WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT A NEW LOOK IN FRENCH-AFRICAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 30, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
A New Look in French-African Relations
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES
FILE COPY
DD NOT DESTROY
Secret
N! 660
30 March 1973
No. 0363/73A
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A NEW LOOK IN FRENCH-AFRICAN; RELATIONS
Summary
Paris is loosening the ties that bind it to its former colonies in Black Africa; in so
doing, Paris is reacting to pressures from some of the states involved. Since inde-
pendence in 1960, fourteen of France's former colonies-Mauritania, Senegal, Ivory
Coast, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Niger, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon,
Cameroon, Congo, Mali, and the Malagasy Republic-have been dealing with France
under a series of 14 separate, paternalistic accords. Paris is holding bilateral talks
with each country that has requested revision of these accords. The Africans have
not tried to coordinate their demands; nor is it assured that they will all be treated
alike, since their economic and sentimental value to France varies widely.
Over the past decade, Paris has used the accords to ensure French dominance of
commerce, trade, and finance and to give France the decisive voice in cultural and
educational matters. French private and public investment has flourished because
the climate has been favorable and no restrictions placed on the repatriation of
profits. Paris has channeled over $4 billion in aid to the area over the past decade.
None of the African states has challenged the idea of continued cooperation with
France, but virtually all of them would like to make the special relationship more
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African Countries Maintaining Close Ties with France
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flexible and less one-sided. Specifically, they are looking for a better economic deal.
Paris appears willing to go along in revising technical, aid, and cultural accords, but
will be less forthcoming where monetary and defense policies are concerned. So far,
Mauritania has pulled out of the franc zone because the French would not meet its
demands concerning Nouakchott's new national currency, and neither Mauritania
nor the Malagasy Republic has been able to reach an agreement with France on the
revision of defense accords. Paris seems to be in a position to regulate the pace and
extent of change, but if the Africans become more assertive the French may be
impelled to make considerably more changes than they have so far been willing to
accept.
After granting its African colonies independ-
ence in 1960, France has managed to keep close
ties with all of them. (Guinea, which became
independent in 1958, is an exception.) Operating
under a series of paternalistic accords, France
today still sees political and military advantages in
a continuing relationship with its former color'es
in Africa. Commercial profits, along with what
might be called the French cultural imperative,
will also push Paris to keep its hand in; at least,
they will slow the French retreat in the face of
African pressure for change.
France, pre-eminently among the old im-
perial powers, has been keen on spreading its
language and culture. In the 19th century, it went
so far as to develop an extraordinary policy under
which France would "assimilate" the colonial
peoples into the French way of life. Based on the
doctrine that French civilization was in every way
superior, the assimilation policy invited Africans
to adopt French standards in nearly every sphere
of human activity. Considering that the French
were very much outnumbered (there are today
some 50 million Africans and less than a quarter
of a million whites in French-speaking Africa),
the policy never had much of a chance and was
abandoned. Still, echoes of the philosophy under-
lying it still reverberate through the African col-
onies, and France continues to transplant its cul-
tural, linguistic, and educational experience to
Africa.
French businessmen in Africa, frequently
abetted by African associates, have, since inde-
pendence, enjoyed a preferential position. Their
preferential position is little disturbed today, and
they continue to reap and expatriate huge profits.
In the past year or so, the French leadership
has begun to take a less possessive attitude toward
its former colonies. The gradual shift reflects not
only the change in leaders in France but an in-
creased restiveness on the part of the leaders of
the French-speaking African states. General De
Gaulle is gone, and President Pompidou has re-
placed him. The General pursued a quite personal
"The day will come when the men for whom France
is a second fatherland will no longer be in power.
Should not France show that she takes the word
independence seriously?"
Le Monde, January 1973
African policy, molded by his concern with
France's "civilizing mission" and his World War 11
connections with the former African colonies and
some of their leaders; Porpidou carries less bag-
gage of this type. Also gone is Yvon Bourges, who
headed the French cooperation program; in his
place is Pierre Billecocq, a progressive and prag-
matic man, committed to a policy of open dia-
logue with any state that wishes to revise the
accords. He has pledged that France "will stop
meddling in everything." Billecocq appears to
have the full backing of Pompidou and at least
the acquiescence of the shadowy Jacques Foccart
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nation in 1969 of De Gaulle, but even the General
could pull only Ivory Coast and Gabon along to
join France in supporting the breakaway Biafran
regime in English-speaking Nigeria. Lefore he de-
parted, De Gaulle also saw the French-backed
Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organiza-
tion begin to change from a force for political
moderation to a lobby for the African states'
econorr.;c interest.
Other poles of attraction have emerged. With
the French-speaking African states' association
with the EC, their economic allegiances are slowly
being reoriented from France toward a kind of
partnership with Europe generally. Thus fai, the
impact has been as much psychological as mate-
rial, and France's former colonies would like to
diversify their aid and trade relationships. The
English-speaking countries nearby attract them, as
does the possibility of closer regional ties or aid
from Moscow, Peking, and Western donors. As
President Diori of Niger has asked, "Can we be
blamed for playing all our cards?"
Foccart (I.) and Billecocq
Over the past year or so, Diori has gradually
become the most outspoken and articulate critic
of France's role in Africa, voicing complaints that
most other leaders lack the courage to put into
words. He is convinced that Niger's long-range
development is linked to that of Nigeria, already
Niger's main African trading partner. Diori wishes
to be free to promote even closer economic ties
with Lagos. He has also had a close assistance and
advisory relationship with Canada. Ould Daddah
of predominantly Muslim Mauritania has been
drawing closer to Libya and Algeria, and his for-
eign policy moves in that direction complement
his desire for "Arabization" at home to the detri-
ment of French cultural influence in his country.
I ]-I he influence of Foccart, who still
heads the Secretariat of African and Malagasy
Affairs at the Elysee, has apparently diminished
over the past year.
Personalities on the African side have also
changed. In the 12 years since independence,
eight of the fourteen states have undergone one
or more changes of leadership, and in each in-
stance (except for Gabon) a military strong man
is in power. The leaders today feel less grateful to
France, either because newer and usually younger
figures have emerged with no special affection for
France, or because sentimental ties binding the
old guard to France are wearing thin. The break-
down of loyalt'^~ was accelerated by the resig-
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"We want to recover our sovereignty and we are
ready to pay the price."
President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania
There have been anti-French pressures in vir-
tually all states. No Africzii government can
safely ignore activist elements among students,
labor, and civil servants. In many countries of
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French-speaking Africa, these elements have been f
sharpening their criticism of close cooperation
with France and demanding accelerated African-
ization, better jobs, and greater economic sover-
eignty. The extension of schools and consumer
economies has created rising popular expecta-
tions, but not enough jobs for the younger and
more politicized generation that now comprises at
least half the population of French-speaking
Africa. This generation resents French dominance
of commerce, which stifles native opportunities in
every country except Mali, and the continued
prEsence of expatriates in the government.
The questioning of France's role has been
encouraged in recent years by the large number of
predominantly young, anti-establishment French
technicians, particularly teachers, who have been
sent to Africa as volunteers in lieu of military
service. There is also a body of sophisticated
writing by French-speaking Africans aimed at
their contemporaries in government and academic
circles. Their writing portrays the African policy
of France as inherently selfish and anachronistic.
A Canadian economist produced an influential
study for the Niger Government that took a hard
and critical look at the advantages and disadvan-
tages for Niger of membership in the franc zone.
I t is no wonder then that over the past year
a number of French African leaders have sought
changes in the basic accords designed to satisfy
their wish for greater national control. So far,
eight of the 14 are known to have expressed
dissatisfaction to France via diplomatic channels
or in public pronouncements. Pressures for
change have come most strongly from Mauritania
and the Malagasy Republic; Niger, Congo, Daho-
mey, and Cameroon are not far behind, with
Togo and Gabon bringing up the rear. (Mali,
having largely broken out of the French sphere a
decade ago, is a sympathetic bystander.) Chad,
the Central African Republic, and Upper Volta
will probably follow in seeking modest modifica-
tions in their ties with France. Only Ivory Coast
President Houphouet-Boigny, France's staunchest
African ally and the grand old man of West Afri-
can politics, has privately expressed his
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"For Paris, the franc zone is the true
backbone of French policy in Africa."
Jeune Afrique, December 1972
All ex-French territories, except Guinea and
now Mauritania, retain full membership in the franc
zone. Twelve states participate through the multi-
lateral African Financial Community, which embraces
three subgroupings, each with its own currency and
issuing bank. Africans receive monetary stability and
accept conservative French monetary and banking
policies in place of national control. Zone arrange-
ments protect France's privileged trade by setting
effective ceilings on imports by Africans from outside
the zone and the EC, and minimum levels for certain
imports from France. Most African issuing banks
must hold their members' pooled currency reserves
and foreign exchange earnings in French francs in a
French treasury account into which receipts are
credited and payments debited. African states ordi-
narily cannot impose exchange controls or revalue
their currencies without the consent of all parties,
and they are obliged to follow the lead of France in
these areas. Congo, Malagasy Republic, and Mauri-
tania have, however, initiated exchange controls with-
out asking French permission.
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satisfaction with the accords as they are. Senghor
of Senegal is not really dissatisfied, although he
has strcnger domestic pressure to deal with.
Those who want change are looking for a
better economic deal: they want broader regional
cooperation, particaiarly with English-speaking
states nearby; grcdter control over their own mon-
etary matters; and an end to strings on French
aid. The Africans are just beginning what is cer-
tain to be a long dialogue with Paris on monetary
matters, and they are far from a consensus on the
modifications they want.
President Ould Daddah of Mauritania be-
lieves that the sizable foreign exchange earnings
of his country's mining operations are adequate
to back a national currency (with a little help
from President Qadhafi, who has offered a sub-
stantial drawing account on the Bank of Libya).
Ould Daddah c~..n, therefore, be more aggressive in
his financial demands than the others who lack
his combination of political determination and a
well-heeled backer. Togo, which has been success-
ful in attracting aid from Bonn and Peking, has
more maneuverability than a country like Gabon,
where the French investment is heavy and Presi-
dent Bongo needs French troops to stay in office.
Cooperation Agreements Between France and Its African Client States
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Upper Vol, i
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In general, however, the African attitude is char-
acterized by ambivalence: they want more con-
trol over their own affairs, but they want France
to stand behind them. This attitude finds expres-
sion in the demands of some states for financial
autonomy while insisting that Paris continue to
back their currencies.
The French Response
French officials are themselves divided on
how far Paris should go in meeting African de-
mands. Even those favoring a continuation of the
Gaullist policy of aid to Africa, however, have
apparently realized that African development has
become too costly for France and that other
donors must be encouraged to share the burden.
The concept of French Africa as a "special pre-
serve," in which no poachers are allowed, seems
to have been abandoned. Emphasis now is on
"coordination," although Paris clearly expects to
go on playing the key role.
Paris' position is not without its own ambiv-
alence. France is willing to open its former col-
onies to more outside economic influence, but is
extremely sensitive about retaining its cultural,
commercial, and military dominance. Paris wants
to continue its privileged relationship, but is will-
ing to begin a gentle disengagement in which it
controls all stages of the retreat. Pompidou,
during his trip to Africa last November (his third
since 1971), outlined a "new look" in French aid
policy. From now on, he said, French aid would
be given on a flexible, over-all, multi-year frame-
work tied to the development plans of the Afri-
can countries. France would remain the major
donor (in fact, French aid this year-$345 mil-
lion-is .15 percent more than last), but would
cooperate with other donors and try to help the
Africans diversify their sources of aid.
The French plan to reduce their visibility in
Africa by cutting back the number of French
technical assistants and by training Africans to
replace them. The majority of the more than
10,000 cooperants are teachers, and it was a stu-
dent, after all, who threw a tomato at Pompidou
during his trip to Niamey in 1972, and students
are at the center of discontent and political unrest
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French African Cooperation Accords
The accords, signed at independence in 1960,
have never been published, but their general provisions
are known. They spell out a broad range of relation-
ships in diplomacy, economics, culture, and defense,
and provide the legal basis foi continued French
hegemony in French-speaking Arica. Guinea did not
sign the accords and has not hrd diplomatic relations
with France since 1965. Mali signed the accords but
established its own national currency and bank in
1962; after five years of floundering, it signed a
financial accord with France in 1967 by which Paris
underwrote its currency.
The accords gave Paris a virtual monopoly in
trade and greatly facilitated commercial relations by
guaranteeing the convertibility of African francs into
French francs at a fixed rate; Paris also gained control
of African regional banks. French public and private
investment flourished because there were practically
no restrictions on the repatriation of capital and
profits to France. The accords were by no means
one-way street; France has poured in over $4 billion
in aid to the area since 1960.
Paris forged strong cultural ties through the use
of French as the official language and through dom-
ination of African educational systems and the media.
Although most of the military agreements specified
that France would defend the fledgling African states
against internal or external threats, Paris has moved in
cpenly only when its economic interests were seri-
ously threatened (e.g., Gabon in 1964). It has over-
flight rights in most countries and permanent military
bases in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Chad, and the
Malagasy Republic (the latter now being disputed).
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in many countries. Finally, Paris has proposed
that its educational assistance be re-oriented
toward technical and vocational training, particu-
larly modern training for young farmers. Specifi-
cally, more attention will be placed on literacy
programs in vernacular languages. Pompidou has
said that he favors cooperation between the
French- and English-speaking countries, but Paris
would not look kindly on the integration of its
former colonies into a larger unit in which the
interests of the English speakers might prevail.
In the cultural, military assistance, and dip-
lomatic fields the Africans are pressing for change
and are likely to get it. Now that Africans have
taken control of their national universities and
other institutions of higher learning, they want
the educational accords modified to drop the
requirement that rectors, professors, and curricula
be chosen by agreement between the African gov-
ernment concerned and France. In the military
assistance field the Africans reject the stipulations
that make them give first priority to France in
seeking arms and training and consult Paris before
approaching alternative sources. At least one ex-
colony, Congo, would put an end to the anachro-
nistic. formality which institutionalized the role of
the French ambassador as the dean of the diplo-
matic corps. The Malagasy Republic and Maurita-
nia have already done so.
Between the formulation of a new aid strat-
egy and its successful execution lies a number of
formidable obstacles. Many African countries do
not have the development planning capacity re-
quired for a closely coordinated long-term devel-
opment effort. With the exception of Peking,
which has offered Dahomey and Togo $45 mil-
lion and $46 million in aid respectively, there are
no new donors in sight with both the resources
and the interest to play a significantly larger role
in French-speaking Africa. There is a real possi-
bility for coordination between the French and
other donors (including the US) in such matters
as houseing, transportation, and industry.
A cutback in the number of French techni-
cians and educators may be a step in the right
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direction, but the course will be far from smooth.
Increased teaching in the vernacular languages, for
example, creates controversy. Which vernacular?
Last month saw rioting in the Malagasy Republic,
caused in part because the coastal tribes fear
increased use in the educational system of the
Malagasy language (essentially Merina, the lan-
guage of the plateau people). French cooperation
chief Billecocq is right in noting that Paris has
imposed Sorbonnes on countries that need quite a
different sort of training; however, the African
elite has learned that a French education leads to
a coveted job in the bureaucracy; this is a lesson
that will be hard to forget. Above all, it is diffi-
cult to legislate decolonialization. As a Togolese
official remarked, "The French talk easily about a
new look, but it is not so easy to kill the old man
who sleeps inside many Frenchmen."
French Monetary Policies
One of the most important, and from Paris'
view, durable, ties that bind France and the Afri-
cans it once ruled is the monetary one. There is so
far no new look in France's conservative mone-
tary policies in respect to the franc zone, nor is
one planned. African francs are fully convertible
to French francs at a fixed rate guaranteed by
France, and the four African regional banks of
issue aie French controlled. Monetary questions
are still handled by French officials in the various
African financial ministries and in the countries'
national banks. Pompidou has expressed sympa-
thy for the African wish for a greater monetary
say; he is prepared to make more of the franc
zone's foreign exchange reservas available for
African economic development, but has indicated
that Paris will retain ultimate control. The
changes that have taken place in the five-member
bank of the equatorial African states have been
largely cosmetic; the staff has been Africanized,
the bank has taken on a modest economic dev,;l-
opment role, and credit policies have been re-
laxed. West African members of the franc zone
already enjoy an Africanized staff, and their cen-
tral bank will be given similar development and
credit prerogatives. In both cases, however, the
banks are run by a French managing director and
a two-thirds vote of the board of directors is
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required on "important" questions, with the
French deciding what is important.
Fundamental revision of the franc zone-
central to the influence Paris wields in Africa-
does not seem in the cards unless the Africans
begin to pull together. Aid chief Billecocq in aLe
Monde interview last month put forward pro-
posals for a two-tier zone that go far beyond
those of his more conservative colleagues. During
Pompidou's African trip last winter, he reacted
sharply to a request by Togolese President Eya-
dema for a revision of links hctween French and
African francs. "The African franc," Pompidou
pointed out, "would collapse in a day without
French backing." Despite France's hard line, Pres-
ident Ould Daddah's example in leaving the franc
zone will probably embolden some others to look
for alternative backers and then press for more
flexible :rant zone arrangements. President Eya-
dema reportedly received a flurry of congratula-
tory telephone calls from fellow African leaders
following his request to Pompidou.
Mauritania has asked for the termination of
both its mutual defense pact and its communica-
tions agreements with France. Nouakchott ob-
jects to the provision that gives France the right
to station and move troops through the country.
In rancorous negotiations last month the two
sides failed to reach agreement on military coop-
eration. Mauritania refused to give France mili-
tary overflight rights and, when France tried to
make the continuation of the advisory mission
contingent on concessions to the French position
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on overflights, asked Paris to withdraw its mili-
tary advisers. Military cooperation negotiations
are also deadlocked in the Malagasy Republic; the
French are unwilling to surrender their naval base
at Diego Suarez, the headquarters of their Indian
Ocean military forces. The Malagasy insist on
asserting their sovereignty over the base. The two
sides have yet to find a formula that would satisfy
their sensitivities without requiring expulsion of
the French. The two countries, however, have
made progress in working out new monetary ar-
rangements. The Malagasy Republic is to remain
in the franc zone, but :;will enjoy more economic
independence.
Certain geographic, cultural, and political
factors set Mauritania and the Malagasy Republic
apart from the other nations of French-speaking
Africa, and the difficult pattern of negotiations
between these two countries and Paris will prob-
ably not be followed elsewhere. Mauritania and
the Malagasy Republic, after all, were the coun-
tries which resisted most strorigiy the French
19th century policy of assimilation.
Still, change is in the wind throughout
French-speaking Africa, and Paris may not be able
to control the pace as closely as it would like.
Close cultural ties are likely to persist, but once
he generation of Senegalese President Senghor
and Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny-
heavily wedded to French language and culture-
passes from the scene, Paris may find that con-
sider0l more than cosmetic change will be re-
quired.
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