WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT THE 28TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050025-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 21, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
meekly Summary
Special Report
The 28th UN General Assembly
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21 September 1973
No. 0388/73A
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MBODIA+CAMEROON+CANADA+CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.+CEYLON+CHAD+CHILE+CHINA+CO
ONGO REPUBLIC+COSTA RICA+CUBA+CYPRUS+CZECHOSLOVAKIA+DAHOMEY+DENMARK+E
REPUBLIC+ECUADOR+EGYPT+EL SALVADOR+EQUATORIAL GUINEA+ETHIOPIA+FIJI+FiNLd
RANCE+GABON+GAMBIA+GHANA+GREECE+GUATEMALA+GUINEA+GUYANA+HAITI+HONDL
NGARY+ICELAN JAIDIA+InNnnnlRCiA-r-IRAnM--IRAs--IRRI Anln-4-I5ZR RY COAST
APAN+JORDAN XEMBOUF
MADAGASCAR 2 8 th ANIA+MAI
AEXICO+MONGO UA+NIGEF
RWAY+OMAN+P THE TUGAL+Q
RUMANIA+RWAN LIA+SOUZ
SOUTHERN YE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY +TANZAN
HAI LAND+TOG E+UNITED
PER VOLTA+URL ION OF ARA
ALBANIA+AFGHANISTAN+ALGER IA+ARGENTINA+AUSTRALIA+AUSTRIA+BAHRAIN+BARBd
ELGIUM+BHUTAN+BOLIVIA+BOTSWANA+BRAZIL+BRITAIN+BULGARIA+BURMA+BURUNDI+
MBODIA+CAMEROON+CANADA+CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.+CEYLON+CHAD+CHILE+CHINA+CO
ONGO REPUBLIC+COSTA RICA+CUBA+CYPRUS+CZECHOSLOVAKIA+DAHOMEY+DENMARK+D
REPUBLIC+ECUADOR+EGYPT+EL SALVADOR+EQUATORIAL GUINEA+ETHIOPIA+FIJI+FINLI
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NGARY+ICELAND+INDIA+INDONESIA+IRAN+IRAQ+IRELAND+ISRAEL+ITALY+IVORY COAST-
APAN+JORDAN XEMBOUF
MADAGASCAR Summary ANIA+MAI EXICO+MONGO The 28th General Assembly, which convened this week, will devote UA+NIGEF
much of its time to going over familiar ground. The reluctance of the major
RWAY+OMAN+P powers to bring new matters before a forum they find increasingly hostile TUGAL+Q
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SOUTHERN YE issues. The nonaligned states are primarily interested in obtaining commit- +TANZANI
HAILAND+TOG ments for greater economic assistance from the developed nations ar'a E+UNITED
censure of Israel and the white African regimes. The Korean question, a
PER VOLTA+UR veteran of more than 20 years on the agenda, will be the only major N OF ARA
ALBANIA+AFG East-West issue coming before a session otherwise likely to be marked by IN+BARB~
considerable superpower cooperation. This cooperation has brought the easy
ELGIUM+BHUT approval of one new and important item: membership for the two Ger- URUNDI+E
manies. The growing and more aggressive voting majority of the nonaligned
MBODIA+CAMER will accentuate both these tendencies of great power disinterest and non- CHINA+COI
CONGO REPUBLI aligned activism; the 28th session, is thus likely to see further confirmation of :NMARK+D
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North-South
polarization of the UN. The assembly will
REPUBLIC+EC also be called upon again to deal with terrorism, the UN's finarwial problems, FIJI+FINLA
RANCE+GABON and various proposals for new disarmament mechanisms. TI+HONDU
NGARY+ICELAND+INDIA+INDONESIA+IRAN+IRAQ+IRELAND+ISRAEL+ITALY+IVORY COAST4
JAPAN+JORDAN+KENYA+KUWAIT+LAOS+LEBANON+LESOTHO+LiBE RIA+LIBYA+LUXEMBOUR
MADAGASCAR+MALAWI+MALAYSIA+MALDIVE ISLANDS+MALI+MALTA+MAURITANIA+MAU
VIEXICO+MONGOLIA+MOROCCO+NEPAL+NETHERLANDS+NEW ZEALAND+NICARAGUA+NIGEF
)RWAY+OMAN+PAKISTAN+PANAMA+PARAGUAY+PERU+PH I LIPPINES+POLAND I-PORTUGAL+Qi
RUMANIA+RWANDA+SAUDI ARABIA+SENEGAL+SIERRA LEON E+SINGAPORE+SOMALIA+SOUT
SOUTHERN Y~er31Ele~~ /1S1 E RIA+TANZANI
THAI LAND+TOGO+TRINIDAD AND TOBAG TURKEY+UGANDA+UKRAINE+UNITED
PI=P vn1 TL-r-IIPIIrIIAV-i.I-FI 71111 A-LVIMM-V11r-nQI AI 7AID .L7nnfDrrnlI nE7 Inft
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Korea will provide the only major contest
between East and West, and one of the few issues
on which the Soviet Union and China will stand
together. In past years, this confrontation has
taken place in the 25 member General Com-
mittee, which meets at the beginning of each
session to determine the assembly agenda. This
year, however, South Korea has indicated in ad-
vance that it will not oppose inclusion of the
Korean question on the agenda or North Korea's
participation in the debate. South Korea has also
announced that it will accept the dissolution of
the UN Commission on the Unification and Re-
habilitation in Korea. Thus, the assembly seems
certain to take up the question of Korea and to
dissolve the Korean commission.
Kwon Min Jun
First North Korean observer at UN
Special Report
One issue of debate will be whether the
Koreas should eventually have dual membership
in the UN or a single seat, as North Korea insists.
Controversy will focus, however, on the future of
the UN Command, which enforces the Korean
armistice as an agent of the Securi- v Council.
Although US forces remain in South Korea under
the UN Command, a bilateral treaty of 1954
authorizes their presence and would continue in
effect even if the command were disbanded. The
US will cosponsor a resolution recommending dis-
solution of the commission but preservation of
the command; Algeria, along with the Soviet
Union, China, and other allies of North Korea will
offer an opposing resolution calling for the dis-
mantling of the UN Command and the removal of
all foreign troops. Even if approved, the Algerian
resolution would have little immediate impact
because the Security Council must act to disband
the UN Command. Nevertheless, it would mark
an important psychological defeat for the West
and a dramatic swing of majority support to the
North Korean position. The vote is expected to
be close.
German and Other Membership Questions
Approval of membership for the two Ger-
manies-which was quickly passed during Tues-
day's opening session-will be one of the most
important acts of the 28th assembly and one of
the clearest demonstrations of East-West coopera-
tion. The US, USSR, Britain, and France had
carefully planned the entry of the two Ger-
manies-which the Security Council approved this
summer-to avoid reference to contentious issues
such as the status of Berlin. The vote on German
membership proceeded as smoothly as that of the
Bahamas, which was offered at the same time.
German membership will bring into the UN
two important industrial states at a time when the
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organization is becoming increasingly involved in leave the US isolated with an uncomfortably
international economic and financial questions. small minority of countries.
West Germany, in particular, is expected to pro-
vide new impetus for economic cooperation,
which has tended to lag in recent years. The
Germanies will also make a substantial addition to
the impoverished UN budget. Their entry may
renow the drive for universal membership-last
acclaimed two years ago with the seating of the
People's Republic of China-and may set an
example for the other divided states, Korea and
Vietnam.
Bangladesh membership may also be ap-
proved if agreements between India and Pakistan
on exchanges of prisoners can be completed be-
fore the assembly adjourns in December. The
only other membership issue before this session
might be a decision on Cambodian credentials, if
Prince Sihanouk succeeds in pressing his challenge
of the Khmer delegation.
After the debacle of this summer's Middle
East review in the Security Council, there is little
hope for any breakthroughs in the assembly. Sec-
retary General Waldheim's recent visit to Syria,
Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan seems un-
likely to provide the basis for a new initiative.
The Arab states, huwever, will probably attempt
io exploit the momentum generated by the
actions of the Security Council, the International
Civil Aviation Organization, and the nonaligned
conference in censuring Israel for hijacking a
Lebanese comm,;rcial aircraft. The assembly
could provide the forum for another lengthy and
bitter debate culminating in a resolution con-
demning Tel Aviv in language stronger than the
threat of great power vetoes would permit in the
Security Council. This may be one of several
votes sponsored by the nonaligned states that will
Passengers fleeing a hijacked plane destroyed in Libya
Entangled with the Middle East confronta-
tion, the agenda item on terrorism will also con-
sume long hours of debate. Arguing that pro-
posals to control terrorism are in fact directed
against their cause, the Arab states, assisted by
other nonaligned members, blocked all progress in
a committee established by last year's assembly to
recommend anti-terrorism policy. The problem
will now be tossed back into the lap of the 28t11
assembly. The US and several West European
states will try to gain approval of the Convention
on the Protection of Diplomats. The substantive
recommendations of this convention and of a
Belgian proposal on the taking of hostages may,
Special Report - 3 -
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however, be lost among nonaligned contentions
that violence is a justifiable tool of self-deter-
mination.
Measures Against Apartheid
The Africans also will tap the full voting
strength of the nonaligned majority when they
press for stronger measures against the white
south African regimes. The US may again be
condemned for importing Rhodesian chrome: a
resolution that singled out the US for violating
the sanctions against Rhodesia was killed by veto
in the Security Council this summer but is likely
to be approved by the assembly. The African
offensive may also include requests for recogni-
Armed South African police at Carltonville
where eleven workers were killed
Special Report
tion of liberation movements in Portuguese-con-
trolled areas of Africa and censure of alleged
Portuguese massacres in Mozambique. There will
also be a call to censure South Africa for alleged
repression in Namibia. All have good prospects
for approval. The recent shooting o` mine
workers by South African police will undoubt-
edly aid the black Africans' cause. There may also
be efforts to endorse the Oslo Conference on
Apartheid and Colonialism, which passed many
recommendations unacceptable to the US.
Budget: Debts, Dollars, and Development
Consideration of the UN's perennially
strained budget will raise several issues of political
significance. Proposals will probably be made for
abandoning the devalued dollar as the organiza-
tion's primary unit of account and for collecting
assessments partially in another currency such as
Swiss francs. The $9-million loss suffered by the
UN during recent currency fluctuations and deval-
uations has created pressu?es for such reforms.
Despite US opposition, substantial support could
develop for dual-currency assessments.
The US will also resist efforts to reopen the
issue of a maximum 25-percent assessment ceiling
on the contribution of any one member state.
Although this ceiling was approved in principle by
last year's assembly, some nonaligned states may
attempt to bar its implementation. A North-
South confrontation can also be expected when
developed states, the primary sources of revenue,
support continuation of the austerity measures
initiated last year by the secretariat. The less-
developed states, the primary beneficiaries of UN
expenditures, will argue against economy moves.
Increased assistance programs will, in fact, be a
primary goal of developing and nonaligned mem-
bers this year. A scheduled review of the
Economic and Social Council's second
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development decade will ;provide the occasion for
various proposals for new and expanded pro-
grams. Among them may be resolutions asking
developed states to contribute one percent of
their national incomr,; to assistance, and the crea-
tion of a new fund for scientific and technical
assistance.
Disarmament Proposals
Communist and nonaligned members can be
expected to advance several disarmament propos-
als. Their purpose will be to gain parliamentary
advantage-since these are among the most diffi-
cult initiatives to oppose-rather than realistically
to expect any early reduction of arms. The
Soviets will no doubt again urge preparations for
a world disarmament conference, which they re-
gard as a forum for offering new ideas on disarma-
ment problems. A study committee established
by last year's assembly was unable to agree upon
even the terms for an initial meeting. This ex-
perience, along v. ith US and Chinese opposition,
may dampen enthusiasm for further steps toward
such a conference. It is still possible, however,
that the assembly will agree to reconstitute the
study committee.
The Soviets are also likely to push for a
repeat of last year's lop-sided assembly endorse-
ment of a resolution on non-use of force. This
proposition has met strong Chinese opposition
because of its close link with Soviet propaganda
themes and because it allows for nuclear retalia-
tion in the case of an attack with conventional
arms-for example, a Chinese incursion over
Soviet borders. The US and the Western camp in
general abstained on the non-use of force resolu-
tion last year, maintaining that the resolution
constituted a new interpretation of the obliga-
tions members assumed under the UN Charter.
The Soviets may claim, however, that US signa-
Special Report
ture of the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement
at the June summit should lead to US support for
the resolution. Yet another Soviet proposal on
"strengthening international security" can also be
expected. Intended as an anti-Western catch-all
and couched in very general terms, the proposal
has been endorsed by succeeding general assem-
blies without any effort toward implementation.
The assembly will also hear the annual re-
port of the Geneva Disarmament Talks, which for
the second consecutive year have made no signifi-
cant progress. This report is certain to stimulate
harsh criticism of the US and USSR, co-chairmen
of the talks, whom the nonaligned states hold
responsible for the lack of movement. Some
members of the Geneva talks may try to initiate
debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban. If they
succeed, a focal point of discussion will be the
conflict between nonaligned interest in indirect
methods of verification and US insistence on on-
the-spot verification.
The nonaligned states are also expected to
attack the US, using the occasion of a secretariat
report on the use of napalm and other incen-
diaries. If sufficient support is garnered, proposals
may be made to ban these weapons.
Attitude of the Nonaligned States
The nonaligned states will be aggressive, as
well as more united and adept in part iamc itary
procedures, when they press their grievances this
fall. They may be particularly anxious to repay
what they see as US inflexibility in vetoing three
of their Security Council resolutions this year.
Inspired by the recent nonaligned conference in
Algiers, they will be prepared to use their strong
majority in the assembly to argue their political
and economic demands.
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One of their primary economic goals will be
continued discussion of the Charter -)f Economic
Rights and Duties of States, the product of the
developing states' activities in the UN Confc;-c ice
on Trade and Development. Some of them hope
to use this document to extend the obligations,
under international law, of economically ad-
vanced states to help developing countries. The
US and other developed countries, who abstained
when the charter was originally approved, will
urge consideration of a statement of economic
principles rather than a legally binding document.
f?. i
Yugoslav Ambassador Lazar Mojsov
Outspoken supporter of nonaligned
During its two years of UN membership the
People's Republic of China has used the General
Assembly to spotlight its pose as champion of the
Chinese Delegation
underdeveloped states. China will continue to
support many of their causes-particularly on
issues of economic development, colonialism, and
Peking's favorite theme of resisting superpower
hegemony. The Chinese may, however, find their
role as nonaligned champion complicated by their
own interests as a great power. Peking is willing to
sacrifice some of its influence among the non-
aligned in order to pursue its own disputes with
Moscow and protect vital Chinese interests. Dis-
A similar North-South economic conflict will armament issues will bring the conflict between
Fr arise when the assembly assesses the Economic Peking and Moscow into sharp focus: China will
and Social Council's review of the UN's second campaign against Soviet proposals for a World
development decade. Nonaligned states can be Disarmament Conference and non-use of force,
expected to resist Western efforts to include in both of which are favored by the nonaligned.
the final statement the principle that, although
the developing countries need external assistance, As an emerging great power, China also occa-
the primary responsibility for development rests sionally finds that it has less interest in using the
upon the developing states themselves. General Assembly as a platform for venting
Special Report -6- 21 September 1973
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grievances than as an arena for demonstrating that
it is a responsible member of the world commu-
nity. Peking thus prefers not to take positions on
various nonaligned causes that attract little sup-
port from other nations. In the past, China has
been able to abstain frequently, pleading that as a
new member it had not yet formulated policy on
all U111 matters, but after two years of broadening
its ac`ivities to all aspects of General Assembly
work t'lis defense will have limited value. Peking
will meanwhile campaign, probably successfully,
to accord Chinese the status of a UN working
language-a measure representing an annual ex-
pense of approximately $2.1 million, which some
nonaligned states might prefer to direct to assist-
ance programs.
heim's tenure, the Secretariat has taken many
initiatives but brought few to fruition. The role of
the UN has become increasingly passive: it merely
takes note of accomplished change-as the assem-
bly will do when it acts on the Korean and
German issues-and provides a forum for debate
and measuring policy reaction. These functions
are pale in comparison to the role of active par-
ticipation in world affairs once envisaged for the
UN.
If the assembly debates thus largely reflect
the frustrations of the less developed in the face
of what they see as great power inertia-and their
own divisions-the assembly nevertheless points
up that such frustrations are increasingly likely to
Outlook 25X1 pervade international affairs and will have to be
The inability of the General Assembly to
generate significant action-which its 28th session
seems about to confirm-is a malady shared by
other UN organs. The Security Council, still dom-
inated by the great powers, has ended many of
this year's meetings deadlocked by a veto or the
threat of one. During Secretary General Wald-
taken into account by the industrialized powers.
The assembly's function as a reflector of political
realities will also be evident in the increased
caucusing of the nine European Community
states-a reflection of their recently reaffirmed
intention to consult and coordinate foreign policy
positions as they attempt to define a "European
identity."
The General Assembly in Session