WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ROMANIA: THE CEAUSESCU STYLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: November 16, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP 5T00875R001500050029-6 25X1
25X1
Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Report
Romania: The Ceausescu Style
Secret
N9 974
i6 November 1973
No. 0396/73A
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
 CIA-RDP85T00875RO01500050029-,Ij(jgke hmen va
USHLJLJEJM
Nkolae
U P[U1 urcuu Gea
Romania
taistelussa edistyksen,
Scritti scelti Yhteistyon ja rauhan
1971 puolesta
Edukxi de cab a:
CEAUSESCU
Nicc4c
c""Tescu
Ntcbut; CEAU$ESCU
IVI1.12V?~'1111\ \I
Ruma"Wien auf derv Weg
des Sozia[isrnus
Reden _ A ._r_ -.
~a~atze-
Interviews
Mit eincm Vorwort
Von Waldemar Bcsson
Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
SECRET
25X1
Summary
Since Romania decided in 1964 to pursue a basicaliy independent foreign
policy, it has moved quietly away from Moscow. Despite its continued membership
in the Warsaw Pact, Romania:
? is receiving economic and political support from Peking;
? has developed close ties to West Germany, the EC, and much of Western
Europe,
? was the first East European nation to be visited by an American president,-
* has persistently sought closer ties with the nonaligned world.
Nicolae Ceausescu, president and party chief, has been primarily responsible for
the political discipline, economic sacrifice, and nationalistic self-assertion that has
been the hallmark of Romania in the early 1970s. The road toward independence
has not been easy, however, and Bucharest still has a long way to travel. Romania's
ties to the Soviets still constitute a major restraint on Ceausescu's maneuverability.
Still, he is undoubtedly the most free-wheeling leader in the Warsaw Pact and a
unique figure among the East Europeans.
Special Report
Approved For Release 2005/01/1 SE 85T00875R001500050029-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
SECRET
Foreign Policy
Ceausescu's foreign policy is a blend of defi-
ance and conformity, but the over-all goal is to
maintain-and even increase-the surprising degree
of independence that has been won from Mos-
cow. In foreign affairs, Ceausescu and Romania
have gaine.i international prominence out of
proportion to the country's relatively small size
and power base. Nevertheless, Romania remains a
member of the Soviet military and economic
system in Eastern Europe, acrd the leaders hi
Bucharest clearly recognize that these ties bind.
Ceausescu's skill lies in his ability to tailor
his foreign policy initiatives to the levels of Soviet
tolerance. Scrupulously careful not to push Mos-
cow too far, he balances defiance in one area with
cooperation in another. Ceausescu's trip to Peking
in 1971 was a rare miscalculation but, in the face
of Moscow's anger, he restored the balance with
several conces-ions in the economic field. Simi-
larly. following an independent stance in Vienna
and Helsinki, Ceausescu earlier this year made a
conciliatory gesture to Moscow by accepting a
visit from Soviet Defense Minister Grechko. It
was the first time a Soviet defense minister was
allowed in Bucharest since the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
Such concessions have not compromised the
basic principles of Romania's independent course.
Romania maintains re:!ations with the full spec-
trum of the communist world-Moscow, Peking,
Belgrade, and even Tirana-as well as with the
leading West European parties. Under Ceausescu,
the government has solidified its ties to Western
Europe and has even attempted to identify with
the nonaligned world. Romania is the only East
European nation to maintain full diplomatic ties
with both Israel and its principal antagonists in
the Arab world.
Bucharest has since 1958 refused to allow
Warsaw Pact exercises on its territory. The Roma-
nians defied Khrushchev's scheme for suprana-
tional economic integration. Ceausescu has re-
peatedly attempted to loosen his country's ties to
Special Report
Born in 1918, Nicolae Ceausescu is to-
day the youngest party leader in Eastern
Europe. He is one of ten children born in a
small village in the foothills of the Carpathian
Mountains about 90 miles northwest of
Bucharest.
Ceausescu has almost model credentials
for a Communist leader. Of humble peasant
origin, he was forced to leave home at an
early age to find work. Making his way to
Bucharest, Ceausescu was soon swept up in
the worker unrest of the depression era. At 15
he joined the Communist-sponsored national
anti-fascist front. He was imprisoned by the
pro-Nazi Romanian regime during World War
II and tortured for his activities. After the
Soviet occupation of Romania, Ceausescu re-
sumed his work in the party, rising through
the ranks to the number two slot behind
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej. When Dej died in
1965 Ceausescu succeeded to the party lead-
ership. Ceausescu has combined hard work,
talent, and no small measure of egotism to
push himself and his country to the fore in
the international arena.
Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
SECRET
the Warsaw Pact, and was the only pact leader
who openly criticized the Soviet-led occupation
of Czechoslovakia.
More recently, Ceausescu has carried his de-
fiance of Moscow into the multilateral negotia-
tions on European security. Underlying his moves
is a deep-seated, almost obsessive, fear that the
talks on security and force reductions will result
in a de facto division of Europe into two spheres
of influence dominated by the super powers.
Ceausescu apparently believes that thi , would
leave Romania exposed to arbitrary pressure from
the Kremlin without any hope of mocerating
leverage from the West.
Ceausescu laid down the guidelines for Ro-
manian activism at the European security talks
last November. He stressed that a tough line was
necessary on procedural questions because the
initial talks, then about to begin, would set prec-
edents that would become binding. The Roma-
nians have insisted that all nations participate in
the talks as equal, independent states, irrespective
of their membership in military alliances. Roma-
nia's strenuous efforts along these lines drew
sharp criticism from Moscow and several of its
East European allies. Undaunted, Ceausescu sent
a strong delegation to the current security talks
this fall. It is expected that the Romanians will
present proposals that are out of step with the
East Europeans and thus will likely draw more
criticism from the Soviets.
Special Report
Ceausescu greeted by Brezhnev
i'; Moscow, August 1970
The gap separating Moscow and Bucharest
was reportedly widened during the Crimea sum-
mit in late July. Among other things, the two
countries we at odds over the issue of frontiers.
Moscow told the summit meeting that it favored
the inviolability of existing trontiers. Bucharest
favors a formula that woad rule out the use of
force to change them, but leave open the posy .-
bility of future adjustments by mutual consent.
This approach is designed to avoid permanent
foreclosure of Bucharest's claim to northern
Bukovina and Bessarabia, which are now part of
the USSR.
Disagreement over China also flared at
Crimea. Several Romanian diplomats subse-
quently asserted that only Ceausescu's presence at
the summit gathering prevented condemnation of
Peking in the final communique. Ceausescu also
sent effusive congratulations to Mao Tse-tung on
his re-election as party chairman.
Bucharest's determination to resist Soviet
pressure to join the anti-Chinese chorus was
underscored in early September by the visit to
Peking of Emil Bodnaras, a long-time Ceausescu
adviser. Bodnaras undoubtedly used the occasion
to discuss Moscow's anti-China campaign with his
hosts, and he may also have raised the possibility
that Moscow would convene an international
communist conference with the aim of drumming
China oUt of the world movement.
- 4 - 16 November 1973
Approved For Release 2005/01/1~Ett385T00875R001500050029-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/11 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500050029-6
SECRET
I 25X1
Ceausescu has observed and learned from the
policies of his neighbor, Yugoslav President Tito,
although Ceausescu modifies the lessons to suit
his own style. Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation
predates 1968, but the Soviet occupation of
Czechoslovakia pushed the two Balkan leaders
closer together. Now, some five years after the
Kremlin's move against the Czech spring, the
sense of anxiety and urgency has waned. Ceau-
sescu and Tito were in frequent contact until the
recent Middle East war, when Yugoslavia's extrav-
agant support of the Arabs ran up against Roma-
nia's ties to Israel. 25X1
Both Ceausescu and Tito are committed to
non-interference in the affairs of other states,
united in their fear of Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe, and wedded to the principle that every
Communist party and every nation is not only
equal but master of it own house.
Ceausescu recognizes, however, that his
freedom of maneuver is much more limited than
Yugoslavia's. An 830-mile border with the Soviet
Union is enough by itself to curb Bucharest's
activities. Romania is still part of the Soviet de-
fense and economic system in Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, Ceausescu has learn.,=d from Tito the
Special Report
merits of carrying his country's case into interna-
tional forums, and he has developed a feeling for
just how far he can go without provoking the
Soviets into a strong reaction. 25X1
Ceausescu has led his country into wide co-
operation with the Yugoslavs. Bucharest and Bel-
grade are putting final touches on a plan for the
joint production of a subsonic military aircraft.
There are reports that an agreement has been
reached for a joint venture in submarine construc-
aw is another exampl Ceausescu's willingness
to borrow and adopt from the Yugoslavs.
Adopted in December 1971, the law provides for
the wartime mobilization of all adults-male and
female and is based on a similar act in Yugo-
slavia.
Ceausescu has also borrowed from Tito in
moving Romania closer to the third world. The
Romanian leader has played host to a seemir'gly
endless parade of third-world leaders. In the
spring of 1972, Ceausescu visited eight African
coun`ries and -, little over a year later he traveled
to six Latin American nations, trips clearly in-
tended to strengthen Bucharest's international
16 November 1973
Romania s new cieTerme
Approved For Release 2005/01/1'~SFCIA=R6P85T00875R001500050029-6
 Approved For Release 2005/01/1 S1Q-JJQP85T00875R001500050029-6
25X1
position as well as to promote trade. A more
subtle objective is to involve Romania more
deeply with nations that may share its sensitivity
to real or imagined manipulation by big-powe'
blocs. More recently, Romanian media gave a
great deal of favorable publicity to the fourth
nonaligned summit in Algiers in early September.
The Romanian press bent over backward to draw
parallels between Romanian policies and those of
the nonaligned movement.
Looking Westward
Ceausescu has sought closer ties to the West,
has encouraged Western investment and coopera-
tive ventures in Rumania, seeing in these a Wes"_
ern stake in his nation and a vote of confidence in
its future.
Ceausescu has made a major effort to court
Western Europe. In the first half of 1972 he
visited Italy and West Germany. His four-day
sojourn in the Federal Republic was the first by a
Romanian chief of state to West Germany. During
these and previous visits to Western Europe, Ceau-
sescu asked his hosts to join him in signing a
ten-point declaration of "solemn principles" gov-
erning relations between states. These principles
stress the equality, independence, and territorial
integrity of all states as a cornerstone for the
future.
Romanian-US relations play an important
part in Ceausescu's thinking. In the process of
building better ties with Washington, Ceausescu
has put special emphasis on improving trade and
on industrial, scientific, and technological coop-
eration. He has also sought to improve relations
by developing personal ties with presidents
Johnson and Nixon. Early in 1973, Romania be-
came the first Warstiw Pact country to buy US
commercial aircraft, concluding a contract with
Boeing for three 707s. More recent!, , Bucharest
has expressed interest in a US projev.t that would
guarantee Romania much-needed co'