ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001500140022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: July 12, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

 L
Economic Intelligence Weekly
LOAN COPY
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IHIIO19 H.
Secret
CIA No. 7712/73
12 July 1973
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Soviet Plans for a Third-Generation Computer Slip
Japan May Have Misjudged Soybean Problem
Indian Grain Purchases Still Stalled
Bleak Outlook for Thailand's Rice Exports
Buyers' Resistance to Higher Chinese Textile Prices
US-USSR Seek Japanese Role in Yakutsk
India's Nuclear Program Loses Canadian Support
East European Debt Continues to Rise
Japan Expands US Timber Operations
Articles
Outlook for Soviet and East European Grain Crop Grain prospects
appear excellent in both areas - a possible record in the USSR - but
substantial imports will still be needed.
Soviet Hard Currency Trade Deficit Record deficits have generated
the heaviest Soviet gold sales since 1965. 5
Tin Market Developments and the US Government
Stockpile Record high tin prices and foreign production difficulties
may allow accelerated stockpile disposals with little market
disruption.
Iran: The Shah's Economic Interests The Shah wants arms,
technology, and developmental capital from the United States. 7
Monetary Turmoil Threatens European Snake The demise of the
snake would be a substantial setback for many ambitious EC
programs. 8
Note: Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcomed. They may be directed
to
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SECRET
International Monetary Developments The dollar strengthened this
week against major European currencies, aided by rumors of US
market intervention.
African Drought: Status of the Relief Efforts The United States has
pledged one-third of the food promised by foreign donors. 10
Summary of a Recent Publication
Comparative Indicators
Recent Data Concerning Domestic and External
Economic Activity
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
Notes
Soviet Plans for a Third-Generation Computer Slip
The USSR is counting on its RYAD-series third-generation computer
to satisfy growing domestic demand for large data-processing machines. The
RYAD is a copy of the IBM 360 series. The RYAD production program,
however, is now three years behind schedule, and only prototypes have
been manufactured so far. Sizable numbers are not likely to be produced
until the late 1970s. Meanwhile, Moscow is talking with IBM and other
Western firms about assistance and is extending the production runs on
its old, second-generation (transistorized) computers, which were to have
been t)hased out of production in 1971-75.
Japan May Have Misjudged Soybean Problem
Japanese officials may have overstated the impact of the US cutback
in soybean exports. According to official Japanese projections, soybean
stocks would be exhausted by mid- to late October at the norma'. rate
of consumption. Japanese soybean wholesalers, however, estimate
end-of-October stocks at 120,000 - i60,000 tons, or 12-16 days' supply.
If the wholesalers are correct, the Japanese probably would not run short
before shipments from the new US crop could begin arriving in quantity i
Agricultural Minister Shinde has reported that new grain purchases are
under way - apparently for 4 million metric tons - mainly in the United
States, Canada, and Argentina. Since mid-June, however, India has purchased
only some 300,000 tons in the United States.
/Meanwhile, revival of the monsoon rains in early July, after a
two-week dry spell, permitted farmers to resume ph uting. In any case, food
supplies will become increasingly tight prior to the major grain harvest that
begins in October.
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SECRET
Bleak Outlook for Thailand's Rice Exports
Thai agricultural experts project only about 300,000 tons of rice
available for export over the balance of the year, compared with I million
tons actually exported in the same period last year. Thailand has already
committed itself to supply 10,000 tons to meet Cambodia's emergency
needs with a possible 25,000 tons later this year. There is still a chance
that more rice will be made available later in the year if Bangkok forecasts
a good fall crop.
Buyers' Resistance to Higher Chinese Textile Prices
Large price boosts apparently left China with substantial amounts of
unsold textiles at the close of the spring Canton trade 'fair. Japan, the
primary purchaser cf Chinese textiles, curtailed silk purchases, and US and
West European importers bought smaller quantities than they had planned.
Many merchants from Hong Kong - China's second largest customer, with
annual purchases of $50 million - delayed signing contracts in the hope
prices would be reduced.
US-USSR Seek Japanese Role in Yakutsk
Japanese business interests probably will obtain a role in developing
the Yakutsk natural gas deposits in Siberia. US firms, which have already
signed a preliminary agreement with the Soviets, want Japanese
participation, and Occidental president Hammer will soon visit Tokyo to
discuss the matter. The USSR is also courting the Japanese; bilateral
discussions involving prices, pipeline routes, and credits are under way in
Tokyo. Although the Soviets consider Japanese technical and financial
involvement in the project useful, US technical know-how is much more
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India's Nuclear Program Loses Canadian Support
Because of India's refusal to sign the international Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Canada has withdrawn support from the Indian nuclear power
program. As a result, India's nuclear power program, which is planned to
increase from 'the present 580 megawatts to 2,700 megawatts by 1984,
may be set back for some years. To meet the delayed schedule, India will
have to develop and build its own equipment and purchase equipment from
countries, such as France, that are willing to sell without safeguards.
East European Foreign Debt Continues to Rise
Eastern Europe's hard currency indebtedness rose about 25% in 1972
and totaled nearly $5 billion by year's end. The outlook is for more of
the same. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of Romania and
Bulgaria, none of the East European countries is currently experiencing
serious debt servicing problems. The United States is picking up a larger
share of the debt, reflecting the extension of Export-Import (ExIm) Bank
facilities to Poland and Romania and increased agricultural sales to Eastern
Europe. 25X1
Japan Expands US Timber Operations
A major Japanese trading firm probably will purchase a 300,000 acre
tract of North Carolina timberland for $30 million. The Japanese already
have invested heavily in Alaskan timber resources and have a major interest
in the state's largest sawmill. The Japanese al-o have interests in wood pulp
operations in Idaho. The latest move to cxiand their US operations is
designed to assure an adequate supply of US sots vood logs, which account
for almost one-half of Japan's softwood su? ?1ies.
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Percentage Distribution of Total Grain Production
in Eastern Europe During 1966-70 .. . . .
Romania
1816
C v U NT R I E S
Yugoslavia
18%
S 0 U /T H E ?~ N
Hungary 1
Bulgaria
9%
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Outlook for Soviet and East European Grain Crop
The Soviet grain crop could reach a record 157 million tons this year
if favorable weather prevails through the growing and harvesting season,
especially in the important New Lands area. The previous record of 150
million tons was set in 1970, but last yea:, only 134 million tons were
harvested. Even with a record harvest, however, the Soviets will need to
import about 15 million tons of grain during FY 1974; 9 million tons have
already been purchased, including 7 million tons from the United States.
A record sowing of spring grains more than offset the shortfall in
planting winter grains and raised the total sown area to its highest level
since 1965. So far, both winter and spring grains have been developing
well. Moisture conditions at the end of June for winter grains - currently
being harvested - were better than normal and far better than last year.
Timely rainfall and improved organization have given the spring grains a
reasonable start. Spring grain.:., however, are now in a critical stage, requiring
adequate rainfall and cool temperatures.
Eastern Europe (Including Yugoslavia)
rune rains have improved prospects for Eastern Europe's grain harvest
this year. The harvest will reach about 83 million tons if average growing
and harvesting conditions prevail this summer - slightly less than last year's
record crop and a 17% increase over the average 1966-70 harvest.
Eastern Europe would still need to import between 8 million and 9
million tons of grain in FY 1974. Questionable prospects for output of
the important non-grain feed crops in the northern countries could mean
higher import requirements for grain. Because the Soviet grain crop will
fall short of domestic requirements, Eastern Europe will have to depend
on Western suppliers for most of its import needs. 25X1
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Soviet Hard Currency Trade Deficit
A record hard currency deficit of $1.4 billion in 1972 and the even
larger deficit expected for 1973 have already led the USSR to sell more
gold than at any time since 1965, and large gold sales are likely to continue.
Spurred by imports of Western grain and equipment, Soviet hard
currency imports increased by 41% in 1972 to a record level of almost
$4.2 billion. The USSR imported roughly $700 million in grain from the
West, about $500 million more than in 1971. Machinery and equipment
imports from the West rose by more than $300 million to an all-time high
of nearly $1.4 billion. In contrast, exports increased by only 6% to roughly
$2.8 billion. Exports of oil, the USSR's chief hard currency earner, increased
by less than 2% to $580 million.
The Soviet hard currency deficit in 1973 probably will be higher than
in 1972. Imports of grain may exceed $1 billion, and equipment imports
will be higher than the record 1972 level. Meanwhile, exports are not
expected to grow any faster than in 1972: oil delis cries to hard currency
countries, for example, will increase little, if at all, and exports of other
major commodities such as lumber pro:.ably will not increase substantially.
To help finance the 1972 hard-currency deficit, the USSR sold
significant quantities of gold for the first time since 1965. Gold sales in
1972 exceeded 150 tons and earned the USSR roughly $300 million. Thus
far in 1973, the USSR may have sold as much as 150 tons which would
have earned them about $400 million. With prospects for an even larger
deficit in l..v73, the USSR probably will continue to sell gold throughout
the year. Gold sales have become more attractive relative to borrowing
because of the rise in the price of gold on the free market and because
the cost of borrowing on the international money markets has increased
by roughly 50% over the last six months. Additiona, gold sales at the same
rate and at about the same average price (about $85 per ounce) as reported
in the first half of the year could boost earnings from this source to as
much as $800 million in 1973. Sales at current market prices ($120 per
ounce) would earn the USSR close to $1 billion.
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Tin Market Developments and the US Government Stockpile
The bankruptcy and threatened closing of the UK's Williams Harvey
tin smelter may provide the US Government an opportunity to increase
its stockpile sales with minimal disruption to the world tin market. This
smelter, which' has been processing about half of Bolivia's tin ore, produced
some 17,000 tons in 1972 (worth nearly $85 million in current prices),
or 9% of world tin consumption. Tin prices in recent weeks have exceeded
all previous records, in part because of uncertainty about the sioelter's
future.
Bolivia, the world's second largest tin producer after Malaysia, would
find it difficult to shift to alternative smelters because of technical problems
involved in Processing its dirty orej
though Brazil and Mexico have agreed to accept small amounts
of Bolivian ore on an experimental basis, large contracts with potential new
processors are not likely soon.
On the grounds that the world tin market already was weakened by
the availability of cheaper substitutes, both Bolivia and the International
Tin Council strongly protested the US Government decision last March to
sell off its surplus commodity stockpiles. In response to these pressures,
Washington reduced its planned tin releases in 1973 to only 6,600 tons,
even though Congress had authorized sales totaling 18,222 tons.
With the closing of the smelter, however, world supply from current
production would be reduced by up to 17,000 tons annually. This reduction
would provide an effective argument for increasing US stockpile sales by
an amount equivalent to the shortfall in production. Bolivia and Malaysia
can be expected to continue lobbying against further US stockpile ,eleases
despite a nearly 40% rise in tin prices this year. F7 I
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Average
Annual Rate
of Growth
1972/73 Over
1964/65
1972/73
1964/65
GNP (Billion US $)
6.91
16.71
12%
Population (Millions)
24.6
31.2
3%
GNP per capita (US $)
2801
5351
8%
Agricultural output
(Billion US $)
2.21
3.01
4%
Petroleum sector output
(Billion US $)
1.71
4.61
13%
Manufacturing and mining
output, non-oil
(Billion US $)
1.01
3.51
17%
Oil production (Thousand
barrels per day)
1,695
5,000
14%
Government oil revenues
(Million US $)
556
2,700
22%
Defense expenditures
(Million US $)
278
1,460
23%
Defense share of budget
17%
21%
Imports (Million US $)
742
2,940
19%
US share
17%
21%
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Iran: The Shah's Economic Interests
The Shah will use his Washington visit in late July to impress his hosts
with Iran's economic progress. As head of the Middle East's largest and
fastest growing economy - GNP has doubled in the past eight years - the
Shah is looking for additional US capital, know-how, and arms.
The Shah aims to double Iran's GNP again in the next five years,
largely on the basis of oil revenues and foreign loans. Oil revenues will
average about $5 billion annually over the next five years, compared with
less than 63 billion last year. Proceeds from foreign loans will average
another $2 billion annually.
Because the Shah believes a strong military force is needed to defend
Iran's borders and its oil lifeline through the Persian Gulf, annual costs
of defense have risen from about $280 million to almost $1.5 billion during
the past eight years. In addition to the budgeted expenditures, Iran annually
buys $200 million or $300 million worth of arms on credit. Most of the
advanced weapons come from the United States, which currently has about
$2.6 billion in orders for aircraft, radar, naval vessels, and other equipment.
The USSR supplies lesser amounts of military equipment, essentially
non-sophisticated weaponry such as trucks and armored personnel carriers.
If the United States is to retain its present 21% share of Iran's imports,
now running at $3 billion annually, US firms will have to participate with
Iranian firms in the establishment of industries that not only supply local
markets but also promote Iran's exports. Foreign firms are already active
in such arrangements. For example, a Japanese firm recently agreed to set
up a tire plant jointly with the Iranians and to market 25% of the output
in Japan.
The Shah is requesting Japanese and West German firms that are
interested in the government's supply of petroleum products to assist in
establishing more refineries. The Shah also is interested in investing in
foreign refineries. Iran, for example, is in the final stage of negotiating with
US firms for equity participation in existing US refineries. The United States
has joined with Iranian and Japanese firms to form Iran's first liquefied
natural gas plant, which is expected to enter production in the near future.
Additional projects undoubtedly will be pushed by the Shah during his
visit. Iran now ships natural gas by pi eline to the USSR in repayment
for Soviet military and economic credits.
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Monetary Turmoil Threatens European Snake
The continuing foreign exchange turmoil could spell the dc:;nise of
the European snake (the EC system of a joint float), causing difficulties
for many of the EC's programs beyond the obvious blow to progress toward
economic and- monetary union.
? The Common Agricultural Policy would come under strong
pressure for revision in the wake of likely significant shifts
in intra-EC exchange rates.
? The proposed EC regional aid program would be postponed
because Paris insists on fixed parities as its prerequisite.
? Movement toward intra-EC industrial integration would be
further hampered by uncertainty arising from floating
currency rates.
To this point, the snake has been maintained because both Paris and
Bonn, each for its own reasons, have desired to maintain unity in the
EC. The original hope had been that fixing parities within narrow margins
would create the internal pressures in member countries necessary to bring
about substantial economic cooperation. But the inability to formulate a
strong, Community-wide anti-inflation program demonstrates the naivete of
that hope. Now that divergent economic and political realities in the member
countries threaten the vestiges of EC monetary unity, the EC will be forced
to review many of the ambitious programs which were to become a reality
in the next two years. Furthermore, the path toward economic and
monetary union will have to be changed to make a greater measure of
economic integration a prerequisite for fixing parities and pooling reserves.
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International Monetary Developments
After falling to record lows on international money markets last Friday
following the appreciation of the German mark, the dollar strengthened
this week against the major European currencies. It also recovered against
the Japanese yen, which had risen to its highest level ever on Monday.
The major impetus to the rally, which propelled the dollar's value upward
an average of 6% relative to the European joint float currencies and the
Japanese yen, was a flurry of rumors that the United States was about
to intervene in the exchange markets.
Bundesbank president Karl Klasen added to this sentiment on Tuesday
when he announced that the Americans were prepared to act and wanted
to see the dollar supported.
Intervention alone is unlikely to lead to a sustained dollar recovery
through 1913, although the longer term outlook for the dollar is somewhat
more favorable. The near-term burdens on the dollar - inflation, the
psychological impact of continuing domestic political uncertainty, and the
potential damage to the US balance of payments by agricultural export
controls - clearly far outweigh in traders' minds the longer term prospects
for balance-of-payments improvement r; sulting from the already substantial
dollar devaluation.
International money managers, representing the large multinational
firms and commercial banks and some less developed countries, including
the oil producers, believe that in the short term other currencies, particularly
the German mark, are more likely to appreciate than the dollar. To the
extent the money managers act on their belief, it is a self-fulfilling prophesy.
The German mark is the currency favored by traders because ' f its
remarkable performance in .1 a last few years.
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African Drought: Status of the Relief Efforts
For the next several months, survival of several million people in
drought-stricken areas of sub-Saharan Africa will depend on the delivery
of food to distribution centers before roads are made impassable by seasonal
rains, which have begun in some areas. Some 425,000 tons of grains have
been delivered or are en route - about one-third from the United States.
By assigning the grains top priority for rail and truck transport, the
emergency needs of the hardest hit nations - Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, and Upper Volta - have been met. Aircraft from half a dozen
countries, including three US Air Force C-130s, have been aiding internal
relief shipments to the most isolated areas.
Even if the weather improves markedly, the new crop will be poor.
The gathering of people at designated centers, while aiding food distribution,
has meant that many farms are abandoned or undermanned during the
current planting season. In some instances, seed grains have been eaten and
not replaced.
In the worst drought areas, nomadic tribesmen are totally destitute
because their livestock have died. These losses will be felt in the more
populous coastal areas from Guinea to Cameroon, which normally depend
on the drought-stricken area for much of their meat. Several years may
pass before traditional livestock commerce is restored. In the meantime,
nomads are being assigned to state-sponsored agricultural settlements while
their herds are being rebuilt. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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Publication rc Interest
Iraq: Oil Gives Wider Economic Options
(CiA ER IM 73-50, July 1973,
Despite continuing internal political turmoil, Iraq's economy appears
to be heading into a period of growth, led by increased oil output. By
mid-1973, Iraq had overcome many of the difficulties caused by oil
nationalization. Oil production had reached 2 million barrels per day, the
highest ever, and probably will continue to increase throughout the decade.
Although more attention is now being paid to agriculture - the other
important economic sector - progress remains slow. In the trade sector,
increased oil revenues will yield ample trade surpluses and provide the
government with wider options in foreign economic relations. Iraq's heavy
dependence on Communist countries for economic assistance probably will
be diluted by expanding commercial ties with Western countries, particularly
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DOMESTIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
Average Annual
Growth Rate since
Percent Change
Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
Periud Period 1970 Earlier Earlier
Latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
Period period 1970 Earlier Earlier
GNP'
(Constant Market Prices)
United States
Quarter
73 I
1.9
5.3
7.9
Previous
OLarter
7.9
WHO
(Indust
United
LESAL
rial)
States
E PR
ICES
Jun 73
5.0
7.7
14.8
Japan
73 1
3.6
9.4
16.0
152
Japan
May 73
3.8
1 2.3
14.1
West Germany
73 1
5.4
4.7
5.8
23.6
West
Germany
May 73
4.7
6.4
7.1
France
72 IV
1.8
5.3
4.3
7.4
Franc
e
Apr 73
6.2
12.0
20.2
United Kingdom
73 I
1.5
3.2
7.1
8.2
Unite
d Kingdo
m
Jun 73
6.7
6.2
3.7
Italy
72 IV
1.8
3.1
2.7
6.6
Italy
Apr 73
6.4
12.1
18.7
Canada
73 I
2.9
6.3
8.0
12.1
Canad
a
Mar 73
6.6
12.3
27.3
United States
May 73
0.7
5.6
9.7
10.4
United
States
May 73
5.5
9.3
Japan
May 73
9.4
19.4
23.3
Japan
Apr 73
9.4
23.5
West Germany
Apr 73
0
4.1
7.9
2.3
West
Germany
Jun 73
7.9
8.5
Fiance
Apr 73
-2.6
6.6
1.9
-6.0
France
May 73
7.2
8.9
United Kingdom
Apr 73
-08
47
9.8
12.8
United
Kingdom
May 73
9.5
13.6
Italy
Feb 73
-3.0
-0.8
-1.U
-21.2
Italy
May 73
11.0
15.5
Canada
Mar 73
0.4
6.8
9.8
13.4
Canad
a
Jun 73
8.1
11.4
RETAIL SALES`
(Current Prices)
United States
May 73
1.5
11.6
11.8
14.7
United
Sates
Jun 73
1.2
7.9
7.4
10.3
Japan
Mar 73
3.9
12.8
24.8
45.0
Japan
Mar 73
2.9
18.9
27.5
29.9
West Germany
Mar 73
-5.7
9.1
5.9
14.2
West
Germany
Apr 73
-0.6
12.2
9.5
6.9
France
Mar 73
4.1
6.3
7.0
6.7
France
Mar 73
0.8
12.5
9.9
-3.4
United Kingdom
Mar 73
3.0
12.9
19.8
26.8
United
Kingdom
Apr 73
2.2
12.2
13.1
19.1
Italy
Jan 73
-8.3
81
' 1.9
3.3
Italy
Dec 72
7.0
22.5
24.5
52.3
Canada
Apr 73
2.5
12.1
14.6
30.6
Canad
a
May 73
1.0
15.1
11.6
11.1
Percent Rate oIInteresi
IZ Months 3 Months 1 Month
Representative Rates
United States
Prime finance paper
Jul 8
7.63
4.63
6.75
7.25
Japan
Call [Honey
Jun 30
6.75
4.75
5.50
6.00
West Germany
Interbank loans (3 months)
Jul 6
14,25
4.:0
N.A.
12.63
France
Call money
Jul 6
9.00
3.75
7.25
7.63
United Kingdom
Local authority deposits
Jun 22
7.22
3.79
7.38
7.52
Canada
Finance paper
Jul 8
7.25
5.26
5.i5
8.63
Euro?Dollars
Three-month deposits Jul 6
9.81
525
7.88
8.69
'Seasonally Adjusted
12 July 1973
UNCLASSIFIED
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EXTERNAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Average Annual
Growth Rate Since
EXPORT PRICES
Percent Change
latest from Previous 1 Year 3 Months
Period Period 1970 Earlier Earlier
EXPORTS'
(US S)
United States
May 73
6.4
13.7
18.9
(I.o.b)
United States
May 73
5,603
Jan-May
26.511
19,015
Japan
May 73
12.1
20.7
63.8
Japan
May 73
2,861
Jan-May
13.773
11,011
West Germany
Apr 73
11.0
13.0
64.4
West Germany
May 73
5,740
Jan-May
24.827
18,721
France
Doc 72
8.4
7.1
16.0
France
May 73
3,2.32
Jan-May
13,848
10,408
United Kingdom
Apr 73
9.9
4.2
40.4
United Kingdom
May 73 2,303
Jan-May
11,125
9,675
Italy
Feb 73
8.2
8.9
26.9
Italy
Apr 73 1,491
Jan-Apr
5.776
5,908
Canada
Mar 73
5.3
9.4
19.5
Canada
Apr 73 i 1,983
Jan-Apr
7.780
6,260
EXPORT PRICES
IMPORTS'
Latest Cumulative (Million US S)
(National Currency)
(f.o.b.)
Penod Million US S 1973 1972
United States
May 73
3.1
13.7
18.9
United States
May 73
5,761 Jan-May
27,306
20,647
Japan
May 73
1.3
4.8
13.5
Japan
May 73
2,593 Jan-May
11,033
7,369
West Germany
Apr 73
0.7
1.3
4.2
West Germany
May 731
4,362 Jan-May
19.370
15,248
France
Dec 72
4.7
0.5
18.6
France
May 73
3,215 Jan-May
13,328
10,153
United Kingdom
Apr 73
1.8
9.6
15.4
United Kingdom
May 731
2,832 Jan May
12.651
10,228
Italy
Fab 73
2.7
6.6
19.8
Italy
Apr 73
1.700 Jan-Apr
6,390
5,322
CanadL
Mar 73
1.8
9.3
29.4
Canada
Apr 73 I
1,747 1 Jan-Apr
7,219
5,988
IMPORT PRICES
TRADE BALANCE`
Latest
Cumulative (Million US SI
(National Currency)
Penod
Million 1IS S 1973 1972
United States
May 73
1.2
10.0
17.4
43.1
United States
May 73
-158
Jail May
-795
-1.832
Japan
May 73 11
2.5
2.8
14.3
13.2
Japan
May 73
268
Jan-May
2,740
3,642
West Germany
Apr 73
1.3
0.3
7.2
5.3
West Germany
May 73
1.378
Jan-May
5,457
3,475
France
Dec 72
8.1
4.7
0.2
17.2
France
may 73
-13
Jan-May
520
255
United Kingdom
Apr 73
2.4
10.2
22.9
36.9
United Kingdom
May 73
-529
Jan-May
-1.526
-551
Italy
Feb 73
3.5 ~
6.5
9.3
23.2
Italy
Apr 73
-209
Jan-Apr
-614
587
Canada
Mar 73
3.4
1 4.1
6.2
18.4
Canada
Apr 73
236
Jan-Apr
541
292
Latest Period 1 Year 3 Months
US $
rercerit change from
End of
June 1970 Earlier Earlier
Per Unit Dec 66
18 Orr: 71 19 Mar 73 29 Jun 13
United States
May 73 i
14.0
16.3
13.3
14.0
Japan (Yen)
0.0038
38.38 1
17.59
0.39
1.30
Japan
Jun 73
15.2
4.1
15.8
18.1
West Germany (Deutsche
Mark)
0.4444
76.77
43.22
25.50
7.78
West Germany
May 73
32.2
8.8
19.9
29.5
France (Franc) Pound
0.2588
28.18
31.44
17.42
7.16
France
Jun 73
12.3
4.4
9.4
11.2
United Kingdom~terhng)
2.5550
-8.44
-1.94
3.82
-0.97
United Kingdom
Jun 73
7.0
2.8
8.9
6.0
Italy Lura)
0.0017
8.06
0.58
-2.26
0.87
Italy
Apr 73
6.4
4.7
4.3
5.8
Canada (Dolly)
1.0010
8.52
0.32
0.33
-0.07
Canada
Jun 73
5.9
4.3 6.2
6.0
TRADE-WEIGHTED
EXCHANGE RATES
Percent Change Irom
As of 6 Jul 73
Dec 66 18 Dec 71 19 Mar 73 29Jun 73
United States
-22.00
-12.30
-5.44
-1.85
Japan
23.49
9.48
-2.62
0.38
West Germany
35.23
17.98
12.88
3.90
France
-6.52
6.66
4.19
2.81
United Kingdom
-33.85
-19.58
-5.11
-3.96
Italy
-24.94
-23.63
-16.67
-4.03
Canada
3.51
-3.00
-1.33
-0.54
12 July 1973
Approved For Release 2006/04/19 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001500140022-3