THE SYMPHONIE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030180-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 180
• Publication Date: December 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Symph'onie Communications Satellite Program
00CUMENY S.,
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FILE
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ER IM 70-179
December 1970
Copy No. 13
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by nn unauthorized person is prohibited by law,
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CENTIAL INTELLIGENCE) AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Symphonie Communications Satellite Program
Introduction
The Symphonie project is a joint undertaking
by France and West Germany (with minor participa-
tion by Belgium) to develop, build, and launch
two communications satellites into equatorial
synchronous (geostationary) orbit over the Atlantic
Ocean. These satellites are being designed to per-
mit extensive coverage of Europe, Africa, the Near
East, and the Western Hemisphere.
This memorandum examines the background, cur-
rent status, and prospects of the Symphonie pro-
gram. It devotes special attention to an assess-
ment of Franco-German objectives in undertaking
the Symphonie projectr especially as they relate
to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Consortium (Intelsat).
Background
1. The Symphonie program dates from June
1967 when the governments of France and West
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence, the Office of Strategic Research,
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and the
Foreign MiseiZe and Space Analysis Center.
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Germany agreed to merge their separate communica-
tions oa::ollite (comsat) programs. The agreement
called for equal cost sharing by the t.;o count r as
and equal division of contracts between French and
German industry. In October 1968, after reviewing
bids submitted by two consortiums of French and
German firms, the two governments chose the Con-
sortium Industriel Franco-Allemand pour le Satel-
lite Symphonic (CIFA,;) to undertake the detailed
planning and constrilation of the Symphonic satel??
lites. France and West Germany made this decision
to move ahead with their own comsat program not-
withstanding the fact that they were both charter
members of the International Telecommunications
Satellite Consortium (Intelsat), created in 1964
and already in 1968 approaching its objective of
deploying a "single global" comsat system.
2. CIFAS originally consisted of Nord Avia-
tion, Sud Aviation, Compagnie General de Tele-
graphie Sans Fil, Compagnie Francaise Thomson
Houston Hotchkiss Brandt, Societe Anonyme de
Telecommunication from France and Messerschmitt
Boelkow Bolhm and Junkers from West Germany.
Subsequently, in order to give West Germany equal
participation in the electronics portion of the
program, the firms AEG Telefunken and Siemens and
Halske were added to the winning consortium.
3. When other European countries were invited
to participate in the Symphonic project, Belgium
accepted and was given a 4% share in both the
costs and the industrial participation.
System Characteristics
4. The Symphonic program provides for de-
velopment and construction of a prototype satel-
lite for ground testing, two satellites to be
orbited, and two ground stations. The two flight-
rated satellites are to be launched into synchro-
nous equatorial orbits over the Atlantic at 15?
West longitude. The first Symphonie satellite
is now- scheduled to be launched in mid-1973 and
the second approximately six months later. The
satellites will weigh about 400 pounds; each will
have one receiving antenna (with a beamwidth
capable of receiving signals from the one-third
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of the globe "visible" to the satellite) and two
transmitting antennas. One of the transmitting
antennas will cover Europe, the Middle East, and
most of Africa with the centerline of the zone
extending from the United Kingdom to Madagascar.
The other transmitting antenna will cover northern
South America, the Caribbean, and part of eastern
North America with the centerline of the zone
forming an axis approximately between Montreal
and Buenos Aires.
5. Each Symphonie satellite will be able to
relay two television channels or several hundred
telephone channels.* They also will have a mul-
tiple access capability -- that is, they will be
able to relay signals between more than two
ground stations at the same time. (For a com-
parison between Symphonie and the Intelsat series
of satellites, see the Appendix.)
Objectives Underlying Symphonie
6. The decision of France and West Germany
to push ahead with Symphonie arose from a complex
amalgam of technological., economic, political,
and prestige considerations. Clearly, the desire
to improve Europe's long-run position vis-a-vis
the United States in the field of aerospace tech-
nology was a primary motive. The early success
of the Intelsat system and the rapidly rising
demand for its services indicated that satellite
communications represented one area of aerospace
technology where relatively early returns on
investment could be expected. In addition to the
hope for an economically viable Symphonie system,
it is clear that France and West Germany counted
on the building of a credible technological base
to give them access to a substantially larger
share of Intelsat procurement contracts.** Apart
Information on the precise number of telephone
channels is not available.
'F* There is evidence indicating that this hope
has been realized to at least some degree. The
non-US (principally West European) share in pro-
curement for successive generations of Intelsat
satellites is reported as follows: Intelsat I --
nothing; Intelsat II -- 3%; Intelsat III -- 6%;
Intelsat IV -- 28% to 37% depending on it?cantive
payments.
- 3 -
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^ C ONIII.)J NTiAL
from considerations of technological advance and
economic gain, the Symphonic program almost cer-
tainly was viewed -- especially by France -- as
an instrument designed to enhance European polit-
idol' leverage and prestige in dealing with the
two superpowers and with the loss developed coun-
tries on issues involving international space
communications.
Syymphonie and Intelsat
7. No Symphonic satellite has yet been orbited
(for reasons discussed below), but the existence
of the Symphonic program and the question of its
intended role in international communications has
poaed problems for those concerned with maintain-
ing the integrity of the Intelsat organization.
8. A basic initial concept underlying the
formation of Intelsat was that it should become
a single, global system, providing satellite
communications to all regions of the world.
Those favoring the "single global" principle
(including the United States) were opposed to the
establishment of regional comsat systems in
competition with Intelsat for economic and tech-
nical reasons. The economic objection was
grounded in a concern that regional systems would
siphon off traffic from Intelsat, thus undermining
its economic viability. This was considered a
critical point since the agreements underlying
Intelsat require it to be economically self-
sustaining while a regional system could be sub-
sidized by its sponsoring governments -- as is
the case with Symphonic. Technical opposition ';o
formation of independent regional systems origi-
nally stemmed from the fear that they would create
harmful radio interference that would degrade the
performance of Intelsat satellites. Subsequent
technical experience has shown that mutual radio
interference between systems probably can be
avoided, but concern over Symphonic as a poten-
tially damaging economic competitor to Intelsat
has continued.
9. Initially, the French and West, German
governments labeled Symphonie as a purely experi-
mental project and sought to establish that, on
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these grounds, it was eligible for technical
assistance from the United States. Within a few
months, however, the project's sponsors (with
France ;-,aking the leading role) revealed unoffi-
cially (a) that Symphonic was in fact viewed as
the initial phase of an operational system and
(b) that they intended to press for the acceptance
of regional systems within any permanent charter
established for Intelsat.* In early 1968 an offi-
cial of the French Ministry of Science indicated
that, following successful testing, Symphonic
would be used on an operational basis. This same
official noted in late 1968 that this idea had
been abandoned, but suggested that a follow-on
operational comsat project might be undertaken
after Symphonic. In a slightly different context,
another senior French communications official
declared that France's interest in Symphonie was
predicated on the possibility of building a
follow-on system. By 1969, France was sounding
out US reaction to a plan envisaging the use of
Symphonic to channel relatively low-density
traffic from African countries into the Intelsat
system, to function as a relay for traffic between
African countries, and to distribute television
programs to Africa.
10. Concurrently, at the negotiations on
definitive Intelsat arrangements, France became
a leading voice among those who insisted that the
permanent Charter permit establishment of regional
systems. Following lengthy debate and protracted
negotiations, general agreement now has been
reached among the Intelsat membership that re-
gional systems will be permissible as long as
they are technically compatible with Intelsat and
will not inflict significant economic harm on the
global system.
11. Still to be resolved in a practical con-
text, however, are the knotty questions of what
constitutes "significant. economic harm" and of
defining the characteristics of a "region." With
Since its inception in 1964, Intelsat has
operated under interim arrangements. Negotiations
for a permanent charter have been under way since
1969 and may be completed in the spring of 1971.
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Symphonie and its possible successors in mind,
France has taken the position that regional satel-
lite systems should be permitted to embrace coun-
tries that share not only geographical contiguity
and close economic ties (for example, Western
Europe) but also those sharing historical and
language ties (for example, France and Francophone
Africa).
Status of Symphonie
12. The Symphonie project has provided France
and. West Germany with a revealing introduction
into the complexities and costs of attempting to
compete in the field of comsat technology. At the
time of the Franco-German agreement on Symphonie
in mid-1967, launching of the first satellite was
set for late 1969. Since then the schedule has
been pushed back several times, and the initial
launch date is now set for mid-1973.
ll
ooned from
the Symphonie project has already ba
the $40 million originally programmed in 1967 to
almost $130 million in 1970, with additional out-
lays almost certain to be required.
13. The French and West German governments
encountered substantial difficulty in advancing
the Symphonic project from the concept phase to
actual construction. From the signing of the
joint agreement to build Symphonie in June 1967,
16 months elapsed before a prime contractor (the
CIFAS consortium) was selected. Preparation and
submission of the detailed design for Symphonie
required about another year, and initial construc-
tion work on most satellite subsystems did not
begin until early 1970. An important delaying
factor in building the satellites has been the
requirement for equal division of contracts be-
tween French and German industry which, on several
occasions, has necessitated the rejuggling of
assignments to maintain the stipulated balance.
This requirement also has further complicated the
problems of interlace and coordination of an
already complex project.
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14. Apart from administrative red tape, the
Symphonic project. has also run into some poten-
tially serious technical problems. The builders
of Symphonic have been instructed that the size
and weight of the satellite must be suitable for
launching by the Europa II booster, currently
under development by the European Launcher Develop-
ment Organization (ELDO), and designed to put a
maximum of 400 pounds of payload into synchronous
equatorial orbit. Because of the size constraints
placed upon them, the Symphonic designers have had
to reduce the number of transmitting antennas to
be carried by the satellite from three to two.
France and West Germany failed to procure several
important types of satellite subsystems from US
aerospace manufacturers in the spring of 1970.
There is little doubt that the French and West
Germans are capable of developing these subsystems
themselves, but to do so will probably lead to
further delays, addit4onal technical problems, and
may require additior..1 modifications to the satel-
ite.
15. Planning for Symphonie is proceeding on
the assumption that Europa II -- the all-European
launch vehicle being built by ELDO -- will be
operationally available when the satellites are
ready for launch.* Although the Europa I tests
have failed to orbit a payload, ELDO has neverthe-
less declared all three stages qualified. Testing
of Europa II -- the Symphonie launch vehicle --
is now scheduled to start in the spring of 1971
at Kourou, the launching base built by France in
French Guiana. Given the possibility that new
technical problems will arise during the testing
at Kourou, Europa II may not reach operational
status by the end of 1971 as planned. Even so,
the Europa developers would still have about
another 18 months to perfect the launch system
before Symphonic is scheduled for its maiden
flight.
The basic launcher (Europa I) consists of a UK-
built first stage (Blue Streak), a French-built
second stage (CoraZie), and a Ge.'man-built third
stage (Astris). Because of the added precision
required to inject Symphonie into geostationary
orbit, the Europa II version will also be fitted
with an apogee-perigee system. Development testing
of the first three stages of Europa I has been
carried out at Australia's Woomera test range.
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Conclusions
16. France is the driving force behind the
Symphonie satellite and appears to be determined
to press ahead with the program despite substan-
tial cost overruns, technical obstacles, and
management problems. The first Symphonie satel-
lite is now scheduled for launching into geo-
stationary orbit over the Atlantic ocean in mid-
1973. Although design problems involving both
the satellite and its launch vehicle remain to be
resolved, this launch date probably can be met.
The Symphonie satellite is being designed to
handle two television channels or, alternatively,
several hundred telephone channels and will have
a multiple-station access capability. Symphonie's
antennas will permit coverage of Europe, the Near
East, most of Africa, the Caribbean area, northern
South America, and part of eastern North America.
17. The heavy commitment of money, resources,
and time to the Symphonie project by the French
and West Germans reflects two related objectives.
One is the aim of achieving for Europe a substan-
tially improved position vis-a-vis the United
States in the expanding field of aerospace manu-
facturing technology. Second, deployment of an
operational Symphonie system is viewed by its
sponsors -- especially France -- as a means of
insuring that Europe is not relegated to a minor
role within the emerging Intelsat global satellite
communications network.
18. Under mounting pressure from Symphonie's
backers -- along with certain other West European
countries and Japan -- the Intelsat membership has
now accepted the general principle that regional
systems, are permissible if they are technically
compatible with Intelsat and will not cause sig-
nificant economic harm to the global system.
France's ambitious plans for Symphonie are likely
to lead to considerable debate within the Con-
sortium on the questions of what constitutes
"significant economic harm" to Intelsat and what
are the appropriate geographical limits of a
"regional" communications satellite system.
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Comparison of Sym honie and Intelsat Communications Satellites
Channel capacity
Telephone only
Several hundred
240
240
1,200
Television only
channels a/
2
1
1
4
12
Multiple access capacity
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Weight (pounds)
400
85
191
279
1,225
Design lifetime (years)
5
1-5
3
5
7
Frequencies (GHz)
Uplink
6
6
6
6
6
Downlink
4
4
4
4
4
Number of repeaters
2
2
1
2
12
Bandwidth per repeater (MHz)
90
25
130
225
35-40
Effective radiated power
830
10
35
150
200-4,G00 b/
per repeater (watts)
Total effective radiated
1,660
20
35
300
2,400-25,200 b/
power (watts)
Stabilization method
Flywheel and
Despun antenna
Despun antenna
Despun antenna
Despun antenna
gas jet system
Mid-1973
6 April 1965
25 October 1966
18 September 1968
December 1970
or early 1971
a. Exact telephone channel capacity of Symphonie is not known, but is believed to be somewhat greater than that
of Intelsat II.
b. Depending on antenna beamwidths.
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