INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TIES OF THE MAGBREB

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: May 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Military And Economic Aid Ties Of The Maghreb
ER IM 70-57
May 1970
Copy No. 41
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WARNING
'1'liis dociuncnt contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1970
The Military And Economic Aid Ties
Of The Maghreb
Introduction
The four Maghreb states -- Algeria, Libya,*
Morocco, and Tunisia -- have followed separate
national policies in their foreign economic and
military relations since independence. While all
four have maintained strong ties to the West,
several of them -- Algeria in particular -- have
rapidly expanded their economic relations with
European Communist countries. This memorandum
traces the Maghreb's recent foreign trade and aid
ties, and assesses the extent of their economic
and military dependence on Western and Communist
nations.
Economic Aid Activity in the Maghreb
The Predominance of Western Assistance
1. The countries of the Maghreb have retained
close economic ties with the developed countries
of the West during the past decade in spite of
Communist efforts to reduce Western influence.
Long established commercial relations continue to
dominate the trade patterns of all the Maghreb
countries, and most of the economic and technical
assistance as well as academic and technical training
programs are still sponsored by the West.
* While Libya has never been a Francophone country,
it is generally considered to be among the Maghreb
states.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current In-
teZZigence and the Office of National Estimates.
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2. Almost all of the nearly $3.5 billion of
economic aid delivered to the Maghreb countries
since 1960 has been provided by Western nations
that are members of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC). Communist countries have contributed
only slightly more than $100 million, or about 3%
of the total aid delivered (see Table 1). Among
the Western countries, France, the leading donor,
supplied about one-half of the total; the United
States about 40%; and the United Kingdom, Italy, and
West Germany most of the remainder.
3. Private Western investors have continued to
make capital available to the Maghreb countries at
a level that approximates one-half of the annual
average inflow of public bilateral economic aid.
Except for Libya, where private investment has been
predominately by US companies, French capital flows
have been most important. The continuing.net flow
of private capital, which is estimated at approxi-
mately $150 million for 1968, has been of particular
significance to the economies of the Maghreb coun-
tries because foreign official sources have allocated
only minor amounts of aid for development projects.
4. For the most part, official French assistance
to the Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, has
been provided to fill the gap in administrative and
professional services created by the departure of
French residents after independence, and to stave
off financial collapse of the newly formed govern-
ments. Thus, two-thirds of the $1.6 billion of
French aid delivered during 1960-68 was for technical
services and budgetary support. Most of the aid
provided by the United States to the Maghreb coun-
tries has been through the Food for Peace Program,
and only negligible amounts have been for development
purposes.
5. Algeria, the major Maghreb recipient of
foreign aid, received $1.4 billion of aid from DAC
members after its independence in 1962 through 1968.
All but $175 million was provided by France. Al-
geria accounts for 45% of all Western aid to the
Maghreb since 1960. Morocco, the second largest
recipient, and Tunisia, the third, each received
approximately 25% of total DAC member aid disbursed
to the Maghreb between 1960-68. Approximately 60%
of the aid to these two countries was provided by
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Deliveries of Economic Aid to the Maghreb Countries
1960-68
Million US $
Total
Al
eri
g
a
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Total S/
3,188
1,465
170
823
730
DAC member countries
3,098
1,405
170
817
706
France
U
it
d
1,644
1,227
N.A.
272
145
n
e
States
h
1,199
163
106
482
4
Ot
er d/
255
14
64
64
48
112
Communist countries
90
v)
60
0
6
24
USSR
C)
E
t
46
30
0
1
15
as
ern Europe
19
5
0
5
Communist China
25
25
0
0
9
0
H
a. Data for DAC member countries are not avails Ze for 1969, but if projected at
the average annual rate for 1966-68, approximately $275 million would be added to
total DAC disbursements for 1969. Communist countries made deliveries of about
$15 million in 1969.
b. Deliveries to Algeria are counted only from the date of independence in July
1962.
c. Only deliveries from DAC member countries and the Communist countries are in-
cluded in total aid deliveries inasmuch as data for other donors are not available.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
d. Including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
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the United States. Aid deliveries to Libya, which
have declined steadily since 1960, total $170 mil-
lion, of which 60% has been supplied by the United
States.
Communist Aid to the Maghreb
6. Although Communist countries.have extended
almost $500 million of economic aid to three Maghreb
countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), little
more than 20% of this amount had been delivered by
the end of 1969 (see Table 2). The main reason for
this slow rate of utilization is the character of
Communist assistance. Unlike most Western aid to
the Maghreb, Communist aid is almost entirely for
capital projects, many of which require long lead-
times for survey, construction, and installation.
Shortages of skilled manpower and weakness of plan-
ning and management in recipient' countries, partic-
ularly Algeria, added to the lag in the utilization
of aid. Most of the Communist aid has been provided
by the USSR, which extended over $315 million, or
about 65% of the total. East European countries
have extended $130 million of aid and Communist China
only about $50 million.
7. Algeria, the major Western aid recipient in
the Maghreb, also has been the largest beneficiary
of Communist economic aid to that area. Communist
nations' commitments of $310 million to Algeria
amount to more than 60% of the total Communist
economic aid extended to the Maghreb. The remainder,
about $185 million, has been extended to Tunisia
and Morocco, mostly for light industrial projects
and water resource development. Only a small por-
tion of this aid has been drawn. Moreover, the
$128 million Soviet credit extended to Algeria in
1964 for a steel mill, represents the USSR's largest
and most important single industrial undertaking
in an African country.* The Soviet Union also has
extended a $100 million line of credit to Algeria
which has been allocated to light industrial instal-
lations, dams and irrigation projects, and geolog-
ical prospecting. Other Communist countries also
have concentrated their Maghreb aid undertakings
in Algeria. Of particular significance'is the $50
million Communist Chinese credit, extended to
Algeria in 1963, of which almost one-half was pro-
vided in foreign exchange.
Excluding the UAR.
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Communist Economic Aid to the Maghreb Countries
Extended and Drawn, 1960-69
Million US $
Total
Algeria
Tunisia
Mo
_
rocco
Extended
Drawn
Extended
Drawn
Extended
Drawn
Ext
d
d
en
e
Drawn
USSR
316
60
238
42
34
17
44 1
h
Eastern Europe
131
20
22
6
74
9
35 5
Communist China
52
25
52
25
0
0
0 0
Total
499
105
312
73
108
26
79 6
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Technical Assistance
8. The predominance of Western' involvement in
the Maghreb is especially apparent in the vastly
larger numbers of Western technicians (about 26,700)
working under Western government-sponsored aid pro-
grams during 1968 (see Table 3); in addition, prob-
ably at least as many were working in the Maghreb
under commercial contract. Communist countries were
represented by only about 6,300 technicians, under
both aid and commercial contract -- about one-tenth
the size of the Western presence.
Foreign Economic Technicians
in the Maghreb Countries
1968
Persons 1
Donor
Total
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Total
33,015
12,450
2,740
11,410
6,415
DAC members
26,605
9,920
840
11,150
4,775
France
24,275
9,730
140
10,655
3,750
Italy
490
5
375
100
10
United Kingdom
150
10
110
15
15
United States
820
0
195
195
430
West Germany
380
75
15
80
210
Other
570
100
5
1U5
360
Communist
6,330
2,530
1,900
260
1,640
USSR 1,990
1,700
0
80
210
Eastern Europe 4,240
730
1,900
180
1,430
Communist China 100
100
0
0
0
a. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5 and include on y
technicians from DAC member countries and Communist countries.
b. Does not include technical personnel from these countries
that are sponsored by private sources.
9. Most of the Western personnel in the Maghreb
are teachers and other nonproject-related technicians.
Indeed, of the 24,300 French technicians under
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official sponsorship, representing 90% of the total
Western presence, more than 80% were teachers.
Similarly, the majority of Communist technicians
in the Maghreb states have not been associated with
development projects. In Tunisia and Morocco,
personnel from the Communist states, largely from
Eastern Europe, were predominantly administrative,
educational, and professional personnel. Most of
the 1,900 Communist "technical" personnel working
in Libya were in fact semiskilled laborers from
Eastern Europe working under commercial contract,
assigned to urban reconstruction work, including
housing, sewer lines, and similar activities.
Academic and Technical Students
10. Historically, students from the Maghreb
countries have gone to the West, especially to
France, for advanced education. This pattern has
not been changed radically since independence, al-
though almost 800 technical and academic students
from the Maghreb were studying in Communist coun-
tries in 1968 (see Table 4). Five times as many --
about 4,100 -- were students in DAC member countries
during the same year.
Trade Also Dominated by the West
11. As with aid, the Maghreb's expanding global
trade remains tied to the West. In 1968, Free
World countries supplied about 90% of the imports
of Maghreb countries and took 95% of their exports
(see Table 5). Moreover, even though the Maghreb's
trade with Communist countries has grown much faster
than its total trade during the past few years,
trade with Communist countries still accounted for
no more than 15% of the total trade of any Maghreb
country in 1968 as shown in Table 6.* France has
continued to be the Maghreb's most important trad-
ing partner, accounting for more than two-thirds
of Algeria's total trade in 1968 and approximately
one-third of Morocco's and Tunisia's. West Germany
and Italy are Libya's major trading partners. The
United States accounted for only about 7% of the
Maghreb's global trade in 1968.
In 1969, total trade of the Maghreb may have
expanded by as much as 5% over 1968, and its trade
with Communist countries by somewhat more.
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Academic Students and Technical Trainees
from the Maghreb Countries Studying Abroad
1968
Persons 1
Total
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Total abroad
41865
1,360
185
1,475
1,845
Students
2,945
695
95
1,080
1,075
Technical train-
ees
1,920
665
90
395
770
In DAC member coun-
tries
4,075
985
165
1,310
1,615
Including:
Students
2,340
450
90
915
885
Technical
trainees
.,735
535
75
395
730
Studying in:
Belgium
300
45
0
150
105
France
2,475
700
10
895
870
United Kingdom
105
35
40
15
15
United States
330
25
55
110
140
West Germany
590
105
35
105
345
Other
275
75
25
35
140
In Communist coun-
tries 1
790
375
20
165
230
Including:
Students
605
245
5
165
190
Technical
trainees
185
130
15
0
40
Studying in:
405
195
5
145
60
Eastern Europe
385
180
15
20
170
a. Numbers are rounded to the nearest 5.
b. The number present in December 1968.
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World Trade of the Maghreb Countries 1
1968
Million US $
Total
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Maghreb: Total
imports 1
2,120.3
706.9
644.0
551.3
218.1
Free World
1,942.0
661.9
590.7
489.3
200.1
Of which : 1
France
713.0
471.3
168.8
72.9
Italy
159.0
159.0
United Kingdom
73.9
73.9
United States
275.9
52.8
108.6
70.0
44.5
West Germany
53.4
53.4
Communist
194.7
61.4
54.4
61.4
17.5
USSR
60.5
31.9
6.1
19.2
3.3
Eastern Europe
92.1
21.9
35.9
20.6
13.7
Other
42.1
7.6
12.4
21.6
0.5
Maghreb: Total
exports
3, 247.9
772.4
1,867.4
450.3
157.8
Fr
ee World
3,105.7
722.6
1,864.2
391.3
127.6
Of which:
France
782.8
557.4
188.9
36.5
Italy
370.7
370.7
United Kingdom
344.5
344.5
United States
126.5
5.3
107.8
10.6
2.8
West Germany
494.0
494.0
Co
mmunist
155.5
56.6
2.4
62.1
34.4
USSR
51.4
27.7
18.3
5.4
Eastern Europe
75.3
18.3
2.4
30.5
24.1
Other
28.8
10.6
13.3
4.9
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World Trade of the Maghreb Countries 1
1968
(Continued)
a. Soviet data are from the official Soviet trade yearbook_.
Trade Handbook; data for Eastern Europe and other 'Com-
munist countries are based on official trade statistics of the
Maghreb countries; and figures for the Free World and total im-
ports and exports are from official country data reported by
the IMF, in Direction of Trade, and by the US Department of
Commerce.
b. The components do not add to the totals shown because of
differences between Soviet and Free World reporting.
c. Figures are given only for major trading partners.-
12. As shown in Table 6, the importance of trade
with Communist areas differs substantially among the
several Maghreb countries particular-'y with regard
to exports. This difference reflects the tremendous
importance of oil in Libyan and Algerian exports,
virtually all of which is sold to the West for hard
currencies. Crude oil sales, which made up virtual-
ly all of Libya's exports, in 1968 came to almost
$1.9 billion -- more than the total exports of the
other three Maghreb ccuntries combined. Crude oil
exports, valued at $670 million, also accounted for
a large share -- over 85% -- of total Algerian ex-
ports in 1968. Petroleum sales by both countries
have grown extremely rapidly in recent years.
13. Morocco, with no oil to export, and Tunisia,
still with only modest amounts, have had to count
largely on phosphate fertilizers and tourism as
their chief hard currency earners. Both countries
have faced near stagnant sales of phosphates in the
West and have turned to Communist areas -- Eastern
Europe in particular -- which, in 1968, purchased
25% of Tunisia's phosphates and 20% of Morocco's.
These two countries are not alone in using Communist
markets to dispose of goods that cannot find a!ready
market in the West. Algeria, faced with a drastic
cut in French purchases of wine in 1967, signed a
5-year clearing agreement with the USSR in 1968 to
purchase Soviet goods in exchange for $40 million
of wine annually. There are indications that French
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Communist Countries' Share
of the Maghreb Countries' Trade
1968 1
Percent of Total
Communist Share of
Exports
from
Imports
by
Turnover
Algeria
7.3
8.7
8.0
Libya
0.1
8.4
2.3
Morocco
13.8
14..1
12.3
Tunisia
21.8
8.0
13.8
a. While shares differ somewhat from year to year,
the pattern of the past few years approximates that
of 1968.
purchases of Algerian wine may be used this year at
the expense of Soviet purchases, but the French mar-
ket is highly uncertain in the longer term.
14. For all but one of the Maghreb countries,
external payments pose no serious constraint.
Rapidly rising Libyan oil revenues have outpaced
imports, giving Libya a foreign currency reserve of
around $1 billion at the end of 1969. Similarly,
Algerian reserves rose to about $600 million --
equal to roughly 85% of its 1968 import level.
Morocco too has increased its reserves, which in
1969 reached $115 million -- double the 1967 level.
Only Tunisia, with reserves at around $35 million,
faces serious payments problems. With the cessation
of phosphate sales to India, formerly its major
customer, and with the decline of Western phosphate
purchases, Tunisia will look to Eastern Europe to
buy increasing quantities of its rising phosphates
production. This decline, however, may be offset by
gains in other exports, such as petroleum.
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Military __Aid
General
15. The four countries of the Maghreb rely
entirely on foreign sources of supply for modern
military equipment. Since 1952, these four states
together have received a total of approximately $250
million in Western military aid and sales, about 45%
of which was from the United States. In addition,
Algeria and Morocco have receives an estimated $290
million of Communist arms aid, almost all of which
was from the USSR (see Table 7).
Military Assistance and Sales
to the Maghreb Countries
1952-69
Million US $
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Communist
Bulgaria
1
--
--
Communist China
12
--
--
Czechoslovakia
--
--
20
--
USSR
241
--
13
--
Free World
Total
21
76
105
44
United States /
--
33
49
25
Belgium
--
2
5
--
France
4
Negl.
41
14
Iraq
3
--
--
--
Israel
--
--
4
--
Italy
Negl.
Negl.
5
3
Morocco
1
Spain
--
--
1
--
UAR
5
--
Negi.
Negl.
United Kingdom
3
40
Negl.
1
West Germany
4
Negl.
--
1
Yugoslavia
1
1
--
Negl.
a. Values given are for actua a iveries and exclude
outstanding credits not yet drawn.
b. Data as of 30 June 1969.
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16. Military expenditures have not taken an in-
ordinately large share of the total current expendi-
tures budget of any Maghreb country (see Table 8).
Similarly, arms debt repayments have not been a
significant burden.
Table 8
Military Expenditures of the Maghreb Countries
Value in Million US $
1965
1966
1967
1968
Algeria
Value
Total budget a
765
822
959
1,196
Of which:
Defense expenditures
98
130
125
105
Defense expenditures as a percent
of budget
(13)
(16)
(13)
(9)
Libya
Value
Total budget /
296
462
670
734
Of which:
Defense expenditures
22
48
59
58
Defense expenditures as a percent
of budget
(7)
(10)
(9)
(8)
Morocco
Value
Total budget 1
Of which:
Defense expenditures
57
59
63
80
Defense expenditures as a percent
of budget
(12)
(12)
(11)
(12)
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Military Expenditures of the Maghreb Countries
(Continued)
Value in Million US $
1965 1966 1967 1968
Tunisia
Value
Total budget 1
Of which:
289 315 345 376
Defense expenditures 8 9 8 21
Defense expenditures as a percent
of budget (3) (3) (2) (6)
a. Tots budget comprises currant an development uUgeto.
b. Estimated.
a. All data represent repayments tc the USSR, except
or an
-7
estimated $5 million paid by Morocco to Cnaohoolovakia in
1968-69.
Total
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1969
Algeria
10.8
--
0.1
0.7
1.0
1.8
3.7
3.5
Morocco
12.3
4.0
0.6
0.6
0,5
0.6
3.0
3.0
Algeria and Morocco, which have received Soviet
military aid on liberal terms -- large discounts,
credits repayable in 10 years at 2% interest, and
varying grace periods -- are believed to have made
repayments largely in commodities or soft currency.
These payments, as shown in Table 9, have in no
case exceeded 1% of the total annual exports of
either country.
Table 9
Estimated Repayments for Communist Military Aid
Million US $
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S.I',(; It 1?' L'
17. French military aid in usually provided on
somewhat lean favorable terms -- generally smaller
discounts, with credits repayable in U years at
4.5% interest. Repayment of r.,ESnch aid presumably
in made in commodities or local currency, while
outright sales probably call for hard currency.
Even in the cane of Morocco, the chief recipient of
French aid in the Maghreb, payments for French
equipment probably have not exceeded $1 million
por year. Similarly, Libya, the largest UK arms
customer in the area, has had ample funds to pur-
chase British military hardware, with estimated
payments before 1969 probably amounting to not more
than $2 million to $3 million per year.
Algerian Government Turn; to the U:a-f
for Arms Aid
1.0. During its war for independence, the
Algerian independence movement (FLU) received an
estimated $16 million worth of military assistance
on a grant hanis from Communist China, the USSR,
and Bulgaria. The existence of longstanding terri-
torial disputes among Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
stimulated poatindepondenco arms buildups in these
countries. Moroccan claims on Algerian territory,
following the latter's independence in 1962, r.e-
oulted in a brief border war between Altieria and
Morocco in October 1963. An a result of their poor
military nhowinq, the Algerians. turned to the tt `it
for major military assistance. The TenpOnried
generously, agreeing to provide Al(leria with about
4'235 million of military aid in agreements nion"d
in October 1963 and May 1965. Thin was more than
the total aid received by the throe othh"-r i'~ fc;hreh
stater from all sources durinca the same 1:1-+ried.
The catim.ated value of .soviet military aid deb .i -
orion to Algeria is nc(iwn in the follo'winq tabula-
tions 1 }}
?!i f*Ii L~4, M
rn. - 1 1 h t 11 lot 1 t a t s 1 [1 L t l rr r r_ tar. 1 far es Al ~t ? r4.r
.%I ? A JVi 1 .'V ..# , ..V7 s. _VJ t SVV A .'V ?
Moth Morocco and Tuninia, concerned over Alneria'n
military buildup, nought additiotia1 military aid,
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obtaining approximately $175 million in arms --
moatly from Weatern countries -- from 1962-69.
19. Soviet army aid hon made Algeria by far the
strongest: power in the Maghreb, with a clear
superiority in virtually every category of modern
weapons (nee Tables 10 and 11) . The quantitien
and typnn of materiel received -- including MICA-21
fighters and Y,omar and Osa-class miaailo patrol
boats -- have gone far beyond any reanonable defen-
sive requirement against ponnible Tunisian or
Moroccan attacks.
Major Communist Military Cquipnont
Delivered to the Maghreb Countries
1960-69
Algeria Morocco
^
Medium tanks 360 122
5-If-propelled assault guns 100 30
Arr orccd per?;onnel carriers S00 00
Field and iA artillery 900 100
: ay.3l rshi p
Miryenvealers 2
t ut r 3r:the :3anerr: 6
?Motor torpedo and rniini 1e boats R 1
Auxiliary craft 3
kiuht "et Lmo era
I -h F_w _!A
Heavy translkorts
Dra&nerR and belicoptern
Surfaco-to-air rianile launchers
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 Major Free World Military tquippment
Delivered to the Maghroh Countries
1952-69
TYPQof i;clu3?pment
Alunrin
Li.b a
Morocco
Tunisia
Land armaments
Medium tanks
6
--
--
Light tanks
--
--
129
17
Self-propelled assault
guns --
--
07
--
Personnel carriern
and
armorer] corn
62
220
Ill
11
Artillery pieces
;lav.~1 ahi
52
146
236
04
Minesweepers 2
2
--
oeubmar.ine chasers --
--
4
1
Motor torpedo +nr1 patrol
boats 2
11
12
10
Auxiliary craft --
2
17
2
Aircraft
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SJ?C R 1',`1'
Jot f ic_t~stns~c:
Trainnr~, t:raflcport(3I
11 aA w
:Lnd ?Sep 1 t f?r.t,4 n to
R0. hn Alr~rt'ians ha`s'ty ?den t.ryji `I to Ai3z c. rb
this Vast influx of "WIviet equip?,.rnt thro. h an
c,Xter i r ?avie`-Pul-prvi ed traintn$ progran and a
far-rra~'~in'f Yt?ta;''1 n1~ation of eiround fL rcrn, At
leant 1,200 5oviet mi1itar;' adsinrrp have t:1-eon
t:re ent in Alietia szirco la+tc 1047_ alf)--.1. as..-
nurlror may have been roduced since late
total of 2,100 Algerian military atudentn have
been sent to Co:- unint countries for trai"it;s1.
Deapite thin offort, defici?ncian in training and
organization continue to handicap the e f f ecti vangcs
of A1rleria's military force. The entabliah not of
an o rational 1., nynte=. for example. has land
bacaune of Algerian training difficul tiien, # ,1 tho
17 -
~a }F
SE ;: E is
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fighter interceptor capability of the air force is
similarly limited.
21. Soviet-Algerian relationn have noticeably
cooled since the June 1967 Arab-Inraeli war. Thin
cooling in relations is evident in the slowinq rate
of Soviet military equipment and spare parts do-
liverien -- there have been no deliveries of major
military equipment since 1960 when the 1965 agree-
ment presumably wan fulfilled* -- and in the utif-
fening ir. arms repayment terms. Prior to June 1967,
the USSR followed a relatively liberal aid policy
toward Algeria, providing an entimated 50% of the
equipment on a grant basis in the form of price
discounts. Since that time the USSR report'rlly
has required that all. equipment be paid for onya
csAdit or barter basin. Moreover, the USSR in 1969,
apparently for the first time, insisted on payment
in hard currency for specialized equipment, such
an the two MI-6 holicoptern ordered in June of that
year.
French Arms Aid to Alctoria
22. An relationn with the USSR have eroded,
Algeria has begun to look more toward Prance for
military ansintance. Prior to 1968, Algeria had
purchased onl; minor quantities of infantry weapons,
?_era, and mincnllanvou, equipment from its
foci or metroj.:ale, although a moderate-nixed French
tr 4-4n.. pro,..ram ha&d contt,nued. In rennonne to
a. as a??a?.-j ,: e. ..-~..
Algerian requenta in early 1960, the French agreed
to double the number of Algerian training nlotu in
France to nearly 700, including pilot training and
technical courses, beginning in September 1968.
23. Increased French technical assistance was
follor,eed by Algerian first requer.t for French air-
craft, an yell as additional ground equipment."
eiri (i._ :... Z~ ~i~~~ ~jG l.if?:~-~' Grp' 'ii iSl'Gii a?? i, ~~ `?.. t.~
4. ; e, ach v rG :G t1 vc rc it 611'! j 2 *c :17~dr. r
25X1
25X1
25X1
aic,irr
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Three Dassault l"alcon executive-typo tranoports
were purchaeod in early 1969, followed by agreements
to purchase 28 Fouga Magietor jot trainers, two
holicrptorn, and some 50 Panhard armored cars, at
a ropurtod total cost of about $10 million. The
French also agreed to train Algerian flight instrue--
M ghreb'n Reliance on Western Aid
24. In contrast to Algeria, the other three
Maghreb countries have relied almost entirely on
Western sources of arms aid. Next to the United
States, France has been the principal source of
military equipment for Morocco and Tunisia, while
the United Kingdom -- prior to the recent French
aircraft agreement -- an the prime arms supplier
to Libya (see Tablet 7). Belgium, Italy, and West
Germany also have sold minor quantities of asborted
air and ground equipment to the Maghreb.
25. France zimilarly has been the major source
of military training assistance to Morocco and
Tunisia, and noon will become no in the case of
Libya as well, in addition to the 350 French ad-
visorn in Algeria, about 400 ne;cve in Morocco, and
s hao ful serve in the small Tunisian armed forces
(see Table 12) . Sotr:e French personnel in Morr)cco
are din ctly under Moroccan command and are par-
ti;illy paid h y smorocco. Those in Algeria and Tuni-
sia nerve in a status similar to U military advina
ory groups, an have than 100 or no t3ritissh advisers
in Libya. Almost all officer ~ncd skilled technical
ILLEGIB
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Military Technical Assistance
a. UMEM ars row d to F he ntarrn`? 5 exaopf 060V
of Zuffisia.
b. As of ~lanuary 1970.
June 1969
Persons J
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia
Military technicians
in country
1,200
0
20
0
USSR
1,200
--
--
--
Czechoslovakia
450
525
405
5
France
400
3
Iran
Israel
5 N.A.
--
Italy
Nationalist China
--
25
UAR J
100
400
United Kingdom
--
100
Military trainees abroad
In Communist countries
525
0
40
0
USSR
500
--
--
Czechoslovakia
--
--
40
--
Cuba
25
--
--
In Free World countries
380
230
405
30
France
350
--
400
N.A.
Greece
--
110
--
5+
Italy
20
--
5
-..
Turkey
--
--
--
25+
OAR
10
--
--
--
~t..Abvu t%AtSIJUUm
--
I cult
--
--
West Germany
--
N.A.
N.A.
--
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training for Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia has taken
place in military schools in Western countries.
In early 1969, however, Tunisia agreed to allow
France to establish a postgraduate military school
to train Tunisian army officers. The creation of
the now school will result in a substantial in-
crease in the size of the French advisory contin-
gent in Tunisia and will reduce the strain on mili-
tary schools in France.
26. Morocco is the only Maghreb country, other
than Algeria, that has received Communist military
assistance. Soviet agreements concluded in 1960
and 1962, and a small one signed in 1966, totaled
about $13 million. Most of the major equipment
received under these accords, including 12 jet
fighters and two jet trainers, currently is in-
operable because of a lack of spare parts. A $20
million agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia
in 1967 for tanks, self-propelled assault guns,
armored vehicles, and a tank training school. In
1968, Morocco resumed its military supply relation-
ship with France by purchasing 24 Fouga Magister
jet trainers. In the same year, a $2 million ve-
hicle deal with West Germany also was concluded.
27. Since independence in 1956, Tunisia has
received a modest amount of US, French, Italian,
and other Western military materiel including some
older vintage aircraft, ground equipment, and a
few naval patrol craft. Two missile-equipped
coastal patrol boats, currently under construction
in France, are scheduled for delivery in 1970.
Most recently, a $5 million French arms agrc.munit,
including three transport aircraft, 13 light tanks,
and some infantry equipment, was concluded in
November 1969. In addition, Italy in 1969 agreed
to provide Tunisia with a comprehensive, ccuntry-
wide radar system, valued at $10 million, to be in
full operation by the end of 1974.
28. Unlike the other Maghreb states, Libya did
with
nshi
ti
l
l
p
a
o
y re
not establish an arts. supp
France until after the coup in September 1969.
Prior to that time, the United Kingdom was the
primary military supplier to Libya, providing some
$40 million worth of ground, naval, and air equip-
ment :supplemented by about $30 million in US arms
aid. Plans for army expansion -- drawn up prior
to the coup -- included acquiring an air defense
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system and the formation of mechanized and armored
brigades. A highly ambitious procurement program
involved British contracts for a complete mobile
surface-to-air missile system -- including modern
Thunderbird and Rapier guided missiles -- valued
at $288 million and a $112 million agreement for
188 Chieftain tanks and some 300 other armored
vehicles. After the 1969 coup, the new Libyan
government canceled the air defense agreement,
although the first installment of $80 million had
already been paid. The armored vehicle agreement
remains in force; however, its future status is
uncertain.
29. The recent French-Libyan agreement for at
least 110 jet aircraft represents a dramatic shift
in Libya's military aid relations. included are
30 supersonic Mirage III-E interceptors and 50
Mirage V fighter bombers, in addition to trainers.
The first 15 aircraft are scheduled for delivery
in 1971, and the balance during 1972-74. The cost
of the aircraft transaction was not disclosed, but
is estimated to be at least $150 million. The
terms of the agreement expressly prohibit the re-
sale or re-export of these aircraft without French
permission.
30. While Libya might reasonably hope to ab-
sorb as many as 100 Mirage aircraft over the next
several years, considerable pilot and ground crew
training -- most of which will be provided by
France -- will be required to enable the Libyans
to effectively handle these sophisticatlvd aircraft.
Libya presently has no pilots or mechanics quali-
fied in supersonic aircraft, and few airfields and
maintenance facilities. The Wheelus and El Adem
air bases now being evacuated by the United States
and United Kingdom probably will be adapted for
use by the Mirages. Training of Libyan personnel,
however, will be a much more drawn out affair.*
04 Barrio pzlo training takes a minimum of one
year, and at least another year is required for
basic proficiency on sophisticated aircraft, ouch
as the Mirage. Basic maintenance training takes
25 weeks and opooialined mechanics' training re-
quirca at least another year for personnel with
the equivalent of a US high school education.
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French officials estimate that it will take 3 to
4 years to train the 200 pilots and 1,000 mainte-
nance crewmen needed to operate and service the
aircraft on order. The first Libyan pilots are
scheduled to begin training in France in the near
future.*
31. To date, the Libyan government has shown
no inclination to cultivate strong links with the
USSR. A Soviet offer of military assistance made
immediately after the coup was rejected.
Conclusions
32. Recent developments in the Maghreb states'
foreign relations have reinforced their already
strong links with the West, particularly with
France, and have created an atmosphere more con-
ducive to cooperation within the region. A major
factor has been the formal settlement of Algeria's
longstanding border dispute with Tunisia and a
tacit agreement with Morocco to relax border ten-
sions. Perhaps even more important is the common
opposition of these three states to the spread of
Nasser's influence into Libya. These developments,
together with more favorable trade and payments
positions for three of the four Maghreb countries,
have made the extension of significant Soviet
influence into the region even less likely than
heretofore.
33. In their economic relations, all four
Maghreb states remain heavily oriented toward the
West, which accounts for more than 95% of the trade
of each. Of $3.5 billion of foreign economic aid
delivered to the Maghreb since 1960, France sup-
plied about half and the United States about 40%.
Communist states altogether accounted for only
about 3% of the total. In addition, private West-
ern capital flows to the area have been substantial,
amounting to perhaps as much as $150 million in
1968 alone. The Maghreb states also have received
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large-scale technical assistance, chiefly doctors,
teachers, and other professional personnel not
associated with development aid. in 1968, the
French government provided about 24,300 technical
personnel, other Western states 2,400, and Commu-
nist countries about 6,300. In addition to the
technicians sponsored by Western governments, prob-
ably at least as many have been working in the Magh-
reb under private contract.
34. In terms of military aid to the Maghreb,
only Algeria received large quantities of military
equipment from the USGR. As relations with Moscow
have cooled, Algeria in the past year and a half
has turned to France for purchase of jet trainers
and a substantial amount of ground equipment. The
scope of French-provided military training also has
been enlarged. The other three Maghreb states have
essentially maintained their traditional reliance
on the West -- primarily the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France -- for military assis-
tance, although France recently has displaced the
United States and the United Kingdom as the prime
source of military equipment for Libya.
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