THE FORCE LEVELS, CAPABILITIES, AND INTENTIONS OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN CAMBODIA, 1971-72

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010033-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: May 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Force Levels, Capabilities, And Intentions
Of Communist Forces In Cambodia, 1971-72
ARMY review completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 May 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Force Levels, Capabilities,
And Intentions Of communist Forces
In Cambodia, 1971-72
Introduction
The purpose of this memorandum is to estimate
the strength of Communist forces in Cambodia and to
assess their capabilities and intentions over the
course of the next 12-18 months. The analysis is
focused primarily on the logistic and manpower con-
straints that might influence Hanoi's choice of
strategic options over the period. Since many of
the determinants that influence Hanoi's course of
action are not quantifiable, this memorandum also
presents a discussion of other factors in the per-
spective from which they may be viewed and weighed
in Hanoi.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office
of Economic Research with a contribution by the
Office of Current InteZZigence and was coordinated
within CIA.
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I. The Enemy Force Structure in Cambodia
Nature of the Buildup
1. After the overthrow of Sihanouk, the Communist
forces in Cambodia were built up with relative ease
by drawing primarily on major division-size units
already astride the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border
and units then operating in the adjacent areas in
GVN MRs 2, 3 and 4. Evidence indicates that in
March 1970 the Communists had been preparing for a
large-scale offensive to be conducted by the 5th
VC, 7th NVA, and 9th VC Divisions against major tar-
gets in GVN MR 3. With the overthrow of the Sihanouk
government, these plans were canceled and the units
were tar eted a ainst Cambodia
2. Despite the deployment of large-size units,
enemy operations in Cambodia have been characterized
by small-unit actions involving probably no more than
10,000 VC/NVA combat troops. In addition, about
10,000 other VC/NVA combat troops have been engaged
both in maintaining defensive positions and in re-
cruiting, training, and propagandizing activities
among the population and insurgent elements in
Cambodia.
3. By June 1970 the commitment of enemy forces
to Cambodia had more or less stabilized and the basic
pattern of enemy force structure and deployment had
emerged. At that time, we estimate that about
50,000 to 60,000 VC/NVA personnel were located in
Cambodia, of which only about 20,000-25,000 men were
in actual combat units. The remaining 30,000-35,000
troops were in administrative service units, concerned
primarily with operating and protecting enemy com-
mand, logistic, and intelligence functions. The
major concentrations of the enemy's combat forces
were located in the Cambodian provinces adjacent
to GVN MR 3. At least three regiments of the 7th
NVA Division as well as the 174th Regiment remained
near the border area but still did not appear to be
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committed to offensive activity within Cambodia.
In the western area -- Siem Reap Province -- one
regiment plus a newly formed regiment and elements
of the 5th VC Division represented the only effec-
tive Communist threat. To the south of Phnom Penh,
two to three regimental equivalents under the Phuoc
Long Brigade* were able to maintain a viable mili-
tary posture in the area. In the northeast area
the Communist presence was limited to one regiment,
dispatched earlier from GVN MR 2.
4. Through the last half of 1970, enemy mili-
tary objectives emphasized protecting vital supply
corridors, disrupting and exerting pressure on
government of Cambodia lines of communication, and
undertaking small-unit harrassments and attacks by
fire on population centers. At the same time, efforts
were under way to build a Communist political organi-
zation and to recruit indigenous personnel for
military units. Throughout this period, there was no
significant change in the disposition of combat units
nor was there any noticeable effort to expand the
combat force structure through the introduction of
new units either from South Vietnam or North Vietnam.
However, several battalions and at least one full
regiment were formed from local personnel and ethnic
Cambodians for use to some extent as fillers for
VC/NVA combat units.
5. Throughout the first quarter of 1971, enemy
military pressure leveled off as efforts were made to
shore up the defensive positions protecting major
supply corridors and depots. Subsequent to the Kom-
pong Som and Route 6 and 7 offensives, the enemy had
to commit as many as 11 regiments in reaction to the
large-scale ARVN offensive launched in February
against concentrations in the Chup Plantation area.
Current Enemy Strength and Disposition
6.
/we believe that little
change has occurred in the size of its force struc-
ture. Enemy force levels, however, have been aug-
mented by the influx of about 5,000 to 10,000 Khmer
Later designated the Phuoc Long Front.
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Communist (KC) troops, raising the level of enemy
forces to about 55,000 to 70,000 men, as shown
below:
Thousand Troops
Combat forces
NV
A/VC 20-25
KC
5-10
25-35
se
rvices NV
A/VC 30-35
Total
55-70
7. In line with existing tactics, the NVA have
deployed most of their combat troops in MR 1,
northeast of Phnom Penh in MR 5, and around and south-
east of Phnom Penh in MR 2. This force consists
of some 100 combat battalions, of which about 50
are VC/NVA maneuver battalions, 30 are VC/NVA com-
bat support battalions, and some 20 are KC maneuver
units. Over 50% of all battalions are located in
MR 1 and southern MR 5. Similarly, most of the
enemy's 30,000 to 35,000 administrative service
troops are concentrated in these two military
regions.
Infiltration
8. Although FANK and ARVN certainly have exag-
gerated the level of enemy losses, it is equally
certain that enemy losses of combat forces have
been heavy during the past year. Substance for
this estimate can be found in the data on infiltra-
tion arrivals since enemy operations in Cambodia
were initiated. For example, during the period
April 1970 through June 1971, arrivals in the COSVN
area are estimated at about 57,000 men -- 20,000
men during the last three quarters of 1970, 29,000
men during the first quarter 1971, and at least
8,000 men during the second quarter 1971.
9. Although COSVN's jurisdiction includes both
GVN MRs 3 and 4, we believe that since April 1970
only a relatively small number of infiltrees have
been infused as filler personnel into units operat-
ing in these two GVN military regions. We estimate
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that probably no more than 10,000 were so deployed
(5,000 in each infiltration cycle). Consequently,
it is likely that infiltration personnel destined
for use in Cambodia will approximate 47,000 troops
by the middle of this year.
10. With the exception of the 52nd NVA Regiment,
which was infiltrated as a unit from southern Laos
into southern Cambodia during January and February
1971, most infiltrees earmarked for deployment in
Cambodia are believed to be filler personnel to
upgrade and to provide replacements for existing
VC/NVA units. When juxtaposed against evidence that
shows little or no increase in enemy main force
strength over the last year, this relatively high
rate of infiltration may reflect enemy needs to com-
pensate for losses incurred by its units. It seems
unlikely, however, that enemy casualties were in the
40,000-man range. It is possible, therefore, that
some of the infiltrees may have been used to flesh out
existing combat units, to augment existing administra-
tive service forces, and to expand its very thin
force levels in Cambodian MRs 3 and 4. If this
analysis is valid, it strongly suggests that while
the enemy's military objectives in Cambodia may be
limited, they certainly have been costly iii terms of
manpower and have required a steady flow of personnel
from North Vietnam. Although burdensome, there is no
indication that the enemy could not sustain a simi-
lar infiltration load through the 1971-72 dry season.
Moreover, in terms of the strategic importance of
maintaining a logistical lifeline through Cambodia,
the enemy may view this as a small price, indeed.
Enemy Force Levels Through 1971 and After
11. It is likely that the size of the VC/NVA
force structure in Cambodia will remain at its cur-
rent level well into 1972. In terms of combat
forces, augmentation from units now in GVN MRs 3
and 4 is unlikely. Enemy forces there are themselves
feeling a manpower pinch, with only minor reinforce-
ment in view. If anything, a shift in forces --
which would be relatively minor in any case -- could
occur from Cambodia into southern South Vietnam to
support enemy forces in the Seven Mountains/Three
Sisters base in Chau Doc and Kien Giang Provinces.
This base, which is an infiltration station for the
principal enemy base in the Delta -- the U Minh
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Forest -- was the first in the Delta to be reinforced
by the North Vietnamese in 1969. For the first time
since April 1969 there are no main force units of
regimental size or larger in the area.
12. It is likely that there will be a continued,
although probably modest, growth in the size of the KC
forces, unless FANK makes a greater effort than it has
heretofore: to challenge Communist activities in the
countryside. The evidence is too fragmentary to cite
hard figures, but it is clear that the Vietnamese
Communists with the assistance of n,:.wly-infiltrated
Cambodian cadre have been placing a high priority on
recruiting and training an indigenous force. There
are indications that Hanoi is attempting to improve
coordination of the KC forces and their Vietnamese
advisers as it attempts to move ahead with the diffi-
cult process of building a KC organization. There is
increasing evidence, however, that the Communists have
had serious problems with their Cambodian recruits,
which may worsen. Mounting difficulties are evident in
attempts to rally Cambodians to the VC/NVA banner
under the guise of returning Sihanouk to power or
ridding Cambodia of US invaders. Furthermore, there
has been increasing evidence of disenchantment among
existing KC units. For example, a recent rallier
reported that of the some 1,500 Cambodians who under-
took training last summer under the supervision of
the VC 272nd Regiment near Chup, only 500 completed
the course while the rest deserted. Finally, inherent
Khmer antipathies toward the Vietnamese are being
exacerbated by the insensitivities of the VC/NVA cadres.
II. Strategy Options
13. Several factors would appear to give the
North Vietnamese an on-going capability to implement
a wide variety of offensive tactics. These include
the fact that the enemy force in Cartbodia has in
our judgment been maintained at least at the same
strength as it was a year ago. The enemy force struc-
ture in Cambodia was also reinforced by the introduc-
tion of new units,
The Communist fore in o is a so have demonstrated
a high degree of flexibility and the capability for
fairly rapid redeployment of -troops as the military
situation warrants.
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14. In addition to the above manpower considera-
tions, the Communist logistic system in Cambodia
also appears to have a current capability to provide
the logistic muscle needed to carry out more inten-
sive levels of offensive activity. It is possible,
for example, that the Communist forces in Cambodia
at the end of 1970 may have had as much as 2,500
tons of ordnance remaining from the Chinese military
deliveries through the port of Sihanoukville. Even
if these stockpiles have been drawn down to a greater
extent than we have estimated, the current level of
logistic activity in northeast Cambodia is such
that we estimate that the Communist forces would
not be completely dependent on the forthcoming dry
season to exercise a variety of offensive options.
In sum, it is entirely possible that the enemy
presently and with little forewarning could mount
very impressive high points of combat activity in
Cambodia.
15. We have, however, considered the situation
wherein a decision by Hanoi to select from a number
of optional strategies would be dictated by the
capabilities of the logistic system in southern Laos
during the 1971-72 dry season. To determine the
possible manpower and logistic constraints in this
situation, our
analysis considers two variants: Strategy I, a low
combat option assuming a continuation of the protracted
warfare with its occasional high points in South Viet-
nam and Cambodia that was typical of 1970; and Strategy
II, a high combat option assuming sustained multi-bat-
talion offensive actions in Cambodia but with low
combat levels in South Vietnam.
Manpower
16., The estimated force augmentations required
to support the alternate strategies are shown in
the tabulation below:
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Thousand Persons
Cambodia MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 Total
Strategy I 25 35 23 17 15 115
Strategy II 45 35 23 17 15 135
The annual infiltration requirements for implementa-
tion of Strategies I and II, assuming that the
enemy maintains total combat forces at current levels
while augmenting its force structure and carrying
out the strategies are estimated at 100,000 and
150,000 men, respectively. It should be noted that
this estimate of infiltration requirements is in
our model a maximum case. Hanoi has demonstrated
consistently that it can continue its current low-
profile warfare even though its forces are being
allowed to erode. But even in this maximum case,
the infiltration requirements appear well within
enemy capabilities, with the buildup for Strategy
II requiring about four months to complete.
Logistics
17. The table shows Communist logistic require-
ments during the next dry season to sustain varying
levels of offensive capability in Cambodia -- that
is, low combat, periodic high points, and high com-
bat alternatives. To place the estimates in per-
spective, they can be compared with our current
estimate of supply inputs into the Laos Panhandle
of 295 to 370 tons daily. Assuming that the Com-
munists move at least the same tonnage into the
Parhandle next dry season, it is obvious that the
three alternatives all fall below or well within
the input range. The Communists need not even
achieve the low end of the 295-370 ton daily input
average next dry season to he in a position to
implement the "low combat" or "high point" strate-
gies before September 1972. Even to implement the
"high combat" option will require that the Commun-
ists operate just above the lower limit of the
range, a performance well within their capability.
Such a performance, however, would mean that stocks
would not be in place until the late stages of the
dry season. For high combat prior to that time to
be feasible, a performance substantially exceeding
the low end of the input range will be necessary.
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Dry Season Flows Needed to Meet Requirements for
Sustained Offensive OpLrations Through
September 1972 a/
Short Tons
Area Supplied Low Combat High Points--Cambodia High Combat--Cambodia S/
Southern Laos
46,500
46,500
Cambodia
2,738
3,413 - 3,713
South Vietnam
17,338
17,100
Total input requirement
66,600
67,013 - 67,313
Daily input requirement
(240 days)
278
279 - 280
46,500
6,750 - 8,550
17,100
70,350 - 72,150
293 - 301
a. A of the requirement estimates include a 25% a owance for bomb amaUL: assessment.
b. Assumes stockpile buildup of one month's high combat resupply requirements.
C. Assumes stockpile buildup of six months' high combat resupply requirements.
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SLUR h,.i.
By operating at the midpoint of the 295-370 tons
daily range, the Communists can build the capability
for launching high combat much earlier -- probably
around the middle of the dry season. On the other
hand, if they operated near the high end of the
input range the high combat option would be feasible
even earlier in the season.
18. Two other considerations weigh heavily on
Communist capabilities in Cambodia. Most important
is the availability of supplies already cached in
Cambodia. If the Communists are willing to draw
down stocks substantially, it would allow them to
shorten considerably the time required to prepare
for sustained high combat in Cambodia. Second, the
analysis just presented imposed a full year's
logistic burden on an eight-month dry season. What-
ever rainy season flow the Communists can muster
would enhance their logistic position.
III. Probable Courses of Action
19. The previous analysis was made without refer-
ence to the effect of US troop withdrawals from South
Vietnam. over the next 12 months and to a number of
other developments such as the relative deployments
and effectiveness of ARVN or FANK troops during this
time frame. All of these factors would weigh heavily
in Hanoi's determination of the strategic options it
might wish to follow. For the most part the impact
of these factors on Hanoi's offensive options is not
quantifiable. To the extent that some of them are,
the quantification must await completion of analyses
of projected FANK and ARVN deployments over the next
12 months.
20. In this section, we attempt a preliminary ap-
praisal of how these factors might influ.nce Hanoi's
decision. Our basic assumption is that the US residual
force by mid-1972 is below 50,000 and does not include
combat troops. To this basic case, we have coupled
four alternative assumptions regarding ARVN and FANK
capabilities and intentions over the period. These
alternative cases or scenarios are assessed in terms
of Hanoi's likely courses of action. The only quanti-
tative evaluation is in terms of the changes in man-
power requirements for each scenario. These manpower
10 -
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estimates are highly tentative and must be regarded
solely as approximate orders of magnitude.
Scenario 1. (a) There will be no change
in AR N s willingness to introduce forces into
Cambodia either to reinforce Cambodian efforts
against the enemy or to initiate offensives of
its own, and (b) there will be no change in
FANK's combat effectiveness.
Scenario 2. (a) ARVN will reduce its
forces in Ca odia, and (b) FANK's combat
effectiveness* will improve to the extent that
it can launch mini-type offensives mainly in
the form of increased numbers of harassing
attacks on major enemy deployments.
Scenario 3. (a) There will be no change
in ARVN's w T3ingness to introduce forces
into Cambodia either to reinforce Cambodian
efforts against the enemy or to initiate
offensives of its own, and (b) FANK's combat
effectiveness will improve to the extent that
it can launch mini-type offensives mainly in
the form of increased numbers of harassing
attacks on major enemy deployments.
Scenario 4. (a) ARVN will reduce its
forces in Cambodia and (b) there will be no
significant improvement in FANK.
21. Under the situation projected in Scenario 1,
and assuming that there is no change in Communist
strategy, the war in Cambodia by mid-1972 wi:1. closely
adhere to the current tactical and strategic situation.
FANK's combat activities will be restricted to
defensive actions geared almost exclusively to
maintaining its major lines of communication. For
its part, ARVN will introduce forces in Cambodia
both to assist FANK in keeping open strategic
arteries (as in the case, of Route 6 and 4), and to
blunt any, sizable buildup of enemy forces along the
border. In view of the assumed drawdown of US force
levels, ARVN initiatives in Cambodia will be limited
Assumes a well-trained army of about 250,000 men,
of which 50,000 would be used in offensive, harassing
operati ord .
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and the enemy almost certainly will continue to
dominate the war there Under these circumstances
the enemy could view Strategy II ,pith increasing
favor. In addition to further strengthening his
logistical system in Cambodia, an offensive in
Cambodia could destroy FANK's budding military
capabilities so as to delay considerably its
emergence as an effective fighting force.
22. Moreover, against this alignment in which
ARVN's initiatives would for the most part emphasize
preventive reaction tactics and FANK's posture would
be purely defensive, the enemy could reasonably
consider undertaking a sustained offensive in Cam-
bodia with somewhat less than the 45,000 combat
troops originally postulated for the strategy.
Although he almost certainly would have to upgrade
his forces in Cambodian MRs i and 2, the enemy
probably could leave his force levels elsewhere in
Cambodia relatively constant. on this basis he
might be able to implement Strategy II with a com-
bat force structure of 35,000-40,000 men. Similarly,
he probably could maintain the protracted war stra-
tegy with a combat force level of about 20,000 men,
5,000 fewer than originally postulated.
2?.. The improved combat effectiveness of FANK
posited in scenario 2, could affect Communist calcu-
lations. Heretofore, the enemy has viewed FANK as
a minimum threat on its periphery. Consequently, he
has been able to achieve his objectives with minimum
force levels that have successfully tied down larger
but untrained, poorly led FANK units. "o the extent
that FANK presents a viable militar; posture, the NVA
will be forced to commit more and better troops to
this theater of the war, if for no more than to
maintain its existing positions, Even within t'`.is
context, Hanoi probably would still view Strategy
II favorably. Although implementation of the high
combat option within the framework of Scenario 2
almost certainly would entail high casualties rates,
Hanoi probably would be motivated by the fact that
a continuing increase in FANK's fighting effective-
ness would over the longer term be an intolerable
burden and entail far greater risks.
24. Even under these conditions the North Viet-
namese may consider a combat force structure of
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35,000-40,000 men sufficient to support the offen-
sive. The reduction of an ARVN presence in Cambo-
dia certainly would weigh heavily in this decision.
Such a consideration, however, probably would not
prevail under the low combat, protracted war option.
The increased combat effectiveness of FANK might
make the NVA increasingly cautious, and they
would view any reduction in combat force levels
that could jeopardize the maintenance of their
logistical system as too risky.
25. For Hanoi, Scenario 3 certainly would have
the most omnious overtones. For all practical
purposes the NVA would be forced to fight a main
war against an aggressive ARVN while at the same
time being concerned by burgeoning aggressive
forces to their rear -- something they have never
faced before. Probing actions by FANK and full-
scale offensives by ARVN could place their logisti-
cal lifeline under increasing pressure, and force
the enemy to fall back to almost a defensive war in
CambocJia. Even then, enemy casualties would
increase and Hanoi probably would have to commit
additional forces to counterbalance this double-
barreled threat. Under these conditions, Hanoi
probably worild view the low combat option -- Stra-
tegy I -- as most strategically desirable until
its forces are in a position to attack and neutra-
lize FANK, which would still be the weakest link in
the friendly force structure.
26. Combat manpower requirements to sustain the
protracted war strategy would probably increase
by about 5,000 men. The majority of the Licrease
would be deployed in Cambodian MRs 1 and 5 where
pressures on the logistical system would be the
greatest on-going threat. There would be an even
more dramatic increase in combat manpower require-
ments, on the order of 10,000 men, if the enemy
attempted to implement the high offensive strategy.
The ability of both FANK and ARVN to take a heavy
toll of enemy attacking forces would be at the heart
of this increase.
27. As Scenario 3 delineates serious problems
for the enemy by mid-1972, Scenario 4 provides the
singular most favorable conditions for him. Within
this context, friendly forces will be incapable of
undertaking new initiatives in Cambodia. To Hanoi
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the war in Cambodia will continue to be viewed as
a minimum threat on its periphery and the situation
would permit the commitment of more forces to the
main war in South Vietnam. Under these circumstances,
the NVA might perceive the low combat option as most
desirable. This strategy would keep casualties at
relatively low levels while the NVA positioned
themselves politically and militarily to place
primary emphasis on the war in South Vietnam. This
highly favorable tactical and strategic environment
could enable the NVA to support a protracted war
strategy witli even less than the 20,000 combat forces
postulated in Scenario 1. in terms of the high combat
option the enemy could view a maximum combat force of
35,000 men as more than adequate.
IV. The Communist View of Cambodia
28. It is now over a year since Sihanouk was
ousted from power, and the fundamental outline of
Communist st,7ategy has become reasonably clear.
The captured documents, the various COSVN direc-
tives, the statements of ralliers,
and public statements in
Hanoi and Peking all seemed to suggest that the
North Vietnamese neither foresaw nor were working
directly toward a quick or early overthrow of the
Lon Nol government.
29. Within days after Sihanouk's ouster, pru-
dent North Vietnamese military commanders began to
make adjustments along the border to accommodate
the new politico-military situation. Bases were
expanded, caches were moved deeper into Cambodia,
and efforts to raise an indigenous Cambodian Com-
munist force were intensified. As part of this
effort, the Communists also undertook a wide range
of attacks against Cam?odian population centers
between May and August of 1970. This action had
;' twofold purpose. It applied heavy political-
psychological pressure on the new leaders in Phnom
Penh in the hope that either they would adopt
different policies or that other more accommodating
leaders would be brought into power through some
internal political upheaval. The attacks on the
population centers also had a tactical purpose. It
tied down Cambodian troops to defensive positions,
while the Communists moved quickly to establish a
presence in the countryside and began the difficult
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task of establishing new supply lines, organizing
a political apparatus, and raising an indigenous
military force for local security and other related
activities.
30. The Communists have largely devoted the
past dry season to a continuation of this effort.
In almost every area of the country, Communist
cadre and main force units have been devoting a
considerable portion of their energies to building
an organization in the countryside. As part of
this effort, ethnic Cambodian Communists, most of
whom have been in Hanoi for many years, were re-
turned to Cambodia to assume control over the
fledgling indigenous apparatus.
31. The evidence that is currently available
suggests that this process is far from reaching a
stage of development in which Hanoi can assume
that it has adequately protected the western flank
of its forces located along the Cambodian-South
Vietnamese border without the diversion of signif-
icant numbers of its own combat troops. On the
contrary, the Communists are having a tough time
generating support among a Cambodian population
that is outright antagonistic :;hen it is not
apathetic. At the same time, however, it seems
unlikely that FANK's performance over the past six
months has given the North Vietnamese reason to be
alarmed that it will face in the next year a serious
challenge from the west. On the political side,
despite recent difficulties associated u'ith Lon
Nol's incapacitation, there are no signs of any
early changes that would either significantly
affect the performance of FANK or change Cambodia's
fundamental policy with respect to the war. Under
these circumstances, there does not appear to be
any fundamental change in the situation in Cambodia
that would either afford the Communists the oppor-
tunity for making disproportionate gains by adopt-
ing a more aggressive strategy or compel them to
alter their course because of a significant shift
in the military realities.
32. There are two important cave,.zts to this
prognosis. The realities of the situation in Cam-
bodia are such that the Communists could create a
military "crisis" at any time or place of their own
choosing and without necessarily fulfilling the
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requirements that by definition constitutes a "high"
military option in South Vietnam. In short, the
Communists can militarily accomplish far more with
far less in Cambodia than in South Vietnam. This
being so, Hanoi might see Cambodia as a battlefield
in which it could retain some elements of initiative
in the Indochina war without running great risks of
a major setback. A "major" offensive in Cambodia
might throw into the question the efficacy of US
support to Cambodia and help create the impression
that the war in Indochina is far from over despite
the progress that has been made in South Vietnam.
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