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Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum Assessment of the Soviet Program to Provide Academic Training for Students from the Less Developed Countries Secret ER IM 68-127 October 1968 Copy No. 75 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 WARNING This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET Foreword The program of Soviet academic training of nationals from leas developed countries has grown since its inception in 1956 from a modest effort to train an elite cadre of Communist sympathizers into a sophisticated program for professional train- ing. The size of the program has expanded rapidly as a result of the development of state-to-state relations between the USSR and developing countries and because of the pressures from newly emerging states for increased opportunities to train their nationals. Kremlin leaders undoubtedly view the results of the program favorably and will continue to use it as a permanent part of their program for penetrating less developed countries. The Soviet training effort, although modest in comparison with Western programs, is a matter of increasing concern to the Free World as the pool of personnel return- ing from Soviet training expands. This paper dis- cusses the development of the program and its rele- vance to Soviet objectives. It also tries to assess the impact of the program and its future delineation. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence October 1968 Assessment of the Soviet Program to Provide Academic Training for Students from the Less Developed Countries Summary Nearly 19,000 students from less developed countries have received academic training in the USSR under a special program inaugurated in 1956. Half of these students have come from Africa, nearly one-third from the Near East and South Asia, and the remainder from Latin America and the Far East. Training has been heavily weighted toward specialization in the fields of engineering, medicine, mathematics, the natural sciences, and law and economics. Patrice Lumumba University -- established in 1960 training nationals for the express from the emerging purpose of countries -- currently is training about one-third of the 11,000 to 12,000 students enrolled in the USSR. The remainder are studying at some 170 higher educational institutions throughout the Soviet Union. The Soviet program began as an adjunct of Moscow's trade and aid offensive in the newly emerging states. The USSR recognized that many of these countries lacked trained personnel to administer the new organs of state economic and political power which were being created. Through intensive indoctrination and training of selected nationals, the USSR sought to establish in the new nations a pool of trained personnel, sympathetic to Soviet institutions and policies, from which future political leaders and administrators would be drawn. Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET The early years of the program were charac- terized by Soviet recruitment of pro-Soviet students and by massive doses of political indoc- trination. When these policies eventually pro- voked violent protests from some of the new states, the USSR began to accept students selected by their own governments, and the more obvious forms of indoctrination were brought to an end. The Soviet authorities still believe that exposure to Soviet cultural and academic life will enhance the USSR's prestige among influential groups in the new countries and that some of the trainees ultimately will assume important posts in their countries' political and economic structures. So far, however, Moscow's academic training prcgram. has had a modest impact. Although the 6,000 people who have already returned from Soviet training are a significant addition to the pool of trained manpower in the developing countries, the Soviet program is overshadowed by the long-standing training provided by Western countries, whose colleges and universities cur- rently are educating an estimated 113,000 students from the developing countries. Nevertheless, in Moscow's view the program is succeeding, and the modest annual outlay of $35 million to $40 million for foreign academic training, over the long term, may produce more durable ties with some developing states than will result from the much more costly financial outflow associated with the Soviet eco- nomic aid program. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET Development of the Program The Number and Origin of Students 1. Since the inception in 1956 of the Soviet academic training program for students from less developed countries, an estimated 18,800 students have gone to Soviet institutions of higher learning. As is shown in Table 1, the number of students de- parting for study in the USSR averaged less than 300 annually during 1956-59; accelerated rapidly during 1959-62, reaching a peak of more than 3,500 in 1962; and then declined gradually to only about 1,500 in 1967. of Academic Students from Less Developed Countries for Training in the USSR 1956-67 Persons Near East Year Total Africa Par East Latin America and South Asia 1956-59 1,110 75 25 20 990 1960 1,610 425 315 150 720 1361 2,110 555 225 215 1,115 1962 3,570 1,960 265 305 1,040 1963 2,890 1,860 140 255 635 1964 2,250 1,395 130 260 465 1965 1,940 1,120 245 230 345 1966 1,805 1,035 40 305 425 1967 1,530 950 20 235 325 2. The annual fluctuations in the number of de- partures reflect the development of the program over time and relate to the number of places made avail- able for training foreign personnel by Soviet authori- ties. In 1960 the USSR increased the facilities for training students from deve-loping countries by allotting additional places at state universities and by providing approximately 500 places at Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, which was opened in 1960 especially to meet the needs of students from - 3 - SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO1600010077-6 SECRET the developing countries. Thus the number of students departing from the less developed countries for study in the USSR rose in 1960 by more than 40 percent over the cumulative total for the preceding four years. By 1962, as the enrollment levels at Patrice Lumumba and other Soviet universities increased, the number of departures rose to more than twice the 1960 level. Present capacity, estimated at 11,000 to 12,000, probably was not reached until 1965 and is now vir- tually completely utilized. Since then, new students have gone to Soviet universities to fill vacancies rather than new places. With fewer places available for new students in recent years, the number of annual departures has leveled off and in 1967 had fallen to approximately the 1960 level. 3. Of the total number trained between 1956 and 1967, approximately 50 percent have come from Africa, 32 percent from the Near East and South Asia, 11 percent from Latin America, and 7 percent from the Far East. In addition to the record level of new enrollees in 1962, the year also marked a dramatic shift to Africa as the chief area of student origin. Beginning in 1960, as many African countries gained their independence and sought educational opportunities for their untrained peoples, the number of African applicants to Soviet universities s':elled. By 1962 the number of African students departing for academic training in the USSR rose to 1,960, or almost five times the 1960 level, 4. In 1962, African students in the Soviet Union came from 29 countries, compared with 11 in 1961. Although the number of departures from African countries began to decline in 1963, the reduction in the number from most other areas was proportionately greater, and African nationals have accounted for 55 to 65 percent of the total number of new students from less developed countries in every year since 1962., The largest number of African students studying in the Soviet Union have come from Somalia, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. Together they have sent a total of more than 3,500 students since 1959. 5. The shift to a predominantly African stu:! nt body in the USSR during the early 1960's reduced the importance of the presence of Near East and South Asian students, who had accounted for about 50 percent of the total before 1962. With the large increase in the number of Africans in 1962, the SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO1600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET Near East - South Asian departures were less than one-third of the total. The decline from 1,115 in 1961 to 325 in 1967 in the number departing from this area is accounted for largely by the reduced number from Iraq. Departures from Iraq fell from approximately 700 in 1961 to an estimated 25 in 1967 as the Iraqi government adopted restrictive measures to control the number departing. Smaller declines occurred in the number of departures from Afghanistan, Syria, the UAR, and Yemen. 6. Students departing from Latin American countries have been increasing as a percentage of the total, because annual departures from Latin America have remained relatively stable, at 250 to 300 per year, while departures from other areas declined. 7. The importance of the Far East as a source of student trainees evaporated after the 1965 attempted coup in Indonesia. Prior to that time, more than 1,000 Indonesian students, or more than 70 percent of the total number from the Far East, had gone to the USSR for training. Academic Facilities and Curricula 8. Although students from less developed coun- tries are studying in some 170 academic institu- tions of higher learning scattered throughout the Soviet Union, about two-thirds are in Moscow. Patrice Lumumba Friendship University -- named for the radical. leftist Premier of Congo (K), murdered in early 1961 -- is by far the most important school in the USSR for training nationals from the develop- ing countries, and in 1967 it accommodated about one-third of the total number of these students. 9. Lumumba University was established in 1960 to provide specializes: facilities for educating students from the less develcped countries. As part of Moscow's drive to reduce the traditional ties of the newly emerging states with the Free World, the University was set up to cope more effectively with problems peculiar to students from vastly different cultural and educational backgrounds. The University consists of one preparatory and six specialized faculties that offer 69 academic degrees. During the 1967/68 academic year the school had an enroll- ment of more than 3,600 students from less developed SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET countries and about 500 from the USSR, who presumably keep the foreign students under surveillance. 10. Other Soviet institutions of higher learning open to foreign students include: state universi- ties in Moscow, Leningrad, Irkutsk, Kiev, Odessa, Minsk, Tashkent, Kharkov, and Lvov. In addition, polytechnical, agricultural, medical, and other specialized institutes throughout the Soviet Union receive foreign students.. 11. Educational policy in the USSR is subject to rigid central planning, and universities are under the direct control of the Ministry of Higher Education. The Minister of Education, who also is a member of the Central Committee, dictates policy and program content and is able to manipulate the role of ideology and academic studies in the education process. 12. The average course of study for foreign students at Soviet universities and specialized institutes is five to six years, including one to two years of preparatory instruction in Russian, elementary sciences, and the humanities. Soviet preparatory training for foreign students is con- ducted through special faculties at ten Soviet institutions, including Lumumba and Moscow State Universities. These faculties employ expert language teachers, special textbooks, and teaching aids to help supplement the secondary training of new students and to provide a more uniform academic base for students from different educational back- grounds. In contrast with the educational equiva- lence standards imposed on foreign applicants by the United Kingdom, through its A Levels, and the United States, by its College Board Examinations, the USS1 has not established a standard device for accrediting previous education.. This plus the fact that all courses in the USSR are taught in Russian has made preparatory work a prerequisite to the Soviet foreign academic training program. 13. Following preparatory training, students enter regular university faculties where they may pursue one of aver 300 specialties offered by the Soviet educational system. No Soviet institution offers a program in the liberal arts comparable to that offered by many Western schools. For the most part, students go directly into a specialty and pursue narrow courses of study that emphasize the SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET acquisition of technical skills. Field work is required of Soviet students to provide practical application of their studies; this requirement is believed also to apply to students from less de- veloped countries. In the 1966/67 school year, students at Patrice Lumumba were enrolled in the following major fields of study: Percent Engineering 39 Agriculture 7 Medicine 16 Mathematics Science and Natural 11 Philosophy and History 9 Law and Economics 18 Each of these general fields of study _s broken down further, such as mechanical engineering which in turn includes the following specialities: agricultural machinery, machine tools, casting equipment, automobiles, tractors, and aircraft engines. Students are required to spend at least 3,500 hours in their major field of study, which is almost 1,000 hours more than is required, in a much broader study frame, by most Western schools for a Master's degree. On the successful comple- tion of requirements, which include course work, a diploma project, and Soviet state examinations, students are awarded a diploma, which the USSR claims is equivalent to a Master of Arts or Master of Science degree in Western universities. This is a special degree awarded to students from de- veloping countries. Master's diplomas in Russian and in Western European languages also are given on the decision of the state examination commission to foreigners graduating from Soviet universities. Recruitment Scholarship Provisions 14. Foreign nationals studying at institu- tions of higher learning in the USSR receive all- expense scholarships from the Soviet government. - 7 - SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET These include stipends of about $90 per month for students at preparatory schools, $100 for under- graduates, $110 for post-graduates, and $167 for advanced trainees.* In addition, the Soviet government provides all foreign students with free tuition and medical care, transportation to the USSR and back to students' home countries at the end of their course of study, an annual book allowance of up to $55 for post-graduates and advanced trainees, and an allowance to purchase warm clothing on arrival in the USSR. 15. Scholarships are awarded by the Soviet government and directly by the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University to students who have ful- filled the following admission requirements: (a) For undergraduate courses at universities or technical, medical, or agricultural institu- tions, applicants must be between 17 and 35 years of age and must have completed their secondary school education; (b) Post-graduate courses are open to university graduates up to 40 years of age; and (c) Advanced training or re- fresher courses are open to specialists and teachers who have completed their higher education. There is no age limit for this group. 16. Initially, these requirements were inter- preted very loosely, and students were accepted with little previous schooling. Patrice Lumumba originally provided for the admission of applicants who had not completed their secondary education as a means of attracting students from lower economic and social strata. The Soviets discovered, however, that the "poor students," for whom Patrice Lumumba University had been established, also were poorly qualified for academic study. The rat_o of 'E Based on a ruble-dollar ratio of one ruble to US $1.11. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET was high, and some 850 students were returned home by 1967 because of academic failure. Their inability to meet minimum academic standards contributed to widespread dissatisfaction among students and was an important factor in the demonstrations of African students in December 1963. These demonstrations provided the Soviets with an opportunity to introduce a more rigid interpretation of admission standards and, to impose controls over student behavior while they were in residence at Soviet universities. Soviet regulations introduced in early 1964 restated the requirement for certificates attesting to an adequate secondary education. They also provided for the expulsion of students who did not complete individual plans of study within the established time periods or who violated study discipline or the rules of an institution. While these regulations were probably directed at eliminating the dissidents, they also suggest the further development of a more academically oriented Soviet program. Poverty and poli`i'al affiliation became less critical deter- minants of eligibility for study in the USSR, and the emphasis on academic achievement increased. Recruitment Methods 17. The USSR recruits students for academic training through bilateral agreements or under the sponsorship of UN agencies, with the a proval of the applicants' governments. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET 19. More often in recent years, scholarships have been provided through official channels under bilateral cultural or student exchange agreements or under the auspices of UN agencies. Applications under bilateral accords or under UN programs gen- erally are made through the Ministries of Education in the candidates' countries. Applications for study at Patrice Lumumba University are made directly to the University or through Soviet embas- sies and consulates. Many developing countries, aware of the threat of illegal recruitment, have forbidden direct applications to the University. In 1962, India established a selection board espe- cially for students applying to Patrice Lumumba, and many countries have begun to administer Soviet s(holarships through special boards. Moscow also has begun to realize that political and economic convictions alone are not appropriate criteria for academic achievement and is applying stricter admis- sion standards. Soviet Objectives 20. The Soviet Union's sophisticated program of academic training for students from developing countries fits within the framework of overall Soviet objectives for penetrating the less developed coun- tries of the Free World and thereby promotes Soviet foreign policy aims. The new program differs sig- nificantly from the training of foreigners within the USSR during the Lenin-Stalin era, which empha- sized the preparation of revolutionaries who were already committed to the overthrow of established governments. The training of foreign revolutionaries SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET still continues in Moscow and is carried on through Higher Party Schools and other means. 21. The shift from an ideological to an academic focus began after the 20th Party Congress in 1956, when the scope and character of Moscow's program for educating personnel from developing countries was substantially revised to conform to Soviet poli- cies of so-called peaceful coexistence. The new tool, therefore, was forged in the early years of Moscow's "trade and aid offensive" in the less de- veloped countries. Its creation reflected a need that was quickly made evident to Moscow in many of the newly emergent nations of Asia and Africa, namely the lack of indoctrinated or trained cadres with whom Moscow's representatives could work in promoting the spread of Communist influence. During the early post-Stalin period, from 1956 to 1960, the USSR tried to insure the creation of cadres sympathetic to Communist philosophy by insisting that foreign students take as much as 500 hours of economic and political indoctrination, concurrent with professional course work. Between 1960 and 1962, however, the required specialized courses in Communist ideology were reduced and eventually eliminated because of objections of the students' home governments. As Moscow pushed forward its scheme for training administrators, engineers, doctors, and other professional personnel, formal indoctrination was largely confined to after-school activities, to Russian language courses, or to rele- vant courses such as economics and political science, The transition to a more thoroughly academic program reflected the desires of developing nations that began to exert pressures on the Soviet Union in their state-to-state relations. Following the formalization of cultural exchanges through bilateral agreements, the less developed countries have par- ticipated directly in the selection of students for training in the USSR and have restrained the Soviet Union in the execution of the more blatant indoc- trination aspects of its education program. Long-Run Objectives 22. Since the mid-1950's, Soviet goals in Free World less developed countries have been restated within a longer time frame,, and programs are being tailored to accomplish Soviet objectives more gradually. Because of its altered timetable for effecting revolutions in less developed countries, - 11 - SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET the Soviet Union also has adopted a long-term per- spective with respect to its training program for foreign students. In the long run, the USSR hopes to establish Communist societies in less developed countries and expects that training foreign nationals in academic subjects will help to accomplish that goal. 23. By providing professional academic train- ing, the USSR is creating a pool of elite cadre from which developing countries may draw at least some of their political and economic leaders, par- ticularly in view of the shortage of trained per- sonnel in these countries. It is hoped that these cadre will be favorably inclined toward the USSR in spite of the reduced ideological content of the academic program. Although the changed philosophical guidelines for Soviet external relations have altered Soviet strategy vastly in the educational field, the USSR hopes that some trainees will assume important positions in local political party structures and public media on their return home and that intercultural exchanges, increased eco- nomic relations, and military dependence will lead to increased Soviet influence and eventually to communism in the less developed countries. 24. Khrushchev, in his speech at the inaugura- tion of Patrice Lumumba University in November 1960, stated that the purpose of the University was to provide higher education and that there would be no attempt to inculcate Communist ideology. He added that, nevertheless, the Soviet Union "would not take it amiss" if a student decided that he approved of Marxism-Leninism. By teaching a common language, through familiarization with the structure of Soviet institutions, and by making Russian culture available to foreign students, conditions are believed to be favorable for ex- panding Soviet influence to shape economic and political developments in developing countries. Short-Run Objectives 25. Following the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the emerging countries, the USSR recognized that the education of less developed country nationals would be a major step forward to create and maintain satisfactory rela- tions with the less developed countries. By pro- viding education for these nationals, the USSR also eVC'vvirr Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET expected to undermine Western prestige and influence by decreasing the latter's monopoly on higher educa- tion; to enhance Soviet prestige by spreading its reputation for industrial, scientific, and intellec- tual achievements; and to strengthen the bonds of understanding between the USSR and the less developed c-,untries through close cultural contacts. Training in the Russian language and familiarity with the Soviet institutional structure are intended to establish organizational and personal links between the USSR and nationals of less developed countries that might enhance the Soviet image and produce lasting re- lationships. In the end, the USSR hopes that these conditions will provide the foundation for revolu- tionary situations. Assessment of the Program The Less Developed Countries' Point of View I3onefito from the Program 26. The less developed countries have been receptive to the programs of academic training offered by the USSR because of their expanding requirements for higher education. Confronted with an urgent need for skilled personnel at a time when their rapidly growing populations in- tensify the competition for a limited number of places in Western institutions, the governments of developing nations have welcomed the opportunity for higher education in the USSR. The five-fold expansion between 1960 and 1967 of Soviet facili- ties for training nationals from less developed countries has provided places for some 11,000 to 12,000 students, most of whom otherwise would not have received advanced education. Since 1956, approximately 6,000 students from less developed countries have completed academic training in the USSR. It is estimated that about 2,500 f these students were trained as engineers, 1,000 as doctors, and 750 as mathematici.ins and scientists. For many countries, especially in Africa, the injec- tion of these skills, although modest in nurrzer, constitutes a significant addition to their reservoir of educated nationals and relieves to some extent the critical shortages of professional personnel. The 1,500 degrees awarded to Africans by Soviet universities between 1963 and 1967 have added sig- nificantly to the total number of degree holders in SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 S11"CRE l' many of these countries. The 6,200 students froo Sub-Saharan Africa in the, USSR at the end of 1967 constituted an c?stimatod 25 percent of the total number from thin area that were studying abroad. In 1965, while than 50 Yemenis had university degree_n, several hundred were being trained in Soviet universities. Although many students may have preferred Western education, the lower admis- sion standards and more generous, financial arrange- ments in Soviet institutions have made education in the USSR more fearsible for these students than 27. Fewer students from developing countries have nought Soviet academic training because of ideological persuasion; their motivations have been a desire for professional training in the face of limited alternatives. For the most part, these ntudents now go with the approval of their govern- mcnts, and their applications are processed through the legal apparatus established by their governments. Probably no more than 15 or 20 percent of those studying in the USSR in 1.967 had come without the sanction of their own gover.nmc'ntn; in 1960 the num- ber wao an estimated 50 percent. 8. In spi to of th?? problemrs t hat. they have had in adjusting to :;oviet social and institutional patt' rn::, aftit, r an initial period mc,:t students have dd,ju:.t('ci because they are not wi I Iing to sacrifice what might be their only opportunity to receive an education. fly the end of 1966, at leant 1,200 =:tuclentn had left the USSR before completing their educational programs, but up to 70 percent of these probably departed because the academic work was too difficult.. 29. In addition to student dis:ratisfaction tha .:tri from tht hie of abi11ty to at:l ry :scholar;tic requirements, frictions have occurred because many students have found it difficult to conform to the conditions of a hi,jh1y conservative educational establishment. Students originating from countries that are undergoinc, rapid political, :social, and economic change have found racial dis- crimination, curtailed personal freedom, and con- stant r.urveillance upnetti,nq and inconsistent with SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SFCIth,'l' Soviet propaganda about the USSR. Nevertheless, in 1967 there were 8,000 applications for some 600 places at Patrice Lumumba University. ,,'valuation of Training 30. ror the most part, less developed coun- tries are satisfied with the quality and character of Soviet training. Afghanistan, the UAR, India, Niger, Somalia, and Uganda, among others, have ex- pressed satisfaction with the quality of academic training received by their students in the USSR. Sierra Leone reportedly ccnsiderr- some aspects of Soviet technology an more advanced than that of the West and urges its students to seek training in the USSR. The emphasis of Soviet education on narrow specialties may serve the immediate require- ments of some less developed countries more effec- tively than the broader liberal arts programs of the West. Several graduates of Patrice Lumumba University have been awarded advanced degrees in the United States, and Western businessman who have worked with African graduates of Soviet schools have commented favorably on their performance. Although graduates from Soviet institutions gen- erally are not as well trained as those educated in the West, the disparity in largely a function of the difference in preparatory education and the lower level of skills that the foreign students in the USSR bring to their advanced studies. To help overcome this problem, many lens developed countries includinct Mali, Condo (B), Somalia, and the Sudan are permitting the Soviets to teach Russian in their countries, and since 1964 the USSR has been more careful in screening candidates for scholar- ships. 31. Nevertheless, the governments of many Latin American countries, and of Ghana, Iraq, and Lebanon, have been critical of the quality of Soviet education and in some cases have not accepted Soviet degrees until additional course work wan completed. In Chile, an in most other Latin American countries, academic credentials of returnees from the USSR are not recognized, and they ave unable to work in their profesions. Some counties, notably Lebanon ant: Ghona, have imposed stringent resting requirements on students returning from for.Nign universities, a measure probably directed agairnt Communist-trained graduates, ,nd some countries are negotiating - 15 - SF CR El' Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SE,C;IZ141'1' diploma equivalence agreements with the USSR. By and large, in spite of some deficiencies of their education, Soviet-trained students have had few difficulties in finding jobs on their return. 1?i.nk of 1'o/t:tiaal Iniloc'trinat.lon 32. Initially, many less developed countries, especially in Africa, were permissive in their attitudes toward student training abroad because of their urgent need to replace trained foreign personnel withdrawn by former metropolo countries. Countries are increasingly aware of the need to relate education directly to their development needs and also are awakening to the dangers inherent in educating their students in the USSR. Recognizing political conformity as endemic to Soviet society, most lens developed countries -- even those with close economic and political ties with the USSR, such as the U1R -- are ?mposiny restraints on the selection of students for training in the USSR and have tried to control their activities in the USSR. This is being done largely through bilateral agree- ments that provide developing countries with some leverage and control of their nationals. The Ivory Coast, for example, recently has considered signing a cultural agreement with the USSR in order to con- trol the students that had gone to the Soviet Union without its sanction and to establish machinery to reduce the number of illegal departures in the future. 3 -3 . ':'1 facilitate and tea tnutl1 for the selection process, most of these clc'_,ernments have introduced measures to sere?+?n ipplicatits for their maturity and reliability. They have tried to send students that can differentiate between fact and ideology. A number of countries, including 'T'anzania and Kenya, have established scholars-hip committees to process student applications. Burma, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Nepal, and Nic{eria are among those that require the Minister of Education. to approve all applications; and a few countries have gone no far as to require exaf?inatIonn to tc.:.t applicants' loyalty to their own government. Students from those countries that went to the USSR without permission of their govern- ments or who engaged in political activity while in the USSR face the risk of being arrested or may be denied employment on their return home. The home government also m.iy refuse to reissue their passports or to issue entry visas to allow their return. SE.C:R F'1' Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRE'].' 34. In many cases the less developed countries have trier to maintain a continuing control over their students while they are in the USSR, even of those whose departure they did not approve. India, the UAR, and Iraq have maintained a cautious view, and the Indian government has made its diplomatic mission in Moscow responsible for careful supervision of grantees. The Indian Minister of Education con- trols the courses of study that its students can undertake, and several countries do not allow them to take courses abroad that are available in their own country. The Soviet Perspective In the Program Achieving Ito Objcotivoa? 35. From the Soviet point of view, the program is probably achieving its goals. The availability of opportunities for higher education in the USSR Is reducing the former almost complete Afro-Asian dependence on Western education; it is enhancing the Soviet reputation for academic achievement in some less developed countries; and it is strengthening Soviet relationships with educated nationals of less developed countries. The USSR probably is reinforcing its ties with foreign nationals who were sympathetic to Communism before going to the USSR; it undoubtedly has won over a few new supporters; a few have become disaffected; but the great majority probably accept the experience for its educational value and in the process develop professional and cultural ties with Moscow. Soviet recruitment enables the USSR to ferret out for training Communist sympathizers that later may play leadership roles in the less developed countries. 36. It is still too early to assess the probable impact of Soviet education on personnel from less developed countries and eventually on their govern- ments. The estimated 6,000 nationals from developing countries that have been graduated from Soviet insti- tutions of higher learning have not yet begun to exercise important influences on their governments. Western programs have been of long standing, and in 1967 alone, more than 65,000 nationals from less developed countries were being trained in the West ;excluding the United States) and an additional 48,000 in the United States. Table 2 compares the Soviet program in 1Q67 with those of Western coun- tries. - 17 - SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET Estimated Number of Academic Students from the Less Dec,eloped Countries Being Trained in the USSR, Western Countries, and the United States, by Area 1967 Persons USSR Western Countries 1 United States Total 10,995 6b,G00 48,270 Africa 6,455 17,000 5,535 Far East 500 7,500 4,045 Latin America 1,155 8,500 14,410 Near East and South Asia 2,885 32,000 24,280 a. Including Western Europe, Australia, Canaaa and Japan. Estimates for these Western countries are based on 1964 data, the latest year available. 37. The fact that Western institutions are training more than ten times as many students from developing countries than the USSR does not dilute the impact of Soviet education by this amount. In somc countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the balance is in the Soviet favor. But even in countries where Western training far outweighs the number trained in Soviet institutions, Moscow may have an advantage since there are no "programs" in the West. Students go to Western schools of their own selection, without intercession of the host government; there are no national objectives; and there is no indoctrination. Moreover, for the achievement of long-run Soviet objectives, they need not havu a majority. A small revolutionary nucleus can '.. certain circumstances effect a government takeover. Nor does it appear that the Soviet Union is concerned about the relative academic merits of its own program compared with those of the West. For the most part, the students being trained in the USSR could not meet Western entrance require- rr>th hts, but the USSR has been al le to train these F..-.ple to make a contribution on their return to tneir homelands. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET 38. In Sub-Saharan Africa these countries have become increasingly dependent on the USSR for advanced education. In the 1967/68 academic year, approximately 6,200 students from Sub-Saharan Africa were being trained in the USSR, compared with 5,225 in the United States. In some countries such as Mali, the contrast is marked: more than 300 were being trained in the USSR and only 10 in the United States. Moreover, African students may be more vulnerable to indoctrination than students from other areas because often they are less sophis;,i- cated than students from areas where there has been more cultural interchange, and they react more violently to their environment (as is demonstrated by the iaet that they have accounted for most of the student discontent in the USSR). Evidence of Ideological Changes as a Result of Training 39. The relationship of ideological change to academic training in the USSR is difficult to measure, and the results of an attempted correla- tion probably would bye of limited validity. There are no firm data as t,D which of the returnees are sympathetic to Communist philosophy or what activi- ties they pursue on their return. To be effective, Communist supporters may lie low until opportune situations arise. The consensus has been that suc- cessful indoctrination is largely a function of the selection process, and the political orientation of most students has been altered only slightly as a result of their training in the USSR. It is impossible to estimate the number that became indoctrinated as a direct result of their Soviet education. 40. Most of the developing countries that are aware of the dangers of Soviet indoctrination appar- ently have not detected major changes in the political and economic views of returning students. Careful student selection and control of student activities in the USSR presumably are considered adequate safeguards, and most countries have indi- cated that their returnees have been affected only SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET slightly. With the reduction of the number of students going to the Soviet Union through illegal recruitment channels, the number of pro--Marxist returnees should be reduced. Influence of Returning Students 41. The impact of Soviet academic training on the political and economic processes of most less developed countries has been negligible. Except in a few countries, such as Yemen and many in Sub- Saharan Africa, where- the pool of educated personnel is very small, the importance of such training in creating a cadre of personnel trained in the USSR rather than in the West also has been small. Soviet- educated students returning to the more progressive developing countries have tended to enter the pro- fessions -- engineering, medicine, and law; chose returning to other less developed countries apparently are marked for positions in the government, the military establishment, and teaching. A number of countries have sent junior government officials to the USSR for training to reduce the serious shortage of skills in the government hierarchy. The Central African Republic, Cameroon, and Sierra Leone, among others, have marked students educated abroad for positions in the government. Of 40 students recently returned to 13 countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, from training in the USSR, 11 were employed as teachers and 25 were employed by their governments. Most of the government employees were in technical ministries, but four of these were placed in top- level positions. They included a Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Commerce, an Assistant to the Vice President, and a cabinet- level officer ii economics. A Soviet-trained Somalian, Hassan Hagi Omar Amei, was elected to the Somalian National Assembly in 1964 on his return from Moscow State University where he had studied International Law. In spite of his out- spoken anti-Western attitudes, Hassan was appointed in July 1967 to the sensitive post of Minister of Information. Later he was reassigned as Minister of State for Rural Development and Self-Help Schemes. 25X1 Information is not avai able to judge the extent of Soviet-trained students who have turned agents, but their number is believed SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET to be small and undoubtedly they were recruited from students who came to the USSR with some Communist persuasions. 42. In the long run, returning students may exert more important pro-Communist influences in their home countries through membership'and activities in social, political, and economic organizations. This factor is especially critical for Latin American countries whose trainees in the USSR were recruited illegally and who are presumed to be Communists. The activities of this group, that often defy sur- veillance, may constitute a threat to their govern- ments. Outlook 43. In ;ap*e of sporadic student discontent and other relat:-,,i problems, Moscow is expected to continue to use acadei.ic training as an important element of its strategy for establishing Soviet influence in, less developed countries. While there is no precise measurement of the program's accomplishments or of how Soviet attitudes will affect its implementation in the future, qualitative judgments point to a positive Soviet assessment. 44. The student training program is a low input/ high yield effort. It involves an annual outlay of $35 million to $40 million which produces a continuing stream of young people exposed to Soviet culture. For most, it is the only foreign experience they will have. In the Soviet judgment, this expenditure may produce stronger ties with some less developed countries than result from the $150 million to $200 million annual net outflow from economic aid programs, some of which are fraught with difficulties and end in failure. 45. In the Soviet view the education of nationals from developing countries is not directly competitive with Western training, which will always be a larger program. Students will continue to come to the Soviet Union because of limited opportunities elsewhere, and the experience of recent years when applications for training in the USSR have exceeded the number of SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6 SECRET places, at times by more than 15 to 1, may be ex- pected to continue. In the future, the academic background of recruits will improve. As the develop- ing nations seek new opportunities to educate their rapidly growing populations, the competition for admission to Soviet universities will become keener, stricter admission standards will be imposed, and the quality of Soviet education for nationals of the developing countries will be improved. The fragmentation of skills associated with Soviet edu- cation may be too narrow for application to Western institutional structures. Nevertheless, narrow specialization fulfills the immediate technical re- quirements of the developing nations. Although Soviet training may lack the breadth of scope to produce able administrators, from the Soviet view this is not critical, because political leaders often do not come from academic backgrounds. 46. In 1968 an estimated 1,500 to 1,700 new students from less developed countries will enroll in Soviet institutions of higher learning, reflecting places vacated by returning peak-year enrollees to their homelands. It is expected that the USSR will add facilities for educating students from the develop- ing countries in the next several years. The number added may be 1,000 to 1,500, or possibly more, de- pending on the Soviet assessment of the return on this program and the competing requirements for new facilities by Soviet students. Even without any addition to its present facilities, however, the level of new enrollments will be somewhat higher for a few years and then gradually stabilize at 1,800 to 2,000 per year. The rapidly expanding enrollment of children in primary schools of the less developed countries between 1950 and 1966 (during which period the number doubled) will exert continuin!j pressures on the governments of less developed countries to provide additional opportunities for tho higher education of their nationals. Because there will be an ever-increasing shortage of faci%.ities, some countries may be willing to accept Soviet conditions for acceptance of their students. These could include the reintroduction of ideological trai,iir.g and a more rigid, doctrinaire program. This kind of shift in emphasis would conform to the current har,3 line attitude of Kremlin leaders. - 22 - SECRET Approved For Release 2009/10/06: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600010077-6