RECENT TRENDS IN SOVIET SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030124-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 124
• Publication Date: September 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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-Seeret-~
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Trends In Soviet Satellite Communications
-Seeret-
ER IM 70-124
September 1970
Copy No. 6 0
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Recent Trends In Soviet Satellite Communications
Introduction
Technological change within the Soviet communi-
cations satellite (comsat) program has been much
slower than that achieved by the Western-based In-
telsat consortium. Now in its sixth year, the
Soviet comsal: system is still dependent on essen-
tially "first-generation" technology for operational
space and ground segment hardware. New subsystems --
both satellite and ground stations -- are currently
under development, however, which should provide the
USSR with a substantially more advanced comsat sys-
tem within the next year or two.
This memorandum assesses recent developments in
Soviet satellite communications and examines trends
in system planning. Estimates of the aggregate cost
of the Soviet comsat program and its major components
are also included. These are the first such estimates
within the US intelligence Community.
Satellite Developments
Molniya-1
1. With the launch of two more Molniya satel-
lites in February and June 1970, the USSR has now
successfully orbited 14 comsats of the Molniya-1
type since April 1965. The highly elliptical orbit
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
it was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intel-
ligence, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office
of Scientific Intelligence, and the Foreign Missile
and Space Analysis Center.
SEC LE'T
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of the Molniyas causes them to pass repeatedly
through the Van Allen radiation belts. The degene-
rative effects of this radiation and poor quality
control of the satellites' components have probably
been the primary causes of the relatively short use-
ful lifetimes exhibited by the satellites thus far.
Of the 14 Molniyas orbited, probably only the four
or five most recently launched are still active.
These satellites are capable of relaying 60 two-way
telephone conversations, but thus far the system's
primary emphasis has been on the relay of television
from Moscow to a network of ground stations dispersed
throughout the USSR.
2. A primary consideration in the Soviet choice
of a highly elliptical orbit (rather than an equa-
torial synchronous orbit) for the Molniya system
was that it provides excellent coverage of the
northern latitudes. This choice has resulted, how-
ever, in a number of disadvantages. In addition to
the short operating lifetime of the satellites, the
elliptical system requires a minimun, of two satel-
lites in orbit at the same time to provide continuous
24-hour coverage of the USSR. In order to optimize
system coverage and reliability, the USSR uses three
or four satellites operating in tandem. The com-
bination of short operating lifetimes and large
numbers of satellites required for reliable opera-
tion greatly increases the cost to the USSR of
maintaining the Molniya-1 system.
Molniya-2 and Statsionar
3. The USSR is planning to launch two new types
of communications satellites -- a second-generation
Molniya to be known as Molniya-2 and a geo-stationary
satellite called Statsionar.. Although their orbits
will differ widely, both :,..,ailites will have similar
technical characteristics., Molniya-2 will be posi-
tioned in the same highly elliptical orbit as the
Molniya-1 series, while Statsion,ar is scheduled to be
placed in synchronous equatorial orbit over the Indian
Ocean.
4. Information filed by the USSR with the In-
ternational Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) of
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
indicates that these second-generation satellites
will operate in the internationally recommended
frequency range of 4-6 gigahextz (GHz) rather than
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the 800-1,000 megahertz (MHz) range used at present
for Molniya-1 operations. The additional bandwidth
provided by the frequency shift will greatly increase
the potential channel capacity of the new satellites
and will allow the simultaneous relay of both tele-
vision and multichannel voice transmissions, which
is not possible with the Molniya-1 satellites. The
additional bandwidth also fits well with Soviet
plans to develop an operational multiple-access
capability (whereby many ground stations can work
with a satellite at the same time), a highly desir-
able feature for a satellite communications system
if it is to operate in conjunction w!,th land-based
telecommunications systems.
5. Successful development and deployment of
the Statsionar satellites would serve at least two
important objectives. First, Statsionar should have
a much longer useful lifetime than the present Mci-
niya series, an advantage that satellites in syn-
chronous orbits have exhibited over those in highly
elliptical orbits. This extended lifetime would
reduce the long-run costs to the USSR of operating
a satellite communications system. Secondly, the
USSR almost certainly does not want synchronous
satellite technology to remain the exclusive province
of the West. in order for the USSR and mo:3t of the
Third World countries to be mutually "visible" via
satellite, an equatorial synchronous orbit is neces-
sary.
6. Soviet authorities have filed with the IFRB
a probable launch date of December 1970 for Stat-
sionar. However, owing to serious problems encoun-
tered with the only Soviet booster (the SL-12) cap-
able of placing Statsionar into equatorial synchro-
nous orbit, there is considerable doubt now that
this target date can he met. Placing the Molniya-2
into elliptical orbit should n(t confront the USSR
with any serious problems, but Moscow has supplied
no information on the initial launch date for this
satellite.
Ground Station Developments
Domestic
7. The USSR has developed the world's first
and only domestic satellite television distribution
system. The impetus for development of this system
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derives from the importance attached by the Soviet
leadership to the expansion of television as a
centrally controlled propaganda medium.* Coinci-
dent with the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution in 1967, the USSR put into operation a
network of special-purpose satellite ground stations
(known as "Orbital' stations). Currently, these
stations are capable only of receiving one channel
of television; they can neither transmit television
nor handle telephone and telegraph traffic. In
addition to the Orbita stations, there are ground
stations at Moscow and Vladivostok (known as Mol
niya stations) which can both transmit and receive
and are used for relaying telephone and telegraph
traffic as well as television between the two cities.
8. The Orbita network in the USSR has grown
from 20 stations at the end of 1967 to 29 by mid-
1970, with 8 more currently under construction and
two more in the active planning stage (see Table I).
A senior official of the Soviet Ministry of Communi
cations has stated that the network will continue
to expand at the rate of 6 to 8 new stations per
year. The USSR has not provided any forecast of
the ultimate size of the Orbita network, but a
total of at least 50 stations seems more than likely.
9. Many c,f the Orbita stations are located
east of the Urals in sparsely populated, areas where
there are few land-based communications lines
capable of carrying television signals. In the
selection of these areas for constructions of Orbita
stations the importance of television for propaganda
may well have been subordinate to the government's
desire to help make life in remote areas less unat-
tractive.
10. The physical expansion of the Orbita network
has been accompanied by the steady growth of Orbita
programming. In 1968 the Orbita network relayed
about 4:i hours per week of live Moscow telecasts.
This figure rose to 50 hours per week in 1969 and
is increasing again in 1970 by a further 25%. In
addition, a number of the Orbita stations are being
technically modified so that they can receive tele-
vision programs from Moscow in color. At four of
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Soviet Ground Stations a/
Molniya Stations -- Operational
Moscow (Molniya-2 and Stat-
sionar)
Vladivostok
Orbits Stations -- Operational
Abakan
Alma Ata
Archangelsk (Molniya-2)
Ashkhabad (Statsionar)
Blagoveshchensk
Bratsk
Chita (Statsionar)
Dzhezkazgan
Frunze (Statsionar)
Guryev
Irkutsk (Statsionar)
Kemerovo (Statsionar)
Khabarovsk (Statsionar)
Komsomolsk (Molniya-2 and
Statsionar)
Krasnoyarsk
Kyzyl
Magadan (Molniya-2)
Orbita Stations -- Operational (Continued)
Murmansk (Molniya-2)
Norilsk
Novosibirsk (Molniya-2 and_Statsionar)
Okha
Petropavlovsk (Molniya-2)
Surgut (Molniya-2)
Syktyvkar (Molniya-2)
Ulan Ude (.1-rcatsionar)
Uray
Vorkuta
Yakutsk (Statsionar)
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (Statsionar)
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Soviet Ground Stations a/
(Continued)
Orbita Stations -- Under. Construction
Orbita Stations -- Planned
Anadyr.
Batagay
Bilibino
Tiksi
Nikolayevsk-na-Amure
Okhotsk.
Molniya-2 Stations -- Planned
Sovetskaya Gavan
Tbilisi
Dudinka
Ust' Nera
Salekhard
Zeya-
Zayarsk
a.
Current y operational Soviet ground stations whose locations coincide with
those of future Molniya-2 and/or Statsionar ground stations are identified by
parenthetical designators.
Cn
C)
h
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the stations -- Alma Ata, Ashkhabad, Frunze, and
Ulan Ude -- this switchover to color has been com-
pleted.
International
11. During the past year or so, the USSR has re-
newed and enlarged its commitment to provide satel-
lite ground stations to other Communist countries,
but there is no evidence of similar arrangements
with any non-Communist country. Thus far, the only
ground station actually built by the USSR outside
its borders is an Orbita facility in the area of Ulan
Bator, Mongolia. A period of more than two years
elapsed between the agreement to build the station
and the initial groundbreaking in April 1969, but
once construction began the station was completed
in only nine months.,
12. A satellite ground station promised to Cuba
almost five years ago has yet to materialize. In
January 1970, however, this commitment was formalized
into a written agreement which, for the first time,
spelled out the fact that the Cuban station will have
multiservice capabilities -- that is, it will be able
to handle telephone and telegraph traffic in addition
to television, and will be able to transmit as well as
receive.
13. Firm evidence of Soviet intent to sponsor
establishment of satellite ground stations in East-
ern Europe has become available only in recent months.
In March 1970 a Czech-Soviet communique announced.
that construction of an Orbita station would bagin,
sor,n in Czechoslovakia. This was followed in July \
3.70 by an announcement indicating that the USSR
was going to provide Bulgaria with a multiservice
ground station. In neither case is there evidence
that construction has been started yet nor have
target dates for operational status been announced.
Program Costs
14. The figures presented below represent a
rough approximation of the cost of the Soviet comsat
program. In the absence of direct data on internal
Soviet expenditures, the estimates were based on
what it would cost (in US dollars) to duplicate the
Soviet program in the United States. The methodol-
ogy -- outlined in the Appendix -- makes substantial
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use of costing models developed elsewhere, but these
have been modified and amplified wherever necessary
to make cost components conform as closely as pos-
sible to the unique parameters of the Soviet pro-
gram.
15. Through mid-1970, total costs of the Soviet
Molniya-l program are estimated to have been some-
where between $700 million and $750 million. This
estimate includes the cost of research and develop-
ment, launchers, satellites, failures, ground
stations, and yearly operating and maintenance costs.
16. The space segmun~ of the Molniya program
has been by far the most expensive element of the
system because of the short operating lifetimes of
the satellites. Eacii of the 14 Molniyas success-
fully orbited since 1965 probably has cost the USSR
an estimated $33 million -- $20 million for the
booster and $13 million for the satellite. The 14
Molniyas would cost about $460 million excluding
the cost of failures. On the basis of a 75% prob-
ability of mission success the program probably
has experienced about five failures (either booster
or satellite), which would raise the total cost of
the space segment alone to more .:han $600 million.
17, in comparison, ground station costs have
been much lower, it is estimated that the approxi-
mately 30 Orbita stations cost between $l million
and $1.5 million each depending on the location and
the hostility of the terrain. The two multiservice
Molniya stations, larger and more complex than the
Orbita stations, are estimated to have cost between
$2.5 million and $3 million each. (A standard In-
telsat ground station, by comparison, costs between
$4 million and $6 million.) Total costs of Soviet
ground statii.rn deployment probably have totaled
somewhere between $40 million and $50 million.
18. Over the next two years or so, the develop-
ment of Molniya-2 and Statsionar, continued expan-
sion of the ground segment, and maintenance of the
system probably will require outlays amounting to
another $300 million.to $350 million. It appears
highly likely, therefore, that the total cost of
the Soviet comsat program will exceed $1 billion
by the end of 1972.
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Trends in System Planning
Domestic
19. Soviet comsat system development continues
to place primary emphasis on meeting domestic
priorities and requirements. As a necessary ad-
junct to the new freque-icy plan for the Molniya-2
and Statsionar satellites, the Orbita stations are
scheduled to be modified for operation in the 4 to
6 GHz range. in addition, Soviet planning calls
for selected (but as yet undesignated) Orbita sta-
tions to be equipped for both transmission and
reception of multichannel -telephone and telegraph
traffic. When fully operational, this network of
multiservice ground stations will contribute sub-
stantially toward overcoming the serious lack of
high capacity cable and microwave radio relay lines
in the Soviet regions lying east of the Urals.
20. According to official Soviet information,
the Molniya-2 and Statsionar satellites will work
with a network of 21 cities in the USSR (see Table 1)
Three of the cities -- Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Kom-
somoisk -- will have a ground station complement
capable of operating with both Molniya-2 and Stat-
sionar. Ground stations serving the remaining 18
cities are to be split evenly between the two sys-
tems. Since 18 of the 21 designated sites already
have ground stations in operation, completion of
the 21-city network will require the construction
of only three new stations at.Dudinka, Salekhard,
and Zayarsk, The 18 existing ground stations will
require technical modification in order to operate
with the new satellites but this probably can be
done with relatively moderate outlays of time and
money. Soviet authorities have not indicated what
is to be done with the Orbita stations that are
not earmarked for operation with the new satellites.
It seems likely that these unassigned stations also
will operate with Molniya-2 or Statsionar but will
be used only for reception of television.
International
21. Except for completion of the ground station
in Mongolia and the formalizing of promises to build
stations in Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria,
little has occurred over the last year or so to
clarify Soviet intentions in the international com-
sat-field. Intersputnik, the Soviet-sponsored in-
ternational comsat organization, has remained
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essentially a "paper tiger": its membership has
never increased beyond the original eight signa-
tories -- all Communist countries -- and of late
its existence is only infrequently mentioned, evcIn
by the USSR Alt';iough seemingly moribund, Inter-
sputnik may nevertheless be serving Soviet purposes.
As signatories to Intersputnik, the other Communist
countries are probably effectively restrained from
seeking membership in Intelsat, the Western-based
comsat consortium, and the USSR may also see in
Intersputnik a bargaining counter that could prove
useful in any future dealings with Intelsat.
22. In looking to the future, Soviet comsat
authorities appear to have selected the frequency
ranges for Molniya-2 and Statsionar with considerable
shrewdness. The radio frequency bandwidth of the
new Soviet satellites will overlap by 40% with
frequencies used by Intelsat, thus opening up the
possibility of technical cooperation between the
two systems. However, with the remaining 60% of
its bandwidth lying outside of the Intelsat frequency
range, the USSR will be free to operate independently.
The Soviet choice of frequency bands thus appears
designed to give the USSR considerable technical
flexibility in deciding how close or remote its
future relationship with Intelsat will be.
Conclusions
23. The characteristics of the Soviet comsat
program contrast sharply with those of the Western-
based Intelsat consortium. The Soviet system has
been developed primarily to satisfy domestic rather
than international priorities and is used mainly
for television distribution rather than for the
relay of telephone and telegraph communications.
Thus far, the Molniya/Or.bita program has required
outlays estimated at more than $700 million. Al-
though expensive, the program has brought television
to remote parts of the USSR at only a fraction of
the cost of conventional cable and/or microwave
radio relay lines.
24. Ultimately, the Soviet comsat system will
be fully integrated into the terrestrial common
carrier telecommunications network and will provide
multichannel telephone, telegraph, and data services
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in addition to television relay. The speed with
which this is accomplished depends on the success-
ful development and operational deployment of the
new-generation Molniya-2 and Statsionar satellites.
Substantial slippage in Soviet plans for these new
satellites is suggested by the long string of fail-
ures encountered in tests of the booster to be used
to launch Statsionar and also by the decision to
orbit two more of the old Molniya-ls in 1970. It
appears especially unlikely that the USSR will meet
its December 1970 target date for placing the first
Statsionar into equatorial synchronous orbit.
25. The USSR has shown little inclination thus
far to establish the priorities and to commit the
resources necessary to convert Intersputnik into
an authentic rival of Intelsat. Soviet authorities
may be reluctant to undertake major initiatives in
this direction until their new-generation satellites
have been successfully tested. Alternatively,
Moscow might decide that cooperation with the 75-
member Intelsat Consortium would be more advantag-
eous to the USSR than attempting to compete by means
of Intersputnik.
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APPENDIX
Methodology fo': Costing the Soviet Comsat Program
Since the USSR has supplied virtually no infor-
mation on the cost of its comsat program, an attempt
has been made to estimate the cost of a comparable
program in the United States. The basic reference
material is from Chapters 12 and 13 of TeZacommuni-
cation SateZZitea (Iliffe Books Ltd. and Prentice-
Hall, 1964), edited by K. W. Gatland. This source
was used for computing ground station costs P.nd
total system costs. Costs for the space segment of
the Soviet comsat prograr, were supplied by the Office
of Strategic Research (CJR), CIA. Despite the use
of many simplifying assumptions, the resulting esti-
mate probably represents a reasonable approximation
of the cost of the Soviet comsat program.
Ground Segment Costs
Orbita Ground Stations
Table 13.15 in Gatland was used to develop the
basic component costs of an Orbita ground station.
The table was modified to take into account the
size of the Orbita antenna and the fact that Orbita
stations do not have a transmission capability. The
estimated cost components for an Orbits station are
shown in Table 2.
Average cost of an Orbita station is estimated
to range between $1 million and $1.5 million. The
high side of the range reflects higher construction
costs resulting from hostility of terrain and re-
moteness of site. The low side of the range reflects
probable economies of scale as Orbita stations have
moved toward the status of "off-the-shelf" production
items.
Molniya Ground Stations
The cost of a Molniya ground station is also
based on Table 13.15, modified to take into account
the larger antenna size, number of antennas required,
the tran..amission capability, power of the transmitter,
and the multichannel communications capability (see
Table , 3) .
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Table 2
Initial Orbita Ground Station Costs
Thousand US $
Equipment
Pedestal, reflector
Foundation
Data takeoffs
Servo circuitry
Transportation
Transmitters
Diplexers
Maser
Receiver, I.F. amplifier
Receiver, monopulse
Boresite equipment
Acquisition equipment
Teletype
Multiplex terminal equipment
Performance monitor
Computer
Standby power
Echo suppressors
Spares
Installation, engineering, and labor
Real estate improvements
232
20
25
50
23
0
50
5
50
50
50
0
0
50
70
9
30
107
200
250
1, 271
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Initial Molniya Ground Station Costs
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Table 3
Thousand US
Pedestal, reflector
Foundation
,Data takeoffs
Servo circuitry
Tranapcrtation
f'ubtotal
Cost (two antennas)
Tra1,{emitters :
Power amplifier
Exciter
Cost (two transmitters)
35F+
30
50
23
100
10
220
486
Diplexera (two @ 20)
40
Masers (two @ 50)
100
Receivers, I.F. amplifiers (two @
5)
10
Receivers, monopulse (two Q 50)
100
Soresite equipment
50
Acquisition equipment
so
Teletype
12
Multiplex terminal equipment
86
Performance monitor
50
Computer
70
Standby power
9
Echo suppressors
30
Subtotal
1,799
Spares, 15%
270
Installation, engineering, and labor 200
Real estate improvements 250
Total
2,519
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A range of $2.5 to $3.0 million in used an the
initial cost of a Molni!.a ground station.
allacc E3et)ment
The following coat figures have been supplied
by 03tt, based on krwwn parameters of the Soviet
Holniya-l system and preliminary estimates for the
follow-on ayntt3mn.
a. Molniya-lt
Satellite coat ..............$13 million each
Launch and booster costs ..... $20 million each
b. Future costs
Molniya-2t
Satellites cost ..........P22 million each
Launch and booster coata.$20 million each
Satellite cos t...........$22 million each
Launch and booster coatn.S45 million each
c. a-tenearch and development
costs......... .............S40 million
The noAr 4 etnamant cnntn r+ett frnt_d f^r tha USso
- s ~ .:.v vv.~
are much higher than comparable costs incurred by
Intelsat owing t ri:hari ly to tw-a feaWtt tha at... C,...ti..
eatallitea are much larger. The estimated weight of
Molniya-l is 2,000 pounds. In contrast, the weights
of the Intelsat satellites have been an followat
Intelsat I ... 85 pounds
Intelsat 11............190 pounds
Intelsat III............ 322 pounds
The heavier Soviet payload is mi.ch more oxvannivo In
and of itself, as in the much larger booster required
to place it into orbit.
Program Costa
Two different mnthodn were used to compute the
coat of the entire program to date. The first method
is strictly additive -- merely a suing of all
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estimated cash outlays. the second method uses a
formula approach taken from Chapter 12 of Gatland.
These methods are presented in Tabiea 4 and 5.
oi, the basis of tha calculations in Tables 4
and 5, a range of ;0,700 million to 5750 million
appears to be a reasonable approximation of total
expenditures for the soviet comsat program to date.
rotor > x enditoms
Although information on the future Kolniyam2
and 5tatsionar programs is very fray entary, an
attempt wan made to estimate future costa of the
soviet comsat program. t`ince the additional ground
segment costa required to complete the program be-
come inafynificant in relation to the total cost of
the program, they are not considered here.
The assumption 14 Mad+9 that, by the end of 1272,
the V5111i will (a) launch one experimental Statatonar
satellite and c:he for operational use and (b) that
it will also teat one Xolniya-2, and then launch
four additional olniya-2a for optimum coverage of
the VS-:H. On the basis of cost eatir:ate guyppll t1
by C5k for launches and satel l i tec, the additional
expenr#iturea required for 1 olniya-2 and 15tataionar
would be about 5250 million. Addinq this to the
estimate of 5700 million to 5750 million for outlays
al ready Made, brings the total eatir?ated cost of the
soviet comsat program to over 51 billion b the and
of 1772.
I
SAC;R ,r
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030124-1
SE(RV,14
Table 4
COgt of Molniya-1 Comnat Piorlsam
(Additive Mathocl)
Million UN
14egearoh and Development 40
Space aeent
14 Molniya-1 aatelliteg 0 13 182
14 launches 0 20 200
5 failures a/ 0 33 165
fubtota 1
Ground aa'iment
29 orbi to gtationg $ 1.25 average 36.25
2 rb4olniya atationg q 2.7S averaje 5.50
Opp-rational and maintenat costa!
1967-64
20 orbital
9 .125
2.5
1964-69
2S orbt tas
a .125
3.1
196-20
30 orbit an
G .125
3.9
l 11 5.3, fV
~afii1a
Stationg
.275 x
S years
2.7
1.? ILLEGIB
Is ECR
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SJ C~ItJ 'i.
Table 5
Coat of Moln:ya-1 Comsat Program
(1`ormula Approach)
CZ,wC0+Cf,+C0N
Where C~, total coat over N yearn incurred in the
development, establishment and operation
of a satellite communications system
C 0 R&D cost
Ct initial establishment coat
CD operational and maintenance coat per year
also C ngCg ? no (C. 4 ns1Cs)
pnsl
and CD no IC1 + Cb 4 ns1CsI ' kn C
sl q
where n 9 = number of ground stations
no * ntx bar of satellites in operational ayntem
nsl " number of satellites per launch
p *. probability of launch auccean
t *- an satellite life
k o annual cost of maintaining ground stations
an proportion of oata_bltrah n_nt cost
c:g cost of establishing ground station
C .
_ was t ''. v::& :3 t~ ..: Lit
Cl - total Cost of launch axcloding booater
and satellite
Ch - coat of booster-rocket ayatem
let CO * 40
ng 31 for CC and 2S as an average for CO
n_1
n~l*1
p+~ .T5
t ? 1.S
k ? .10
19
SECRET
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r SECRET
Table S.
Coat of Molniya-1 Comsat Program
(Formula Approach)
(Continued)
Cg ? 1.25 for orbits and 2.75 for Molniya
t
i
e
at
ona
C ? 13
CI + Cb ? 20
N w 6 for satellites,
3 for ground stations
Substitution of the above values into the equation
yield a C of 754 that is, a total estimated
for the Soaiet comsat program amounting to $754 mil"coat
lion.
20 -
SECRET
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