CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE COMMUNIST AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: August 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

/_ /-- 11 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2 C-
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Current Developments in Chinese Communist Agriculture
Secret
ER IM 68-95
August 1968
copy N!
25X1
52
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Eacludad from automatic
downgrading and
dadatrifcation
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1968
Current Developments in Chinese Communist
Agriculture
Summary
Current developments in Communist China's agri-
culture strongly indicate that the 1968 grain harvest
will be less -- perhaps substantially less - than
the excellent crop of 1967. Floods in widespread
areas of southern and central China are worsening
the prospects for the harvest of early rice and are
delaying the sowing and cultivation of autumn grains.
The Cultural Revolution is continuing to erode
the authority and morale of rural cadres and to im-
pede the supply of chemical fertilizers, insecticides,
irrigation pumps, and other inputs to agriculture.
The cumulative impact of the Revolution is yet to be
felt on the agricultural procurement and distribution
system because the bumper 1967 crop relaxed the
pressure on the system.
Contracts for the delivery of grain thus far in
1968 are running about 15 perce:it below the level of
1967. Purchases for future delivery are surprisingly
light in view of the favorable market price for wheat
and the anticipated decline in grain output in 1968.
The regime may be awaiting the final outcome of the
midyear harvest and the early indications of fall
harvest prospects before negotiating additional
contracts.
Note: This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research.
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
SECRET
Although shortages of subsidiary foods and a
deterioration in the quality of the grain ration
are apparent in widespread urban areas, basic nu-
tritional standards have held up. The loss of
discipline in rural areas is permitting peasants
to increase private cultivation and marketing in
spite of the regime's orders against the extension
of private activity. Thus additional supplies of
subsidiary foods in many local areas may be partially
offsetting the reduction in the availability of
major grains.
- 2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
SECRET
portions, of winter grains (winter wheat, barley,
beans, peas, and sweet potatoes) and early rice.
- 3 -
SECRET
Heavy Rainfall and Flooding
1. Exceptionally heavy rainfall and flooding
over much of Central and South China is dimming the
prospects for the early grain harvest.* The damaging
rainfall began during the last 10 days of May. Pre-
cipitation in this period was more than 350 percent
of normal over small areas along the Kwangtung coast.
Damage was apparently confined to the western portion
of the Canton Delta. Refugees from Kai-ping, En-ping,
and Nan-h ai hsiens in Kwangtung reported serious crop
losses -- for example, "the great flood in our area
destroyed grain crops as they were budding and the
crop failure will be serious."
2, A second period of exceptionally heavy rain-
fall occurred during the last 20 days of June. As
shown on the map, rainfall activity was intense over
a broad area of South and Central China. Precipita-
tion was more than 200 percent of normal during the
second 10 days of June and 400 to 600 percent of
normal during the last 10 days of the month. The
rivers draining the area swelled rapidly, flooding
the adjacent low-lying fields and threatening the
dikes downstream. Conditions were especially serious
on the Hsiang Chiang and Kan Rivers flowing north and
emptying into the Yangtze River and on the Kwei, Hsi,
Tung, and Han Rivers flowing southward into Kwangtung
Province.
3. Accurate meteorological data are not available
for July, but data from the official press and other
sources confirm the occurrence of serious flooding
all through the month. The Huai-pei Plain in Anhwei
and Kiangsu provinces -- which had experienced pre-
cipitation of 400 percent to 800 percent of normal
in the last 10 days of June -- was added to the areas
' The ear ain harvest consists, in roughly equal
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
biU1t.L I
suffering from flood. Editorials on 18, 20, and 21
July reported that "the suddenness of the flood is
unparalleled in recent years," that "some areas were
disaster stricken," and that "all possible ways and
means to insure the safety of the north Huai main
dike" were being used.
4. Because of hilly terrain in Kwangtung, damage
to crops has been largely from flash floods; only
in the Swatow area are there important losses in the
early rice crop. Similarly, a combination of hilly
terrain and apparently successful emergency work on
the dikes is preventing extensive damage in the
Yangtze area. In contrast, the Huai-pei area is
poorly drained farmland that is prone to flooding
and waterlogging. Here the main damage is to the
planting and cultivation of corn, kaoliany, millet,
and soybeans to be harvested in the fall. Damage
to other fall-harvested crops -- intermediate and
late rice, tubers, and miscellaneous grains -- can-
not be determined at this time.
Adverse Effects of the Cultural Revolution
5. Chinese crop prospects are further endangered
by the unfavorable effects of the Cultural Revolution
on agriculture. These problems were admitted by
Premier Chou En-lai in a 2 February 1968 speech in
which he stated that "this spring inadequate prep-
arations were made for sowing, which must be
properly pushed. This year, the situation with re-
gard to water conservation and fertilizer is worse
than that of last year, and additional stimulation
is required." In spite of Chou's warning, disruptions
in farm operations and reductions in the supply of
new machinery, chemical fertilizer, and pesticides
continue. These difficulties will compound the
effects of unfavorable weather on the 1968 harvests.
Farming Operations
6. References to disruptions affecting farming
operations in China are much more numerous now than
in 1967. Editorials and reports confirm that in
many provinces farming activities such as water
conservation work, manure collection, and field prep-
aration are behind schedule because of peasant and
- 4 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
COMMUNIST CHINA
Areas of Heavy Rainfall and Flooding, Mid 1968
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
AR?E~OT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE~~~--~, / ~PEKtj `
I~
~? l' rte ,, r ~ --+ `
\
,
?
`.
1.
? 11
K"6' N
,
~
l \
i
,
Hu
1 ?~/..R.
G51A( -1EHSI
Ls I?nun \ ~~cN
Lan
% chow
A
Sian
\
H
k) NA
WAN
SZECH
I
J
I I l 1 t'(I E H .. f~-l'. , C. ArJ
l
Ch'enK tu'
W gang
r WA
K'un mine AUTO
~_ \L ?~ \ S.t
/'IJNNAN N nin
Nan ~11 'Z
c ~ch'an6 0 .~
Chang shat
? -1 ~~t~,AN (t ~~
case"
NankmR J~ShanKhal
-v /`. ' ~ ? 1.'A S
CI(INA
S 1, A
SO(JTI1
C1.11NA SlA
(HAINAN J
103 1
Area of heavy rainfall during June 11-20
Area of heavy rainfall during June 21-30
Rivers with flooding or dangerously high crests
LUZON
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
SECRET
cadre apathy. A recent editorial from Canton states:
... some plans have slackened later-stage
field management of early rice, prepara-
tions for the summer harvest have not been
made well enough, and upsurges in the prep-
aration for late-season farming have not
yet been started. Insufficient manure
has been collected, the speed of sowing
is comparatively slow, and plans for late-
season planting have not yet been translated
into concrete measures at the production
team level.
7. Political unrest and administrative dis-
organi.ation are still slowing up water conserva-
tion projects that require large numbers of laborers,
cadre discipline, and peasant cooperation. The cadres
are uncertain as to where they stand politically,
are showing little initiative, and are still being
chided in the press for "holding back."
Fertilizer and Insecticides
8. The Cultural Revolution continues to hamper
the supply of chemical fertilizer to China's agri-
cultural sector. Domestic production remains con-
siderably below potential, and delays in the ship-
ment and use of fertilizer are common. Fertilizer
imports in 1968 are scheduled to be a record 6.9
million tons, an increase of 1.4 million tons above
1967. However, because of delays in concluding con-
tracts, the bulk of these imports will not reach
the farms in time to aid the 1968 crops. Shortages
of insecticides continue: a typical report, from
Kiangsu Province in mid-July, spoke of insufficient
insecticides to fight a plague of cotton leaf worms.
9. The regime is repeating its advice to
peasants to use self-reliance in meeting these
shortages. An editorial from Kwangtung Province
in mid-June urged that peasants "grasp firmly the
collection of manure, utterly eliminate the idea
of relying on chemical fertilizer, go in for native
and miscellaneous manures in a big way." Never-
theless, numerous reports from individual farmers
- 5 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
SECRET
continue to blame fertilizer shortages for decreases
in crop yields.
Grain Procurement and Food Supplies
10. The disruptive effects of the Cultural Revo-
lution on grain procurement and food distribution is
a major factor contributing to the subsidiary food
shortages and the deterioration in the quality of
diet which are occurring in many urban areas. Food
supplies are normally tight during the late winter
and spring period prior to the first harvest of the
year. In past years, major cities usually received
preferential treatment, in that a uniform flow of
"fine grain" -- wheat and rice -- was maintained
and the ration remained stable. This year, however,
fine grain rations have been reduced in many urban
areas, and the less popular coarse grains -- corn,
millet, kaoliang, and sweet potatoes -- have been
substituted. For example, corn flour has been sub-
stituted for rice and wheat in rations in Peking and
Tsingtao, and wheat flour has replaced rice in the
ration in Shanghai, Fuchow, and Amoy. Shortages of
subsidiary foods such as pork, poultry, and vegetables
have also been reported in many urban and rural areas.
Basic nutritional standards, however, appear to
have been maintained.
11. The regime's concern over continued procure-
ment difficulties is reflected in editorials during
June and July. For example, a 21 June broadcast
from Kiangsu Province referred to class enemies and
their plots to "disrupt the procuremen'; and dis-
tribution of summer grain." Similar editorials have
also appeared recently in Shantung, Chekiang, and
Heilungkiang provinces.
12. A poor fall harvest combined with further
impairment o. administrative controls over grain
procurement and distribution could cause severe
dislocations in food supplies throughout the
country. . I f this were to happen, the Chinese
population during the coming winter and spring would
face further deterioration in the quality of the
diet and possibly debilitating reductions in the
quantity of food available. The regime could be
expected to meet such a situation by increasing
imports of Free World grain.
- 6 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
SECRET
Grain Imports
13. The regime seems relatively unconcerned at
the moment over its agricultural prospects. Con-
tracts thus far for the delivery of grain in calendar
1968 total 3.6 million tons, or some 600,000 tons be-
low the level of 1967 (see the table).
Communist China: Retained Imports of Grain
in 1967 and Contracts for Delivery
in 1968, by Country of Origin
Thousand Tons
Country of origin
1967
1968 a/
Canada
1,000
2,000
Australia
3,000
1,000
Argentina
100
0
France
0
600
Other
100
0
Total
4,200
3,600
a .-Pre liminary .
Rumors of negotiations with France for the purchase
of an additional 1.5 million tons of grain have yet
to be confirmed. Further, there are no indications
of current Chinese negotiations with any of the
other major grain exporters.
14. The present lack of Chinese interest in
grain imports -- in spite of a favorable world
wheat supply -- may be attrt_buted to one or both of
the following reasons: (a) The regime may be
awaiting a final assessment of the early grain
harvest and firmer indications of the outcome of
the fall harvest, which accounts for approximately
70 percent of the total grain harvest; preliminary
assessments of tha fall harvest will not be available
to the authorities until early September. (b) The
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2
SECRET
regime's estimates of import requirements may have
been obscured by the administrative confusion
generated by the Cultural Re'/olution. In any case,
unless the regime chooses to cut rations in urban
areas, grain import requirements probably will be
larger during the winter and spring of 1968-69 than
in 1967-68.
Private Activity
15. During the Cultural Revolution the official
p'ess has been castigating local officials who have
a "bourgeois attitude" in favor of private plots and
private markets. This propaganda, however, is care-
fully directed against the extension of private
activity, and officials have been told not to inter-
fere with existing private plots or private holdings
of livestock.
16. Nonetheless, private activity in the Chinese
countryside has been increasing since the Cultural
Revolution intensified in early 1966. The crippling
of Party and government organizations at the county
level and above, together with the apathy of cadres
at lower levels, has loosened the controls over the
peasants. Fewer hours are being applied to collective
land and to large-scale irrigation and reclamation
projects. This, together with illegal diversion of
chemical fertilizer, manure, and other inputs to the
private plots, almost certainly is leading to sub-
stantial increases in the output of subsidiary foods .
The increased availability of these foodstuffs will
partially offset local shortages of grain.
17. Black market activity in rice and other
foodstuffs is also increasing. This activity,
coupled with a reported 50-percent rise in the
official off-ration price of rice, suggests that
the regime is having difficulty in procuring normal
quantities of staple foods. Grain normally procured
and placed on the off-ration market by the govern-
ment is being retained in the countryside and is
becoming available through black market channels.
- 8 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010044-2