US VERSUS SOVIET EMERGENCY AID TO PERU
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030122-3
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 28, 2011
Sequence Number:
122
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 1, 1970
Content Type:
IM
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CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030122-3.pdf | 470.08 KB |
Body:
VUU111 14081-
Intelligence, Memorandum
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030122-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030122-3
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its ?ansmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030122-3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/10/31 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030122-3
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
August 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
US Versus Soviet Emergency Aid To Peru
Introduction
Immediately following the Peruvian earthquakes
on 31 May 1970 which killed an estimated 50,000
persons and left another half million homeless,
there was a massive outpouring of assistance from a
number of countries, led by the United States.
More than a week passed before the USSR officially
expressed sympathy, two weeks elapsed before a token
amount of Soviet Red Cross aid arrived in Peru, and
it was not until six weeks later that a much publi-
cized Soviet airlift to Peru began. This memorandum
discusses the difficulties and delays surrounding
the Soviet aid effort, and compares the scope of this
effort with that of the United States and other
countries.
US Assistance to Peru
1. The United States was one of the few countries
that responded immediately to the needs for assistance
generated by the Peruvian earthquake. On1 June, the
day after the disaster, US Ambassador Belcher extended
the sympathy of the United States'and presented a
check for $25,000 to the Junta de Asistencia Nacional.
This was followed by his immediate request for material
aid. Or 2 June, several loads of supplies arrived by,
airlift'from a disaster reserve set up in Panama.
Note: The memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
2. During the period 2 June - 11 July, 44
flights were made from the United States and Panama,
delivering more than 700 tons of cargo. In addition,
the USS Guam -- a helicopter carrier -- was dis-
patched to Peru. Helicopters from this carrier,
along with other US aircraft made ovGr 1,900 sorties
within Peru, dispensing more than 950 tons of sup-
plies and transporting almost 5,000 personnel. Be-
cause normal transportation within the affected area
in Peru was completely disrupted, the availability
of the US helicopters -- 22 in all -- and other air-
craft was very important. Reportedly, the Peruvian
Air Force had only two helicopters operative.
3. In addition to supplies airlifted into Peru
and the sorties carried out within Peru which to-
gether were valued at $3.2 million, the United States
also donated nearly $6 million in PL 480 food for dis
tributi.on through US voluntary agencies. The US
voluntary agencies alone undertook to feed soma
250,000 Peruvians daily. Moreover, the United States
provided another $7.4 million for rehabilitation aid.
Thus, US government aid to Peru totaled some $16.5 mil-
lion, and together with an additional $8.5 million
from US private organizations, aid from the United
States to Peru totaled about $25 million.
4. An incomplete list indicates that other coun-
tries provided more than $6 milion worth of aid to
Peru. The prompt action by Western Hemisphere coun-
tries was noteworthy. For example, Argentina, in
addition to a cash grant of about $40,000, provided
other emergency supplies including a hospital plane
(value of material aid is unknown). Chile donated
more than $200,000 worth of supplies excluding a
60-bed field hospital provided by the Chilean govern-
ment. From Canada came more than $1 million worth
of-aid, which took the form of cash grants, food,
clothing, generators, and air support involving eight
aircraft.
5. The Cuban response to the Peruvian disaster
was particularly swift. Within four days of the
disaster Cuba mounted an airlift which by the end of,
June had completed more than 20 flights. The Cuban
assistance included five 30-bed field hospitals,
medical teams, 50 mobile kitchens, and other supplies
brought in by a large trawler on 18 June. Moreover,
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CONFIDENTIAL
according to the Cuban press, more than 100,000
Cubans donated blood to the victims of the earthquake.
No T.-alue has been placed on the Cuban aid, although
it is claimed that the first two flights carried some
15 tons of relief supplies. Cuban medical teams have
gone home but they have given the medical clinics to
Peru.
6. Aid from other countries took similar form,
such as cash grants, food, clothing, medical supplies,
personnel, temporary shelters, and other supplies.
Even Communist China, through the International Red
Cross, donated $600,000 in cash. In most cases, how-
ever, the value of the aid provided is not known.
Conceivably, it could total a few million dollars
more in aid than has been calculated. Moreover, aid
continues to flow in from both governmental and private
sources -- including from the United States -- to help
in the reconstruction of Peru. US assistance to pro-
mote rehabilitation and economic development that will
dwarf all current aid is now being firiotsd up.
The Soviet Effoxt
7. The Soviet response to the disaster which
struck Peru was slow in coming. It was not until nine
days after the earthquake that a telegram of sympathy
arrived from President Podgorny. This was followed by
an announcement on the same day that the Soviet Red
Cross would send aid to the earthquake victims; in a
few days a Soviet airplane arrived in Lima with a token
shipment of relief goods valued at about $35,000.
8. A full month later, apparently waking up to
the facC that its prestige had been damaged by its
failure to respond generously and promptly to the
situation in Peru, the USSR announced that it would
conduct a massive airlift to Peru. The announcement,
a leftist Lima newspaper noted, came the day after
the completion of Mrs. Nixon's trip to Peru. Mrs,.
Nixon, on the last day of her trip, commented th4~t
her trip would . "focus the attention of the world
on the needs of the earthquake victims. . . ."*
.9. The USSR announced that there would be 65
flights, 61 by AN-12s and 4 by the giant AN-22s. Ac-
cording to the original plans, the airlift was to
begin on 3 July, with the first plane landing in Lima
* The Soviet response may also have been prompted
by the Cuban aid effort.
3 -
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on 7 July. The schedule was then revised, calling
for all 65 flights to be completed during the period
10-21 July. The first flight -- an AN-12 with .Aix:.
tons of cargo -- finally left the USSR on 9 July
and arrived in Lima on 12 July. There were 1,4.ad
ditional, flights over the next six days, inclddinq;
ten AN-1,2s and four AN-22s. On 18 July an AN-22
reportedly carrying equipment and supplies fora'
hospital was lost over the Labrador Sea. Further
Soviet flights to Peru were canceled for one week;
they were resumed on 25 July and by the end of the
month six more AN-12s flew in supplies. A two-week
pause ended with a final cancellation of the air-
lift on 15 August. It was explained that the re-
mainder of the supplies would arrive by ship. Of
the, 65 flights planned, only 21 were completed.
"He didn't want to miss the streetcar"
2'Z Comercio? Lirna
July 1970
10. The Soviet response to the Peruvian tragedy
was largely a fiasco from the i:.ginning. From the
long-delayed official expression of sympathy, to
the meager assistance provided two weeks after the
earthquake,, to the final cancellation of the highly
publicized airlift, the Soviet effort was?.a comedy
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of errors. Having awakened to the fact a month
late that it had failed to grasp an opportunity to
improve its image in Latin America, the Soviet
attempt to recoup its losses through a massive air-
lift also failed because of technical difficulties
and bureaucratic bungling.* The airlift was apparently
planned in haste. By the time the first Soviet, flights
were'arriving, the Peruvian government declared that
the immediate emergency was over and that it was
shifting to a "rehabilitation stage."
11. The hasty decision to undertake the airlift
did not allow enough time for the proper planning of
an exercise of the size and scope envisioned by the
USSR. Under normal circumstances considerable prep-
arations are required to ensure a smooth operation for
such an airlift, such as aircraft maintenance person-
nel and spare parts located along the proposed route
to take care of equipment failures and other technical
problems. Apparently such advance preparations were
inadequate. Moreover, the distance to be covered --
more than 7,000 miles, much of it over unfamiliar ter-
ritory -- undoubtedly compounded Soviet difficulties.
Thus, the failure of the airlift to Peru, conducted
by the Soviet military, stands out in sharp contrast
to the well-planned and executed airlift of arms to
the UAR in 1967 and the airlift to'Prague in 1968
when Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia.
Scope of Soviet Aid
12. The value of the Soviet aid scheduled to be
provided cannot be accurately estimated. The USSR
itself has never indicated the amount of aid it would
provide. Various estimates put the total tonnage
that the 65 flights would have been able to carry at
about 700 tons. A partial list, for which no value
has been attached, includes a 200-bed hospital, 75
* In an attempt to improve its image the USSR put
up its 200-bed hospital in a show-place location on
a main road only a few,. miles from a Peruvian hospital
in Huaraa. Moreover, when it finally started re-
ceiving patients in Early August --- too late to pro-
vide emergency aid to earthquake victims -- it was in
fact merely supplementing services provided by the
local Peruvian hospital which reportedly was no Zong
er overworked.
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CONFIDENTIAL
medical specialists, medical supplies, 100 prefabri-
cated houses, and building materials and equipment.
Three helicopters for its hospital were also sent
by the USSR and have since been donated to Peru.
According to a Soviet Red Cross official, food valued
at 100,000 rubles was to be included amore,,, the sup-
plies. Using the average value per ton-of supplies
provided by US private relief agencies as a.guide in
the calculation, the most generous estimate of the
value of Soviet relief aid -- assuming all 700 tons
are sent -- might approach $1 million exclusive of
the hospital and its personnel. This would be about
4% of the total supplied by the United States, and
more relief continues to come from the United States
as well as other countries.
Conclusions
13. The United States has led scores of other
countries in providing emergency and rehabilitation
relief to the victims of the Peruvian earthquakes, of
31 May. Not only were US personnel and supplies
among the first on the scene, but the US government
and voluntary agencies have furnished substantially
more aid -- valued at about $25 million -- than all
other countries combined.
14. By contrast, the USSR has suffered at least
an initial propaganda defeat because of its handling
of relief aid to Peru. Not only did the USSR respond
very late, but a much publicized airlift designed to
salvage something from the embarrassing situation
was fraught with problems from the start. Whatever
political impact the USSR had hoped to achieve by the
airlift probably evaporated when the airlift was can-
celed after one-third of the flights had taken place.
15. The scope of the Soviet aid effort was small
in contrast with that of the United States. The
highest valuation that could be put on Soviet aid
to Peru would be about $1 million -- assuming all
scheduled deliveries are made -- or about 4% of
US aid to Peru.
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