WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT FORCE REDUCTION TALKS BEGIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: October 26, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
State Dept. review completed
Force Reduction Talks Begin
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"Y,; 26 October 1973
No. 0393/73A
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Summary
Talks on the "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated
measures in Central Europe" are scheduled to begin in Vienna on 30 October.
Demanded by the West in return for the European security conference, these
negotiations will figure importantly in determining detente's future course.
The Western side hopes that the talks will produce an agreement maintaining-
but at a lower level-the strategic balance in Europe. Such an outcome will depend
in part on the unity of the allies. The West Europeans will be especially touchy if the
talks take on the look of a US-Soviet bilateral exercise. They will also be guarding
against measures that could limit future European defense coop-ration. Although
NATO will be starting the talks with a "common negotiating position," allied pants
of view diverge on many specific issues, and the talks will put the Alliance under
considerable strain.
The Soviets, for their part, will make the most of any signs of Western disarray.
Moscow is engaging in the force reduction talks primarily because it considers
negotiations on force reduction to be part of the price of detente and not because
of a wish to reduce Soviet troop strength in Europe. The clear signs of Western
disunity and the public mood in the US and several West European countries
favoring quick reductions, however, may incline Moscow toward a somewhat more
positive view of the negotiations. On particular issues that will arise in the talks,
Soviet positions seem to be in the formative stage.
Although the idea of troop cuts in Europe
started out as a Soviet ploy in the 1950s, Moscow
was no longer pressing the matter in 1965.
Shortly thereafter, NATO adopted the proposal
as its own. I n the late 60s and early 70s, the West
regularly proposed force reduction talks as a
counter to the Soviet campaign for a European
aecurity conference.
The allies formally invited the East to talk
about force reductions in 1968. After several such
invitations, Moscow responded in 1970, linking
force reductions with a European security confer-
ence and maintaining that stationed (i.e., foreign)
forces should be the ones reduced. The West
replied that indigenous forces should be included.
In 1971, Brezhnev included the idea of European
troop reductions in his "peace plan." The allied
response, something of a delaying tactic, was to
send former NATO Secretary General Brosio to
explore Soviet views. Instead of receiving Brosio
in Moscow, the Soviets waited until the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit in the spring of 1972 when they
agreed, in exchange for a US pledge to start
preparations for a European security conference,
that force reduction talks could also begin. The
following fall, it was agreed that preparations for
the security conference begin in November 1972,
with the conference itself to start in June 1973,
and that the initial force reduction talks would
open in January 1973 and actual negotiations
begin in September or October 1973.
The problem then arose of who should take
part in the force reduction talks. NATO began by
inviting the Soviet Union, Poland, East. Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to meet in Geneva.
In part because of Romanian insistence, the
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Sov;ets responded that the talks should be open
to "all interested states." The Soviets also sug-
gested Vienna as the site. The allies eventually
agreed on Vienna; they also agreed that Romania
and Bulgaria should be added to the list of partici-
pants.
The initial, or -ireparatory, force reduction
talks did begin in lati January 1973. The Soviets
almost immediately touched off another contro-
versy by claiming that Hungary should not take
part. As a result the initial talks were taken up
largely with this matter, which was settled in
June by what amounts to an agreement to dis-
agree: Hungary will start out as a special partici-
pant (observer) but the question can be reopened.
On the allied side, the long impasse over
Hungary's status produced considerable strain,
much to the delight of the Soviets. Many of the
allies wanted to fight hard to keep Hungar' in the
talks, on the grounds that Hungary's absence
would leave a large loophole which would allow
the Soviets to station on Hungarian territory the
troops they had withdrawn from other parts of
Central Europe. A number of NATO members
felt that the US was much too willing to come to
a quick, disadvantageous agreement with the So-
viet Union on Hungary's status, thus confirming a
lingering West European fear that the major deci-
sions in the force reduction talks would be
reached bilaterally between the US and USSR.
Once the Hungarian question was put aside,
the other business of the preliminary talks was
finished with d;spatch. The Soviets managed to
have the word "balanced" struck from the title of
the talks. They knew full well what the West
means by the term-that Warsaw Pact troop cuts
should be larger than NATO cuts. The West was
successful in inserting the phrase "associated mea-
sures," which implies that reductions should be
accompanied by a variety of constraints on the
activity of troops. The Soviets had long opposed
such constraints. The agenda of the talks was left
open, and any of the direct participants may add
items. The West had originally sought a more
detailed agenda, but when it became clear that
the Soviets would insist on the removal of several
desired items, the allies decided it was wiser tj
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leave the matter of the agenda largely up in the
air.
From late July until last week, the allies
labored to arrive at a common position for the
force reduction talks. The kernel of the document
setting forth this position is a US proposal that
has been modified to take allied views into ac-
count. Most of the serious disagreements withir,
the Alliance, however, have merely been papered
over. Indeed, the only common position was not
to take a clear position on a number of issues.
This Together with the allied experience during
the initial talks, indicates that maintaining allied
unity will be one of the major problems of the
negotiations.
Many of the allies have serious misgivings
about the whole idea of force reductions, and
PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS
WEST EAST
Direct Participants
United States Soviet Union
Canada East Germany
Great Britain Poland
West Germany Czechoslovakia
The Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
Special Participants (Observers)
Norway
Denmark
Italy
G recce
Turkey
Romania
Bu Igaria
Hungary*
I*The question of Hungary's status may be
reopened.
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Soviet, British, and US delegations at preparatory talks in Vienna
these have not lessened as the talks approach. The
West Europeans are supporting the force reduc-
tion talks primarily because they think the nego-
tiations might be useful in fending off US con-
gressional pressure for pulling troops o;. t of
Europe. At the same time, many have come tD see
in the Vienna talks an opportunity for acceding
to public pressures for cuts in their own forces.
On the other hand, the West European members
of NATO share three basic concerns about the
talks.
o They fear that as a result of troop
reductions, the security of Europe will suffer.
They insist, therefore, that "undiminished
security" be one of the cardinal principles of
the negotiations. Troops might be reduced,
but this must be done so precisely that the
strategic balance between Warsaw Pact and
NATO forces is not disturbed.
? They fear that the Soviets might suggest
measures during the talks that could limit the
possibilities for future European defense co-
operation or progress toward a more unified
Europe generally. The European Community
has already held two unprecedented discus-
sions-on Italian initiative-to consider pos-
sible relationships between force reductions
and European integration.
? They fear that the force reduction exer-
cise could easily turn into e US-Soviet show.
They will be sensitive to bilateral contacts and
will insist on maximum European involve-
ment in the major proceedings of the negotia-
tions.
The British have long been the most skepti-
cal. During the initial talks, they fought harder
than; anyone else on Hungarian participation and
ilhc.ught the "solution" a bad bargain. After a
re-evaluation of their force reduction policy this
summer, the British were less obstinate during
discussions of the common allied position. In the
negotiations that are about to begin, however,
they will often strongly diverge from US views on
both substance and tactics.
London's qualms about force reductions de-
rive from its analysis of Soviet motives. In a long
paper submitted to NATO in August, the British
maintained that the Soviets were still bent on
altering the balance of power in Europe in their
favor, on undermining the military and political
effectiveness of NATO, on obtaining a substantial
reduction of the US military presence in Europe,
and on preventing the West European govern-
ments from taking steps to fill the gap through
greater defense cooperation. A serious Soviet ne-
gotiating posture in the Vienna talks is simply not
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compatible with these long-term aims, according
to the British. They think that the Soviets will at
least try to drag out the force reduction exercise
as long as possible.
The West Germans-probably the most posi-
tive of the allies about force reductions-view the
talks as a logical extension of Ostpolitik as well as
a way of minimizing US troop cuts. Bonn hopes
That reductions in the Bundeswehr will come out
of the talks. The West Germans will nevertheless
be guarding against an agreement that would have
the effect of turning Germany into a special dis-
armament zone.
Belgium will continue to be a thorn in the
side for the US. Having appointed themselves
spokesman for the smaller members of the Alli-
ance, the Belgians will have much to say and will
diverge from agreed positions when it suits them.
They are also likely to continue to be sticky on
procedural points. They will especially champion
the Lse of multilateral sessions for negotiating
purposes and oppose the "emissary" system by
whi0 the US and only one other NATO member
negotiate with the Soviet Union and one other
representative of the Warsaw Pact. This system
used extensively during the initial talks, is favored
by the US and many other allies as an effective
way to make progress on complex negotiating
points. The Dutch will be less troublesome than
the Belgians. The present Socialist government in
the Netherlands heartily supports the reduction
exercise as a means to reduce the Dutch army.
Denmark and Norway not only approve of
the objectives of the force reduction exercise but
will be trying to have it expanded to include their
territory. The Greeks and the Turks, on the other
hand, will be fighting hard to prevent any exten-
sion of force reductions to them. They will also
be pressing for measures that would protect them
from Soviet troop movements as a result of a
force reduction agreement.
The Italians have been prominent among
those insisting that nothing be agreed upon which
would limit progress toward European unity.
More immediately, Rome fears that the price for
coverage of Hungarian territory may well turn out
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to be the inclusion of Italy. This apprehension is
far from groundless since the Soviets argued
throughout the initial talks that if the allies
wanted full Hungarian paicicipation, Moscow
would demand full Italian participation. Both
Hungary and Italy are now special participants
(observers) in the talks. If the question of Hun-
gary's role is reopened and if the West tries to
have Hungary's territory covered by a non-cir-
cumvention provision or by constraints on mili-
tary activity, the Soviet counter-demand is almost
certain to be for similar coverage of Italy.
There are no signs that France's opposition
to the force reduction talks is softening. French
representatives are not likely to be present any
time soon, either as full participants or observers.
The French have long objected to the bloc-to-bloc
aspect of the negotiations. They may also feel
that the talks are shaping up well enough so that a
French presence is not necessary.
Paris has found ways to involve itself in the
talks without participating, however, and it will
likely continue to do so. Last spring, France did
not oppose discussion in an EC forum with the
French present of the implications of force reduc-
tions for West European integration. This con-
sid',ration of a security topic in an EC forum-to
which the French had consistentl'. objected pre-
viously-was probably viewed by Paris as a way to
highlight the dangers of the talks.
The French agree with the other West Euro-
pean allies that the possibility of future defense
cooperation must not be circumscribed by the
force reduction talks. In fact, their suspicion that
the negotiations might lead in this direction is
among the factors that seem to be causing them
to re-think their defense policy. Foreign ~I1inister
Jobert said in June, "European defense is begin-
ning to look more and more as if it should have
its own character." So far, this hint has not yet
been followed up in any concrete way, but it has
tantalized integration-minded Europeans
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UNITED
KINGDOM.
Reduction area
NATO member
Warsaw Pact member
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T
The Soviets are not engaged in the force
reduction exercise because they are convinced of
its merits. They are talking because the subject
seems an unavoidable concomitant of their policy
of detente and because it has been linked to the
European security conference. Still the initial de-
fensive and negative Soviet attitude toward the
force reduction negotiations has changed as Mos-
cow has begun to appreciate the potential bene-
fits. The Soviets evidently believe domestic US
pressures for reductions give them valuable lever-
age both in the force reduction talks and in other
dealings with the US. The preliminary talks gave
the Soviets an insight into the potentially disrup-
tive effect of the talks on NATO. In addition, the
Soviets may hope that a force reduction agree-
ment could precipitate a rush by Western Euro-
pean countries to reduce their forces. While an
agreement on force reductions could eventually
contribute to destabilization in Eastern Europe,
the actual process of negotiating allows the So-
viets to increase the kind of "coordination" that
strengthens their control.
Moscow's campaign to close ranks argues
against any significant show of indepenr'ence by
the East Europeans-except, of course, Romania-
at the force reduction talks. Although they are
not direct participants, the Fomanians will push
to be heard, not because they expect to be suc-
cessful, but because they want to dramatize their
position.
The general issues implicit in force re-
ductions have been the subject of considerable
tugging and pulling in most East European coun-
tries for several years. For example, the East
European dilemma is how to protect purely na-
tional interests and ensure Communist control
while getting the Soviet military out of the area.
The Hungarians would be delighted co play a
significant role in the force reduction talks. They
will not press the issue, however, in the face of a
firm Moscow position. To an important degree,
Hungary's frustration is shared by other Warsaw
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Pact regimes, particularly those making up the
northern tier.
Althoughi East European arguments on force
reductions have thus far revolved around strategic
interests, national priorities, and the impact on
relations with Moscow, the question of stationed
and indigenous forces may also loom large. Any
agreement by Moscow to withdraw a significant
portion of its forces could well spark fears among
East European leaders that the Kremlin will pres-
sure them to increase the combat effectivene;s of
their own forces. This in turn touches on the
question of resource allocations-a sensit;:a
matter to regimes determined to use detente to
achieve rapid growth of consumer-oriented econo-
mies.
Moscow's allies will, of course, go along with
whatever the Kremlin decides will be conducive
to getting US troops out of Germany and re-
ducing NATO and especially West German forces.
How willingly they give their support, however,
will be decided by how much the bargain will cost
them, both financially and in terms of their na-
tional interests.
The allies are agreed that force reductions
should be restricted to Central Europe. This
wo':ld include the territory of West Germany and
the Benelux countries on the Western side and
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia on the
Eastern side. Hungary's status is open, but the
allies would find it difficult to include that coun-
try without making substantial concessions. There
is thus allied sentiment for a "constraints" area-
within which there would be limitations on mili-
tary activity. There is, however, no allied cons n-
sus on this point.
Soviet view-, on the area in which reductions
will take place are replete with ambiguities. Post-
war disarmament proposals from the Soviet bloc
were transparently intended to neutralize Ger-
many, and the Soviet approach in force
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reductions is rooted in these origins. Partly in
response to West German views, the Soviets may
now be willing to consider a broader area of
reductions. Presumably their acceptance of full
participation by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the
Benelux countries at the preliminary talks means
that Moscow is prepared to include them in the
area of reductions. There is still no certainty that
the Soviets favor reductions throughout Central
Europe or that they will not seek to place certain
countries in some type of constraints zone. Soviet
academics have repeatedly argued that force re-
ductions in Central Europe cannot be isolated
from the global strategic alignment.
Scope o` Reduction
One of the basic allied tenets about force
reductions is that they must be asymmetrical:
since the Warsaw Pact has more troops in Europe
than NATO does, the Pact must make greater
reductions. The allied position for the talks thus
calls `.3r the imposition of a "common ceiling" on
NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central
Europe-i.e., neither group of forces must be al-
lowed to exceed 700,000 men. The British have
had trouble with the common ceiling proposal
since the US first introduced it in late July, ar-
guing that it would be wiser to make reductions
on the basis of a measurement of combat capa-
bility than purely on the basis of manpower.
Although they have been partially convinced that
combat capability is difficult to measure and that
the common ceiling concept in practice will not
amount purely to a percentage manpower reduc-
tion, the British are still wary. They have been
urging-with the support of Italy and the Nether-
lands -that while the concept may be presented
to the other side, the precise figure of 700,000
should not be used.
The Soviets have made the point repeatedly
that force reductions should not be to the detri-
ment of any participant. Beyond this, they have
said little about the central question of the magni-
tude of reductions, and their efforts have been
directed mainly at rebutting the NATO concept
of asymmetry. Soviet commentators contend that
only equal reductions would maintain the secu-
rity of each side, leaving open the question of
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whether equal numerical or equal percentage re-
ductions is meant. Given the Soviet appraisal of
the relative strenciths of NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces, Moscow might not acknowledge signifi-
cant differences between the two approaches.
Phasing
TI he allies have agreed to attempt to pursue
their force reduction goals through a two-phase
process. During the first phase, the Soviets would
be called upon to withdraw one tank army (both
men and tanks) and the US would withdraw an
equal proportion of men. This would amount to a
15-percent reduction by each side. The Soviets
would be withdrawing approximately 68,000
troops and 1,700 tanks; the US would be pulling
out 29,000 troops. In the allied concept, the US
would be allowed to maintain heavy equipment in
Europe on account of the "asymmetry of condi-
tions," i.e., the fact that Soviet troops and mate-
riel could be returned more quickly to Central
Europe. In addition to reductions in US and So-
viet forces, the allies in the first phase will be
seeking agreement of the other side to hold a
second phase and agreement to the concept of a
common ceiling but not necessarily-at this
time-to a specific number).
While this is the agreed position for the first
phase, some of the allies are not pleased with it.
The British, although they sjccecded in obtaining
a specific mention of Soviet tanks in the allied
position, are still not sure that reductions are
being figured sufficiently in terms of combat
capability. They have also argued that US troop
cuts should he no larger than 10 percent. The
Turks are uneasy about the effects of the first
phase on NATO's flanks.
The allies are leaving the proposed second
phase of reductions largely undefined at this
point. The general feeling is that it is better not to
be locked into a second phase until they see how
the first goes and that it is better tactics to
con:entrate during the first phase on first-phase
demands only. It is understood that the focus of
the second phase will be on further Soviet reduc-
tions and on non-US NATO forces. The allies will
be insisting to the Pact that the NATO countries
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ested in the reduction of West German troops, the
most significant NATO indigenous forces in the
tentative reductions area. In recent months the
Soviets have taken the position that the balance
between foreign and indigenous forces should be
maintained; in August, a Soviet radio commenta-
tor said that foreign and indigenous forces should
be reduced simultaneously and by equal amounts.
Soviet armor and ski troops
themselves must decide how the indigenous force
reductions of the second phase should be dis-
tributed.
The Soviets may favor a sequential approach
to reductions which would not differ too much in
practice from Western concepts of phasing-with
reduction of foreign forces coming first.
Stationed and Indigenous Forces
The allied agreement on the contents of the
two phases of the negotiations represents a care-
ful compromise on how stationed and indigenous
forces should be included in the talks. The Brit-
ish, skeptical about all force reductions, are espe-
cially leery of including indigenous forces. The
West Germans realize that cuts in the Bundeswehr
during the second phase would help satisfy inter-
nal German pressures, and the Dutch would also
like to cut their forces. These differing perspec-
tives, submerged for the time being, could well
bubble to the surface again as specific goals for
the second phase are planned.
Before 1971, the Soviets spoke of reductions
of foreign (stationed) forces only. Brezhnev's
omission of "foreign" from his speech at the 24th
Party Congress was taken to mean that the So-
viets were prepared to discuss reductions of both,
categories of forces. The Soviets are clearly inter-
Special Report
The subject of constraints has been the
most vexing to the allies in their efforts to arrive
at a common negotiating position. They have, in
fact, not been able to do so. In general, two types
of constraints have been discussed: those that
would come before reductions and consf;aints
that would accompany reductions. The V vest Ger-
mans and British had until recently been the
champions of pre-reduction constraints-prior an-
nouncement of US and Soviet force movements
and major exercises; limits on the size, location,
number, and duration of maj':r exercises; the ex-
change of observers at majo; exercises; and the
like. If constraints could be negotiated before
force reductions, Bonn and London have main-
tained, Soviet motives could be carefully exam-
ined. Recently, both Britain and West Germany
have grown skeptical about some pre reduction
constraints, realizing that allied demands could
produce unacceptable Soviet counter-demands. If
pre-reduction constraints were negotiated, the
WestGermans-supported by Italy and Norway-
would want to hold open the possibility of ap-
plying the constraints outside the reduction area.
The West Germans, along with Belgium, Canada,
and Italy, would also want NATO forces other
than those of the US included in order to give a
multinational character to the first part of the
force reduction negotiations. The UK has ob-
jected to applying pre-reduction constraints to
indigenous forces on the grounds that future
European defense cooperation might be adversely
affected.
The allies have also been discussing con-
straints that would accompany force reductions
limits on the movement of forces into the reduc-
tions area, limits on movements of forces across
national boundaries, notification of major
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West German Leopard tank
movements of forces, agreement to respect the
new relationship of Forces brought about by the
agreement, and the like. The Belgians and West
Germans are concerned that placing limits on the
movement of forces across national boundaries
could inhibit future European defense coopera-
tion. A number of flank countries, especially Tur-
key, have been pressing for speci?l constraints
that would protect them from the impact of
Soviet troop redeployments as a result of a force
reduction agreement.
There is a greater measure of allied consen-
sus or the separate but related question of pre-
venting circumvention. The allies will be seeking
measures to ensure that the Soviets will not un-
dermine any force reduction agreement by in-
crt sing their troops in Hungary. One way NATO
might seek to L .complish this could be the appli-
cation of certain constraints to Hungarian terri-
tory. Any such attempt would feed the concerns
of Italy and other NATO countries about parallel
application of constraints.
Soviet statements have been conflicting on
this subject. In part the conflict is a function of
the interrelationship between the force reduction
talks and the European security conference: the
more the Soviets perceive that the security con-
Special Report - 10 -
ference risks becoming bogged down in military-
related matters, the more they will try to push
these subjects into the force reduction talks.
During Brezhnev's trip to Bonn last May, he ap-
peared relaxed about exchanging information on
troop movements and having observers at maneu-
vers. But he wanted these subjects considered at
the force reduction talks, not at the European
security conference, where they have already
caused considerable difficulty. In general, how-
ever, the Soviets have been negative on con-
straints and related concepts. At the preliminary
talks, they said that ideas such as constraints
amounted to espionage.
Allied views on verification are riot at all
well defined. There is agreement, however, that
any verification measures should not interfere
with "national technical means." Several verifi-
cation measures are mentioned in the common
allied position, among them the use of ground
observers to verify agreed withdrawals and the
employment of special mobile inspection teams
that would travel by helicopter. The British,
Canadians, and Dutch have also argued that any
verification measures arising out of the force re-
duction agreement should be multinational.
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The few Soviet comments on verification
indicate that Moscow views the subject with sus-
picion. At the preliminary talks, several Commu-
nist officials argued that verification should be
limited to the fulfillment of the specific reduction
measures that had been agreed. There have been
some hints, however, that the Warsaw Pact mem-
bers have considered a continuing verification
organ. Any discussion of verification cannot
escape the history of Soviet hostility to on-site
inspection. There have, nevertheless, been some
tentative indi:;aticns of a softer attitude toward
inspection of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact areas.
Nucicar Weapons
The US told the ai!ies orally that it would be
willing to use some nuclear weapons as a bargain-
ing card in the force reduction negotiations.
Nearly all of the allies immediately began asking
questions. The West Germans have pursued the
matter further by suggesting that an open-ended
working group on the nuclear aspect of the force
reduction talks be established. The Germans are
concerned, among other things, about the possi-
bility that including nuclear elements in the nego-
tiations could result in a de facto nuclear ceiling
on the Western side only. The British oppose the
working group idea, preferring instead a dis-
cussion involving the US, UK, and West Germany.
The US would like consideration of the matter
postponed as long as possible since its ideas about
how nuclear weapons might be included in the
Vienna talks are still very general.
The Western side hopes that the talks can get
down to business on 30 October without further
discussion of agenda or procedures. Most of the
allies favor plenaries for a general discussion of
views, but working groups, the use of "emissar-
ies," and informal multilateral and bilateral meet-
ings for more detailed bargaining.
NATO has outlined tactics only for the first
few months of the negotiations. It hopes they will
begin with a general presentation of viewpoints
by both sides, to be followed by an elaboration of
main themes. An outline of the general nature of
Special Report
the common allied negotiating position would
then be made known to the other side; a dis-
cussion of specific parts of the proposal would
follow, beginning with pre-reduction constraints.
The Soviets are likely to take their usual
cautious approach to the negotiations, allowing
the West to make proposals and provid3 an infor-
mation base while they probe for signs of Western
disunity and "give." Moscow probably expects
the talks to be lengthy and indeed may have an
interest in keeping them going as long as it pur-
sues a detente policy. For these reasons the So-
viets may see a series of small steps, each building
on previous agreements. The Soviet military's pre-
sumed distaste for reducti:.)ns in general is another
factor arguing for slow, phased change. Soviet
resistance to what they consider undue com-
plexity, whether in calculating forces, constraints,
or verification, is nevertheless likely to lead them
at some point to introduce a proposal for a
simple, sweeping solution-such as mutual reduc-
tions by 10 or 15 percent-either as an early
maneuver to throw the West off balance or as a
reply to "complicated" Western proposals.
The real Soviet intentions toward the force
reduction exercise are a major unknown. Many of
the allies, although they would no doubt hesitate
to say so explicitly, probably feel that the British
are at least half right in their assessment that
Moscow's basic aims in Europe have not changed
and that the force reduction talks are just one
more means to those ends.
Moscow should not be expected to be very
helpful until the European security conference
has come to a more or less successful end. The
order of the day for the Soviets until then will be
general statements, propagandistic proposals, and
procedural delays. Chances seem slim that after
the security conference is over the Soviets will
summarily abandon the force reduction talks.
Moscow is well aware of the integral connection
of the negotiations to detente in general, and it
may perceive opportunities to weaken Western
defenses.
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Still, the linkage of the force reduction talks
to the other ingredients of detente could also
operate to place the talks in jeopardy. Should
US-Soviet relations in general suffer, the Vienna
negotiations would promptly feel the conse-
quences. The escalating Middle East conflict is
currently causing concern along these lines.
The preparatory talks last spring showed
that allied unity cannot be taken for granted.
Once they are face to face with the Soviets,
however, they may get a new stimulus to preserve
a common negotiating front. Enough allies now
perceive enough advantages in the talks-such as
opportunities for indigenous troop reductions-
that they will be trying to preserve a fair measure
of intra-Alliance agreement.
The preparatory talks also suggested that the
actual negotiations will be long and tough and
that the allies cannot expect to obtain precisely
the results they seek. In the preparatory talks, the
main question was the participation of Hungary,
and nearly four months of discussion produced
only an "agreement to disagree." The actual nego-
tiations will be trying to lower the troop levels in
Europe and yet maintain a military balance ac-
ceptable to both East and West. To solve the
myriad of complex problems this goal entails,
both sides will need to make concessions. In the
process, the talks could become an all but per-
manent forum for detente maneuverin -in
session for years. IF I
Special Report
26 October 1973
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