WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT BREZHNEV AND BRANDT: A THIRD ENCOUNTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050017-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 11, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
WIEEKLY SUMMARY
State Dept. review
completed
Special Report
Brezhnev and Brandt: A Third Encounter
hOcUMENTSERVICES BRAt.
Secret
Wiff
N2 661
1111 NOT
11 May 1973
DESTgy
No. 0369/73A
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Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev begins a five-day official visit to West Germany
on 18 May, the first such visit by a top-level Soviet political leader. He has met his
host, Chancellor Willy Brandt, twice before, both times on Soviet territory. The
previous sessions have been milestones for detente in Europe.
This third meeting may be equally important. Both men have staked a large measure
of their political reputations on the value to their respective countries of European
detente. When they meet, they will want to review the progress that has been made
on multilateral undertakings like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, and on bilateral issues between West Germany and Warsaw Pact states.
Some forward movement may well be possible in some or all of these areas, but
there will be problems, notably how to handle the West German - West Berlin
relationship and how to make the East Germans more cooperative on inter-German
relations.
While European issues will dominate the talks, both men will keep a weather eye on
their countries' relations with the US. Brandt will move carefully with the Soviets so
as not to disrupt Atlantic Alliance relations at a time when consideration is being
given to new forms for the alliance. Brezhnev will be interested in greater access to
West German economic and technological assistance both for its own sake and for
any leverage it will give him when he comes to the US.
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Background
Next week the political leaders of the USSR
and West Germany will meet for the third time in
less than three years, a remarkable development
in post-war Europe. Until recently, West Germany
was at or near the bottom of the list of West
European countries with which Moscow cared to
do business. Soviet animosity was fueled by war-
time memories and the strong Soviet concern
about a reunified Germany. The West Germans
responded with a suspicious and icy attitude of
their own.
More recently, the Soviet advoc'cy of de-
tente in Europe has coincided with Brandt's ten-
ure as the first Social Democratic chancellor in
post-war Germany, and improved relations with
West Germany are an important part of Soviet
detente policy. West Germany now has risen to
first or second place (after France) on the Soviet
list of those West European nations with which
relations are developing favorably. 25X1
There are important reasons, from the Soviet
point of view, why this should be so. The deterio-
ration of Soviet-Chinese relations, political and
economic changes in Western Europe and be-
tween Western Europe and the US, and the needs
of the Soviet economy all contributed to the
Soviet interest in achieving better relations with
Western Europe. Within Europe, West Germany's
economic growth and potential political role gave
it importance, and Brandt's Ostpolitik made a
change in Soviet attitude possible.
After years of mutual distrust -and harsh
propaganda diatribes from both sides, there re-
mains in each country a basic skepticism about
the extent to which relations can and should be
improved. Nevertheless, notable progress was
made at the two previous meetings.
The first Brandt-Brezhnev meeting occurred
in August 1970 at Moscow when the Soviet - West
German non-aggression treaty was signed; the
second was a less formal affair in September 1971
at the resort town of Oreanda in the Crimea.
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Basic Details of the Trip
Brezhnev is expected to visit Pankow as
well as Warsaw before going to Bonn on 18
May. The first two days will be devoted to
official talks to be held at the secluded Hotel
am Petersberg. The Soviets were bothered by
this choice, Chamberlain's residence en route
to Munich in 1938 and the headquarters of
the Allied Control Commission after World
War Il. The remainder of the Brezhnev visit
will be given over to travel to other areas of
West Germany and may include stop: at an
automobile factory, a nuclear installation,
and/or a computerized mail-order house.
The Moscow treaty stands as the key ele-
ment in Brandt's Ostpolitik. At Oreanda, Brandt
tried to persuade Brezhnev that the East should
reach out to meet Ostpolitik. The Soviets sub-
sequently applied pressure on Pankow. and made
the inter-German Treaty possible. Moscow also
worked assiduously to make Ostpolitik more pop-
ular in West Germany by showing that it could
lead to beneficial economic deals and to the emi-
gration of more ethnic Germans from the USSR
to West Germany.
Each leader comes to this third meeting with
his political position strengthened. Just two
weeks ago, Brezhnev won a new vote of confi-
dence from the Central Committee, which gave
him credit for his "great personal contribution"
toward carrying out the peace program laid down
at the 24th Party Congress. On May Day he was
awarded the Lenin Peace Prize for, among other
things, the contribution his "landmark talks"
with Brandt made to the security of Europe.
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The plenum retired Politburo members
Voronov and Shelest, both of whom had tangled
with Brezhnev. The departure of Shelest has par-
ticular meaning for the Soviet - West German rela-
tionship. One of the issues that brought the
former Ukrainian party chief into conflict with
Brezhnev was Shelest's opposition to improving
relations with West Germany and other Western
countries. The plenum added Defense Minister
Grechko, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and KGB
chief Andropov to the Politburo. They have
served as expert advisers in the development of
Soviet policies, and in the short run at least they
can be expected to continue to support Brezh-
nev's program of detente.
The West German political struggle in 1971
and 1972 to ratify the non-aggression treaty with
the USSR temporarily cost Brandt his parliamen-
tary majority and nearly cost him the chancellor-
ship. The major complaint was that Brandt was
conceding too much and getting too little. Op-
position came not only from the Christian
Democrats but also from the coalition Free Dem-
ocratic Pariy and, to a certain extent, from within
the foreign office. Ostpolitik, however, has broad
public approval in West Germany. By keeping the
management of Ostpolitik tightly controlled
within the Chancellor's office, Brandt and State
Secretary Bahr have been able to forge ahead.
With his Social Democratic Party's victory in
the election last November and his own victory at
the party congress in April, Brandt is in a strong
political position.
Updating Ostpolitik
As far as public pronouncements are con-
cerned, the visit will be dominated by mutual
expressions of esteem for Ostpolitik, not only for
the improvement it has brought to West German
relations with the East Europeans but also for its
significance for European detente. Behind the
generalities and bonhomie, however, Bonn has
important dissatisfactions which it hopes Brezh-
nev can be induced to help resolve.
One concerns West Germany's relationship
with West Berlin. The 1971 Four-Power Agree-
ment on Berlin states that "ties...will be main-
tained and developed," but it also states that West
Berlin "continues not to be a constituent part of.
the Federal Republic and not to be governed by
it." This language has led to problems over what
Bonn feels are its legitimate efforts to maintain
and develop ties with West Berlin, and to repre-
sent the city internationally in matters that do
not affect security or status, a right given Bonn in
the 1971 agreement. Bonn suspects Moscow has
not abandoned its usual policy of treating West
Berlin as a separate entity, and the West Germans
are right. The Soviets have sought to make this
point in a number of ways recently by empha-
sizing the distinction between West Berlin and
West Germany. Brandt has responded with a
series of letters to Brezhnev, but these have been
unavailing, at least so far.
Another Bonn concern is that the East Ger-
man leaders, having signed the inter-German basic
relations treaty last fall, are not now interested in
implementing the pact. Following the treaty's sig-
nature, Pankow stepped up its domestic propa-
ganda campaign in favor ofAbgrenzung (demarca-
tion), emphasized the incompatibility of the two
Germanies, and moved to restrict contacts be-
tween the two populations. The inter-German
negotiations ear"er this year reflected the tough
East German position.
The East Germans have been somewhat
more accommodating recently, but Brandt will
still urge upon Brezhnev the necessity for a better
inter-German climate. Indeed, the Soviets are well
aware that the inter-German climate is an impor-
tant component of the total European detente
effort, and they may have intervened in Pankow
to tiring about the recent thaw. The Soviets
would be most reluctant, however, to make any
real change in their stance on the Berlin problems,
and they continue to fear meaningful movement
toward closer ties between the two German
states.
Recent movement in relations between West
Germany and Czechoslovakia will help improve
the atmosphere for the Brezhnev visit, and the
Soviets had a role in making this movement pos-
sible. Czechoslovak and West German negotiators,
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Chronology
Oct 64
Oct 69
Mar 70
Aug 70
Nov 70
Dec 70
Sep 71
Sep 71
Nov 71
Apr 72
May 72
Jun 72
Jun 72
Jul 72
Nov 72
Nov 72
Nov 72
2 Mar 73
19 Mar 73
13Apr73
24 Apr 73
27 Apr 73
2 May 73
4 May 73
7 May 73
10 May 73
16 May 73
18 May 73
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Brezhnev becomes general secretary of the Soviet party
Brandt becomes first Social Democratic chancellor
Brandt to Erfurt, East Germany, to meet GDR Premier Stoph-a first
Soviet - West German non-aggression treaty signed
USSR agrees to provide FRG with natural gas in return for large-diameter pipe
West German - Polish non-aggression treaty signed
Four-Power Berlin Agreement signed
Brandt and B. ezhnev confer at Oreanda in the Crimea
USSR and FRG agree to direct Frankfurt-Moscow air service
Soviet - West German long-term trade agreement initialed in Moscow
Soviet - West German and West German - Polish non-aggression treaties ratified
Four-Power Berlin Agreement enters into effect
Formal inter-German negotiations commence
Soviet - West German trade agreement and a second natural gas/large-diameter
pipe deal signed in Bonn
Inter-German treaty signed, accompanied by a Four-Power declaration
Beginning of massive increase in emigration of ethnic Germans from the USSR
to the FRG
West German firms opt to provide financing and equipment for the USSR's
huge steel mill at Kursk
SPD-FDP coalition wins Bundestag elections
West Germany reports Brezhnev visit in the offing
Soviets begin discussions on uranium enrichment services with a West German
power company
Brandt re-elected chairman of Social Democrats
Brezhnev visit on 18-22 May jointly announced
Brezhnev policies endorsed by the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek begins talks in Moscow
Soviet Ambassador Falin and FRG State Secretary Frank confer on Brezhnev
visit
Czechoslovak - West German treaty negotiations begin
Bundestag begins second reading of inter-German treaty
Inter-German negotiating session to be held
Brezhnev to arrive in Bonn
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after a hiatus of almost nine months, agreed last
month on a compromise formula for treating the
Munich Agreement of 1938. Czechoslovak insist-
ence that the agreement was null and void ab
initio and the West German refusal to acknowl-
edge this had been the major stumbling block to a
bilateral non-aggression treaty. Now that this par-
ticular hurdle has been cleared, a treaty will prob-
ably be ready for signature in June. Formal nego-
tiations on its terms began on 7 May, just after
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek com-
pleted three days of talks with Soviet officials in
Moscow. It will open the door for Bonn to estab-
lish diplomatic relations riot only with Prague,
but also with Budapest and Sofia. All of this
could be accomplished by late this summer and
would complete the formal edifice of Ostpolitik.
Prospects for the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe and the talks on force
reduction in Europe will surely be discussed. The
Soviets have consistently given precedence to the
security conference, and the Brezhnev-Brandt
talks will undoubtedly reflect this priority. The
Soviets and West Germans have often found
themselves on opposite sides in the wrangling over
the agenda. In particular, Moscow wants a clear,
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unencumbered declaration on the principle of
inviolability of frontiers, while Bonn wants this
principle linked to renunciation of force so that
peaceful changes, like the reunification of Ger-
many, would not be precluded. The West Ger-
mans, in company with their NATO allies, have
sought stronger language on "human contacts"
than the Soviets are willing to concede.
Both of these agenda items have moved sig-
nificantly closer to resolution since the current
round of preparatory talks began in Helsinki on
25 April, and may no longer be contentious when
Brezhnev and Brandt meet. The Soviet leader will
be seeking a strong endorsement for the confer-
ence from Bonn, and he may hope to win
Brandt's agreement to begin the actual conference
in late June at Helsinki and to make its con-
cluding stage the occasion for a "summit" meet-
ing.
Brezhnev and Brandt will treat force reduc-
tions cautiously. Both sides will endorse the con-
cept, but each will make sure that whatever for-
mulation is used does not endanger its security
interests. For the West Germans, this means that
the area of reductions should not be limited to
the two Germanies. The Soviets are likely to
stress reductions and resist Western ideas about
constraints.
The security conference and force reduc-
tions constitute only a portion of the dialogue.
Brandt, as a leading "Europeanist" among the
West European heads of government, will prob-
ably be asked about the implications of the grow-
ing political cohesion and economic might repre-
sented by the EC. Brezhnev could well decide to
raise the subject of relations with China. Since the
meeting at Oreanda in 1971, Bonn has established
diplomatic relations and expanded commercial
transactions with Peking. In public, Moscow has
largely ignored these moves, but Soviet sensitivity
has come through in its criticism of West Euro-
pean "reactionaries" who are seeking to thwart
detente by developing closer relations with China.
As they talk, both men will have their re-
spective visits to Washington very much in mind,
but it is doubtful that relations with the US will
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play a major part in their conversations. Brandt
has just had a series of conversations with Presi-
dent Nixon, and Brezhnev has just talked with Dr.
Kissinger. Moreover, basic differences between
Brandt and Brezhnev over what the Atlantic
Alliance is and what it may become make it a
poor subject on which to dwell.
A bilateral issue likely to come up for discus-
sion is the emigration of ethnic Germans from the
USSR to West Germany. The Soviets have turned
the flow on and off to suit their purposes. For
example, during the 1963-66 period when the
Christian Democrats governed in Bonn, Moscow
gave only 1,991 Soviet citizens who were ethnic
Germans permission to return to West Germany.
In 1972 alone, the figure reached 3,300, and
nearly half left in November, the month of the
Bundestag elections.
Figures on such emigration for the first quar-
ter of this year are running at more than two and
one-half times the 1972 pace. Nonetheless, West
German officials are not sanguine about exceed-
ing a 3,300 total for the year and are especially
distressed that more than 38 percent of those on
a list given the Soviets in November 1971 still
have not received exit permits. A complaint has
been registered, and the Chancellor probably will
underscore it.
Brez nev as ma e i c ear a e opes
or significant progress on major items of eco-
nomic cooperation. He may in fact be coming at
an opportune time since East-West economic rela-
tions are expanding, and West Germany has re-
gained its place as the USSR's leading trading
partner in Western Europe. The meeting itself is
not likely to produce new contacts, but it will
almost certainly push along some of the more
significant large-scale undertakings now under
consideration. These include the billion-dollar
steel mill to be built at Kursk south of Moscow.
The West Germans are to provide much of the
financing and equipment in a barter arrangement
for Soviet deliveries of iron pellets. Similarly, he
West Germans have supplied the USSR with
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large-diameter pipe in return for natural gas for
West Germany.
Brezhnev may try to sell Brandt on the pro-
vision of Soviet uranium enrichment services to
West Germany. The subject came up when Itd!ian
Prime Minister Andreotti traveled to Moscow in
October and when Premier Kosygin visited
Sweden last month. The USSR, which sees a
considerable potential gain in foreign exchange
from such services, maintains it can enrich ura-
nium for use in peaceful applications at a lower
unit price than the US appears prepared to offer.
One West German power company already has
decided as a test case to negotiate further with
the Soviets this month for a single loading of a
nuclear reactor under construction. Brandt will
wish to review other EC energy options and US
supply policy before he enters talks on a longer
term relationship with the USSR in this impor-
tant field.
A ten-year bilateral economic cooperation
agreement patterned after the Franco-Soviet
model may be concluded, assuming the resolution
of the impasse over the issue of a clause extending
the agreement to West Berlin. West German and
Soviet negotiators began talks on a draft text on
25 April. Bonn expects the agreement will be
limited to general statements concerning the
desire of both parties to increase economic coop-
eration, but it may list particular sectors in which
cooperation seems most feasible. Bonn rejected
an initial Soviet version of the proposed accord
Brezhnev and Brandt in the Crimea, 1971
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that called for a? five-year "concrete program" of
specific projects. Brezhnev probably will seek a
Bonn commitment for generous credit terms on
Soviet purchases of equipment, but may not get it.
West German officials have told the US that
'bilateral accords on scientific and technical coop-
eration, cultural exchanges, civil aviation, and
environmental prcjects may also be signed during
the Brezhnev visit. The first two agreements have
been completed except for the Berlin clauses. The
proposed civil aviation accord has required more
intensive negotiations because Bonn wants per-
mission for Lufthansa to land at Tegel Airport in
West Berlin on Frankfurt-Moscow-Tokyo fliahts.
Cooperation on environmental problems should
provide few problems.
Prospects are good that some or all of these
five agreements will be signed by Brezhnev in
Bonn. A failure to achieve signature would indi-
cate a continuing-and perhaps deepening-
problem over the status of the West German -
West Berlin relationship and reluctance on the
Soviet side to be flexible when it counts. Compro-
mise language on the Berlin clauses may be easier
to find at the summit, however, where larger
interests are likely to prevail.
This third meeting of the Soviet and West
German leaders shculd go well. The stakes are
high for both Brezhnev and Brandt, perhaps
higher than they were at Moscow in 1970 and at
Oreanda in 1971. Brandt needs another success to
demonstrate the continued value of Ostpolitik.
Brezhnev needs to show that detente has practical
value for the USSR. West German industry can
provide some of this directly; furthermore, Brezh-
nev will surely recognize that he will have an
advantage when seeking US economic coopera-
tion in June if he has already made significant
progress with the most advanced industrial state
of Western Europe.
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