THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600040045-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Secret
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ER IM 71-44
March 1971
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1971
INTELLIGENCE tIEMORANDUM
The Ho Chi Minh Trail
Introduction
The Ho Chi tlinh Trail, the popular name for
the Communists' logistic system in the Laotian
Panhandle, is very much a misnomer. It is really
a labyrinth of roads, trails, waterways, small
dispersed storage buildings, truck parks, and
repair facilities. The 1,900 miles of roads within
the Panhandle are not the Lincoln highways of the
1920s, nor are they in the same class as a Burma
Road or Alcan Highway. They are more similar to
the logging roads of the west or Canada, but even
these roads are designed to carry much heavier
vehicles than those used in the Panhandle of Laos.
The road system of the 1Io Chi Binh Trail ex-
tends in a north-south direction for over 300
miles across a rugged mountain chain 2,500 to
3,500 feet in elevation, from Mu Gia Pass in the
north to the tri-border area (where Cambodia,
Laos, and South Vietnam join) in the south. In
terms of terrain and distances closer to home,
moving supplies through the Ho Chi Minh Trail would
be roughly analogous to traveling from Allentown
to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Weather is a major factor in understanding
the operation of the enemy's logistical system in
Laos. In the Panhandle the dry season arrives in
mid- to late October and lasts until about mid-
May. During this period the Communists must move
the bulk of their supplies to Cambodia and South
Note: 'his memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Economic Research.
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Vietnam because once the rains start it becomes
extremely difficult to move large volumes of
supplies over water soaked roads and to ford
swollen streams. Finally, in moving supplies
through the flo Chi Minh Trail the Communists
not only must overcome the problems of terrain,
distance, and weather but must also cope with an
unprecedented scale of US bombing.
The Communists rely heavily upon Soviet built
trucks to move supplies. They also rely on a
wide variety of other transport means as well.
These include pipelines in the northern reaches
of the Panhandle, and, when needed, oxcarts,
bicycles, pirogues, and porters. Innovations such
as free floating POL and food down the rivers are
used with skill and effectiveness.
Description of the System
Entry Corridors
1. Supplies enter the Laotian Panhandle
through three major corridors: (1) the well-known
Mu Gia Pass which is the northernmost entry route,
(2) the Ban Karai Pass which was first opened in
April 1966, and (3) Ban Raving Pass, more commonly
known as the Western DMZ entry corridor, which was
opened to traffic in December 1969. A look at a
map makes it clear why the North Vietnamese have
added the new entry corridors. From Mu Gia Pass
to Tchepone is 90 miles. From the western DMZ to
Tchepone is only 30 miles.' Thus, by using the
southern entry routes traffic moving into the
Tchepone area avoids much of the harassment of the
bombing. The availability of three major entry
corridors also makes it easier for the North Viet-
namese to counter the bombing.
2. In the northern reaches of the Panhandle,
from the three passes south to the Tchepone area,
there are a vast number of alternate roads that
the North Vietnamese have built to counteract the
effects of the bombing. Thus when one road is
See the system map following page 10. A de-
tailed map of the Tchepone area follows page 8.
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interdicted there may be as many as four alterna-
tive routes over which the North Vietnamese can
shunt traffic. In the Ban Karai Pass area there
are as many as 5 roads that can be used to move
supplies across the border into the system. The
number of roads, alternatives, and bypasses in the
area north of Tchepone has grown to such an extent
that the road system there can be characterized as
a web of interconnecting veins rather than a few
mainline arteries.
3. South of Tchepone the road system is less
dense because once supplies reach the Tchepone area
they have passed the main brunt of the bombing.
Nevertheless, the road system south of Tchepone is
still highly redundant. There has been no letup
in roadbuilding in the Panhandle: in 1965 there
were 340 miles of road in the Panhandle, in 1968
there were 1,200 miles, today there are over 1,900
miles.
4. As one moves south through the road system
there are key lateral roads running from west to
east. These are the roads used to move supplies
into South Vietnam. The first such lateral road
is Route 9 which was an important enemy supply
artery during the siege of Khe Sanh but was never
used much by the Communists after that. Farther
south Routes 926 and 922 lead to the A Shau Valley.
Another 90 miles to the south a fan-shaped net of
roads leads eastward from Chavane toward the cen-
tral areas of Military Region 1 of C-,uth Vietnam.
At the foot of the north/south system through the
Laotian Panhandle is Route 110 which is used to
move supplies either eastward into South Vietnam
toward the vicinity of Dak To or Kontum or westward
to the Cambodian supply route running south toward
Siem Pang and Stung Treng.
Logistical Forces
5. The 40,000 to 50,000 personnel charged
with moving supplies through the Panhandle of Laos
are organized into about 16 logistical commands
spread throughout the Panhandle. These commands --
called Binh Trams, meaning "military stations"
in Vietnamese -- are of regimental size and will
have between 1,500 and 3,000 men subordinate to
each. Each Binh Tram has a number of engineer,
transport, and AAA battalions.
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On maps produced
by the intelligence community the designated lo-
cations of Binh Trams tend to give the false im-
pression that they operate at very specific loca-
tions. In fact, Binh Trams have large areas of
responsibility that include many roads, numerous
storage facilities, and other support facilities.
Because of the threat of air strikes, storage
sites and truck parks are carefully camouflaged,
well dispersed, and only a part of them are in use
at any one time. Each Binh Tram has subordinate
units that man the defense and logistical facili-
ties along the routes in its areas of responsi-
bility. Rear Services Units command complexes of
small dispersed storage buildings which may con-
tain as many as 900 tons of supplies. Individual
platoons may be in charge of a personnel way sta-
tion (called a T-station). Even smaller groups
will be dispersed along the roads to control
traffic and relay forewarning of. US air attacks
that may be occurring further down the road.
much about what can be called the "crude sophisti-
cation" of the enemy's logistical system. Truck
repair, to cite one example, is performed at three
separate echelons. A carburetor adjustment or
other minor repair is supposed to be done by a
repair crew of a few mechanics attached to a trans-
portation platoon. More complic-ated repairs are
done by larger repair shops attached to the trans-
portation companies or at the battalion level.
7. We have learned
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8. The Communists have assigned about 2,500
trucks to the Panhandle. The number of trucks
attached to a single transportation battalion
generally varies from 60 to 70. Defense and
engineer battalions also maintain vehicles for
their own use so that there will be between 60
and 300 trucks assigned to any one Binh Tram, the
number generally declining further south along
the main route structure. On 'ny one night, how-
ever, usually not more than 50% of the trucks
available in the Panhandle are on the road.
How the System Operates
9. The enemy's logistical system operates by
moving supplies southward from one Binh Tram to
another until the supplies are shunted eastward
along one of the lateral rouL.es leading to South
Vietnam or until they reach the bottom of the
funnel in the southern Panhandle and are moved
into Cambodia (or South Vietnam).
10. This mode of operation calls for a great
deal of shuttling by the trucks. A typical opera-
tion would be as follows: Trucks
truck park
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persed warehouse. and set aut Er- rehouse in
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c epone. Depending upon the threat of air
attack (and more recently ground attack) a convoy
of from 5 to 15 trucks, dispersed at 30-50 yard
intervals, will move down the road. Speeds are slow,
usually averaging about 10-15 miles per hour.
Canopied parking areas are located at frequent
spots along the road to avoid as much as possible
having the trucks caught in an exposed position
during an air attack. The trucks usually start
their journey at nightfall so as to get to their
assigned destination and be unloaded before day-
break. The empty trucks usually make the return
trip the next night although, under "crash" programs
such as we are observing now, they may make their
deliveries and return the same night. Although it
is unusual, trucks move in broad daylight on some
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occasions, especially when there are emergency con-
ditions or crash programs under way or inclement
weather seriously inhibits US air operations.
11. Over the years, we have come to recognize
a distinct three-phase cycle to movement of supplies
through the Panhandle. The first phase begins in
late September or October and is designed to get
the roads, bridges, fords, and warehouses back in
operating status. Bulldozers come out of caves
where they have been in storage sites during the
rainy season, and together with the engineering
troops armed with axe and shovel, the road system
is put back in operating condition in about a month.
12. In the second phase we begin to see the
input of supplies into the system. These first
inputs are used to replenish the stockpiles drawn
down during the rainy season and to meet the pro-
jected needs of those who are operating the system
as well as the thousands of infiltrators that pass
through the system each year. The Communists
methodically seem to concentrate on the restocking
of the system before facing up to the problem of
maintaining a throughput of supplies to replenish
their stockpiles of combat material in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. This dry season and last the Com-
munists devoted most of the month of December to
this restocking phase.
13. In the third phase the system goes into
high gear, or what the Communists call their
"general offensive," when they push supplies
through to South Vietnam and Cambodia. This year
the general offensive began on the night of
4 January, about the same date as last year.
The Surge Effect
14. Both last year and this year, activity in
the Panhandle clearly reflects what we have come
to call "the surge effect" as supplies flow south-
ward through the system.
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15. As a specific Binh Tram reports on the
accomplishments of its own crash program, Binh
Trams further to the south then become more active.
As the southward flow of supplies into the area
under its control increases, the receiving Binh
Tram then launches its own crash program to move
the goods even further south. This pattern was
very clear last month when the Communists launched
a "crash" program
16. This surge of supplies from north to south
through the Panhandle is similar to what we observed
last year. The southward surae was reflected in
all of which began to report greater
roug put tonnages exiting to South Vietnam as
the transport offensive went on.
17. The surge of supplies that we observe is
not a one-time, massive slug of supplies finding
its way for 300 miles south through the system.
Last year, for example, the surge reached
the area around Ban Bac in the southern
Panhandle, about mid-March. At about the same
time the input of supplies through Mu Gia Pass,
the most northern entry corridor, began to taper
off, but the inputs through Ban Karai and the
western DMZ routes were continuing at high levels.
By late March the input through Ban Karai had
pretty much phased out. But it was not until well
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into April that the inputs through the western DfZ
route began to phase down. Thus for several
months -- !larch and April in particular -- there
were large flows of supplies moving throughout the
entire system.
18. Last year's pattern is being repeated this
dry season, and we clearly see an increasing level
of traffic moving farther and farther south in thr
Panhandle. The new wrinkle this year is that the
Communists, clearly anticipating the Allied incur-
? sions toward Tchepone, have accelerated their
supply movements in a series of crash programs.
19. This system of a series of crash programs
to accelerate an increased level of supply move-
ments has a two-fold objective. First, to supply
the Communist combat forces opposing Lam Son 719,
and, second, to move at record rates the normal
throughput of supplies out of the potentially
dangerous Tchepone area to the Binh Trams to the
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Measuring the Flow
21. The most difficult problem in understanding
the operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail is to gain
an appreciation of the volume of supplies that
move through the system. Ideally, one would want
to know the volume that entered the system, the
volume consumed within Laos, and the tonnages that
moved into Cambodia and South Vietnam. Obviously,
the composition of these supplies whether rice,
ammunition, weapons, or salt is even more important.
22. Years ago when Mu Gia Pass was the major
entry point the task was easier.
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26. In view of the vast amount of labor that
has gone into the building of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
the total tonnages of supplies moved from one Binh
Tram to another frequently sound :mall to those
unfamiliar with the logistic statistics on the war
in Indochina. Indeed, they seem small compared to
the 40,000 to 50,000 men employed in moving them.
They are microscopic when compared to other bench-
marks -- US requirements in South Vietnam, or even
Communist military requirements in the Korean War.
27. However, they can be put in perspective in
terms of the war in South Vietnam by realizing
that the very large tonnages of ordnance that
arrived in Sihanoukville -- a route not subject to
interdiction or natural obstacles -- for the
VC/NVA forces -- 21,600 tons -- averaged out to
about 20 tons a day between the time these deliveries
started and the time they ended. Thus the ammunition
and weapons that nightly move down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail seem adequate for maintaining a hot war in
Indochina.
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