THE CHILEAN ECONOMY: ALLENDE'S INHERITANCE AND PROBABLE ACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030149-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 149
• Publication Date: October 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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Cold ?
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Intelligence Memorandum
The Chilean Economy: Allende's Inheritance
And Probable Actions
a. 1
Wong wwwassful
ER IM 70-148
October 19.70
Copy No. S1
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended,
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
CMclud?d 1,om .Womo]ie
Jownciodinp and
dedosdfeolion
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Foreword
The listing at the end of this memorandum is
UNCLASSIFIED and may be removed for more convenient
use.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Chilean Econom : Allende's Inheritance
And Probable Actions
Introduction
On 24 October the Chilean Congress ratified
the electorate's recent minority choice of a
Marxist president who has piedged to create a
"revolutionary, nationalistic, and socialist
society." Scheduled to begin a six- ve-i term on
3 November, Salvador Allende will be working with
an economy where private enterprise already is
weak and the government's role large. Moreover,
Allende's Socialist-Communist coalition will
inherit an economy strengthened in recent years
by high copper prices and large investments in
copper and other foreign-financed development
projects. At the same time, the new administra-
tion will be confronted with rapidly rising
popular expectations, sluggish output growth, a
deeply engrained. inflation mentality, and an
economy badly shaken by the very fact of his
election. This memorandum discusses the economy
Allende will inherit, those factors fairoring
achievement of his economic goals, and those that
will work again:lt him.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Inte ZZigenee.
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Chile's Mixed Economy
1. Chile is already a long way down the
economic path Allende intends to follow. By
almost any measure, the states economic role is
large and has been growing rapidly. Central
government revenues equal 27% of gross national
product (GNP) -- by far the highest proportion in
Latin America, excluding Cuba -- and compulsory
social security contributions increase this to
more than 35%. Total public sector spanding
approaches one-half of GNP. Public expenditures
make up 80%-85% of total fixed investment.
2. The government employs about 15% of the
labor force and participates directly or indirectly
in nearly every economic activity. Its role as a
commercial.producer of goods and services has in-
creased substantially over the ]last three decades.
particularly during the Frei administration
(1964-70).,which expanded some state enterprises,
created new industries, and nationalized various
firma. The state now owns wholly or in part more
than 90 'enterprises, including most of the country's
larger ones (see the attached, unclassified listing)..
It dominates not only electric power, transportation,
and communications but also the copper, steel, petro-
leum, chemical,,and cellulose industries. Moreover,
the government is the only major domestic source of
medium- and long-term industrial credit. Thus,
investment during the Frei years has gono mainly
into the state-owned industries or into joint ven-
tures with private foreign or domestic capital.
3. Chile's private enterprise system -- already
distorted by three decades of rapid inflation and
government intervention prior to 1964 -- thus has_
been further weakened during the six years of
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) leadership.
Although Frei and his more conservative supporters
had hoped to maintain private investment while
expanding the state's economic role, his govern-
ment's policies actually strongly discouraged
private initiative. Ever-increasing tax and wage
bills squeezed profits, credit for private indus-
trial expansion generally was tight, and investor
confidence was eroded by increasingly vocal attacks
on the capitalist system by PDC leftists as well as
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openly Marxist forces. As a result, private
industry almost certainly suffered net disinvest-
ment in recent years.
Precedent of Frei's Moderate Social Revolution
4. Far-reaching social reform achieved con-
siderable momentum under the Frei government. His
administration gave a high priority to income re-
distribution and expanded social services to lower-
income groups. The problem has been that the PDC
program unleashed further economic demands and
political pressures for radical change, and rapid
reform itself had economic costs that limited
capabilities. As a result, the gap between expec-
tations and fulfillment widened considerably as
Frei's administration neared its end.
5. Although the administration's agrarian
reform program* fell far short of its goals, it
markedly changed land tenure patterns in some key
agricultural areas and had a revolutionary impact
on attitudes regarding private property rights.
As with industry, Frei failed in his intention to
preserve private farmers' investment incentives.
Despite his reassurances that efficient producers
would not lose their property, the program pro-
ceeded as much in a spirit of vengeance as reform.
It is doubtful that any sizable landowner without
close PDC contacts felt safe from expropriation
during the administration's later years. Moreover,
implementing agencies have shown a marked prefer-
ence for socialized agriculture, with the result
that most if not all families settled are organized
into communal farms.
6. The Christian Democrats did accomplish
their basic goal of achieving a social "revolution
in liberty," and the Presidential election -- in
which two out of three voters chose markedly
leftist candidates -- showed that most Chileans
are not disposed to turn back. Large segments of
the urban and rural poor participated in national
life for the first time. Organized into unions,
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cooperatives, and various community action groups,
many were awakened to their economic-political
potential. Although the PDC fostered their politi-
cization, it clearly did not gain their full voting
support, because social revolution brought polit-
ical polarization as well. The incoming Allende
administration nevertheless can, with some justi-
fication view the 1970 election as a mandate for
further and more radical change.
Economic Advantages Accruing to Allende
7. Among other economic advantages, the
Allende government is fortuitously assuming power
just as the large copper expansion program nears
completion.* The largely US-financed program.
begun in 1967 involves an investment of about
$600 million and will increase the large mines'
output from 650,000 short tons to almost one
million tons in 1971. It also will more than
double refining capacity and permit three-fourths
of the expanded mining output to be refined
domestically. In 1970, Chilean government tax
and equity returns from the lard companies'
operations probably will be more than double
their 1967 level and will average 85% of gross
profits. If world cropper prices average about
58 cents a pound** and output increases as planned,
* The Gran Mineria (the three large mines owned
and operated by Anaconda and Kenneeott) accounted
for 86% of Chilean copper output before their in-
vestment program was initiated in 1967. In addi-
tion to expanding these three mines and related
refining facilities, the program involved opening
two new mines -- one by Anaconda and the other by
Cerro Corporation.
Since mid-1966, Chilean copper has been sold
at London Metal Exchange (LME) prices which
averaged 69 cents a pound in 1966, 51 cents in
1967, 56 cents in 1968, and 67 cents in 1969.
After holding strong at 74 cents a pound during
the first half of 1970, LME copper prices began
to decline and broke below the 50 cents level in
mid-October. Despite [footnote continued on p. 5]
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the large mines' copper exports will approximate
$1 billion in 1971.
8. Certain other industries are now consider-
ably more developed and better able to meet Chilean
needs than when Frei took office. Using its own
resources as well as foreign aid, the government
substantially expanded such industries as steel,
petrochemicals, lumber, paper, and cellulose.
Private foreign capital also has been encouraged
to enter these fields, sometimes on a joint venture
basis,, and also to establish automotive assembly
plants.
9. Allende will also inherit record-high for-
eign reserves. Thanks to prolonged high copper
prices, foreign assistance receipts averaging
nearly $210 million annually, and capital inflow
for copper development, gross reserves rose from
$90 million in 1964 to an estimated $500 million
in October 1970. To he sure, the public foreign
debt considerably more than doubled during the
same period and now approximates $1.5 billion, but
Allende already has signaled that repayment sched-
ules will not be honored.
Major Economic Weaknesses
10. In deciding on the precise nature and
timing of his initiatives, Allende presumably
will take some account of other, less favorable
economic circumstances. Chile's economic growth
recently has been sluggish, averaging little more
than 3% during 1967-70. Even without disruptive
social change, accelerated growth would be ham-
pered by inadequate investment' during the Frei
years. Rising public investment has been partly
offset by declining private investment, and total
investment has declined as a share of GNP. In-
deed, by 1969, total fixed investment excluding
the foreign-financed copper program was no higher
than in 1964 -- itself a low. year because of
political uncertainties preceding Frei's election.
new additions to mining capacity in Chile and ex-
pected elsewhere in 1971, soft copper prices could
prove to be temporaz-y.
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11. The Allende government will inherit an
economy wracked by rapid inflation -- a problem
that has resisted stale-ilizaton efforts for more
than three decades. The Frei government succeeded
in slowing inflation during its first two years.
But by 1967 the combination.of rapidly rising
real wages, greatly increased government spending,
excessive monetary expansion, and stagnating out-
put caused price rises to accelerate. Although
the official consumer price index registered an
average increase of 25% annually during 1967-69,
current and constant price measures of private
consumption in official national income accounts
indicate the rate was nearer 33% -- and this per-
haps is still understated. Inflation in 1970
could be considerably more than 40%.
12. The crisis of confidence in Chile since
Allende's electoral victory on 4 September may
cause serious difficultiec3 for the new administra-
tion, at least in the shc,::t run. Sharply reduced
consumer demand and inventory reduction by appre-
hensive dealers have caused widespread declines
in industrial orders,. sales, and production.
Despite Chile's highly protective labor legisla-
tion, industrial unemployment could rise substan-
tially in the next month or so as a result of
bankruptcies. The Frei administration issued
large amounts of new currency during the financial
panic following the 4 September election to pre-
vent commercial bank failures, and, because of
continuing economic deterioration, it printed
still more money in early October to cover a short-
fall in government revenues and to maintain bank
liquidity. The new administration will have to
cope with the inflationary impact of massively
increased money supply while trying to get the
economy moving again.
Allende's Prospective Economic Actions
13. Allende'and his Popular Unity Front have
left no doubt that their basic goal is to estab-
lish a state-controlled socialist economy. The
only question is how fast his government will
move to eradicate capitalism and restructure
Chilean society along socialist lines. Some
disagreement is apparent within the Front on the
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timetable and question of compensation for expro-
priated resources. 1t is reasonable to assume,
however, that Allende -,'iill move as quickly as his
administration's capabi".ities permit and offer
as little compensation as possible.
14. Spokesmen for the Popular Unity Front say
they want to form three broad economic sectors:
A dominant, state sector of existing
state enterprises and new ones to
be expropriated -- notably the large
copper, nitrate, iodine, iron ore,
and coal mines; financial institu-
tions, especially banks and insurance
companies; foreign trade enterprises;
marketing organizations; and all other
activities that "condition Gcoaomic
and social development" (that is,
all sizable producers of goods and
services).
-- A private.sector consisting of service
establishments and other small enter-
prises, which also will be subject to
state planning.
-- A joint state-private sector in which
enterprises will give the government
equity participation in exchange for
loans.
Although Allende has been brandishing a list of
some 160 large companies earmarked for early
expropriation, he almost certainly will move
first against the copper companies and banks.*
The 160 companies represent a very large share
of Chile's private industry, both foreign and
domesticaZZy owned. A 1967 census indicated
that there were only some 300 enterprises with
more than 200 workers, including the 90 alread
owned wholl or partly by the government.
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15. The government will face a delicate timing
problem in establishing an elaborate state control
mechanism. 'To minimize economic dislocation and
avoid coalescing effective political opposition,
Allende's administration will want to move
promptly -- but not recklessly. Prompt action
will be facilitated by the already extensive state
apparatus, weaknesses in Chile's capitalist insti-
tutions, broad acceptance of socialist ideology,
and -- perhaps most important -- the Communist
Party's organizational abilities. Nevertheless,
despite the intention to establish a planned
economy as quickly as possible, Allende's advisers
apparently have not yet drawn up detailed blue-
prints and seem at least temporarily awed by the
prospect of assuming government responsibility in
the midst of economic difficulties.
16. With few exceptions, Chile has suff-cient
expertise to operate the companies now wholly or
partly foreign-owned. The copper industry, for
example, relies largely on Chilean technicians and
managers at the mines, and the Allende government
should have little trouble in assuming marketing
functions. It would have difficulty, however, in
maintaining some technologically advanced opera-
tions and investment programs in such fields as
telecommunications, unless West European and
Japanese firms were willing to replace the US
companies now involved. In any event, one of the
Allende government's most serious problems will
be holding onto indigenous skilled manpower. Post-
election emigration already has involved some
"brain-drain," and Allende apparently has drawn
up plans to restrict it.
17. Agrarian reform will be markedly accel-
erated. Jacques Chonchol, a leading official in
Prei's reform program and now a key figure in
Allende's coalition, already has drawn up a 20-'
point program aimed at rapidly completing agri-
culture's transformation. All remaining large
and medium-sized holdings will be expropriated
and organized into large collective or state
farms, and small farmers will be integrated into
collectives or cooperatives. The state or state-
controlled collectives will take over marketing.
Terror tactics will probably minimize effective
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landowner opposition. Perhaps the major constraint
on Allende's agrarian actions will come from
peasant groups with kulak tendencies.
18. Allende's counter-inflationary program
invludes nationalizing all activities required for
economic growth and enforcing and expanding an
already elaborate price control system even if
private profits are squeezed severely. He may
also use the orthodox Communist weapon of cur-
rency reform to sop up additional purchasing power
pumped into the economy before and during the
interregnum. Against the backdrop of previous
administrations' failures in trying to slow price
increases, Allende claims that a "people's govern-
ment is the only one capable of reducing if not
ending the scourge of inflation." But much de-
pends on his budget, credit, and wage policies.
Short-term difficulties in achieving price sta-
bility will be severe, particularly if the regime
is unable to contain workers' demands for higher
pay and other benefits expected from an Allende
victory. And even in the longer run, unless
aggregate supply and demand are brought into
reasonable balance, Allende's controls would
merely suppress continuing inflation and neces-
sitate rationing, subsidies, multiple exchange
rates, and other mechanisms designed to insulate
the economy from reality.
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Productive Enterprises
with Chilean Government Participation
Percent of
Government
Sector and Enterprise Ownership
Agriculture, Forestry and Hunting
Servicio de Equipos Mecanizados
(SEAM) 100.0
Sociedad Agricola CORFO Ltda.
(SACOR) 100.0
Forestal Pilpilco S.A. 100.0
Hacienda Concon Bajo Ltda. 100.0
Industrias Forestales S.A. 50,10
Empresa Nacional de Semillas S.A.
(ENDS) 100.0
Forestal Arauco S.A. N.A.
Forestal Lebu S.A. N.A.
Fishing
Marco Chilena S.A.S. 84.7
Pesqueras U2idas Horizonte 55.0
Sociedad de Terminates Pesqueros
Ltda. 99.7
Compaflia Pesquera Arauco S.A. 100.0
Empresa Pesquera,Tarapaca S.A. 98.5
Pesquera Coloso 39.8
Pesquera Guanaye 37.9
Pesquera Iquique 49.0
Pesquera Indo 47.4
Coal Mining
Compaftia Carbonera Colico Sur 99.9
Compatiia Carbonera de Pilpi__-o 58.5
Compatia Carbonera Victoria de
Lebu 99.9
Iron Mining
Compatiia de Acero del Pacifico
S.A. (mine)
E. Copper Mining
Empresa Nacional de Mineria
(ENAMI) 100.0
Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A. 51.0
Compat>tia de Cobre Chuquicamata S.A. 51.0
Compaf! a de Cobre Salvador S.A. 51.0
Compafi a Minera Cerro Negro 77.4
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Sector and Enterprise
Percent of
Government
Ownership
Compaflia Minera Chaflaral y
Taltal S.A.
84.2
CompafiCa Minera Tamaya
30.0
Empresa Minera de Mantos Blancos
5.7
Compafira Minera Maipu Ltda.
Compafira Minera Carolina de
Michilla S.A.
N.A.
25.0
Compafia Minera Loica Ltda.
33.3
Compalia Minera Andina S.A.
30.0
Compa?fa Minera Exotica S.A.
25,0
Compafiia Andnima Cuprifera de
Sagasca
25.0
F.
Other Mining Activities
Empresa Minera de Aysen (EMA)
100.0
Empresa Nacional de Petroleo
(ENAP)
100..0
Sociedad Geotermica del Tatio
51.0
Sociedad Quimica y Minera de
Chile S.A. (SOQUIMICH)
37.5
G.
Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco
Industries
Pesqueras Unidas Horizonte S.A.
55.0
Marco Chilena S.A.I.
84.7
Industria Azucarera Nacional
S.A. (IANSA)
96.?6
Sociedad Lechera Nacional Ltda.
100.0
Empresa Pesquera Tarapaca
98.5
Cooperativa Agricola y Lechera
Osorno Ltda. (CALO)
60.0
Cooperativa Agricola y Lechera
Victoria Ltda.
100.0
Pesquera Coloso
39.8
Pesquera Guanaye
37.9
Pesquera Iquique
49.0
Pesquera Indo
47,4
,Ii..
Wood Products & Cork, Furniture,
Paper & Cellulose
Papelera del Pacifico
60.0
Impregnadort de Maderas S.A.
(IMPREGMA)
76.7
Industria'Celulosa Arauco S.A.
60.0
Industria Celulosa Constitu
io
c
n
S.A.
66.7
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Percent of
Government
Sector and Enterprise Ownership
Laninadora de Maderas S.A.
Maderas y Sint4ticos S.A.
(MASISA)
1. Rubber Products, Chemicals,
Petrochemicals and Coal Derivatives
Empresa Nacional de Petroleo (ENAP) 100.0
Fabrica de Acido Sul?urico S.A.
(FASSA; 99.6
Sociedad Chilena de Fertilizantes
(SOCHIF) 93.8
Compafi(a Sudamericana de Fosfatos
S.A. 100.0
Petroquimica Chilena S.A. 100.0
Petrodow S.A. 30.0
Quimica Alquil S.A. 20.0
J. Non-Metallic Minerals, Primary
Metals
Compafiia de Acero del Pac(fico
S.A. (Steel mill) 55.1
Vibrocret S.A. 30.5
Industria Nacional de Cemento S.A. N.A.
K. Fabricated Metal Products, Non-
electrical Machinery, Electrical
Gear, Transportation Equipment
& Others
Astilleros y Maestranzas de la
Armada (ASMAR) 100.0
Fabrica y Maestranzas del
Ejercito (FAMAF) 100.0
Maestranza y Fundicibn Antofagasta
S.A.I.C. 100.0
Ransomes Chilena 60.0
Marco Chilena S.A.I. 84.7
Empresa Electronica Nacional S.A. 80.0
Industria de Conjuntos Mecdnicos
Aconcaqua S.A. 80.0
Corporacion de Radio de Chile S.A. 33.3
L. Construction
Corporacion de Mejoramiento Urbano
(CORMU) 100.0
Corporacion de Obras Urbanas (COU) 100.0
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Sector and Enterprise
Percent of
Government
Ownership
Corporacidn do la Viviorida (CORVI) 100.0
Corpporac16n de Servicios
Habitacionales (CORHABIT) 100.0
Sociedad Constructora do Establ.
Educacionales 100.0
Sociedad Constructora do Establ.
Hospitalarios 100.0
Sociedad de Construccion y
Operaciones Agropecuarias
(SOCOAGRO) 100.0
M. Electricity, Gas, Water & Sanitary
Services
Empresa de Agua Potable de Santiago 100.0
Empresa Nacional de Petroleo (SNAP) 100.0
Empresa Nacional de Electricidad
(ENDFSA) 100.0
N. Transportation
Empresa Maritima del Estado
(EMPREMAR) 100.0
Empresa Transport Colectivo del
Estado (ETC) 100.0
Ferrocarriles del Estado (FF.CC.) 100.0
Linea Area Nacional (LAN) 100.0
0. Commerce, Warehousing, and Communi-
cations
Empresa Portuaria de Chile
(EMPORCHI) 100.0
Empresa Nacional de Frigorificos
(ENAFRI) 100.0
Empresa de Comercio Agr1cola 100.0
Empresa Nacional de Tele-
comunicaciones (ENTEL) 100.0
Compat(a Chilena de Telefonos S.A. 0.3
P. Banking, Insurance and Real Estate
Instituto de Seguros del Estado
(ISE) 100.0
Banco del Estado de Chile lnO n
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Rector and Enterprise
0.
Sorvicon
Percent of
Government
Ownern hit
Entudion Cinematograficon do
Chile S.A.
87.1
Hotolora Nacional S.A. (1IONSA)
100.0
Emprena National do T.V.
100.0
Emprona do Servicioa do
Computation JEMCOi
100.0
Sociodad Inmo,;biliaria do
Exponicionen
38.6
Socio 1i d Inmobiliaria de
Portillo S.A.
0.2
Sociodad Inmobiliaria San
Crintabal
48.8
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