FRANCE AFTER DEVALUATION: PRESENT ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
France After Devaluation:
Present Economic Policies And Prospects
ER IM 70-22
February 1970
Copy No.
49
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
13, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
OROUP I
U XCL17DRD TIIUM AU TUMATIC
UOWN1111ADINf A II
UV1:I.ANSIPII ATIUN
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CONFII)EN1'IAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
February 1970
France After Devaluation:
Present Economic Policies And Prospects
Introduction
During his forthcoming visit to the United
States, French President Pompidou will leave behind
an economy in which his own policies play a cru-
cial -- but still not fully tested -- role in
achieving a viable balance between internal and ex-
ternal economic forces. Faced after his election
with an overheated domestic economy and a steadily
deteriorating international economic position, Pom-
pidou devalued the franc by 11.1% (i.e., a 12.5%
increase in the cost of dollar exchange to French
importers of foreign goods) on 10 August 1969 and
followed up this move with wide-ranging policies
designed to cool the domestic boom and bring the
international accounts into balance within a rela-
tively short time. This memorandum assesses the
French government's present economic policies and
their prospects for success.
Events Leading to the Devaluation*
1. Following the student-labor crisis of May-
June 1968, the French economy staged a remarkable
recovery, marked by the relative lack of government
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current In-
telligence and the office of National Estimates.
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
intervention. Imbalances in France's external
financial accounts soon developed, however, caused
both by trade deficits and by speculative outflows
of capital, which probably totaled about $1 billion
during the year. During the last half of 1968, an-
ticipation of further price increases, a sharply
rising government budget deficit, rapidly rising
wages, and speculation on a franc devaluation all
combined to produce a rapid expansion in consumer
outlays and private investment expenditures. During
this period the rate of increase of consumption
exceeded that of disposable income.
2. When the speculative outflow of capital,
which peaked during the international monetary crisis
of November 1968, threatened the parity of the franc,
the government shifted to a more restrictive economic
policy. Price surveillance was intensified and
stricter fiscal and monetary measures were adopted.
3. These measures were instrumental in slowing
the growth of domestic economic activity during the
first half of 1969, but inflation accelerated.
Industrial production, which by December 1968 had
rissn almost 10% above the pre-strike level, grew
only slowly in the course of 1969, as shown in
Table 1. This slowdown was due partly to the attain-
ment of near-capacity production levels and partly
to a slower growth of domestic demand. Real wages,
which had increased about 10% from June to December
1968, rose only slowly through most of 1969, as the
cost of living climbed steadily. Investment expendi-
tures, although considerably less dynamic than in
the last half of 1968, continued to rise. In general,
both excess demand and cost-push conditions persisted,
although to a reduced extent.
4. While domestic production slowed, imports
continued to boom, particularly in the second quarter
of 1969, as shown in Table 2. Unlike the increase
in imports in the second half of 1968 which reflected
a sharp revival of economic activity after the May-
June riots, the renewed spurt in imports in the
second quarter of 1969 appears to reflect to some
extent the existence of excess demand but mainly
speculative buy' anticipation of a devaluation
of the franc. the rate
of inventory accumulation was high as business
accelerated its purchases of investment and consumer
goods. As speculative fever grew, foreigners tended
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CONFIDENTIAL
1963 = 100
Industrial /
Real
Retail
Wholesale c/
1968
Production
Wages
Wages b/
Prices
Prices
January
125
130.9
113.8
115.0
103.1
February
126
115.1
10 3.7
March
128
115.2
101.6
April
128
132.6
114.8
115.5
100.9
May
89
115.8
101.0
June
104
116.2
101.9
July
130
146.7
125.8
116.6
102.4
August
130
117.2
102.9
September
131
117.9
104.0
October
137
149.9
125.8
119.2
104.8
November
139
119.6
105.1
December
141
119.9
108.9
January
140
152.0
125.4
121.2
109.6
February
137
121.6
109.9
March
137
122.1
110.4
April
142
155.0
126.3
122.7
111.5
May
143
123.3
111.8
June
140
123.7
112.7
July
141
158.6
127.7
124.2
113.1
August
141
124.5
114.5
September
142
125.2
115.6
October
146
162.1
128.7
126.0
117.4
November
126.5
118.1
December
126.8
a. Seasonally adjusted.
b. Hourly rates for manufacturing workers.
c. Intermediate products.
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CONFIDENTIAL
France: Imports of Industrial Equipment
and Manufactured Consumer Goods, Quarterly Data a/
Million US $
1967
Industrial
Equipment
Manufactured Consumer
Goods
lst quarter
519
406
2d quarter
516
407
3d quarter
419
350
4th quarter
499
436
1st quarter
528
471
2d quarter
520
454
3d quarter
535
453
4th quarter
674
660
lst quarter
637
680
2d quarter
757
755
3d quarter
709
683
a. Francs were converted to dollars at the par
value rate of exchange of 5.55419 francs to US $1.
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CONFIDENTIAL
to postpone their purchases from France in antici-
pation of lower prices. As a result, exports
declined slightly in the two months preceding the
devaluation.
5. The boom in imports and the slowing down of
exports increased the trade deficit. The gap be-
tween imports actually entering the country and
exports actually leaving it, however, accounts for
only a part of the massive deficit in the French
balance of payments, which totaled almost $1.9
billion in the first half of 1969 (see Table 3).
The deficit was smaller than the $2.4 billion in
the second half of 1968 because of the elimination
of a net outflow of about $1 billion on capital
account by means of tight exchange controls.
Exchange controls, however, were unable to prevent
a heavy loss of foreign exchange through changes
in the timing of payments on commodity transactions.
6. Anticipating higher import prices following
a devaluation, French importers sought to prepay
their foreign purchases to the extent possible.
At the same time, foreign buyers of French goods
attempted to postpone payment until after the de-
valuation. The French government instituted con-
trols to curtail forward transactions in foreign
currencies, but these controls were not effective.
Payments for imports exceeded receipts for exports
by $0.5 billion in the second half of 1968 and by
$1.3 billion in the first half of 1969. However,
the trade deficit as recorded by French customs --
that is, the value of imports actually entering the
country less the value of exports leaving it -- was
only $0.1 billion and $0.3 billion, respectively,
in the same periods on the basis of comparable
valuations (see Table 4). The difference between
these two measures of the deficit on commodity
transactions ($0.4 billion in the second half of
1968 and $1 billion in the first half of 1969) is,
in effect, a capital outflow due in large part to
speculative leads and lags in payments. During
this period the Bank of France recorded steady
losses of reserves, with the exception of a few
months following the temporary resolution of the
November 1968 monetary crisis. From 31 March 1968
to 31 July 1969, gross reserves (including the IMF
gold tranche) declined $3.3 billion, and an addi-
tional $1.5 billion in swap credits was used up.
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Table 3
France: Summary Balance of Payments Outside Franc Zone a/
Million US
First Half
Second Half
Total
First Half
1968
1968 -
1968
1969
-128
-904
-1,032
-1,603
Merchandise trade balance
(f.o.b./f.o.b.)
-79
-537
-616
-1,318
Services
-49
-367
-416
-285
Transportation
-69
-93
-162
-131
C
Travel
35
-179
-144
-16
Z
Other
-15
-95
-110
-138
T1
Unilateral transfers
-216
-279
-495
-313
d
0
z
Current account balance
Long-term capital
-344
-276
-1,183
-435
-1,527
-711
-1,916
165
Basic balance
-620
-1,618
-2,238
-1,751
Short-term capital
-456
-543
-999
-121
Other b/
168
-209
-41
14
Total
-908
-2,370
-3,278
-1,858
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. Includes (1) Merchandise Transactions Abroad, (2) Multilateral Settlements,
and (3) Errors and Omissions.
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France: Commodity Trade Flows and Payments
Million US $
Payments Basis Customs Basis Adjusted
Customs
Exports Imports Exports Imports Balance
(f.o.b.) (f.o.b.) Balance (f.o.b.) (C.i.f.) Balance (f.o.b./f.o.b.)
1968
First half
Second half
Total 11,195
1969
First half
Second half
Total
-79
5,116
5,735
-619
-46
-537
5,899
6,675
-776
-108
11,811
-616
11,015
12, 410
-1,395
-154
-1,318
6,569
7,648
-1,079
-314
7,115
8,308
-1,193
-362
13,684
15,956
-2,272
-676
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CONFIDENTIAL
On 8 August 1969, gross reserves, which had
totaled $6.9 billion on 31 March 1968, had dwindled
to $3.6 billion (see Table 5). During the same
period, the liabilities of the Bank of France
increased from zero to $2.4 billion.
Economic Policies After the Devaluation
7. Immediately following the devaluation on
10 August, the Pompidou government initiated a
comprehensive stabilization program designed to
aid in accomplishing three linked objectives:
(a) to balance the central government cash budget
by January 1970 and keep it balanced throughout
the year; (b) to curb excess consumer and invest-
ment demand in the economy as a whole by March 1970;
and (c) to balance France's foreign trade account
by July 1970.
8. As part of its deflationary fiscal program,
the government reduced the anticipated 1969 budget
deficit from $1.2 billion to $650 million. This
was accomplished essentially through acceleration
of corporate income tax payments, increased col-
lection of customs duties resulting from a higher-
than-planned level of imports, a freeze on certain
government expenditures (for example, new govern-
ment hiring), and cancellation of the 1969 special
tax credit for inves ;.:rent goods purchased after
3 September 1969. r:he 1970 budget bill, approved
in late November, projects a small surplus, pri-
marily from a reduction in the rate of growth of
expenditures. Government expenditures in 1970 are
to increase 6.2% over those of 1969, substantially
less than the average annual increase of 12.1% in
the three years 1967-69 and the 1969 increase of
16.1%. Because of prior commitments in several
major areas of current spending (for example, edu-
cation), a major part of the expenditure cuts has
fallen on government capital expenditures. Funds
authorized for public works are slated to decrease
by 7% from the 1969 authorization. The existence
of "optional credits," however, allows the govern-
ment to inject additional funds into the economy
on short notice if this should seem desirable.
If optional credits are included in the 1970 budget,
capital expenditures could increase by as much as
4% rather than decreasing by 7%.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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French Gross Reserves, Quarterly Data
Million US $
1968
Gold
Foreign
Exchange
IMF/GAB
Gross
Reserves
Change of Gross Reserves
31 March
5,235
788
883
6,906
30 June
4,739
778
--
5,517
-1,389
30 September
4,166
208
--
4,374
-1,143
31 December
3,877
323
1
4,201
-173
31 March
3,827
159
1
3,987
-214
30 June
3,552
58
1
3,611
-376
31 July
3,551
43
1
3,595
-16
Total
-3,311
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CONFIDENTIAL
9. In monetary policy, aside from extending
credit controls to mid-1970, the principal innova-
tions were to close the many loopholes in existing
controls and to force the banking system to observe
the credit quotas imposed by the monetary author-
ities. The French government now has in effect
probably the stiffest credit controls of any West-
ern country. The discount rate, raised by the Bank
of France to 8% in October, is, with the exception
of Denmark's 9%, the highest in Western Europe.
The Bank also increased minimum reserve requirements,
tightened the criteria for rediscounting medium-
term loans for investment, and included previously
exempted operations within the credit quotas. Con-
sumer credit also was tightened. Minimum downpay-
ment requirements were increased from 30% to 50%
for autos and to 40% for most other consumer
durables, and maximum repayment periods typically
were reduced from 18 to 15 months. The government
also introduced a variety of incentives designed to
increase personal savings. These include higher
interest rates on savings accounts, special premiums
for those depositors who leave their funds in such
accounts for extended periods, and increased tax
exemptions for bond interest and life insurance pre-
miums.
10. Still, the total package of policy measures
in the government's stabilization plan does not
represent a severe austerity program. Fearful that
too strong deflationary measures would cause a
recession, as well as political unrest, the Pompidou
government is trying to achieve a slowing of infla-
tion and a balance in its foreign trade accounts by
mid-1970 without absolute price freezes, declines
in production, or large increases in unemployment.
For political as well as economic reasons the
government is unwilling to curb demand drastically
by increasing taxes. Furthermore, the reductions
in government expenditures in 1969 and in the budget
planned for 1970 will inevitably take time to have
a significant impact on the level of economic activ-
ity. The effects on economic activity are planned
to be moderate -- a 4% growth of GNP in real terms
and a 4% rate of inflation are expected in 1970.
This would preserve most of the competitive edge
gained from the August devaluation and, by reducing
the pressure of domestic demand on productive capac-
ity, would facilitate the expansion of exports.
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I CONFIDEN'iiAL
The Economy Since Devaluation
11. Trends since the August devaluation in both
domestic economic activity and foreign trade and
payments are encouraging. The tightening of mone-
tary policy has already brought about a decline in
credit creation, and the resulting high interest
rates have contributed to a substantial increase
in domestic savings. In November the rate of growth
of private savings was the highest ever recorded.
Although figures are not available for total sav-
ings, net deposits in savings banks, which had
totaled only $3U0 million during the first half of
1969, had reached $1.7 billion by the end of Decem-
ber. At the end of 1969 the money supply was in-
creasing at an annual rate of less than 6% -- half
the rate prevailing in December 1968.
12. Tighter money and more restrictive credit
policies appear to be affecting consumer expendi-
tures. Although little data are yet available, a
November study of retail merchants' opinions indi-
cates that a slackening of consumer demand is
expected. In December, automobile and appliance
sales reportedly fell sharply from normally high
seasonal levels. Inflation showed some signs of
slowing as retail prices rose only 2.5% in the
second half of 1969 compared with 3.2% in the first
half, in spite of the increase in prices of imported
goods as a result of devaluation.
13. France's trade balance has improved. The
French government had predicted in October that
stabilization policies would result in a balance
in foreign trade by mid-1970. ("Balance" in this
context is defined as a ratio of exports (f.o.b.)
to imports (c.i.f.) equal to 93%.*) Substantial
increases in exports during September-December and
a decline in imports after October (see Table 6)
brought a balance far ahead of the government's
original schedule (see Table 7). The government
is now projecting a small surplus by mid-1970.
* The French government uses the trade balance
based on monthly customs data, and thus the 93%
benchmark, as a proxy for more complete data on
trade and current account payments because of the
delay in collecting and publishing balance-of-pay-
ments figures .
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CONFIDENTIAL
French Trade Outside Franc Zone
Seasonally Adjusted
Million US $
Exports
(f.o.b.)
Imports
(c.i.f.)
Trade
Balance
January
811
855
-44
February
814
866
-52
.March
829
869
-40
April
804
878
-74
May
616
624
-8
June
591
858
-267
July
982
1,028
-46
August
870
957
-87
September
842
976
-134
October
914
1,036
-122
November
887
1,042
-155
December'
876
1,077
-201
January
949
1,081
-132
February
926
1,059
-133
March
890
1,046
-156
April
993
1,195
-202
May
978
1,226
-248
June
1,022
1,234
-212
July
1,012
1,289
-277
August
955
1,260
-305
September
1,075
1,349
-274
October
1,183
1,397
-214
November
1,130
1,227
-97
December
1,198
1,290
-92
a. Francs were converted to dollars at the par
value rate of exchange of 5.55419 francs to US $1.
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Exports as a Percentage of Imports
in Trade Outs&.de Franc Zone
1968
1969
January
0.95
0.88
February
0.94
0.87
March
0.95
0.85
April
0.92
0.83
May
0.99
0.80
June
0.69
0.3
July
0.96
0.79
August
0.91
0.76
September
0.86
0.80
October
0.88
0.85
November
0.85
0.92
December
0.81
0.93
14. Devaluation does not appear to have stemmed
the outflow of capital until after Germany revalued
the Deutschemark on 26 October 1969. Until that
time, French capital continued to flow to Germany,
and official French reserves continued to decline,
necessitating a $500 million drawing on the $985
million standby credit granted by the IMF. Follow-
ing the German revaluation, however, substantial
reflows of capital from West Germany enabled the
French government to reduce its short-term foreign
indebtedness, thereby increasing its net moi,etary
reserves by $200 million in November and $250 mil-
lion in December. As a result of further reflows
of capital, the reversal of leads and lags in pay-
ments, and the allocation of $165 million in Special
Drawing Rights (SDR's), net monetary reserves rose
almost $400 million in January 1970. As of 31 Jan-
uary 1970, they were estimated at $2.1 billion, up
from $1.2 billion on the eve of devaluation.
Prospects for 1970
15. Prospects are for a large improvement in
France's balance of payments during the first half
of 1970. Basically, the improvement will reflect a
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CONI 1I)EN'1'IAL,
reversal of the speculative transactions in goods
and currencies which were responsible for most of
the deficit in 1969. Inventory accumulation of
imported goods, which was large before the devalua-
tion, should be reduced.. The reversal of leads
and lags in France's foreign trade payments should
have an even larger effect. Some of this improve-
ment will appear in the balance of payments for
the last half of 1969, but most of it will be
registered in 1970 balance-of-payments data. It is
impossible, however, to predict the magnitude of
the reflex of speculative funds into France. The
amount of French funds being held outside France is
still very large. Probably some two-thirds of the
cumulative balance-of-payments deficit of over $5
billion during 1968 and the first half of 1969 was
due to one or another form of speculation or capital
flight. With the franc devaluation and the Deutsche-
mark revaluation accomplished and the gold market
depressed, much capital could return to France. On
the other hand, confidence in the franc and in
France's economic and political stability clearly is
not as yet strong, and many people may await develop-
ments in France before bringing th.iir money home.
16. Much will depend, therefore, on the ability
of the Pompidou government to slow inflation, while
avoiding serious labor unrest. There appears to be
a fair chance of slowing inflation. Although business
investment plans as of November indicate further
expansion of investment expenditures, largely due to
c.)ntinued strong foreign demand for French industrial
goods, the rate of increase is expected to decline
somewhat. Consumer demand appears to be slackening.
The government estimates that productive capacity in
industry will increase faster than industrial output.
However, upward pressure on prices and an inflation
psychology persist. Although the devaluation of the
franc has not led to any acceleration in the rise of
prices so far: it will no doubt be instrumental in at
least maintaining some cost-push inflationary pressure
in early 1970 despite the gradual slackening of home
demand. The November survey of French business
opinion mentioned earlier suggests 1970 price in-
creases in the order of 5%, somewhat higher than the
government's forecast of 4% for 1970.
17. The government must also obtain the coopera-
tion of workers and trade unions in moderating their
demands for large wage increases. The governn:ant
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CON I11) V, N'I'I A I.
thus tar has been able to maintain the rif fensivo
in labor relations with the more militant unions.
Within the pant few months, Pompidou and Chaban-
Delmas have announced sever. al innovat i.onti , .includ-
ing a participation plan for workers in the
nationalized Renault plant and a minimum salary
schedule based on cost of living and production
indexes. Four major unions in the n.;ttona].ized gas
and electricity ty industry (EGF) -- but not the Com-
munist-dominated General Cori federation of Labor
(CGT), which represents more than half: of all IGI'
workers -- have signed a now two-year labor contract
providing, effective 1 January, for wage increases
based on the increase of gross domestic product,
worker productivity, and other economic i.ndicator.s.
In 1970 the new formula should permit a 7% increase
in wages in these industries. The contract also
provides for a three-month period of negotiations
following a union',; announcement of its intention
to strike and prohibits work stoppages during the
negotiation period. The government recommended
this agreement as a model for general wage and
labor negotiations next spring. The CGT rejected
the contract in a referendum hold on 14 January,
but it is unlikely that the Cr;T will strike at this
time as there appears to be widespread popular sup-
port for the government's negotiating position. A
compromise agreement must now be reached, probably
with a modification of the no-strike clause.
18. The Pompidou government appears to be
solidly installed in power, and is working effec-
tively. Public suppoi.t is probably as positive as
can be expected in a period of forced economic
slowdown al.;o charactv, i zed by r i s; i ng price-;. The
government thus far has been generally successful
in containing labor union unrest. There are two
major reasons for this public relations, 5uccet:s;.
First, the rehabilitation package contains a sur-
prisingly high number of measures; in favor of the
underprivileged classes:. These measures do not
represent much of a fi:;cal cost even in c';mbination,
but do create the Impression of concern with, and
concrete steps toward, io .~:.:is~ ~~ijiivvi.iiR?lil on the
part of the regime. Second, the brunt of the direct
burden of eliminating the budget del ici t is. made
to appear to fall on "big bu sines:;" al though ulti-
mately the consumer will pay.
I CONI' II)F.NTIAI.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030022-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030022-4
(;ONV11)F'N'Iii\I,
19. It in likr-ly that thn Porn},Idou tlr)vnr.nrnnnt:.
will cont_i.nun tin prnnont: oconomlc policion throutlh
mid-1970, the t.artlot date for the and of the yovor.n-
mont'n nhnr.t-run ntabl.1.1 zatt, ion 1)rorlr.am. At that
timr?, n n1.iclht cooI nrl of -I of the done'nti_r r,c~onr)rny,
cou})lnt1 with i.rn})rc)vnrnnnt. 1.n the })aymnntrj balanc.r?,
nhnuld tkl.low thr rlov(,rnmt,nt: c;rrontrrr lrnway in
innti t:ut i nil economic p)]. icy rr+fOrmn. 11ownv(1r, tho
trannition period may hn t)rolr)nrlnd by thn pr.oInct:nd
tilowdown in wor.ldwi de Oconomi c act i vi ty, r?npr?ci ral ly
.in Wont (r rnrany and the Un I t!d Stilton, in the
?locoed half ()f 1970. Thn anticIp.itnd nl()wnr economic
(growth in thn,,;e two countrir+n, which toynthnr account
for morv than 30% of total Franch trade may for. co
the rlovr?rnmont to Continun s to rontricti vo ncon()mle
policinn beyond mid-1971).
.).0. 1n the, lc)nrlrr too r) and i f domnr.ti r. })cal i ti cal
ntabi l i t_y 1)rnva i It;, Lho out lttnk fc,r the l"rnnc:h
oconorny nnnmr: taVr)J'abin. :;})ncui.ativn force!: anirlri,
France iprobably not very far from nttui 1 ihri um in
stn halancr' of paymontn. A ha!;ic imbalance dnvrl(,)})nd
dur. i ny 1')68 an 1'rnnch pri cn!: and Cnr?.tn incroa!jed a
groat coal morn than tho:e in moat other induntri.il
countr.inn. Thin wc)rr:nnincl of Yranrn't, cr)mpnt.itive
pon i t inn , hownvOI , ha!; })rob ably boon of f not by the
franc (lnvalua! iron and ihri Detjtnchr?mar'k? rr`valuntion,
tho of 1oct n of both of which on trade wi 1 l not hr-
fully fnlt for many m()nth!:. 1 ranch nX3)ort- n have
c(,)ntinuet-I to rlrn rapidly and nhould hold their own
in the fut.urn. Thi!: in turn nh(ould }pr-rmt t .a nu`-
fiCir-nt uzrowth in import n tr) a J'r,q}>r-r'Lal,lr+
r.-.to of ncc n,-mi c 'gro'wth .
'-h" (1r-va iuat .'';) of t,'zn franc and the- ro-
valua i l.'n of th? Ir'tjtc1jn:'ar/ hour- In, 1 ar Sr- part
rr!mr)Vc-d the rtpnculaIt i f j ?tj -
Juno 19b8 7:jd Au';--;':t 1969, had ?cr-atr-d a hu+1r,
l'ronch 2 a l?ancr--i): },ay:-.r?ntn and a rabid
I'^i Ri rln Qx c:anr7n rnfj f*?'i Arj,
Mont of the 1'.-!:~: n ronor?:en r.urinrl that =r-rind
wan the ro':ult of a lar?Y, o y'on(idr`nCo i;. ?t
franc (rnflectnd in 1aruuo-ncaln anti('3})at