WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CUBA'S DIPLOMATIC GAINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 9, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WEEKLY SUMMARY
special Report
Cuba s Diplomatic Gains
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N2 660
9 March 1973
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diplomatic gains
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C'.(1l.,i''. Ihllts to develop normal relations with other nations reached a high
level clnr uc; I) '. Fidel Castro oracle official visits to 11 nations. CLIba established
diplnrnrrti I,I;ions with 1 1 countries-- not the sank 1 1 --and expanded its political,
ucunolrnI nlliwii ties with malty othc_trs.
incwosed participation in v,iudd affa,rs stems in part from a major
shut iiitti.rl 'd in 1968--away iruru mc:ctri vocal support of armed revolutionary
violemc'' uiri viii) I mote cotvenliom,II pursuit of closer economic and political ties
with ulhcs 111e pursuit sr_nta,i to I ,rlin Anrr,ricor, but spread to Ahica and
the Midctln F i t, e lierc' C~rsiro hir: rii~;rlral iris prugrajni,. quin(l; and where he Flops his
I,:n.litst siil)I)(H I to seven,II insurgency Of fort:;.
Cuba's rr>lalions with the hl)' have also grown closer, although not
always in ways to Castro's taste. Fur r >unlt,le, Urban ir_Iherence to CEMA and the
ecortum!C syref nuents reached Iasi yuai with the Soviet Union seem to Illave given
Moscow a greater role in the fornni nIiit ott and execution of Cuban economic policy.
Castro is bound to chafe urider such restrictions. This will put some pressure on him
Ir, loot. I,u ahernalives. For the p'esc-:rrt, he scorns to prefer pursuing his diplomatic
;;icr:ess, :, in Ito, -, hod World to undertaking moves toward it rapprochuament with the
Urnuocl St,itc s.
Al 1 (;;ratio has sottorn:d his anti-American oratory and has kept flexible
the r,t,nchiu 1i, fir sr is fcr du.rhngs with the United States, he seems confident that
the OAS :.,nn k fill') policy has failed and tha: Iic therefore has no need to make
conces>I ,ii
The change to rational fc,rc icfn pol-
icy -initially tentative end caution', concen-
trated at the outset err i irw seiccted nations of
Latin America. Castro Ira: long seen himself as a
modern-day Boliva , destined to lead Latin
America in its "second v,,ai of irndependenc e"
this time from the US. It his eyes, the US wan
responsible for nearly If Cuba's economic ctiffi?
copies and had replaced Spain as the cot oni;tl
power in the hemisphere. His aggressive 5upporl
of insurgency was designed to reduce, if not elim-
inate, US influence in Latin America through a
sort of revolutionary confrontation. Having dis-
covered these tactics were non-productive, Castro
turned to more orthodox methods to guild his
mlluence in the region and to undermine the US
and OAS policy of isolating Cuba.
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In these efforts, Castro has been able to
capitalize on several factors.
? I he ine wising tide of nationalism
thruuyhout Latin America.
? The ascension to power in Chile, Peru,
Panama, and Ecuador of regime, that wish to
demonstrate their independence of the US.
? The of(-..( line of Cuban support for local
revolutionary groups has reduced fears of
Cuban subversion in many Latin American
nations.
? The belief of sonic governments that the
US may embarrass them by suddenly re-
versing its policy on Cuba.
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Fidel in Moscow, June 72.
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Fidel welcomes Mongolian Priaic Minister Tsedenhal to
Cuba. November 72.
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~.vv yAN\~, v
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Cuban Contacts With
Latin America Since 1968
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Republic
El Salvador
French West Indies
French Guiana
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican
Ecuador
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Bolivia
Brazil
British West Indies
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Surinam
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
I
I
?i?
i 0 ?
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?i?
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Nine months ago, Cuba had diplomatic rela-
tions with only two Latin American nations-
Mexico and Chile. The total is now seven, though
most of the additions were small island states in
the Caribbean. Diplomatic relations were resumed
with Peru in July and established with Jamaica,
Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Guyana in De-
cember. Other nations in the hemisphere, in-
cluding Venezuela and Panama, are considering
closer relations with Havana.
Cuba has used a variety of methods to main-
tain and increase economic, cultural, and political
ties with its Latin neighbors. At Castro's invita-
tion, high-level military delegations from Peru and
Chile witnessed combat exercises by the Cuban
armed forces and came away impressed. The
Cuban news agency, Prensa Latina, opened bu-
reaus in Argentina and Panama, bringing its Latin
American total to six. Cuban cultural, athletic,
and technical delegations visited at least 11 Latin
American nations last year. The provision of relief
supplies and a medical team to victims of the
Managua earthquake is a recent example of
Castro's determination to change his style. Castro
has also subdued his language; for example, in his
public speeches during the past three years, he has
rarely mace an explicit call for violence.
This moderate approach does nct extend to
the Organization of American States itself. Castro
has usually reserved his most vituperative lan-
guage for that organization. Because he has estab-
lished friendly relations with some of its mem-
bers, he has recently taken care to differentiate
between "progressives" and "reactionaries."
Castro's reluctance to offend certain nations may
cause him to soften his flamboyant rhetoric
against the organization, but there is little chance
that he will ever rejoin. He has called for the
creation of a "union of Latin American states"
that would exclude the US.
Although the intensity of his anti-US ora-
tory has been reduced since September, he was
probably attempting first to encourage US politi-
cians who wanted to make Cuba an issue in the
US presidential campaign and then to expedite
the hijacking talks. Castro, wishing to retain maxi-
rnum flexibility, has frequently altereu the condi-
tions he sets for any dealings with the US. For the
present, he seems confident the sanctions policy
has failed; thus, he probably sees no need to make
meaningful concessions.
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Cuban activity in th . Third World increased
JLas year, u a
re 7ions with six African and Middle Eastern
nations: Sierra Leone, Yemen (Aden), Zambia,
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritania, and Somalia. In
several others, Cuba is attempting to raise its
representation from a non-resident to a resident
basis. This was accomplished in Mali and Cyprus
last year. Relations with Ghana, interrupted in
1966, are expected to be restored early this year.
Despite chronic economic difficulties, Cuba
is conducting modest aid programs in Africa. It
has sent medical teams and agricultural tech-
nician to at least a half-dozen African nations,
but the major part of the Cuban assistance in this
area has been of a military nature. For example,
there are several hundred Cuban advisers in
Guinea, many of whom have been engaged in
training the militia and the presidential body-
guard. A similar program has recently begun in
Yemen (Aden). Such projects not only increase
Cuba's prestige but also enhance Castro's role
among Third World leaders. Cuba may be angling
for African support in international organizations.
The Cuban maneuvers on the Puerto Rico issue in
a UN committee last year may lead to other
attacks in such bodies against the US that would
be more directly related to Cuban interests.
There is another feature of Cuban aid to
Africa. When Havana turned away from insur-
gency in Latin America, it shifted more of its
attention in this respect to Africa. It is providing
training as well as financial and material assistance
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to several revolutionary groups, primarily the
Conakry-based rebel movement which seeks to
gain control of Portuguese Guirea
this shift of emphasis as a means of maintaining
his image as a revolutionary leader with less risk
of alienating the US or Latin American govern-
m en ts.
The USSR and Eastern Europe
Cuba has developed a closer relationship not
only with the countries of Latin America and the
Third World, but with the USSR and other coun-
tries of Eastern Europe as well. Cuba's poor eco-
nomic performance, despite large amounts of So-
viet aid, has brought increasing pressure from
Moscow for more rational economic policies. The
pressure has been particularly heavy since Castro's
ill-conceived and unsuccessful effort to produce
10 million tons of sugar in 1970 led to severe
economic dislocations.
It also led to greater Soviet involvement in
the Cuban economy. In December 1970, a So-
viet-Cuban Inter-governmental Commission for
Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration
was created. During 1971, Cuba received visits
from two high-powered Soviet delegations headed
by senior economic ministers. Shortly after Fidel
Castro's summer visit to the USSR in 1972, Cuba
became a full-fledged n.,:mber of the Soviet-led
Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(CEMA). Although Castro probably can expect
some additional assistance from the East Euro-
pean members of CEMA, the organization will in
large part serve as a device to press Cuba fer more
orthodox economic planning while binding it ever
more closely to the Communist bloc.
The economic agreements concluded during
Castro's visit to the USSR in December 1972
reflect the steady tightening of the Sovi^t-Cuban
knot. Castro described some of the key aspects of
the agreements in a televised speech on 3 January,
but his presentation suggested that he had paid a
bitter price. His subdued attitude suggests that
the Soviets may have demanded a still greater role
in the formulation and implementation of Cuban
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economic policies. Castro may also have been
pressed to delegate more responsibility in domes-
ic matters to h:s subordinates. He probably had
accommodate the Soviets on both points.
Castro is undoubtedly deeply disturbed over
the ramifications for Cuba of improving US-
Soviet relations. He was excluded from the nego-
tiations that defused the 1962 missile crisis, and
he cannot help but feel that Cuban interests
might be adversely affected by Moscow's present
dealings with the US. Although Castro has paid
lip service to Moscow's detente policy, he and
other Cuban leaders have occasionally made in-
direct criticisms along the line that "imperialism's
apparent cooperation...is deceptive and false in
the long run."
Foreign Initiatives for 1973
Cuba's policy of pushing for normal diplo-
matic ties in Latin America, Africa, and the
Middle East is expected to continue. Castro's
scheduled official visits to Mongolia and Yemen
(Aden) this year almost certainly will be supple-
mented by other stops in the Third World. Ha-
vana may not manage diplomatic relations with as
many nations in 1973 as it did in 1972, but it will
undoubtedly concentrate on maintaining and
strengthening those ties it has, particularly in
Latin America and Africa.
Despite the change in tactics, Castro's goals
in Latin America show little change. He still
wants most of ',r to reduce US influence in the
hemisphere, discredit the OAS, and secure a
major role for Cuba. He will probably work to
achieve these goals by trying to take advantage of
the momentum achieved in largely neutralizing
the OAS sanctions. Although the OAS general
assembly may in April further emasculate the
sanctions policy, Castro is unlikely to moderate
his antipathy toward the organization.
Castro will probably give priority to moving
even closer to Chile and Peru, assuming the pres-
ent administrations stay in power in the two
countries. Attention will be paid to the possi-
bilities for expansion of ties with Venezuela,
Panama, and perhaps Ecuador. In addition,
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Fidel greeted by Algerian President Bouniediene.
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Havana will keep its eye peeled for targets of
opportunity-e.g., the possible emergence of a
more sympathetic regime in Argentina after the
elections this month.
As long as his present more moderate
approach meets with success, Castro is unlikely to
risk being isolated again by resuming widespread
support of Latin American guerrilla movements.
Nevertheless, he will still give selected revolu-
Itionary groups limited material assistance, some
training, and considerable propaganda support,
but those selected will have to have shown an
ability to survive on their own.
Havana is likely to work to maintain and
strengthen its ties with the relatively radical na-
tions of Africa and the Middle East by under-
taking a number of modest economic aid projects
in these nations. An expansion of Cuban military
assistance programs in Yemen (Aden) and Sierra
Leone is possible. At the same time, Castro will
probably attempt to maintain his revolutionary
credentials by continuing to provide funds, train-
ing, and material assistance to insurgents fighting
against rightist governments in Africa.
The USSR, directly and through CEMA, will
play a larger role in economic decision-making in
Cuba, and this is bound to constrict Castro's
room for maneuver. As this occurs, Castro seems
likely to chafe occasionally. He has few alterna-
tives to this sort of a relationship with the Soviet
bloc. One possibility is that he could ease his
stance toward the US. Though he is willing to
deal with Washington on matters such as hijack-
ing, he gives every evidence of finding a course
toward rapprochement with Washington more
distasteful than increasing subordination to Mos-
cow. This being so, no serious Cuban effort to
alter the present relationship appears likely for
some time to come.
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