WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT JAPAN: THE COMMUNIST PARTY COMES OF AGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 23, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Japan: The Com;nunirt Party Comer of Age
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
Secret
FIVE COPY N? 656
DONUT DESTROY 23 February 1973
No. 0358/73A
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communist party comes of age
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Spectacular gains by the Japan Communist
Party in the Diet election last December provided
a splash of color in a political rite that was other-
wise gray and predictable. When the Diet recessed
before the election, the Communist Party was the
smallest of the five national parties; when the
Diet convened in January, the party was the third
largest. The Communists nearly tripled the size of
their delegation in the Diet's powerful House of
Representatives, from 14 to 39 seats, and won
more than 10 percent of the popular vote.
This election success, together with the
party's ranking as the biggest non-ruling com-
munist party outside Western Europe, is the fruit
of a decade-long campaign to mold the party in a
moderate image with mass appeal. Nevertheless,
many Japanese distrust the Communists and only
voted for the party in December to show their
dissatisfaction with the ruling Liberal Democrats.
The newly confident Communists now
command more attention in Diet proceedings,
and their presence on the strategic House Steering
Committee makes it more difficult for the ruling
conservatives te, pass key legislation. Barring a loss
of voter support through irresponsible behavior,
the Communists will probably register additional,
but more modest, gains in future Diet elections.
They pose no immediate threat to the hegemony
of the Liberal Democrats in the Lower House, but
could contribute to the loss of the conservative
majority in the Diet's Upper House in 1974.
(from left) Leaders of the Japan Communist Party
Secretary-General Tetsuzo Fuwa, Central Committee Chairman Sanzo Nosaka, Presidium Chairman Kenji Miyamoto
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Turbulent Beginnings
Marxism first aroused the interest of Japa-
nese intellectuals in the late 19th century, but a
communist party was not formally established
until the end of World War I, and then it was only
a covert organization under the direction of Mos-
cow. In the period up to World War 11, the party
was ruthlessly suppressed. Its leaders were in jail
or exile, and Factionalism was endemic as the
party faithful were preoccupied with doctrinal
wrangling. Moreover, the party's subordination to
the Comintern and its demands that the emperor
must go alienated it from rising Japanese national-
ism.
The party was legalized by the occupation
authorities in 1945. In th political freedom of
postwar Japan, the Communists blossomed. In
1946, Sanzo Nosaka, a pre-war party leader, re-
turned from exile in China and broke with party
usage to call for reliance upon parliamentary
democracy. He went so far as to support reten-
tion of the emperor if this was the wish of the
people. Many of the civil rights, labor, and admin-
istrative reforms that Nosaka joined in advocating
were implemented during the occupation. This
moderate approach, which sought to win broad
popular support, paid dividends; the party came
to be called "the lovable Japanese communists."
In the 1949 general election, the party won
10 percent of the popular vote and 35 seats in the
House of Representatil::s. A year later, party
membership, which had never gone over a thou-
sand persons in the prewar period, reached
150,000. This honeymoon as a party of mass
appeal was not without its pitfalls, however, and
it was short lived. In Jani:ary 1950, the Comin-
form denounced the Japanese Communists for
their advocacy of a peaceful transition to social-
ism and their view of the US occupation as a
progressive move.
Nosaka promptly bowed to Moscow's cen-
sli,re and issued a self-criticism, while the party
fired new verbal blasts against US policy. Scat-
tered incidents of violence led to the jailing of
communist leaders, and the party reverted once
Special Report
1922 Patty luundud by snwll band of intclloctuals.
1922-45 Year; of illegal usislence and control of the pdr I,, by lhu
Sowui Conul,teln, repression increased in the life
1930s, fotcinq leadurs into jail, undeiglottnd, and told
exile ill chilla.
1945 Occupation political lefolins legahre the Communist
Pally anti iulqusc its luadtas hon1 detention.
creuUt
1946 S;rn,o Nortka nnurns lions China and begins Si
the usage of the "lovable Communist fiat ly.''
1949 Thu party wins 35 ,rats in the House of RepresenCtuves.
1950 Dunouncud by the Comintern lot s'nd:uuj it peaceful
ft,insttlon to sou;'lisni, the party turns to;evolufionaty
Gtr.lics and its Icadurs yo undunlround and into exile.
1952 Negative public: nsu.lion to the patty's nvotu nonaty
imagr cauuts the loss of ,ill 35 Loaves Hottse sails.
1955 Parry "tO is bt'gin to rnodurtte. OW imaqu of the
patty-.I movenurnt act"I''tated nndot flit! le,idursIlip of
Kenji Miyanwtu.
1964 RelaUOns with the Cummunlst Patty of OW Sovn'l
Union etc btokt'n and Sot 5yrnt?utht;"tc, Intl I,y
Yoshio Shupt, ;err espellutl hunt the pill ty.
1966 RolaUunctvith theChtrn";a C.mnntne;l Pat t',' d'.'te'"ltal"
rout I hu JCP suit ten; con ltilt] irlq ,'bust' if urn Peking.
1969 .JCP ';hength ill Lotvut House nlcnr,acs front 6 to 1,1
;fats.
1971 Miy;unoto visits Moscow, I-lanut, Rums, ;ind Bucharest
hl improve ta:,tllonc amt reallnm patty's indepantlence,
1912 1Ninninq more than 10 ftmcunt of Ihu popular vote, Iliv
tilt ty takos 39 seats in the 49i ntemhe' Hours of Repre.
silltotives.
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Japan:
Gains in Communist Party Strength
Sapporo
1972.._.
at' _ 4
Prefectures with more than 10%
Japanese Communist Party vote
2 Number of seats in prefecture
held by communists
Major industrial area
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y,s?: KokYo
Osakti J
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again to a covert status. Popular support dropped
precipitously as the party became a symbol of
extremism, and in the 1952 election, it lost all of
its Diet seats. By the end of the decade, the
Communists acknowledged the failure of mili-
tancy and began to turn the party once again in a
more moderate direction.
Success of the Miyamoto Line
Reorientation of the party : ,as a slow proc-
ess that only gained momentum in tl-,i mid-1960s
under the leadership of Kenji Miyamoto, a liter-
ary critic and party ideologue who became chair-
man of the party presidium in 1970. He called for
a two-stage revolution in which Japan would first
rid itself of American "imperialism"-that is, the
security arrangements with the US-and then
build a socialist state-nationalizing key indus-
tries. All of this was to ba accomplished at the
polls. Miyamoto systematically changed party
practice to eliminate the taint of violence and
opened to the press and public all meetings of the
party congrr.ss save those related to finance and
personnel. Today, party influence is pronounced
in many youth federations, particularly the
Zengakuren university groups, but the party is a
bitter enemy of the violence-prone "New Left."
The Communists are caustic in their denuncia-
tions of the terrorism of the Red Army Faction
and the United Red Army, and they have pro-
moted peaceful activities among the young left.
In contrast to the Socialists, the Communists did
not suffer at the polls from public identification
of their party with the excesses of student protest
action in the late 1960s.
Independence from foreign communist party
influence hac reinforced the moderate image of
the Japanese Communists, and has enabled them
to exploit nationalistic sentiments in Japan. The
Japanese Communists took advantage of the
deepening Sino-Soviet split in the early 19bOs to
loosen ties with both Moscow and Peking. The
Indonesian Communist Party's debacle in 1965
was tinal proof to the Japanese Communists that
they should go their own way. Now, after decades
of seesawing between subservience to the Sovietc
or the Chinese, the Japanese party is vigorously
critical of both.
Special Report
Amassing Support at the Polls
The more nationalistic the Communists have
become, the more success they have had at the
polls. Working from a base of three seats in the
House of Representatives in 1960, the party in-
creased its holdings slightly in both 1963 and
1969. They now have a still modest 39 seats in
the 491-member Lower House. In the same
period, the party has progressed from one to ten
members in the House of Councilors. The Com-
munists are, moreover, partners in over 100 re-
formist local governments and are the third-rank-
ing party, over-all, in local assembly seats.
Paralleling these gains, membership has
grown to 300,000. These members are well-dis-
ciplined, giving the Communist Party organiza-
tional strength far superior to that of the Social-
ists and Liberal Democrats, who command
broader support. Modest but steady growth is also
occurring in the percentage of the electorate that
identifies the Communists as its preferred party.
Newspaper polls showed 3.6 percent of those
polled chose the party on the eve of the -1972
elections, an increase from the respective 1969
and 1967 levels of 2.4 and 1.5 percent.
Communist candidates standing for national
office are a new breed. They shun ideology in
favor of bread-and-butter issues. A large propor-
tion of these office seekers are articulate
Japan Communist Party Results in
House of Representative Elections Since 1960
Percent of
Popular Vote
Number of
Seats Won
1900
2.9
3
1963
4.0
5
1907
4.8
5
1969
6.8
14
1972
10.5
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physicians, lawyers, and educators-models of
respectability. They speak out on social and en-
vironmental problems and promote a party plat-
form that calls for greater attention to the prob-
lems of the common people and less for those of
big business. They favor abrogation of US-Japa-
nese security arrangements.
The Communists can afford massive public
relations campaigns, and this has boosted their
fortunes at the polls. Donations from small
businesses, the collection of membership fees, and
the sale of a party paper whose Sunday circula-
tion approaches 2 million copies, give the Com-
munists working funds well beyond those of the
other opposition parties. Additionally, the party
makes excellent use of its affiliated doctors and
lawyers in the search for votes. I 'Ls Diet members,
famous for their responsiveness to constituent
needs, can call upon these professionals to pro-
vide free services. Although the Socialists and
Democratic Socialists have general control of
Japan's two largest labor federations, the Com-
munist Party has infiltrated a number of impor-
tant unions to the point where these assets can be
mobilized at election time.
In putting together their victory last Decem-
ber, the Communists drew heavily upon Japan's
"floating vote,' a growing body of citizens-par-
ticularly youth rand urban workers-alienated by
the inertia of the other political parties. The Com-
munists were unable to make any significant in-
roads in the largely conservative agricultural areas,
but they did make gains in several mixed urban-
rural areas. These were mainly districts slated for
industrial development under Prime Minister
Tanaka's plans for "remodeling the archipelago";
in these areas, voters reacted against Tanaka's
plans, largely out of fear of heavy pollution
coming with new industry.
The failure of the middle-of-the-road
Komeito, Socialist, and Democratic Socialists par-
ties to provide a viable alternative to the ruling
party has enhanced the appeal of the outspoken
Communists. Still, much of the Japanese elec-
torate suspects Communist motives. Many voters
used the party only to express their mounting
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dissatisfaction with inflation, inadequate welfare
programs, and worsening environmental condi-
tions. Despite the size of the Communist protest
vote, many Japanese also recognized that only the
ruling party, which has an overwhelming majority
in the Lower House, can get things done. As a
result, most Communist gains were made at the
expense of the moderate Komeito and Demo-
cratic Socialists, and, in a few districts, the Com-
munists and Liberal Democrats both increased
their Diet strength.
Even though the Communists control fewer
than 10 percent of the Lower House members,
the party's stronger position is subtly altering the
way politics is practiced in the Diet. The party is
commanding more attention from the media and
other political parties, and having topped 21
seats, the party is entitled to introduce non-
budgetary legislation and to sit on the directorate
of the House Steering Committee.
In the past, the Liberal Democrats have
relied upon closed-door sessions of the Steering
Committee to work out necessary compromises
with the opposition parties and to smooth the
passage of legislation. The Communists roundly
condemn such practices, arguing that government
business should be transacted in a "fish bowl."
Their demand for open committee meetings is
already inhibiting the Komeito and Socialists
from engaging in back-room compromise, and the
Liberal Democrats are finding it more difficult
and time-consuming, although not impossible, to
shepherd controversial bills through the Diet. As a
result, the ruling party may be forced to rely
more upon the clout of its majority to manage
Diet business. Governing by force of numbers is
considered unfair by the Japanese, and if the
Liberal Democrats make frequent use of so-called
forced votes, without the participation of all par-
ties, they will get bruising criticism from the
media and opposition parties.
Communist Party willingness to levy per-
sonal attacks on Prime Minister Tanaka and to
delve into the financial dealings that have long
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oiled the Japanese political system could prove an
additional embarrassment for the government.
During the past several months, the party has
waged a quite nasty campaign against Tanaka's
financial dealings, and the party may well try to
arouse greater public criticism of the ingrained
spoils system.
Ironically, at the same time that the Com-
munists are helping to make life more difficult for
the ruling party and to crystallize voter protest,
their increased strength is making progress toward
a unification of the opposition more difficult.
The party's relations with the Komeito, Socialists,
and Democratic Socialists have deteriorated
steadily since last December. The Socialists, in
particular, feel that the growing appeal of the
Japan Communist Party threatens their status as
the most influential opposition party and their
control of the country's largest labor federation,
Sohyo. Friction between the two parties has been
most evident in sessions of the Diet's Steering
Committee, where the Communists charge that
the Socialists collude with Liberal Democrats. In
turn, Socialist leaders bitterly accuse the Com-
munists of engaging in a campaign of lies to block
the formation of a united front that could push
the conservatives out of office. Although the two
parties have long sparred in this way, their dispute
is becoming so emotional that it may be difficult
to change course.
In the short run, this feuding is causing some
Japanese to regard the Communist Party as politi-
cally immature. Voters who had looked to the
party to vitalize united opposition to the gov-
ernment have been disappointed. Already, the
Liberal Democrats have benefited from this dis-
unity with the election of conservative candidates
in several local contests that might otherwise have
gone to the opposition. One Tokyo lawyer, in a
letter to a major Japanese newspaper in early
February, may have spoken for many citizens
when he warned that popular disdain for oppo-
sition party bickering could cut back, rather than
increase, the seats of the Communists and Social-
ists in the next Diet election.
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"Big city dwellers voted for the Socialists and Com-
munists to air their resentment of Liberal Democratic
policies that ignore urban problems in favor of big
business...
"Now, however, the squabbling of the two parties is
benefiting the consen'atives in local elections and
creating a deplorable situation in the Diet...
"If this continues, Jar from increasing the seats of the
Socialists and Communists in the next election, popu-
lar disdain may well cut them back. "
(Letter to the Editor/Asahi Shimbunr/ 4 February
1973)
If current Diet squabbles are short lived and
the Communists manage to avoid alienating the
electorate with their histrionics, both big ifs, their
Diet strength should continue to grow, although
the pace of future increases will probably be more
modest than that of last December. The Commu-
nists are now striving to pick up additio,eal seats
from mixed urban-rural areas-having already won
seats in nearly ever-,, district of their large city
strongholds. Japan's multi-member, single-ballot
election district system will make another round
of spectacular growth difficult to achieve.
Special Report
Although the Communists cannot increase
their strength sufficiently in the near term to
threaten the hegemony of the Liberal Democrat-
in the Lower I-louse, much less bring the party to
power, the Communists are likely to exert an
influence on the Japanese political scene that goes
well beyond their limited numerical strength in
the Diet. Their December election gains, while
not making any direct inroads on safe conserva-
tive seats, shook the Liberal Democrats since the
gains highlighted the Japanese voter's dissatisfac-
tion with the government's performance. Unless
the Liberal Democrats respond with programs
that alleviate urban ills and allay fears of indus-
trial pollution spreading to rural areas, additional
Communist gains could contribute to possible loss
of a Liberal Democratic majority in the July 1974
elections for the Upper House of the Diet.
The Upper House is not as powerful as the
Lower House; it can veto or stall legislation, and a
two-thirds majority vote in the Lower House is
needed to override such action. The Liberal
Democrats do not have a two-thirds majority in
the Lower House, and an end to their majority in
the Upper House would complicate their control
of the legislative process. In that event, the oppo-
sition parties are not apt to oppose conservative
policies across-the-board, but the Liberal Demo-
crats would be forced into significant ad hoc
political compromises to get a voting majority in
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