INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TIES OF THE MAGBREB

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CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6
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October 21, 2011
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57
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May 1, 1970
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Memorandum The Military And Economic Aid Ties Of The Maghreb ER IM 70-57 May 1970 Copy No. 41 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 WARNING '1'liis dociuncnt contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re- ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence May 1970 The Military And Economic Aid Ties Of The Maghreb Introduction The four Maghreb states -- Algeria, Libya,* Morocco, and Tunisia -- have followed separate national policies in their foreign economic and military relations since independence. While all four have maintained strong ties to the West, several of them -- Algeria in particular -- have rapidly expanded their economic relations with European Communist countries. This memorandum traces the Maghreb's recent foreign trade and aid ties, and assesses the extent of their economic and military dependence on Western and Communist nations. Economic Aid Activity in the Maghreb The Predominance of Western Assistance 1. The countries of the Maghreb have retained close economic ties with the developed countries of the West during the past decade in spite of Communist efforts to reduce Western influence. Long established commercial relations continue to dominate the trade patterns of all the Maghreb countries, and most of the economic and technical assistance as well as academic and technical training programs are still sponsored by the West. * While Libya has never been a Francophone country, it is generally considered to be among the Maghreb states. Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current In- teZZigence and the Office of National Estimates. SECRET 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET 2. Almost all of the nearly $3.5 billion of economic aid delivered to the Maghreb countries since 1960 has been provided by Western nations that are members of the Development Assistance Com- mittee (DAC). Communist countries have contributed only slightly more than $100 million, or about 3% of the total aid delivered (see Table 1). Among the Western countries, France, the leading donor, supplied about one-half of the total; the United States about 40%; and the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany most of the remainder. 3. Private Western investors have continued to make capital available to the Maghreb countries at a level that approximates one-half of the annual average inflow of public bilateral economic aid. Except for Libya, where private investment has been predominately by US companies, French capital flows have been most important. The continuing.net flow of private capital, which is estimated at approxi- mately $150 million for 1968, has been of particular significance to the economies of the Maghreb coun- tries because foreign official sources have allocated only minor amounts of aid for development projects. 4. For the most part, official French assistance to the Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, has been provided to fill the gap in administrative and professional services created by the departure of French residents after independence, and to stave off financial collapse of the newly formed govern- ments. Thus, two-thirds of the $1.6 billion of French aid delivered during 1960-68 was for technical services and budgetary support. Most of the aid provided by the United States to the Maghreb coun- tries has been through the Food for Peace Program, and only negligible amounts have been for development purposes. 5. Algeria, the major Maghreb recipient of foreign aid, received $1.4 billion of aid from DAC members after its independence in 1962 through 1968. All but $175 million was provided by France. Al- geria accounts for 45% of all Western aid to the Maghreb since 1960. Morocco, the second largest recipient, and Tunisia, the third, each received approximately 25% of total DAC member aid disbursed to the Maghreb between 1960-68. Approximately 60% of the aid to these two countries was provided by SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Deliveries of Economic Aid to the Maghreb Countries 1960-68 Million US $ Total Al eri g a Libya Morocco Tunisia Total S/ 3,188 1,465 170 823 730 DAC member countries 3,098 1,405 170 817 706 France U it d 1,644 1,227 N.A. 272 145 n e States h 1,199 163 106 482 4 Ot er d/ 255 14 64 64 48 112 Communist countries 90 v) 60 0 6 24 USSR C) E t 46 30 0 1 15 as ern Europe 19 5 0 5 Communist China 25 25 0 0 9 0 H a. Data for DAC member countries are not avails Ze for 1969, but if projected at the average annual rate for 1966-68, approximately $275 million would be added to total DAC disbursements for 1969. Communist countries made deliveries of about $15 million in 1969. b. Deliveries to Algeria are counted only from the date of independence in July 1962. c. Only deliveries from DAC member countries and the Communist countries are in- cluded in total aid deliveries inasmuch as data for other donors are not available. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. d. Including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET the United States. Aid deliveries to Libya, which have declined steadily since 1960, total $170 mil- lion, of which 60% has been supplied by the United States. Communist Aid to the Maghreb 6. Although Communist countries.have extended almost $500 million of economic aid to three Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), little more than 20% of this amount had been delivered by the end of 1969 (see Table 2). The main reason for this slow rate of utilization is the character of Communist assistance. Unlike most Western aid to the Maghreb, Communist aid is almost entirely for capital projects, many of which require long lead- times for survey, construction, and installation. Shortages of skilled manpower and weakness of plan- ning and management in recipient' countries, partic- ularly Algeria, added to the lag in the utilization of aid. Most of the Communist aid has been provided by the USSR, which extended over $315 million, or about 65% of the total. East European countries have extended $130 million of aid and Communist China only about $50 million. 7. Algeria, the major Western aid recipient in the Maghreb, also has been the largest beneficiary of Communist economic aid to that area. Communist nations' commitments of $310 million to Algeria amount to more than 60% of the total Communist economic aid extended to the Maghreb. The remainder, about $185 million, has been extended to Tunisia and Morocco, mostly for light industrial projects and water resource development. Only a small por- tion of this aid has been drawn. Moreover, the $128 million Soviet credit extended to Algeria in 1964 for a steel mill, represents the USSR's largest and most important single industrial undertaking in an African country.* The Soviet Union also has extended a $100 million line of credit to Algeria which has been allocated to light industrial instal- lations, dams and irrigation projects, and geolog- ical prospecting. Other Communist countries also have concentrated their Maghreb aid undertakings in Algeria. Of particular significance'is the $50 million Communist Chinese credit, extended to Algeria in 1963, of which almost one-half was pro- vided in foreign exchange. Excluding the UAR. SECRET, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved Communist Economic Aid to the Maghreb Countries Extended and Drawn, 1960-69 Million US $ Total Algeria Tunisia Mo _ rocco Extended Drawn Extended Drawn Extended Drawn Ext d d en e Drawn USSR 316 60 238 42 34 17 44 1 h Eastern Europe 131 20 22 6 74 9 35 5 Communist China 52 25 52 25 0 0 0 0 Total 499 105 312 73 108 26 79 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET Technical Assistance 8. The predominance of Western' involvement in the Maghreb is especially apparent in the vastly larger numbers of Western technicians (about 26,700) working under Western government-sponsored aid pro- grams during 1968 (see Table 3); in addition, prob- ably at least as many were working in the Maghreb under commercial contract. Communist countries were represented by only about 6,300 technicians, under both aid and commercial contract -- about one-tenth the size of the Western presence. Foreign Economic Technicians in the Maghreb Countries 1968 Persons 1 Donor Total Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia Total 33,015 12,450 2,740 11,410 6,415 DAC members 26,605 9,920 840 11,150 4,775 France 24,275 9,730 140 10,655 3,750 Italy 490 5 375 100 10 United Kingdom 150 10 110 15 15 United States 820 0 195 195 430 West Germany 380 75 15 80 210 Other 570 100 5 1U5 360 Communist 6,330 2,530 1,900 260 1,640 USSR 1,990 1,700 0 80 210 Eastern Europe 4,240 730 1,900 180 1,430 Communist China 100 100 0 0 0 a. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5 and include on y technicians from DAC member countries and Communist countries. b. Does not include technical personnel from these countries that are sponsored by private sources. 9. Most of the Western personnel in the Maghreb are teachers and other nonproject-related technicians. Indeed, of the 24,300 French technicians under - 6 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET official sponsorship, representing 90% of the total Western presence, more than 80% were teachers. Similarly, the majority of Communist technicians in the Maghreb states have not been associated with development projects. In Tunisia and Morocco, personnel from the Communist states, largely from Eastern Europe, were predominantly administrative, educational, and professional personnel. Most of the 1,900 Communist "technical" personnel working in Libya were in fact semiskilled laborers from Eastern Europe working under commercial contract, assigned to urban reconstruction work, including housing, sewer lines, and similar activities. Academic and Technical Students 10. Historically, students from the Maghreb countries have gone to the West, especially to France, for advanced education. This pattern has not been changed radically since independence, al- though almost 800 technical and academic students from the Maghreb were studying in Communist coun- tries in 1968 (see Table 4). Five times as many -- about 4,100 -- were students in DAC member countries during the same year. Trade Also Dominated by the West 11. As with aid, the Maghreb's expanding global trade remains tied to the West. In 1968, Free World countries supplied about 90% of the imports of Maghreb countries and took 95% of their exports (see Table 5). Moreover, even though the Maghreb's trade with Communist countries has grown much faster than its total trade during the past few years, trade with Communist countries still accounted for no more than 15% of the total trade of any Maghreb country in 1968 as shown in Table 6.* France has continued to be the Maghreb's most important trad- ing partner, accounting for more than two-thirds of Algeria's total trade in 1968 and approximately one-third of Morocco's and Tunisia's. West Germany and Italy are Libya's major trading partners. The United States accounted for only about 7% of the Maghreb's global trade in 1968. In 1969, total trade of the Maghreb may have expanded by as much as 5% over 1968, and its trade with Communist countries by somewhat more. - 7 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET Academic Students and Technical Trainees from the Maghreb Countries Studying Abroad 1968 Persons 1 Total Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia Total abroad 41865 1,360 185 1,475 1,845 Students 2,945 695 95 1,080 1,075 Technical train- ees 1,920 665 90 395 770 In DAC member coun- tries 4,075 985 165 1,310 1,615 Including: Students 2,340 450 90 915 885 Technical trainees .,735 535 75 395 730 Studying in: Belgium 300 45 0 150 105 France 2,475 700 10 895 870 United Kingdom 105 35 40 15 15 United States 330 25 55 110 140 West Germany 590 105 35 105 345 Other 275 75 25 35 140 In Communist coun- tries 1 790 375 20 165 230 Including: Students 605 245 5 165 190 Technical trainees 185 130 15 0 40 Studying in: 405 195 5 145 60 Eastern Europe 385 180 15 20 170 a. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5. b. The number present in December 1968. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET World Trade of the Maghreb Countries 1 1968 Million US $ Total Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia Maghreb: Total imports 1 2,120.3 706.9 644.0 551.3 218.1 Free World 1,942.0 661.9 590.7 489.3 200.1 Of which : 1 France 713.0 471.3 168.8 72.9 Italy 159.0 159.0 United Kingdom 73.9 73.9 United States 275.9 52.8 108.6 70.0 44.5 West Germany 53.4 53.4 Communist 194.7 61.4 54.4 61.4 17.5 USSR 60.5 31.9 6.1 19.2 3.3 Eastern Europe 92.1 21.9 35.9 20.6 13.7 Other 42.1 7.6 12.4 21.6 0.5 Maghreb: Total exports 3, 247.9 772.4 1,867.4 450.3 157.8 Fr ee World 3,105.7 722.6 1,864.2 391.3 127.6 Of which: France 782.8 557.4 188.9 36.5 Italy 370.7 370.7 United Kingdom 344.5 344.5 United States 126.5 5.3 107.8 10.6 2.8 West Germany 494.0 494.0 Co mmunist 155.5 56.6 2.4 62.1 34.4 USSR 51.4 27.7 18.3 5.4 Eastern Europe 75.3 18.3 2.4 30.5 24.1 Other 28.8 10.6 13.3 4.9 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET World Trade of the Maghreb Countries 1 1968 (Continued) a. Soviet data are from the official Soviet trade yearbook_. Trade Handbook; data for Eastern Europe and other 'Com- munist countries are based on official trade statistics of the Maghreb countries; and figures for the Free World and total im- ports and exports are from official country data reported by the IMF, in Direction of Trade, and by the US Department of Commerce. b. The components do not add to the totals shown because of differences between Soviet and Free World reporting. c. Figures are given only for major trading partners.- 12. As shown in Table 6, the importance of trade with Communist areas differs substantially among the several Maghreb countries particular-'y with regard to exports. This difference reflects the tremendous importance of oil in Libyan and Algerian exports, virtually all of which is sold to the West for hard currencies. Crude oil sales, which made up virtual- ly all of Libya's exports, in 1968 came to almost $1.9 billion -- more than the total exports of the other three Maghreb ccuntries combined. Crude oil exports, valued at $670 million, also accounted for a large share -- over 85% -- of total Algerian ex- ports in 1968. Petroleum sales by both countries have grown extremely rapidly in recent years. 13. Morocco, with no oil to export, and Tunisia, still with only modest amounts, have had to count largely on phosphate fertilizers and tourism as their chief hard currency earners. Both countries have faced near stagnant sales of phosphates in the West and have turned to Communist areas -- Eastern Europe in particular -- which, in 1968, purchased 25% of Tunisia's phosphates and 20% of Morocco's. These two countries are not alone in using Communist markets to dispose of goods that cannot find a!ready market in the West. Algeria, faced with a drastic cut in French purchases of wine in 1967, signed a 5-year clearing agreement with the USSR in 1968 to purchase Soviet goods in exchange for $40 million of wine annually. There are indications that French - 10-- SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET Communist Countries' Share of the Maghreb Countries' Trade 1968 1 Percent of Total Communist Share of Exports from Imports by Turnover Algeria 7.3 8.7 8.0 Libya 0.1 8.4 2.3 Morocco 13.8 14..1 12.3 Tunisia 21.8 8.0 13.8 a. While shares differ somewhat from year to year, the pattern of the past few years approximates that of 1968. purchases of Algerian wine may be used this year at the expense of Soviet purchases, but the French mar- ket is highly uncertain in the longer term. 14. For all but one of the Maghreb countries, external payments pose no serious constraint. Rapidly rising Libyan oil revenues have outpaced imports, giving Libya a foreign currency reserve of around $1 billion at the end of 1969. Similarly, Algerian reserves rose to about $600 million -- equal to roughly 85% of its 1968 import level. Morocco too has increased its reserves, which in 1969 reached $115 million -- double the 1967 level. Only Tunisia, with reserves at around $35 million, faces serious payments problems. With the cessation of phosphate sales to India, formerly its major customer, and with the decline of Western phosphate purchases, Tunisia will look to Eastern Europe to buy increasing quantities of its rising phosphates production. This decline, however, may be offset by gains in other exports, such as petroleum. - 11 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET Military __Aid General 15. The four countries of the Maghreb rely entirely on foreign sources of supply for modern military equipment. Since 1952, these four states together have received a total of approximately $250 million in Western military aid and sales, about 45% of which was from the United States. In addition, Algeria and Morocco have receives an estimated $290 million of Communist arms aid, almost all of which was from the USSR (see Table 7). Military Assistance and Sales to the Maghreb Countries 1952-69 Million US $ Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia Communist Bulgaria 1 -- -- Communist China 12 -- -- Czechoslovakia -- -- 20 -- USSR 241 -- 13 -- Free World Total 21 76 105 44 United States / -- 33 49 25 Belgium -- 2 5 -- France 4 Negl. 41 14 Iraq 3 -- -- -- Israel -- -- 4 -- Italy Negl. Negl. 5 3 Morocco 1 Spain -- -- 1 -- UAR 5 -- Negi. Negl. United Kingdom 3 40 Negl. 1 West Germany 4 Negl. -- 1 Yugoslavia 1 1 -- Negl. a. Values given are for actua a iveries and exclude outstanding credits not yet drawn. b. Data as of 30 June 1969. - 12 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET 16. Military expenditures have not taken an in- ordinately large share of the total current expendi- tures budget of any Maghreb country (see Table 8). Similarly, arms debt repayments have not been a significant burden. Table 8 Military Expenditures of the Maghreb Countries Value in Million US $ 1965 1966 1967 1968 Algeria Value Total budget a 765 822 959 1,196 Of which: Defense expenditures 98 130 125 105 Defense expenditures as a percent of budget (13) (16) (13) (9) Libya Value Total budget / 296 462 670 734 Of which: Defense expenditures 22 48 59 58 Defense expenditures as a percent of budget (7) (10) (9) (8) Morocco Value Total budget 1 Of which: Defense expenditures 57 59 63 80 Defense expenditures as a percent of budget (12) (12) (11) (12) - 13 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Military Expenditures of the Maghreb Countries (Continued) Value in Million US $ 1965 1966 1967 1968 Tunisia Value Total budget 1 Of which: 289 315 345 376 Defense expenditures 8 9 8 21 Defense expenditures as a percent of budget (3) (3) (2) (6) a. Tots budget comprises currant an development uUgeto. b. Estimated. a. All data represent repayments tc the USSR, except or an -7 estimated $5 million paid by Morocco to Cnaohoolovakia in 1968-69. Total 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1969 Algeria 10.8 -- 0.1 0.7 1.0 1.8 3.7 3.5 Morocco 12.3 4.0 0.6 0.6 0,5 0.6 3.0 3.0 Algeria and Morocco, which have received Soviet military aid on liberal terms -- large discounts, credits repayable in 10 years at 2% interest, and varying grace periods -- are believed to have made repayments largely in commodities or soft currency. These payments, as shown in Table 9, have in no case exceeded 1% of the total annual exports of either country. Table 9 Estimated Repayments for Communist Military Aid Million US $ SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 S.I',(; It 1?' L' 17. French military aid in usually provided on somewhat lean favorable terms -- generally smaller discounts, with credits repayable in U years at 4.5% interest. Repayment of r.,ESnch aid presumably in made in commodities or local currency, while outright sales probably call for hard currency. Even in the cane of Morocco, the chief recipient of French aid in the Maghreb, payments for French equipment probably have not exceeded $1 million por year. Similarly, Libya, the largest UK arms customer in the area, has had ample funds to pur- chase British military hardware, with estimated payments before 1969 probably amounting to not more than $2 million to $3 million per year. Algerian Government Turn; to the U:a-f for Arms Aid 1.0. During its war for independence, the Algerian independence movement (FLU) received an estimated $16 million worth of military assistance on a grant hanis from Communist China, the USSR, and Bulgaria. The existence of longstanding terri- torial disputes among Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia stimulated poatindepondenco arms buildups in these countries. Moroccan claims on Algerian territory, following the latter's independence in 1962, r.e- oulted in a brief border war between Altieria and Morocco in October 1963. An a result of their poor military nhowinq, the Algerians. turned to the tt `it for major military assistance. The TenpOnried generously, agreeing to provide Al(leria with about 4'235 million of military aid in agreements nion"d in October 1963 and May 1965. Thin was more than the total aid received by the throe othh"-r i'~ fc;hreh stater from all sources durinca the same 1:1-+ried. The catim.ated value of .soviet military aid deb .i - orion to Algeria is nc(iwn in the follo'winq tabula- tions 1 }} ?!i f*Ii L~4, M rn. - 1 1 h t 11 lot 1 t a t s 1 [1 L t l rr r r_ tar. 1 far es Al ~t ? r4.r .%I ? A JVi 1 .'V ..# , ..V7 s. _VJ t SVV A .'V ? Moth Morocco and Tuninia, concerned over Alneria'n military buildup, nought additiotia1 military aid, - 1$ - SE-GAL FT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 1 SECREl1, obtaining approximately $175 million in arms -- moatly from Weatern countries -- from 1962-69. 19. Soviet army aid hon made Algeria by far the strongest: power in the Maghreb, with a clear superiority in virtually every category of modern weapons (nee Tables 10 and 11) . The quantitien and typnn of materiel received -- including MICA-21 fighters and Y,omar and Osa-class miaailo patrol boats -- have gone far beyond any reanonable defen- sive requirement against ponnible Tunisian or Moroccan attacks. Major Communist Military Cquipnont Delivered to the Maghreb Countries 1960-69 Algeria Morocco ^ Medium tanks 360 122 5-If-propelled assault guns 100 30 Arr orccd per?;onnel carriers S00 00 Field and iA artillery 900 100 : ay.3l rshi p Miryenvealers 2 t ut r 3r:the :3anerr: 6 ?Motor torpedo and rniini 1e boats R 1 Auxiliary craft 3 kiuht "et Lmo era I -h F_w _!A Heavy translkorts Dra&nerR and belicoptern Surfaco-to-air rianile launchers SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Major Free World Military tquippment Delivered to the Maghroh Countries 1952-69 TYPQof i;clu3?pment Alunrin Li.b a Morocco Tunisia Land armaments Medium tanks 6 -- -- Light tanks -- -- 129 17 Self-propelled assault guns -- -- 07 -- Personnel carriern and armorer] corn 62 220 Ill 11 Artillery pieces ;lav.~1 ahi 52 146 236 04 Minesweepers 2 2 -- oeubmar.ine chasers -- -- 4 1 Motor torpedo +nr1 patrol boats 2 11 12 10 Auxiliary craft -- 2 17 2 Aircraft ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SJ?C R 1',`1' Jot f ic_t~stns~c: Trainnr~, t:raflcport(3I 11 aA w :Lnd ?Sep 1 t f?r.t,4 n to R0. hn Alr~rt'ians ha`s'ty ?den t.ryji `I to Ai3z c. rb this Vast influx of "WIviet equip?,.rnt thro. h an c,Xter i r ?avie`-Pul-prvi ed traintn$ progran and a far-rra~'~in'f Yt?ta;''1 n1~ation of eiround fL rcrn, At leant 1,200 5oviet mi1itar;' adsinrrp have t:1-eon t:re ent in Alietia szirco la+tc 1047_ alf)--.1. as..- nurlror may have been roduced since late total of 2,100 Algerian military atudentn have been sent to Co:- unint countries for trai"it;s1. Deapite thin offort, defici?ncian in training and organization continue to handicap the e f f ecti vangcs of A1rleria's military force. The entabliah not of an o rational 1., nynte=. for example. has land bacaune of Algerian training difficul tiien, # ,1 tho 17 - ~a }F SE ;: E is Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 fighter interceptor capability of the air force is similarly limited. 21. Soviet-Algerian relationn have noticeably cooled since the June 1967 Arab-Inraeli war. Thin cooling in relations is evident in the slowinq rate of Soviet military equipment and spare parts do- liverien -- there have been no deliveries of major military equipment since 1960 when the 1965 agree- ment presumably wan fulfilled* -- and in the utif- fening ir. arms repayment terms. Prior to June 1967, the USSR followed a relatively liberal aid policy toward Algeria, providing an entimated 50% of the equipment on a grant basis in the form of price discounts. Since that time the USSR report'rlly has required that all. equipment be paid for onya csAdit or barter basin. Moreover, the USSR in 1969, apparently for the first time, insisted on payment in hard currency for specialized equipment, such an the two MI-6 holicoptern ordered in June of that year. French Arms Aid to Alctoria 22. An relationn with the USSR have eroded, Algeria has begun to look more toward Prance for military ansintance. Prior to 1968, Algeria had purchased onl; minor quantities of infantry weapons, ?_era, and mincnllanvou, equipment from its foci or metroj.:ale, although a moderate-nixed French tr 4-4n.. pro,..ram ha&d contt,nued. In rennonne to a. as a??a?.-j ,: e. ..-~.. Algerian requenta in early 1960, the French agreed to double the number of Algerian training nlotu in France to nearly 700, including pilot training and technical courses, beginning in September 1968. 23. Increased French technical assistance was follor,eed by Algerian first requer.t for French air- craft, an yell as additional ground equipment." eiri (i._ :... Z~ ~i~~~ ~jG l.if?:~-~' Grp' 'ii iSl'Gii a?? i, ~~ `?.. t.~ 4. ; e, ach v rG :G t1 vc rc it 611'! j 2 *c :17~dr. r 25X1 25X1 25X1 aic,irr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 assified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SEC.R J s'r Three Dassault l"alcon executive-typo tranoports were purchaeod in early 1969, followed by agreements to purchase 28 Fouga Magietor jot trainers, two holicrptorn, and some 50 Panhard armored cars, at a ropurtod total cost of about $10 million. The French also agreed to train Algerian flight instrue-- M ghreb'n Reliance on Western Aid 24. In contrast to Algeria, the other three Maghreb countries have relied almost entirely on Western sources of arms aid. Next to the United States, France has been the principal source of military equipment for Morocco and Tunisia, while the United Kingdom -- prior to the recent French aircraft agreement -- an the prime arms supplier to Libya (see Tablet 7). Belgium, Italy, and West Germany also have sold minor quantities of asborted air and ground equipment to the Maghreb. 25. France zimilarly has been the major source of military training assistance to Morocco and Tunisia, and noon will become no in the case of Libya as well, in addition to the 350 French ad- visorn in Algeria, about 400 ne;cve in Morocco, and s hao ful serve in the small Tunisian armed forces (see Table 12) . Sotr:e French personnel in Morr)cco are din ctly under Moroccan command and are par- ti;illy paid h y smorocco. Those in Algeria and Tuni- sia nerve in a status similar to U military advina ory groups, an have than 100 or no t3ritissh advisers in Libya. Almost all officer ~ncd skilled technical ILLEGIB SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 w ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET Military Technical Assistance a. UMEM ars row d to F he ntarrn`? 5 exaopf 060V of Zuffisia. b. As of ~lanuary 1970. June 1969 Persons J Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia Military technicians in country 1,200 0 20 0 USSR 1,200 -- -- -- Czechoslovakia 450 525 405 5 France 400 3 Iran Israel 5 N.A. -- Italy Nationalist China -- 25 UAR J 100 400 United Kingdom -- 100 Military trainees abroad In Communist countries 525 0 40 0 USSR 500 -- -- Czechoslovakia -- -- 40 -- Cuba 25 -- -- In Free World countries 380 230 405 30 France 350 -- 400 N.A. Greece -- 110 -- 5+ Italy 20 -- 5 -.. Turkey -- -- -- 25+ OAR 10 -- -- -- ~t..Abvu t%AtSIJUUm -- I cult -- -- West Germany -- N.A. N.A. -- - 20 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRETT training for Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia has taken place in military schools in Western countries. In early 1969, however, Tunisia agreed to allow France to establish a postgraduate military school to train Tunisian army officers. The creation of the now school will result in a substantial in- crease in the size of the French advisory contin- gent in Tunisia and will reduce the strain on mili- tary schools in France. 26. Morocco is the only Maghreb country, other than Algeria, that has received Communist military assistance. Soviet agreements concluded in 1960 and 1962, and a small one signed in 1966, totaled about $13 million. Most of the major equipment received under these accords, including 12 jet fighters and two jet trainers, currently is in- operable because of a lack of spare parts. A $20 million agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia in 1967 for tanks, self-propelled assault guns, armored vehicles, and a tank training school. In 1968, Morocco resumed its military supply relation- ship with France by purchasing 24 Fouga Magister jet trainers. In the same year, a $2 million ve- hicle deal with West Germany also was concluded. 27. Since independence in 1956, Tunisia has received a modest amount of US, French, Italian, and other Western military materiel including some older vintage aircraft, ground equipment, and a few naval patrol craft. Two missile-equipped coastal patrol boats, currently under construction in France, are scheduled for delivery in 1970. Most recently, a $5 million French arms agrc.munit, including three transport aircraft, 13 light tanks, and some infantry equipment, was concluded in November 1969. In addition, Italy in 1969 agreed to provide Tunisia with a comprehensive, ccuntry- wide radar system, valued at $10 million, to be in full operation by the end of 1974. 28. Unlike the other Maghreb states, Libya did with nshi ti l l p a o y re not establish an arts. supp France until after the coup in September 1969. Prior to that time, the United Kingdom was the primary military supplier to Libya, providing some $40 million worth of ground, naval, and air equip- ment :supplemented by about $30 million in US arms aid. Plans for army expansion -- drawn up prior to the coup -- included acquiring an air defense - 21 - SEC,Rir r Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET system and the formation of mechanized and armored brigades. A highly ambitious procurement program involved British contracts for a complete mobile surface-to-air missile system -- including modern Thunderbird and Rapier guided missiles -- valued at $288 million and a $112 million agreement for 188 Chieftain tanks and some 300 other armored vehicles. After the 1969 coup, the new Libyan government canceled the air defense agreement, although the first installment of $80 million had already been paid. The armored vehicle agreement remains in force; however, its future status is uncertain. 29. The recent French-Libyan agreement for at least 110 jet aircraft represents a dramatic shift in Libya's military aid relations. included are 30 supersonic Mirage III-E interceptors and 50 Mirage V fighter bombers, in addition to trainers. The first 15 aircraft are scheduled for delivery in 1971, and the balance during 1972-74. The cost of the aircraft transaction was not disclosed, but is estimated to be at least $150 million. The terms of the agreement expressly prohibit the re- sale or re-export of these aircraft without French permission. 30. While Libya might reasonably hope to ab- sorb as many as 100 Mirage aircraft over the next several years, considerable pilot and ground crew training -- most of which will be provided by France -- will be required to enable the Libyans to effectively handle these sophisticatlvd aircraft. Libya presently has no pilots or mechanics quali- fied in supersonic aircraft, and few airfields and maintenance facilities. The Wheelus and El Adem air bases now being evacuated by the United States and United Kingdom probably will be adapted for use by the Mirages. Training of Libyan personnel, however, will be a much more drawn out affair.* 04 Barrio pzlo training takes a minimum of one year, and at least another year is required for basic proficiency on sophisticated aircraft, ouch as the Mirage. Basic maintenance training takes 25 weeks and opooialined mechanics' training re- quirca at least another year for personnel with the equivalent of a US high school education. - 22 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET French officials estimate that it will take 3 to 4 years to train the 200 pilots and 1,000 mainte- nance crewmen needed to operate and service the aircraft on order. The first Libyan pilots are scheduled to begin training in France in the near future.* 31. To date, the Libyan government has shown no inclination to cultivate strong links with the USSR. A Soviet offer of military assistance made immediately after the coup was rejected. Conclusions 32. Recent developments in the Maghreb states' foreign relations have reinforced their already strong links with the West, particularly with France, and have created an atmosphere more con- ducive to cooperation within the region. A major factor has been the formal settlement of Algeria's longstanding border dispute with Tunisia and a tacit agreement with Morocco to relax border ten- sions. Perhaps even more important is the common opposition of these three states to the spread of Nasser's influence into Libya. These developments, together with more favorable trade and payments positions for three of the four Maghreb countries, have made the extension of significant Soviet influence into the region even less likely than heretofore. 33. In their economic relations, all four Maghreb states remain heavily oriented toward the West, which accounts for more than 95% of the trade of each. Of $3.5 billion of foreign economic aid delivered to the Maghreb since 1960, France sup- plied about half and the United States about 40%. Communist states altogether accounted for only about 3% of the total. In addition, private West- ern capital flows to the area have been substantial, amounting to perhaps as much as $150 million in 1968 alone. The Maghreb states also have received - 23 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6 SECRET large-scale technical assistance, chiefly doctors, teachers, and other professional personnel not associated with development aid. in 1968, the French government provided about 24,300 technical personnel, other Western states 2,400, and Commu- nist countries about 6,300. In addition to the technicians sponsored by Western governments, prob- ably at least as many have been working in the Magh- reb under private contract. 34. In terms of military aid to the Maghreb, only Algeria received large quantities of military equipment from the USGR. As relations with Moscow have cooled, Algeria in the past year and a half has turned to France for purchase of jet trainers and a substantial amount of ground equipment. The scope of French-provided military training also has been enlarged. The other three Maghreb states have essentially maintained their traditional reliance on the West -- primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and France -- for military assis- tance, although France recently has displaced the United States and the United Kingdom as the prime source of military equipment for Libya. - 24 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030057-6