INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NORTH VIETNAM: PROSPECTS FOR TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600020154-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 154
• Publication Date: October 1, 1969
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam: Prospects for Trade with the Free World
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Vietnam: Prospects for Trade with
the Free World
Introduction
Trade with the Free World has traditionally made
up only a small portion of North Vietnam's total
trade but it is important to Hanoi as a source of
hard currency. During the bombing years 1965-68 the
volume of trade with the Free World generally de-
clined, while trade with Communist countries, pri-
marily in the form of imports on long-term credits,
increased substantially. The halt of the US bomb-
ing in late 1968 was followed by a slight recovery
of North Vietnam's trade with the Free World, par-
ticularly with Japan.
This memorandum describes briefly the trade be-
tween North Vietnam and Free World countries during
1965-68 and explores the probable direction and
magnitude of such trade in 196'9 and the next few
years. Foreign exchange ettrnings and shipping costs
are also examined as factors that affect the pros-
pects for Free World trade.
North Vietnam has published no trade statistics
since 1963. Data on North Vietnam's trade with
countries of the Free World are available from the
statistics of trading partners. Trading partner
data give the value of North Vietnamese exports
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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including freight and insurance charges and of
imports excluding these charges, thus overstating the
favorable balance of trade that North Vietnam main-
tains with the Free World. The payments by North
Vietnam for shipping and insurance and the value
of grants from Free World sources'are,not known and
there is little information on which to base esti-
mates. Estimates of North Vietnamese earnings of
hard currencies and of holdings of foreign exchange
are thus only rough approximations..
NORTH VIETNAM .
Trade with the Free World
Million US $
28--
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Free World Trade, 1965-68
1. North Vietnam's trade with the Free World de-
clined during 1965-68 largely because of US bomb
damage to facilities that processed coal and manu-
factured pig iron and cement -- the principal exports.
In addition, Free World shipping to North Vietnam was
discouraged by the hazards created by the bombing and
by US diplomatic pressures.* The value of exports
to the Free World as a portion of total exports
dropped from 23% in 1965 to 13% in 1968; imports de-
clined even further, from 6% of all imports in 1965
to slightly more than 1% in 1968. Exports continued
to decline in 1968, even though bombing had been first
restricted and later halted, but imports rose slightly.
2. The most important Free World trading partner
during 1965-68 was Japan, accounting for more than
one-half of exports and supplying one-third of imports
(see the chart). Exports to Japan dropped signifi-
cantly in 1967 when US bombing halted North Vietnam's
pig iron production and damaged coal loading facili-
ties. Imports from Japan also fell in 1967 but picked
up slightly in 1968. Other Asian countries -- Cambodia,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore -- were the next
most important market. Trade with Western Europe de-
clined as shipping costs increased with the closing of
the Suez Canal and as Asian sources increasingly satis-
fied North Vietnam's Free World trade needs. Trade
with France, th dominant West European trading partner,
declined slightly in 1966 and precipitously in 1967
to not much more than $1 million, compared with more
than $5 million two years earlier.
3. Coal has consistently been North Vietnam's
principal export to the Free World. Most of it goes
to Japan. (Nearly 80% of exports to Japan during
1965-68 consisted of coal.) Small amounts of coal
also were exported to Western Europe until 1968 and
to other Asian countries. Other exports included cement
and pig iron until mid-1967; processed foods such
as tea, oil seeds and nuts, and coffee; some rice,
even though the country is a net grain importer; and
handicraft products.
For a more etaiZed discussion and data on North
Vietnam's trade with the Free WorZd during 1965-68,
see the Appendix.
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4. The principal imports were inputs for North
Vietnamese industry and agriculture. From Japan,
North Vietnam imported textiles, iron and steel prod-
ucts, and chemicals, including fertilizer. Other
Asian countries provided crude rubber, vegetable oils,
timber, and corn. The composition of imports from
Western Europe was similar to that from Japan.
Free World Trade, 1969
5. North Vietnamese trade with the Free World in
the first half of 1969 was slightly higher than in the
same period of 1968, according to incomplete data
from trading partners. Exports declined but imports
increased, continuing the trend of 1968. Table 1
shows trade with leading Free World partners during
the first half of 1969.
Trade With the Free World
Thousand US $
Jan-Jun 1969 a/
Jan-Jun 1968
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
Japan
2,577
2,217
2,991
921
Hong Kong
587
100
418
33
Singapore
900
650
990
869
Europe
France 208
385
106
1,000
West Germany 80
6.
113
223
Italy 35
165
45
26
United Kingdom 91
130
62
75
Total 4,478
3, 653
4,725
3,147
a. Data for Singapore are estimated from trade
reported for January-May. Data for Italy are esti-
mated from trade reported for January-April. Data
for Hong Kong include reexports.
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6. The fall in exports was due largely to a
further reduction of 20% in coal exports to Japan.
Production problems in the coal industry probably
will keep 1969 coal exports at a level below that of
1968. Cement and apatite were exported for the first
? time in several years and rice was shipped to Singapore,
but the amounts involved were relatively small.
? 7. The increase in imports in the first half of
.1969 reflects mainly the purchase of 19,000 metric
tons of chemical fertilizer from Japan, the largest
fertilizer purchase from that country in several years.
Another 36,000 tons of fertilizer were delivered during
July-September, and 30,000 tons are scheduled for the
fourth quarter. Therefore, total imports from the Free
World in 1969 probably will be well above the 1968
level.
8. Although North Vietnam's trade with Japan
almost certainly will be up during 1969, with Western
Europe it probably will remain close to the low level
of 1968, as appears to have been the case in the first
half of the year. There were some inquiries by
European firms for coal, spices, and other North
Vietnamese products, but the lethargic responses by
North Vietnam suggest that no substantial increases
in trade will take place during the remainder of 1969.
Importance of Free World Trade
9. Although North Vietnam's Free World trade has
been small, it has been an important source of hard
currency needed to support diplomatic representations
in Free World countries,* to maintain the delegation
at the Paris peace talks, and to support military and
political activities in the neighboring countries in
Indochina. North Vietnam undoubtedly enjoys some
political dividends through the maintenance of Free
World commercial contacts. Access to Free World
Nort R
h maintains diplomatic representations
at the ambassadorial or consulate general level in
the following Free World countries: Algeria, Burma,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), France, Ghana,
Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Laos, Mali, Mauritania,
Sweden, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, the United Arab Re-
public, and Yemen.
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markets also affords North Vietnam the advantage of
obtaining some goods on much shorter lead time than
would be possible on aid accounts from the more rigid
Communist markets. With only one or two exceptions,
however, the products North Vietnam imports from the
Fre,,. World constitute only a small part of total im-
ports and of total requirements for these products.
The exceptions are natural rubber, all of which comes
from the Free World, and fertilizer, about half of
which will probably come from Japan in 1969.
Hard Currency Earnings
10. North Vietnam's trade surplus with Free World
countries has declined greatly in recent years as
shown in the tabulation.
Million US $
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Projection a/
8 8 5 3
a. Estimate --based on January-June data.
On a regional basis, the greater part of North Viet-
nam's surplus has come from trade with Japan and Hong
Kong. Trade accounts with Singapore, Malaysia, and
Cambodia were approximately in balance during 1965-68.
The Cambodian trade resulted in a slight surplus
and the trade with Singapore and Malaysia a slight
deficit. Throughout 1965-68, trade with Europe has
resulted in consistent and growing deficits that
approached $2 million in 1968.
11. These data exclude shipping charges, however,
so that net hard currency earnings were smaller. North
Vietnam's small merchant fleet, with a total capacity
of about 8,000 gross register tons (GRT), carries less
than 1% of the country's total seaborne foreign trade.
12. Since 1966 the transportation of most of
North Vietnam's Free World exports was shifted from
Free World ships to Communist ships. Thus in 1968,
68% of all exports to the Free World were carried on
Communist ships, compared with 27% in 1965. Payments
for Communist shipping services probably were mainly
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or exclusively on aid account.* Estimated charges
for the use of Communist ships in North Vietnam's
Free World trade during 1965-68 are shown in the
accompanying tabulation,
Million US $
Communist
Shipping Costs
1965
1966
1967
1968
Exports
1.38
2.84
2.05
1.87
Imports
0.86
0.66
0.51
0.24
Total
2.24
3.50
2.56
2.11
It is also highly improbable that North Vietnam would
be charged hard currencies for the Free World shipping
that is chartered by other Communist countries to
carry Communist goods to North Vietnam. Charges in-
curred for such Free World shipping in the Communist
trade with North Vietnam are estimated to have amounted
to $1.5 million in 1965 and to more than $5.0 million
in 1968.
13. On the assumption that none of the services
of Communist or Communist-chartered ships were paid
for in hard currency, North Vietnam's hard currency
payments on shipping account were solely those to
Free World shipowners. These estimated payments,
which declined greatly both in absolute terms and as
a share of Free World trade, are shown in Table 2.
14. In addition to earnings of hard currency
through trade with the Free World, North Vietnam re-
ceived during 1966-68 more than $6.0 million in grants
from nongovernmental groups in the Free World. Slightly
less than $3.0 million were currency grants, and the
In 1966 tie USSR requested North Vietnam to pay
in hard currencies 35% of the cost of the Soviet
shipping services used in the Free World trade, but
there is no indication that such payment was ever
made or that similar requests were made in later
years.
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Estimated Annual Net Earnings of Hard Currencies
Million US $
1965
1966
1967
1968
Exports, c.i.f. a/
23.39.
20.69
11.83
10.31
Less shipping costs b/
3.74
1.33
0.39
0.36
Earnings from exports
19.65
19.36
11.44
9.95
Imports, f.o.b. c/
15.00
12.79
6.42
7.29
Plus shipping costs d/
0.48
0.20
0.17
0.1.3
Total cost of imports
15.48
12.99
6.59
7.42
Net earnings
4.17
6.37
4.85
2.53
a. Values are reported by importing country. Dur-
ing the bombing years, North Vietnam apparently re-
ceived the full c.i.f. values from Free World import-
ers and arranged for all shipping on exports. In
mid-1969, North Vietnam asked f.o.b. prices on
Japanese offers to purchase coal, suggesting that
the importer would arrange and pay for shipping in
the normal manner.
b. Shipping costs are those owed to Free World
shipowners carrying exports to Free World countries.
The charges for Communist shipping are presumed not
to be paid for in hard currencies but to be covered
by long-term credits from communist countries.
c. Values of imports are those f.o.b. values re-
ported by the exporting Free World country.
d. Shipping costs are those owed to Free World
shipowners carrying imports from the Free World.
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remainder, medical supplies and small quantities of
food. However, if as seems likely, some of the goods
provided as grants were included in the data on imports
for North Vietnam, North Vietnam's net hard currency
earnings during the period may have been as much as
$3.0 million larger than shown in Table 2.
15. 'Because s;iipping cosh represent a significant
expenditure of North Vietnamese hard currency, there
has been considerable activity in recent months toward
building up North Vietnam's merchant fleet. The
Christo Botev (2,747 GRT) was delivered to North Vietnam
in. late May 1969, apparently a gift from Bulgaria.
Also, North Vietnam is negotiating to purchase the
Amfithea (Cyprus, 5,171 GRT) through a British firm
for $312,000. Purchase negotiations are in progress
with the United Kingdom for two 10,000-GRT? ships at
a price of $1.2 million, with Japan for the Daku Maru
(6,000 GRT) and the Chow Maru (3,874 GRT) , with the
Hong Kong based Ankan Shipping Company for the Lucky
Dragon (Singapore, 4,225 GRT), and with Bulgaria for another
freighter. While some of the negotiations could best
be described as "shopping around," it is apparent
that North Vietnam is intent on expanding its merchant
fleet.
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Trade Prospects
18. To expand Free World trade, North Vietnam must
expand its exports and/or obtain long-term Free World
credits, but the prospectF; are poor for either as
long as the war continues. Although North Vietnam has
considerable potential for expanding exports to the
Free World, it will take considerable time -- possibly
as much as two years -- to regain even the prebombing
export capacity. Industrial facilities were damaged
and allowed to deteriorate during the US bombing, and
agricultural output dropped, so that considerable im-
ports of foodstuffs were required to maintain minimum
consumption. The pace of restoring output of the
principal export products -- coal, cement, and pig
iron -- has been slow since the partial bombing halt
of March 1968. Continued large-scale Communist aid
will reduce the need for a rapid buildup of exports.
19. Japan, which is a potential market for almost
any mineral that North Vietnam can export, will almost
certainly be the dominant Free World trading partner.
Japan has already expressed an interest in buying
increased amounts of coal, apatite, and chromite ores.
Although trade with Western Europe will improve
eventually, it is unlikely to regain its prebombing
importance for North Vietnam, even if the Suez Canal
is reopened.
20. Coal will probably continue to be North
Vietnam's most important export to the Free World,
mainly to Japan and other Far Eastern countries. North
Vietnam has large reserves of anthracite coal esti-
mated by a Soviet survey to be between 2/ and 5 bil-
lion metric tons. Production apparently has been
depressed, but with new equipment from the Communist
countries, productivity could be increased fairly
rapidly. North Vietnam has already received Soviet,
Polish, and Chinese aid for the coal industry, in-
cluding aid to Vietnamese students to study coal
mining techniques in these countries.
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21. Pig iron exports earned nearly $2 million
annually in trade with Japan during 1965-66, but were
stopped by bombing in mid-1967. Photography indicates
that restoration of one of the three damaged blast
furnaces at the Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex the principal source of North Vietnamese pig iron may have been started. This furnace, which has an
annual capacity of 100,000 tons, was only slightly
damaged, and probably could be producing pig iron in
1970. Japanese importers have already indicated an
interest in resuming imports of North Vietnamese pig
iron when it becomes available. In time, however,
as complementary facilities (for ingot and rolled
steel production) are built, pig iron will be no~eded
domestically, limiting the amounts available for
export.
22. Apatite exports, which before the bombing
amounted to more than 300,000 tons (worth about $3 mil-
lion) out of a production of 925,000 tons, should re-
cover rapidly now that interdicted transport routes
have been repaired. The bulk of these exports, how-
ever, will probably go to Communist countries since
most went to these countries before the bombing.
Earnings from Free World sales will probably be small.
Japan is currently negotiating for the purchase of as
much as 5,000 tons per month, which comes to about
$600,000 a year.
23. Other minerals offer some possibilities for
increased exports to the Free World. Cement exports
have not been restored to levels that prevailed before
the damage incurred during the bombing. However, even
when production is restored to pre-war capacity, grow-
ing domestic needs and a low world market price probably
will preclude any important increase in export earnings
from cement. Possible exports of chrome ore have
been discussed with the Japanese, but reserves and
processing facilities within North Vietnam are small.
Tin is mined and refined in relatively small amounts
(the highest annual pre-war production being about
600 tons), most of which is exported to Communist
countries. Small reserves of bauxite -- about 2.5 mil-
lion tons -- probably would not justify the investment
needed to process it as an export.
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24. There are possibilities for the eventual ex-
pansion of agricultural exports to the Free World.
Chronic ills that beset Communist agriculture have
been aggravated by the war in North Vietnam, however,
and it is doubtful whether North Vietnam will be able
to increase output of agricultural products enough
to generate substantial export earnings. Production
of commercial crops such as tea, coffee, tobacco,
groundnuts, jute, and silk is dispersed, poorly
organized, and inefficient. For some time, priority
probably will be given to staple crops, especially
rice, to reduce dependence on imports. Similar
problems hinder timber production, which might other-
w. .se find a ready market in Japan. Industrial equip-
ment for processing foods and for fabricating plywood
and similar lumber products has been imported or is
solicited from Communist countries. Any large increase
in output from these aid projects, however? probably
would be committed first to Coimnunist markets.
25. It is unlikely that exports of North Vietnamese
manufactures to the Free World could be expanded in
any significant way. Domestic requirements for such
products are still far from satisfied by present
levels of output. Although textiles, footwear, and
clothing are now being exported to Communist countries,
the low quality of North Vietnamese goods makes them
poor products for the Free World market. Some negoti-
ations with Japanese and European firms have indicated
a possibility for building small assembly plantL in
the textile industry, but production from these projects,
if they are built, would be small and the increment to
exports would be marginal.
26. As an alternative to increasing the output of
exportable goods, North Vietnam could divert to Free
World markets items such as coal, apatite, and ores
normally exported to Communist countries. This is
occurring in the case of exports of coal to Japan,
which have been largely maintained this year, even
though production had fallen sharply, at the expense
of exports to China. Seaborne exports of coal to
China fell 41 percent in January-August 1969 compared
with the same period in 1968, while the shipments to
Japan declined only 15%. Nevertheless it is doubtful
whether the Communist countries, to which North
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Vietnam is heavily indebted, would long permit a
reduction in North Vietnamese deliveries.
Aid Prospects
27. There is a fairly good chance that North
Vietnam will obtain financial assistance from some
Free World countries even though the war persists.
There are at present two Free World plans offering
long-term assistance for postwar reconstruction and
development of the North Vietnamese economy -- the
Miki Plan and the Nordic Plan. In addition, the
French President, Georges Pompidou, recently offered
limited reconstruction assistance to North Vietnam
once the war is over.
28., ACS originally conceived, the Miki Plan, named
for the former Foreign Minister of Japan, was to provide
for immediate postwar humanitarian relief to both
Vietnams, for housing, hospitals, schools, and the
like. This plan was to have involved expenditures of
about $200 million during a two-year period. Although
the Japanese have allocated $30,000 for a feasibility
study, it now appears that prospects for implementing
the Miki proposal have been dimmed by the political
demise of its originator. It is highly likely, however,
that some form of financial assistance for reconstruc-
tion will be offered by the Japanese government to the
two Vietnams once peace comes.
29. The Nordic Plan was instigated by Sweden and
is supported by the four Nordic countries Sweden, Fin-
land, Norway, and Denmark. The Nordic governments have
already allocated $95,000 to the International Red
Cross in Geneva for a "preliminary in-country survey"
of North Vietnam's immediate needs, and a medium-level
North Vietnamese delegation of trade and industrial
experts toured Sweden in September and subsequently
visited Denmark, Finland, and Norway. The delegation
investigated industrial facilities in these countries
that could be used to aid North Vietnam in reconstruc-
tion and development. The delegation expressed
particular interest in papermaking, shipbuilding, and
hydroelectric facilities.
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30. The total value of assistance to North Vietnam
under the Nordic Plan has apparently not yet been
determined. Officials have indicated that the Swedish
government would extend to North Vietnam reconstruction
assistance valued at nearly $40 million during three
years commencing 1 July 1970 (fiscal year 1971).
Two-thirds of the aid is to be credit and one-third
grant. The aid proposal, however, has generated con-
siderable opposition both at home and abroad, and there
is some doubt whether the aid will be extended at the
time originally announced. Sweden has been the moving
force behind the effort in the Free World to assist
North Vietnam in postwar reconstruction, and the
Swedish contribution is expected to make up the larger
share of the aid provided under the Nordic Plan. So
far the Swedish government is the only Nordic govern-
ment actually to extend aid to North Vietnam, with a
$4 million grant in fiscal year 1970 to be used for
the purchase of medical equipment and fertilizer.
Conclusions
31. Trade with the Free World is of small economic
importance for North Vietnam and is insignificant for
its Free World trading partners. North Vietnam fills
the bulk of its import requirements from Communist
countries on credit or as grants. Imports from Free
World countries are only supplementary and generally
small. A favorable balance of trade with the Free
World, however, has supplied North Vietnam with hard
currency to meet its fairly limited needs, such as
for maintaining diplomatic representation in Free World
countries. In addition, Free World trade provides
contacts useful in generating international support for
the current war.
32. Trade with the free World declined during 1965-
68 because of bombing-induced production difficulties
and US diplomatic pressures. The total bombing halt
in late 1968, however, marked the beginning of a
slow recovery of trade with the Free World, primarily
due to a substantial increase in imports from Japan --
North Vietnam's main trading partner in the Free World.
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33. The slow recovery of the economy from the bomb-
ing, the continued diversion of resourceu to support
Communist military activities in Indochina, and the
growing domontic needs preclude a nubetantia], incroaao
in exports at leant in the next year or two. In the
longer run, thorn will be a number of items that North
Vietnam could market in substantial amounts in the
Free World, especially in Japan. 'these include coal,
cement, apatite, agricultural products, and pig iron.
The availability of there products will depend both
on the effort made to develop oxpor. to and on the amountn
reserved for Commun tut markets. North Vietnam probably
will be anxious to expand trade with the Free World.
Clow much it will be able to do no will be strongly
influenced by Soviet and Chineno trade and aid policy.
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APPENDIX
Free World Trade, 1965-68
Exports
North Vietnam's exports to the Free World have
fallen substantially since 1965, largely because of
the US bomb damage to coal, pig iron, and cement
facilities. Also contributing to the decline in Free
World trade was the fear on the part of trading
partners of sending ships into North Vietnamese waters
during the bombing, the closing of the Suez Canal, and
US diplomatic pressures. Exports to the Free World
an a portion of total exports declined from 23% to
18% from 1965 to 1968. Table 3 shows the value of
North Vietnamese exports to major Free World markets
during 1965-60.
Japan has been the major Free World market for
North Vietnam exports. During 1965-68 North Vietnam
sold goods to Japan with a total value of $34 million,
more than half of all exports to the Free World. Coal
exports to Japan continue to be North Vietnam's major
source of hard currtwncy. More than 1.3 million metric
tons of high-quality anthracite coal from the lion Gai-
Cam Pha area were sent to Japan during 1965-68, brinr-
ing in an estimated $27 million in hard currencies.
North Vietnam Also exported some pig iron to Japan,
although damage from the bombing reduced the volume in
1967, and none was exported in 1968. Less important
North Vietnamese exports to Japan included (1) small
amounts of agricultural products such an jute, raw
silk, and groundnuts and (2) handicrafts, primarily
basketwork, rattan, and straw products.
Following Japan, other Asian countries -- Cam-
bodia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore -- have been
North Vietnam's largest Free World export market in
recent years. North Vietnam exported goods valued
at about $20 million to there countries during 1965-68.
{long Kong imported `ood products such as tea; small
amounts of rice, oil seeds, and nuts; small amounts of
coal; and light manufactures similar to those sent to
Japan. Hong Kong also imported cement until North
Vietnam's cement exports were cut off in mid-1967.
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Table 3
Exports to the Free World, by Country
Thousand US $
1965
1966
1967
1968
Asia
17,958
17,099
10F551
9,368
Japan
11,457
9,651
6,685
6,108
Singapore-Malaysia
1,859
1,793
1,676
1,600
Hong Kong
2,660
3,032
11097
1,160
Cambodia
1,979
1,595
1,086
500
Other
3
1,028
b
7
-
Europe
5,381
3,545
1,180
941
France
3,021
2,643
541
313
West Germany
215
147
122
172
Netherlands
573
112
99
128
United Kingdom
333
7'.'
207
122
Italy
485
1%j
71
107
Switzerland
44
47
9
74
Austria
78
139
74
10
Sweden
24
32
27
9
Belgium-Luxembourg
604
19
27
2
Other
4
7
3
4
Other countries 1
55
47
99
0
23,394
20,691
11,830
10.309
a. C.i.f. values ins u ing shipping o iargeo as
reported by the trading partner.
b. Largely a shipment of rice and Dement to Ceylon.
o. Primarily exports to the United Arab Republic.
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Coffee accounted for more than one-half of exports
to Singapore and Malaysia, with oil seeds, nuts, and
rice making up most of the remainder. Exports to
Cambodia, primarily cement and sugar, dropped signifi-
cantly in 1968.
North Vietnam's exports to Western Europe dropped
from $5.4 million in 1965 to $0.9 million in 1968.
The chief factor in the decline was the rapid fall in
coal exports, which exceeded $3.0 million in 1965 but
declined steadily thereafter and were discontinued
altogether in 1968. Other miscellaneous exports of
processed foods and handicrafts have dropped off slightly
in value from a total of about $1.2 million in 1965 to
$0.9 million in 1968.
France has been North Vietnam's primary Free World
trading partner in Europe, and will probably continue
to be no if the statements by North Vietnamese trade
officials concerning preferred treatment for France in
trade agreements can be accepted. During 1965-68
France received more than one-half of all North Viet-
namese exports to Western Europe. Other significant
Free World customers in Europe included the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy.
Imports
North Vietnam's imports from the Free World de-
clined during 1965-67 but increased slightly in 1968.
Recent increases have resulted largely from the partial
and subsequent total bombing halt, Principal imports
from the Free World have been textiles, chemicals,
machinery and equipment, steel products, and crude
rubber. The value of imports from the Free World has
declined as a portion of total imports from 6% in
1965 to slightly more than 1% in 1968. Table 4
shows North Vietnamese imports from Free World coun-
tries during 1965-68, valued at f.o.b. prices, as re-
ported by the country of origin.
During 1965-68, North Vietnam's imports from Japan
were valued at about $14.0 million, a third of all
imports from the Free World. Imports from Japan
included a wide range of goods, with the principal
items being textile products, primarily wool tops and
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Table 4
Imports from the Free World, by Country
Thousand US $
1965
1966
1967
1968
Asia
9,570_
8,841.
4,019
4,618
Japan
3,853
5,649
1,817
2,444
Singapore-Malaysia
2,800
1,858
1,228
1,232
Cambodia
2,161
1,041
830
703
Hong Kong f
431
251
144
239
Other
325 c/
42
Europe
5,061_
3,893
2,395
2,668
France
2,124
2,290
627
1,374
West Germany
136
212
521
664
United Kingdom
202
104
185
254
Italy
633
399
550
143
Netherlands
93
302
473
46
Belgium-Luxembourg
1,685
515
-
18
Switzerland
101
31
9
16
Other
87
40
30
153
Other countries e/
Total
1 5, 004
12, 790
6,420
7, 290
a. F. o,-b. va
u
eo reported by the trading partner.
b. Including reexports.
n. This total was made up largely by imports of
tallow from Australia.
d. The total came from Soandi:avian countries.
e. Largely trade with the United Arab Republic.
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yarn; iron and steel products such as tinplate, wires,
and rods; and chemical products such as organic com-
pounds and pharmaceuticals.
Imports from the other Asian countries, about
$13 million in 1965-68, consisted largely of raw
materials. Crude rubber,worth about $1.0 million
annually, and vegetable oils were imported from
Singapore and Malaysia. From Cambodia, North Vietnam
imported primarily timber and corn. Much of the
small volume of goods imported from Hong Kong -- only
about $1 million during 1965-68 -- consisted of transit
cargo, including dyeing, tanning, and coloring
materials; metal products; and textiles from other
Free World countries.
North Vietnam imported goods from Western Europe
valued at about $14 million during 1965-68. Such
imports consisted largely of chemicals, basic manu-
factures, and machinery and equipment. Chemical im-
ports made up slightly less than one-fifth of total
imports from Western Europe and consisted of pharma-
ceuticals and miscellaneous industrial chemicals,
largely from France, West Germany, the United Kingdom,
and until 1967 the Netherlands. Basic manufactures
accounted for about one-half of all imports from Western
Europe and included iron and steel products -- chiefly
steel wire -- from France and the United Kingdom and
leather from France. Machinery and equipment imported
from France, West Germany, Italy, and Switzerland
included electrical equipment, transportation equip-
ment -- largely nonmotorized vehicles and cycles --
and miscellaneous industrial equipment and parts,
most of which was related to textile manufacturing.
Small amounts of foods and beverages were also im-
ported from Western Europe. The most significant
trend in this market has been the growing importance
of West Germany. While overall imports from Western
Europe have declined, the value of goods imported
from West Germany has increased almost fourfold since
1965.
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