly. He has been described as
moderately nationalistic; he favors nationalized
public utilities and authoritarian solutions to
national problems. A few factors work against
him, and they could be significant. One is his age.
Born in August 1908, he would be past 65 by
transition time and 70 by the end of his term.
Also, he is not regarded as an inspiring leader,
although the same was once said of Medici.
Finally, Geisel's "candidacy" surfaced too soon,
giving :iis opponents a long lead time in working
to defeat him. It also provided an early impetus
to the succession scramble the President had so
urgently hoped to avoid.
Almost all the four-star army generals in the
Brazilian Army can be considered potential
candidates. Indeed, many consider themselves
presidential timber and are maneuvering to
strengthen their bids for the office. There are
several who, measured by the military's criteria,
seem particularly well-qualified.
? One is General Artur Duarte Candal da
Fonseca, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff
and former director of the national petroleum
enterprises. Candal was born 63 years ago in Rio
Grande do Sul. He was a supporter of former
president Costa e Silva and is friendly to the US,
- 4 - 12 January 1973
Approved For Release 2005/01SBCJ bP85T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
President Medici Confers with
Army Minister Orlando Geisel
General (Ret.) Ernesto Geisel
A Meeting of the Army High Command
Approved For Release 2005/01/1$E(Ltf
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
General Jorge Correa
P
Wd&l
General Candal da Fonseca
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 SEt4Mq5T00875
1. 7
but his nationalistic views could be strong enough
to make him too controversial.
? Another is the commander of the First
Army, General Sylvio Couto Coelho da Frota. A
native of Rio de Janeiro, he is 62. Frota is highly
respected throughout the ai my. This respect is
reportedly shared by President Medici himself.
General Frota is regarded as intelligent, although
not an intellectual, and has long been concerned
about corruption in the army and the govern-
merit.
? General Antonio Jorge Correa, chief of
training and research for the army, has held
several positions in the Armed Forces General
Staff and was secretary general of the army. A
rising star at 60, he is among the youngest of the
possible contenders.
? General Joao Bina Machado, commander
of the important Superior War College, is a Rio
Grande do Sul native, born in 1908. A supporter
of Castelo Branco, the first military president
after the 1964 take-over, Bina Machado is re-
garded as an intelligent and competent profes-
sional.
? Two other four-star generals whose names
have been mentioned are Breno Borges Fortes,
army chief of staff, and Humberto de Souze
Mello, commander of the Second Army. Generals
Oscar Luiz da Silva and Walter Menezes Paes,
commanders of the Third and Fourth armies,
respectively, are outside possibilities.
There are two major generals who have a
chance, albeit a slight one. Each could receive a
fourth star by the time of the transition. The first
is Major General Carlos Alberto da Fonfoura,
director of the National Intelligence Service,
which President Medici once headed. Fontoura is
one of Medici's closest advisers and as such can-
not be ruled out. The other dark horse is Major
General Euler Bentes Monteiro, chief of the army
budget and finance department. Euler Bentes
headed the Northeast Developmental Agency and
is considered an expert in the economic problems
of that region. The nationalist views of Euler
Special Report
25X1
Bentes also could prove strong enough to render
him too controversial.
The supporters of controversial Major Gen-
eral Affonso Augusto de Albuquerque Lima,
who has long aspired to the presidency, are still
maneuvering in his behalf, but he stands virtually
no chance. Passed over for promotion to full
general by the high command, he subsequently
retired. He is outspokenly nationalistic and a
charter member of the hard-line group of officers
who advocate very harsh measures against any-
thing and anybody they perceive as a threat to
national security. It is highly doubtful that he
could generate anything like the needed con-
sensus in the high command, even if he had the
requisite four stars.
Prospects
Some things seem fairly certain. One is that
once Medici and the high command have desig-
nated a successor, his elevation to the presidency
is virtually assured, barring death or incapacita-
tion. Only if Medici were to lose the confidence
of the senior commanders would his choice be
seriously questioned. It would take something
very drastic-such as a sharp, prolonged reversal
of the economy-to provoke such a loss of con-
fidence.
Another is that while the President and the
high command will pick the next chief executive,
there is no reason to assume that he will be a
carbon copy of the incumbent. Although basic
policy directions will probably change little, the
new president, whether Geisel or another general
of similar mold, will have his own team and his
own ideas of how to do things.
In office, he will face a number of persisting
and unanswered questions. One of the most
basic-whether or how the military will give up
the active exercise of power-will have to be
addressed or skirted again by the administration.
There is as of now no indication that the military
establishment is contemplating an early return to
civilian rule. The success that the military govern-
ments have had since 1964 in moving the
economy ahead, in reducing inflation, and in
12 January 1973
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 S iQh PT5T00875R001500050002-5
 Approved For Release 2005/01/1 ~,.C1Q P 5T00875R001500050002-5
restoring Brazil's international credit rating has
made the military confident that their policies are
sound. Likewise, they probably feel vindicated by
the virtual cessation cf terrorism, as well as the
progress made in such areas as vast road-building
projects and large-scale literacy campaigns.
Another basic question is how to include in a new
or revised constitution the Institutional Acts on
which the revolutionary governments have based
so many of their actions. Medici has avoided
acting either to include all these acts in a new
constitution, as some urge, or to do away with
them, as some political opponents of the regime
Special Report
25X1
propose. His reason has been that he wishes to
avoid the divisive debate the issue would involve
if broached formally.
Finally, there is the succession issue itself.
Until the selection process is institutionalized, it
will continue to present a major political chal-
lenge for the government every time a presidential
term ends. And every time the issue arises, it brings
a threat to milit unity and thus to national
political stability.
25X1
25X1
-8- 12 January 1973
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 gGIG_ &5T00875R001500050002-5