FOREIGN MILITARY AID TO CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030046-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Secret-DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Foreign Military Aid T? Cambodia
ER IM 70-46
April 1970
Copy No. 44
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 703 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unanthoriied person is prohibited by law.
annur f-
,U LVUII, WHOM ?UIOM*T,O
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1970
INTELLIGENCE MFMORANDUM
Foreign Military Aid To Cambodia
Introduction
During the past six years the USSR and Communist
China have been the major suppliers of weapons and
ammunition to Cambodia, and the Cambodian military
forces are now armed predominantly with Communist
weapons. In view of the current state of rela-
tions between Cambodia and the Communist countries,
a cutoff in the supply of Communist ammunition and
spare parts seems likely, and intensifies' hostili-
ties are possible. Cambodia's military aid rela-
tions are examined in this memorandum, the strength
and equipment of its armed forces are detailed, and
an assessment is made of the degree of Cambodian
dependence on Communist military supplies. This
memorandum does not discuss the flow of military
supply through Cambodia for Communist forces in
South Vietnam.
Military Aid to Cambodia
1. From 1954 until early 1963, the armed
forces of Cambodia were almost exclusively equipped
by the United States and trained by the United
States and France. During this period the United
States supplied $100 million in military assist-
ance (see Table 1). This assistance involved a
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and wac coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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Free World Military Aid Deliveries
to Cambodia
Million US $
Total
1954-69
1954-63
1964-69
United States
99.8
99.8
--
France
21.5
2.7
18.8
Belgium
0.6
0.6
--
Netherlands
0.5
--
0.5
Yugoslavia
0.7
--
0.7
variety of ground forces weapons, including light
tanks, armored cars, field and antiaircraft artillery,
and small arms. Naval deliveries from the United
States included two submarine chasers, a support
gunboat, and almost 80 landing craft and other
naval vessels. Deliveries for the Cambodian air
force included jet and prop trainers, transport
aircraft, and helicopters. France and Belgium
supplied much smaller quantities of aid, totaling
only about $3 million.
2. In 1963, Cambodia began to reorient its
arms supply relationships toward Communist sup-
pliers. In April of that year a $1 million mili-
tary aid agreement with the IJ3SR was concluded,
and in November, following Prince Sihanouk's
announcement that he no longer would accept US aid,
the US military assistance program in Cambodia was
suspended. Sihanouk's request for military assist-
ance from other sources was quickly followed by a
Chinese offer in late 1963 of $500,000 worth of
military vehicles and infantry weapons, and the
USSR extended an additional $3 million in aid early
in 1964 (see Table 2). Czechoslovakia and Yugo-
slavia also responded with small quantities of aid
in 1964, and France stepped up its aid, extending
$10 million in 1964 aalone.*
Czechoslovakia earlier (May 1961) had extended
a $1.3 million economic aid credit to Cambodia for
the construction of an ordnance factory. The
current production status of this factory is unknown.
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Date of A reement
Total
Apr 1963
Dec 1963
Apr 1964
Apr 196
Oct 1964
Communist Military Aid Extensions to Cambodia
Value of
Agreement
Donor (Million US $)
Types of Equipment Delivered
USSR 1.0
Communist 0.5
China
3 MIG-17 jet fighters; one U-MIG-
15 jet trainer; 24 AA guns;
early warning radar; ammunition
Military vehicles; infantry
weapons
USSR 3.0
Czecho- Negl.
slovakia
Communist 3.6
China
2 MIG-17s; battery of 85mm AAA;
field artillery; mortars; re-
coilless rifles; small arms;
ammunition
Small arms and ammunition
Equipment for 22,000 ground
forces; including AAA, artillery,
18,000 small arms, a weapons
repair shop; ammunition
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Communist Military Aid Extensions to Cambodia
(Continued)
Date of Agreement
Donor
Value of
Agreement
(Million US
$)
Nov 1965
Communist
4.0
May 1966
China
USSR
2.3
Nov 1966
Communist
3.1
2d half 1967
China
Communist
3.0
Feb 1968
China
USSR
5.8
Types of Equipment Delivered
3 MIG-17s; 4 YAK-18 trainer air-
craft; 4 AN-2 light transport
aircraft; field artillery and
AA guns; 3 small patrol boats;
small arms, ammunition, engi-
neering and communications
equipment for 10,000 men
5 MIG-17s, 2 AN-2 light transport
aircraft; battery of 100mm AAA
Ammunition
Ammunition and support equipment
Field artillery and antiaircraft
guns; early warning radar;
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Communist M4.litary Aid Extensions to Cambodia
(Continued)
Date of Agreement Donor
Value of
Agreement
(Million US
$) Types of E
ui
ment D
li
q
p
e
vered
armored personnel carriers; one
U-MIG-15; small armsfammunition,
and support equipment
L
Oct
1969 a/
Communist
N.A.
6 MIG aircraft; light AA guns;
C!]
"
China
other arms; support equipment
a.
No portion
of this agreement has been
implemented.
th
H
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3. Since early 1963, Soviet and Chinese mili-
tary aid extensions to Cambodia have totaled more
than $26 million. France has remained the only
significant non-Communist supplier, delivering
$19 million in assistance during 1964-69. Almost
all of the French aid is believed to have been on
a grant basis, and all but $3 million of the Soviet
and Chinese extensions have been grant aid. Deliv-
eries under existing aid agreements with the USSR
probably were completed in September 1969. With
the exception of an agreement signed with China
in October 1969, which has not been implemented,
deliveries from China under earlier agreements
probably were completed in mid-1969.
4. Soviet assistance -- provided under four
agreements with a total value of $12 million --
has consisted of ten MIG-17 jet fighters, two jet
trainers, two light transport aircraft, field and
antiaircraft artillery, armored personnel carriers,
small arms, ammunition, two BIG BAR radar stations
(early warning and ground-control-intercept), and
various types of support equipment. Chinese
assistance -- valued at approximately $14 mil-
lion -- has been made up chiefly of light infantry
weapons and ammunition, although Peking also has
provided Cambodia with three MIG-17s, four light
transports, and four trainers as well as artillery
and light antiaircraft guns and three small naval
patrol boats. French deliveries of military equip-
ment have included light bombers, transport air-
craft, trainers, helicopters, light tanks and
armored cars, and small arms and ammunition.
About three-fourths of the French equipment was
delivered in 1964-65.
Cambodian Armed Forces (FARK)
5. The Cambodian army has a personnel strength
of some 40,000 men. in addition, some 10,000 re-
servists were asked to return to active duty in
March 1970. The army is organized into 55 infantry
and commando battalions (with an estimated average
strength of 380 men in each unit) and 9 specialized
half brigades of various size (see Table 3). In
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Organization of the Cambodian Army
Type of Unit
Number
of Units
Characteristics
Infantry battalion
Commando battalion
Artillery half-brigade
1
3
groups
Armored half-brigade
1
1
armored regiment
and
1 reconnaissance
Parachute half-brigade
1
2
regiment
battalions
Phnom Penh half-brigade
1
3
battalions
Signal half-brigade
1
3
battalions
Transportation half-brigade
1
Engineer half-brigade
1
6
battalions
Antiaircraft half-brigade
1
2
groups
Royal Guard half-brigade
1
2
battalions
addition to the regular army, there are an esti-
mated 55,000 paramilitary forces -- including
15,000 Provincial Guards, 30,000 Home Guards
(part-time volunteers), 6,000 Police, and 5,000
members of the National Youth Movement -- under
the control of FARK since April 1969.
6. For several years, Cambodia has been grad-
ually phasing out US weapons held by its regular
army units and replacing them with Communist weapons.
The re-equipment of infantry and commando battalions
probably has been largely accomplished.
(sufficient weapons
were available in September 1969 for this purpose.*
The estimated strength of a standard Cambodian
infantry battalion equipped with Communist weapons
is shown in Table 5.
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Sr.CR FT
of a Cambodian Infantry Batta on
T pe of Equipment
Battalion
7.62mm pistol
40
AK-47 assault rifle
150
SKS carbine
120
Light machineguns
18
12.7mm heavy machinegun
3
Rocket launchers (R1 G-2)
7
6 0mm mortar
2
82mm mortar
3
75mm recoilless rifle
3
7. Large quantities of equipment from the US
and other Free World countries -- in many cate-
gories in quantities equal to, or largerat)
this equipment is still used by a - rigades and
infantry and commando battalions, but these units
have been largely re-equipped with Communist arms.
Most US and French weapons apparently were issued
to paramilitary forces, but their condition may be
poor and some may have been lost or sold. Substan-
tial amounts of Free World weapons and ammunition
are still held Zn warehouses, although their con-
dition is not kfaown.
Air Force
8. The Cambodian air force is made up of
1,750 men organized into three wings -- tactical,
technical, and command -- and a technical training
school. Pilot strength is believed to be about
100 men, but not all are presently active. The
equipment inventory of the air force is shown in
Table 7.
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Estimated Equipment Strength
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Ca,rlbodian Air Force Inventory
March 1970
Type of Aircraft
Number on Hand
Fighters/Bombers
MIG-17
13
A-1H
(Skyraider)
11
yy
Transports
AN-2
6
IL-14
1
C-41
12
Helicopters
MI-4
1
Alouette
II
8
Alouette
III
1
Trainers
U-MIG-15
2
T-28
15
T-37
4
Fouga Mag
ister
4
YAK-18
4
Morane Sa
ulinier 733
10
Horizon G
Y 80
12
Other Types
14
Navy
9. The Cambodian navy, with 1,400 men, is
divided into a coastal command and a river com-
mand. Coastal patrols use two US-built PC-type
submarine chasers, and river patrols use small
patrol boats.
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Conclusions
1.0. The quantities of Communist small arms and
heavy weapons available to the regular army are
adequate for present force levels. The ammunition
available in depots for these weapons totaled some
3,000 metric tons at the end of 1969. At the esti-
mated 1969 rate of expenditure (around 600 tons)
this quantity of ammunition would be adequate for
several years. Under enlarged, sustained combat
conditions, however, ammunition would of course be
used up much faster, and certain types of ammuni-
tion -- particularly for field artillery and
mortars -- could run out very quickly.
11. Cambodian ground forces have only small
amounts of Communist-supplied armored equipment
that would require a substantial amount of spare
parts. The only other ground equipment that would
be affected by a cutoff of spares would be the
16 pieces of radar-controlled 85mm and 100mm anti-
aircraft artillery. In the air force, however,
spares and aircraft ordnance probably are in short
supply, and a cutoff in deliveries would quickly
reduce the already limited capability of this
force.
12. A Communist embargo of military supplies
would not prevent an expansion of Cambodian
ground forces. Weapons and ammunition of US and
French origin are also probably available in
sufficient quantities to meet expanded force
requirements. For example, more than 30 batta-
lions could be equipped with the US rifles
currently held in FARK warehouses, if they are
in good condition.
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