NORTH VIETNAM'S MANPOWER POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 30, 1998
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2008/03/03:
CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01 70001
Approved For Release
2008/03/03
CIA-RDP85T00875R00170001
1W
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5 ~Y\ C~
25X1
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
North Vietnam's Manpower Position
DIA review(s) completed.
ARMY review(s) completed.
V On file DOC release instructions apply.
DIA
review(s)
completed.
Secret
ER IM 71-97
June 1971
Copy No. 5 2
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
NORTH VIETNAM'S MANPOWER POSITION
Introduction
1. During 1965-70, about I million men were inducted into the
North Vietnamese armed forces, and more than half that number are
estimated to have been killed in action. The purpose of this memorandum
is to assess the impact of this manpower drain on (a) North Vietnam's
civilian reserve of physically fit men and Hanoi's capability to sustain
continued drawdowns of its manpower reserves over the next few years;
(b) the civilian labor force and output of the economy; and (c) population
growth over the next two decades.
2. The principal sources drawn upon for this memorandum are: (a)
demographic data and projections supplied by the US Bureau of the Census;
(b) data on the infiltration of North Vietnamese soldiers into Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam; (c) enemy order of battle and casualty
estimates for North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos; and
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
Discussion
Military Requirements 1965-70
3. An estimated 1.1 million North Vietnamese men were inducted
into military service during 1965-70, as shown in the following tabulation:
Year Thousand Men
1965 155
1966 260
1967 185
1968 215
1969 80
1970 200 (pre-
liminary)
Total 1,095
The size of the army was doubled in the period 1965-66 in response to
the massive increase in the US presence in South Vietnam and the bombing
campaign in North Vietnam. Continued heavy recruitment in 1967 and 1968
was in preparation for, and to offset casualties resulting from, the major
Communist offensives during 1968. In 1969 the rate of induction dropped
sharply as the Communists shifted to a protracted war strategy. In 1970
the induction rate is believed to have risen again following the ouster of
Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and the widening of the war to the whole
of Indochina.
4. Losses during 1965-70 totaled an estimated 600,000 men.
Included in this total are those killed or mortally wounded on or en route
to the battlefield plus the few who have rallied to the South Vietnamese
authorities. POWs have been excluded, as most rf these presumably will
return to North Vietnam when circumstances p.;rmit. The approximate
distribution, by year, of estimated losses is as follows:
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
Thousand Men
25
50
75
200
150
100
Impact on Manpower Reserves, 1965-70
5. As a result of the induction of an estimated 1.1 million men
into military service during 1965-70, North Vietnam's civilian manpower
reserve 11 declined by an estimated one-third from 2.0 million at the end
of 1964 to 1.3 million at the end of 1970 (see Table 1). It otherwise
would have risen by one-fifth to 2.4 million. Although substantial inroads
have been made on North Vietnam's reserve, the cushion of untapped
manpower is still sizable and could support additional large drawdowns.
As shown in the tabulation below, North Vietnam's armed forces at 0.6
million are equal to only one-fifth the total number of males aged 18-39
in the population. This is less than the comparable figure for South Vietnam
at present and for selected other countries during World War II and the
Korean War.
Million Men
Country
Date
Males
18-39
Armed
Forces
Percent
in the
Armed Forces
^
United States
Jul 45
24.7
12.1
49
United Kingdoiu
Jun 45
8.3
4.7
57
Germany
Jun 44
10.3
9.6
93
South Korea
Dec 53
3.1
0.7
23
North Korea
Dec 53
1.1
0.3
27
Sc ut h Vietnam
Dec 70
2.4
1.1
46
Norv.4i Vietnam
Dec 70
2.9
0.6
21
1. Defined as including physically fit males in the age group 15-39. If
the more restrictive age group 17-35 is considered, the decline of the
manpower reserve during 1965-70 was 800,000, from 1.6 million to 0.8
million.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
6. The age distribution of the reserve has changed markedly since
the end of 1964 as a product of demographic factors and the manner in
which the various age groups were tapped for recruits. As shown in Table
2, a majority of the draftees in every year were taken from the 17-25
age group, although it was evidently found necessary to draw recruits from
other age groups to a greater extent during 1966-68. In 1969, when draft
calls were reduced, the distribution more closely resembled the 1960-64
pattern, although the percent inducted from the 31-39 age group probably
was higher. The end result of this draft policy, as shown in Table 3, was
heavy depletion of the 17-25 and 26-30 age groups. The number of men
in both age groups declined by about one-half. The size of the 31-39 age
group remained stable as callups were about equal to the increase that would
have taken place under normal circumstances. The number of youths in
the 15-16 age group increased by one-fourth, however, as the higher birth
rates of the 1950s more than offset levies for military service.
7. The distribution of men in the pool, by occupation, has not
undergone the radical change that the age distribution has. As shown in
Table 4, for the 1965-68 period, 61% of the POWs questioned on their
former occupation reported they had been farmers, and farmers seem to
have been tapped for military service roughly in proportion to their share
in the population. Data from the North Vietnamese press indicate that
farmers accounted for about 60% of the male labor force in January 1965.
However, the two percentages are not directly comparable, because the POW
sample includes students, while the labor force, by definition, ,sxcludes
students. If students are excluded from the POW sample, farmers accounted
for 67% of the total during 1965-68.
8. The teaching profession also seems to have borne its share of
the burden of military service. North Vietnamese stat;sties reveal that by
the 1968-69 school year, 23,000 or about 30% of the estimated 80,000
physically fit teachers at the gi neral school level (up to the equivalent of
the US 12th grade) were in military service. Nevertheless, the total number
of general school teachers increased during the period because of a heavy
influx of females into the profession and a small increase in the number
of male teachers, excluding those in the armed forces. None of the POWs
reported they had been instructors at institutions of higher education, and
it is believed this segment of the teaching profession largely escaped the
draft through 1970. There is evidence from the North Vietnamese press,
however, that by late 1970 some of the instructors at colleges and normal
schools had received notification that they might be called up.
9. The male student body has also been hard hit by the draft.
Reports from POWs and from the North Vietnamese press indicate that
substantial conscription of students at the high school level and above has
taken pi,- e since 1967.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
that students studying abroad have been recalled for military service, but
press articles tell of students who were selected for overseas study but
"chose" to enlist and of another who "volunteered" for military service
when lie returned from study abroad. J
10. Of the 27% of the POWs who reported oe upations other than
farmer, student, or teacher, most had been unskilled or semi-skilled workers
for the period 1965-68. However, there were some who reported they had
held technical, professional, or supervisory positions in various sectors of
the economy, indicating that the more highly skilled members of the labor
force have not received blanket exemptions.
Future Impact on Manpower Reserves
11. Since 1964, North Vietnam has had to reduce its reserve of
physically fit civilian manpower by sonic 700,000 men. This drawdown
reflects the high human costs that Hanoi has paid to carry on the war
in Indochina. But despite these costs, North Vietnam still has a sizable
reserve of physically fit manpower, amounting to an estimated 1.3 million
men at the end of 1970. This reserve, in gross terms, is adequate to provide
a continued flow of manpower to the war theaters in Indochina. J If
Hanoi's manpower requisitions were at the level observed in 1969 -- 80,000
men - the existing manpower reserves would for all practical purposes
remain intact indefinitely. Even in the event that Hanoi were to carry out
an expanded mobilization program similar to that observed in 1970 -
possibly 200,000 men - the manpower reserves could easily support such
a program for several years.
2. The draft has not as yet had a discernible impact on the total number
of persons sent overseas for study.
3. This may overstate Hanoi's actual capabilities because there probably
is a hard core of physically fit males of draft age Who would not be subject
to induction except in an all-out emergency such as an invasion of North
Vietnam. (For further discussion, see the Appendix.)
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Impact on Labor Force and Output
12. As shown in Table 5, the civilian labor force is estimated to have
}down from 9.4 million in January 1965 to 9.9 million in January 1971.
Had there been no war, the labor force would have grown to an estimated
10.6 million. The shortfall of some 700,000 in the size of the labor force
was less than the number of men called to the colors because of an abnormal
increase in the number of females in the labor force. The burden of the
loss fell entirely on the agricultural labor force, which is estimated to have
been smaller by 0.7 million in 1970 than it would have been under normal
circumstances. The wholesale callup of able-bodied men no doubt had a
qualitative as well as a quantitative effect on the labor force. The impact
of military manpower needs on the labor force together with the fact that
the economy has not yet recovered fully from the disruptions caused by
the bombing campaign explains in part why gross national product (GNP)
in 1970 was only $1.4 billion, some $0.2 billion below the 1964 total.
Had there been no war, GNP could have been up by $0.5 billion to an
estimated $2.1 billion by 1970, about $0.2 billion of which would have
been due to the normal growth of the labor force and $0.3 billion due
to higher productivity resulting from capital formation and improved
technology. Nevertheless, with economic support from Communist
countries, North Vietnam is managing to cover basic needs and has, in the
two years since the bombing halt, progressed about halfway toward the
pre-war level of output.
Impact on Population Growth and Composition
13. Demographic projections indicate that North Vietnam's
population is about I million persons less than it would have been in the
absence of the Indochina War (see Table 6). About two-thirds of this
disparity is due to the direct loss of 600,000 males on the battlefields of
Southeast Asia. Most of the remainder is due to the drop in fertility resulting
from the widowhood of women married to men killed in action and the
temporary separation of spouses because of the presence of men in the
military service. As shown in the tabulation below, this disparity will
continue to grow as time passes and will reach about 4 million, or more
than 10%, by 1990, should the war end during 1971. If the war should
last two n;ore years, the disparity might grow by an additional 1 million.
Million Persons
1971
1975
1980
1990
No
war
21
23
26
33
War
ends
in 1971
20
21
23
29
War
ends
in 1973
20
21
23
28
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
14. While it is doubtful that the long-term effect of the war upon
population growth is a significant factor in Hanoi's military strategy, the
regime can not be wholly indifferent to the sociological and psychological
impact of the war to date. At present, the number of males aged 20-29
is only about seven-tenths the number of females in this age group. In
1975 the percentage would be down to less than six-tenths if the war were
to last through 1973 with a relatively high level of casualties. Beyond
1975 - assuming the war ends in 1973 - the population pyramid will begin
to revert to a more normal shape (see the chart).
Conclusions
15. An estimated 1.1 million North Vietnamese men were inducted
into military service during 1965-70, causing Vietnam's civilian reserve of
physically fit men in the 15-39 age group to decline by about one-third
since the end of 1964, from 2.0 million to 1.3 million. The decline in
the prime age group, 17-25, was much sharper - by about one-half through
1969. However, North Vietnam's reserve thus far has been drawn down
to a lesser extent relativ' to the size of its armed forces than has been
the case in South Vietnam and in various other countries during wartime.
16. The drain of manpower into the military I..?s retarded the growth
of the labor force and, together with the disruptions caused by the bombing
campaign, has had a substantial adverse effect on output. Nevertheless,
North Vietnam, with support from its allies, has been able to meet basic
needs and, in the two years since the end of the bombing campaign, has
reached the halfway point in regaining prewar levels of output.
17. Despite the substantial inroads the war has made on North
Vietnam's civilian manpower reserve, Hanoi has the capability, in
mathematical terms at least, to conscript men at the 1969 level indefinitely
and for several years at a relatively high rate - say 200,000 per year.
18. We are not able to judge specifically what price Hanoi will be
willing to pay in manpower terms in the future to continue the war in
Indochina. Certainly, North Vietnam's leaders can not be unmindful of the
tremendous sociological and psychological burden resting on their people.
However, the regime continues to demonstrate a remarkable ability to get
young men into the armed forces, to keep its working population plugging
away for small material reward, and in general to extract a whole host
of sacrifices without giving much in return. We see nothing to suggest that
this situation will change in the foreseeable future. Tile evidence continues
to point to North Vietnam's willingness to continue making major inputs
of manpower into the military.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
0 War Ends, 1973
65 and Over
60-64
55-59
a"-54
45.49
40-44
35-39
30.34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
2.4 2 2 20 1.8 16 L4 L2 LO .8 .6 .4 .2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 to L2 L4 16 LB 20 22 24
Males (In Millions) Females
24 2.2 2.0 1.8 L6 L4 L2 1.0 .8 .6 .4 .2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 LO 1.2 14 16 L8 20 22 24
Males (In Millions) Females
60-64
55.59
50-54
45-49
40.44
J5-39
30.34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10.14
5-9
0-4
2
4 22
.
2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4 L2 LO .8 .6 .4 .2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 LO L2 14 16 1.8 2.0 22 24
511289 5-71 Males (In Millions) Females
Population Projections for N3rth Vietnam
As of Jan 1
~rv 1 F
L e L 2 2.4
.6 .4 .2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 L01214L6 L820222.4
Males (In Millions) Females
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
North Vietnam's Civilian Reserve of Manpower
25X1 Leaving Pool 25X1
Total Entering Reaching
Year (31 December) a/ Pool Total Inductees Age 40 Otherz b/
1964 2,000
1965 1,900
t 1966 1,700
1967 1,600
1968 1,400
1969 1,400
1970 1,300
126 230 155 51 24
132 336 260 50 26
133 269 185 53 31
144 292 215 54 23
151 150 80 56 14
157 270 200 c/ 58 12
Defined as physically fit males, age 15-39, who are not in the
armed forces. See Appendix for methodology. Rounded to the nearest
100, 00.
b. Including those leaving because of natural death, death from
bombing, and decline in physical fitness.
c. Preliminary.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Percent Distribution of North Vietnamese Soldiers
Captured in South Vietnam, by Age at Induction a/
Percent 25X1
Age at
Induction
All ages
15-16
17-25
26-30
31-35
36-39
1960-64
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
100
100
100
100
100
100
6
4
10
6 b/
9
2
81
69
68
76
66
78
10
17 c/
16
15
13
8
2
7 c/
5
3
8
8
1
3
--
d/
3
3
a. For methodology, see the Appendix. Because of rounding,
components may not add to the totals shown.
b. Includes one draftee who reported his age at induction as 14.
c. Includes a substantial number of former servicemen recalled
following the mobilization order of April 1965.
d. Less than 0.5%.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Trends in North Vietnam's Civilian
Reserve of Manpower, by Age Group a/
25X1
Thousand Men
Age Group
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
All ages
2,000
1,900
1,700
1,600
1,400
1,400
15-16
220
240
250
260
270
280
17-25
760
660
500
400
310
350
26-30
450
430
370
340
260
220
31-35
350
350
350
360
330
330
36-39
220
220
230
240
230
220
a. As of 31 December.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Percent Distribution of North Vietnamese Soldiers
Captured in South Vietnam, by Former Occupation a/
Former Occupation
All occupations
Farmer b/
Student
Teacher
Others
1960-64
1965
1966
1967
1968
1965-68
100
100
100
100
100
100
68
65
66
57
61
61
14
4
10
11
9
9
1
5
4
3
1
3
17
26
20
29
29
27
a. Based on a sample of 655 prisoners who reported former occupations.
The distribution of the sample, by year of induction, is as follows:
1960-64, 85; 1965, 80; 1966, 92; 1967, 215; and 1968, 173. For 1969,
only 18 prisoners to date have reported their former occupation. This
is too small a sample to be meaningful for purposes of this analysis.
b. Including a few fishermen.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
Table 5
Civilian Labor Force in North Vietnam a/
Million Persons
January 1971
January
1965
Actual
No War
Difference
All sectors
9.4
9.9
10.6
-0.7
Men
4.5
4.0
5.0
-1.0
Women
+0.3
Agriculture
-0.7
Men
-0.,,%
Women
-0.1
Other
2.4
0
1.7
-0.4
+0.4
a. Age 15 to 64.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Estimated Population of North Vietnam a/
Thousand Persons
1971 b/
1965
No War
Actual
Total
17,800
20,800
25X1
19,800
0-14
7,400
8,800
8,400
15-44
8,100
9,100
8,500
45 and over
2,300
2,900
2,900
8,600
10,200
9,400
0-14
3,700
4,400
4,200
15-44
3,900
4,500
3,900
45 and over
1,000
1,300
1,300
Female
9,200
10,600
10,400
0-14
3,700
4,400
4,200
15-44
4,200
4,600
4,600
45 and over
1,300
1,600
1,600
a. Projections for the beginning of the year made by the
US Bureau of the Census.
b. Data differ from other- figures published by the Bureau
of the Census because the "No War" estimate assumes a contin-
uation of population trends dating from 1964 and the "Actual"
estimate includes additional effects of the war not included
in other census projections.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
APPENDIX
Methodology
Number of Men Inducted into the North Vietnamese Army, 1965-70
The number inducted in each year of the 1965-69 period is the sum
of estimates of men inducted and earmarked for deployment to South
Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos. The estimates for South Vietnam are
based on monthly infiltration estimates produced by MACV for 1965-67
and by the Intelligence Coordination Group (ICG) at CINCPAC for 1968
to date as well as on reports obtained from POWs captured in South
Vietnam. Induction estimates were made on a monthly basis and then
cumulated. The distribution by month of induction of those infiltrated in
a particuiar mont;l was estimated from the sample of POWs who reported
they were Infiltrated in that month and who reported the date of their
induction. For example, if 50% of the POWs who reported they were
infiltrated in January 1968 had reported they were inducted in July 1967
and 50% had reported August 1967, then half the total number estimated
by the ICG to have infiltrated in January would have been assigned a July
1967 induction date and the other half an August 1967 induction date.
Table A-] presents the cross tabulation of infiltrees by date of induction
cumulated on i:n annual basis.
The estimates of men inducted for deployment to units in North
Vietnam were based on DIA estimates of changes in NVA in-country force
levels plus allowances for military personnel retired because of health or
age, military personnel killed by the US bombing program in 1965-68, and
for NVA personnel drafted prior to 1965 who infiltrated to South Vietnam
in 1965-69 and presumably were replaced.
The estimates of men inducted for deployment to units in Laos were
based on CIA/DIA estimates of changes in force levels and of casualties.
The age grouping of inductees by year was estimated from the sample
of 928 NVA soldiers captured in South Vietnam who reported their age
of induction. All were within the 15-39 age group, with the exception of
one youth who said lie was 14 when inducted.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
The total number of men estimated to have been inducted in 1965-70
is 1.1 million. This figure is believed to be subject to a range of error
of no more than ? 10%,. One indication that the estimate is fairly accurate
is provided by a statement in the North Vietnamese press that 23,000 male
teachers were in military service by the 1968-69 school year. The inductio:i
estimates together with data from POWs on occupation of inductees yield
an estimate of 26,000 teachers drafted during 1965-68.
Losses, 1965-70
Losses sustained by North Vietnam for the 1965-70 period are defined
as the sum of those killed and mortally wounded on Indochinese battlefields,
of men lost while in the infiltration system, and of persons who have rallied
to the South Vietnamese government. The number of NVA soldiers killed
in action (KIA) is based on estimates of combined VC/NVA fatalities
provided by MACV. The North Virtnamese share of the combined ILIA
in each year is assumed to have been equal to the NVA share of the VC/NVA
force level during that year. The estimate of the number of men mortally
wounded is based on the estimated KIA and a factor developed from analysis
of captured documents and POW interrogations
interrogations. Data on enemy ralliers are provided by MACV and by the
South Vietnamese government.
Number of Men in North Vietnam's Civilian
Reserve of Manpower, 1964-70
The estimated number of inductees in each year, by age, was subtracted
from the estimated number of ')Iiysically fit males, aged 15-39, who were
not in the armed forces to arrive at year-end estimates of North Vietnam's
civilian reserie of manpower, by age.
The basic demographic data are estimates prepared by the US Bureau
of the Census, which were in turn based on a North Vietnamese census
taken in 1960. The estimates of the total population are believed by Census
experts to be subject to a range of error of minus 5% to plus 20% because
of the probability of underreporting in the 1960 census and the probability
of error in birth and death rates used to project the 1960 data. However,
the range of error in the size of the military age group would be, for all
practical purposes, 0 to plus 15%%, as the size of this group would be
unaffected by errors in the birth rate and largely unaffected by errors in
the death rate.
The number in each age group estimated to be physically fit was based
on South Vietnamese experience and estimated to be 71% for those entering
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
the pool at age 15 and to range downward to 60% for those leaving the
pool at age 40. This estimate is on the conservative side, as a MACV study
in 1966 showed that about 709,'% of So,ith Vietnamese males in the 16-45
age bracket werc physically fit. YFurthermore, no adjustment h been made
in the percentages to allow for the evidence that physical standards had
been relaxed somewhat by 1968. Several POWs reported that they had been
repeatedly rejected in 1965-67 because of deficiencies suciL as poor eyesight
but had been subsequently drafted. A partially offsetting factor is that some
of the youths in the 15-17 age group probably would not be taken, because
they are not yet mature enough to meet height and/or weight requirements
of the military (roughly 5 feet and 90 pounds), although they are otherwise
physically fit. There have been references in the press to such persoms.
The number already in military service as of 31 December 1964 is
a DIA estimate. The age composition of this group was estimated from
reports of POWs inducted in 1960-64.
Hard Core Not Available for Military Service
It is estimated that a maximum of 500,000 physically fit males in
the 15-39 age group might not be drafted by the regime short of an all-out
emergency, such as an invasion of North Vietnam. This total includes
230,000 in technical, professional, or managerial positions (cadre) and
250,000 ethnics. The estimated 230,000 cadre are distributed as follows:
Thousand Men
Agricultural cooperatives
150
Administrators
20
Administrative committee
members
70
Production team leaders
60
Industry
30
Government administration
40
Services
10
Total
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
These estimates are based on fragmentary statistics published in the
North Vietnamese press. It should be noted that women have gradually
been replacing male cadre since 1965 so that this estimate tends to be
a maximum. On the other hand, it may exclude certain eligible males in
semi-skilled or unskilled positions which are judged to be critical. For
example, the press recently carried an article about a 19-year old who was
not allowed to "volunt,;cr" for military service because his skill as a forger
was needed by a factory in Hanoi.
In addition, a substantial number might not be considered useful or
desirable because they are members of ethnic minority groups, which
account for about 15% of the Nc'rth Vietnamese Population. Language and
cultural barriers render many of the men from these groups of limited value
to the regular forces, although a significant number of them were recruited
into the local militia. To date, less than 2% of the POWs have been identified
as ethnics, although there is evidence that conscription of ethnics was
speeded up in 1968. Several ethnics reported they were given a minimum
of military training and menial jobs. Ethnics may have accounted for slightly
more than 20%, or close to 300,000, of the pool by the end of 1970.
It is estimated that a maximum of 250,000 of these might be deemed
unsuitable for military service, barring an all-out emergency.
In estimating the number who might not be eligible for military service,
no allowance has been made for exemptions on grounds of personal hardship
or social status. Prior to 1965, it apparently was standard practice to exempt
both married men with large families (4 to 5 children or more) and sole
surviving sons with agad parents. After the war began, however, these
exemptions were abolished or largely ignored. Until 1965, men from certain
social groups su h as Catholics (5% of the population) and wealthy
land-owning fami ics reportedly were not generally drafted on grounds of
political unreliability. By 1968 or 1969, however, Catholics were no longer
exempt from service nor were the well-to-do youths. Also, no allowance
has been made for draft dodgers. There are undoubtedly a few, but available
reports indicate that the regime's tight controls over the civilian population
prevent draft evasion from being a major problem.
Labor Force Data
The estimates of the civilian labor force in North Vietnam were based
on demographic data, military inductions during 1965-70 and regime releases
of fragmentary employment data. The "no war" estimate of the size and
distribution of the force by sex and economic sector was based on
US Bureau of the Census projections of the size of the 15-64 age group
by sex, plus an allowance for some movement of labor out of agriculture -
an observed trend prior to 1965.
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010049-5
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5
Distribution of North Vietnamese Army Infiltrees
by Year of Induction and by Year of Infiltration a/
Year
Inducted 196E; 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 Total
Pre-1965 53 48 28 19 3 -- 151
1965 21 26 22 14 1 -- 84
1966 -- 17 43 16 1 -- 77
1967 -- -- 59 73 4 -- 136
1968 -- -- -~ 119 52 4 175
1969 -- -- -- -- 23 36 59
Total 74 91 152 241 84 40 682
a. Based on a sample of 908 prisoners who reported date of induction and
date of infiltration.
b. January-June 1970 only.
Year Infiltrated 25X1
Thousand Men
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01700010049-5