RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010050-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: April 30, 1998
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Communist Logistical Developments In Southern Laos
Secret
ER IM 71-98
Copy No.
62
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN SOUTHERN LAOS
1. This memorandum analyzes logistical developments in southern
Laos since 1 April. By that date, operation Lam Son 719 was ending and
the third phase of the NVA's General Transportation Offensive was
beginning. This assessment focuses on events since that date but does refer -
for purposes of perspective -- to some events occurring earlier which have
been reported previously in this series.
Discussion
Organizational Adjustments
2. As the ARVN forces committed to Operation Lam Son 719 began
to withdraw from the Laotian Panhandle, the Communists launched a
program to realign and strengthen their logistics system. By late March the
logistics corridor, which had been disrupted by the ARVN presence during
the Lam Son Operation, was reopened to substantial vehicle activity.
Note: This memorandum was prepared 1w the Office of Econondc
Research.
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Status of Logistic Facilities
Roads
6. Between March and mid ,May the Communists continued to
maintain and improve their lines of communication in the Panhandle. Reads
damaged by bombing or rain were rapidly repaired and new bypasses and
connector roads built. During the 1970-71 dry season, the Communists
constructed about 500 miles of new roads -- most of them bypass and
connector routes within the existing Ho Chi Minh route structure. The major
exception was time construction of Route 99 extending some 60 miles south
from the Muong Nong area, which provided a heavily canopied alternate
to Route 92 into the Ban Bac area. In the previous dry season the
Communists constructed about 360 miles of new roads, again largely
associated with filling out the existing network with new parallel bypass
segments and cross-connector roads linking the major arteries. By mid-May
the entire system remained operative and was sustaining moderate use at
levels significantly higher than last year, when traffic on the entry corridors
slackened in early March and on the roads south of Tchepone in late April.
7. Since late February, indicated the
construction of significant new additions to the Panhandle roadnet. In late
March the enemy completed portions of a new lengthy bypass in Ban Karai
Pass, providing enemy truck traffic two independent routes through the
Pass. Additional new road construction is continuing east of Route 912
and appears to be headed for a probable link tip with Route 910, another
cross-border route north of the western DMZ corridor.
8. I preliminary road construction
near the motorable terminus of Route 925/608 in South Vietnam. One
possible alignment of this road work would link Route 1032 and its complex
of bypasses directly with Route 608. If this link were completed, the North
Vietnamese would save about 15 miles of the distance from the DMZ to
the motorable terminus of Route 608 that existed in April. Route 608
currently is being extended eastward to the banks of a stream that flows
past Khe Sanh. When completed, this new construction will give the North
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Vietnamese two corridors of approach to the Khe Sanh area. The North
Vietnamese could also use the 17 miles of road cleared by the Allied forces
during Lam Son 719. Most of these roads were extended into the hills
northwest of Khe Sanh to supply fire support bases protecting ARVN units
operating along Route 925/608.
9. Further south, between the end of February and mid-March, a
NVA engineer battalion equipped with bulldozers cleared and
reopened Route 233, forming a connector route between north-south
Routes 23 and 99 and providing a lengthy and relatively secure bypass
route around the Tchcpone/Muong Nong areas. In mid-March,
indicated traces of a second new eaA-west connector road
linking the two major north-south route structures. The new connector road
which extends west from Route 914 toward Muong Phine was compl ted
by 29 April, and Forward Air Controllers (FACs) report that since then
the roadbed has been improved and vehicle traffic on it has steadily
increased. A third probable connecter route leading west from Route 99
toward Saravane was detected under construction in mid-April some 20
miles south of Route 233. Subsequent FAC coverage beginning on 10 May
indicated that additional new road clearing activity leading south from this
probable connector was under way. Pilots traced this construction some
25 miles to the outskirts of Ban Phone where the new road joins Route
16, thus providing a direct overland link from the supply depots in the
Ban Bac area to the northern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. As of 15 May,
however, the roadway was still unsuitable for vehicle use.
10. The construction of these east-west links between the traditional
and alternate north-south systems probably was triggered by the ARVN
incursion and the need to sustain logistic operations into the rainy season.
Construction of new bypass and connector roads in the Panhandle has in
the past signalled increased enemy logistic activity in that area. With
requirements in southern South Vietnam and Cambodia added to the
enemy's logistic burden, a further shift southward of command and control
functions and logistics-related storage facilities and vehicles can be expected
in the - southern reaches of the Panhandle next dry season.
Waterways
11. Tile Se Bang Hieng and Se Kong logistics routes have shown
surprising decreases in the level of waterborne supply activity during the
past two months or so. This is in sharp contrast to the high level of use
observed on these rivers throughout the 1969/70 dry season. Last year these
waterways - particularly the Se Bang Hieng - were used to float substantial
tonnages of fuel, foodstuffs, and other items between distant transshipment
points. During March and April 1970, several hundred to several thousand
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drums and watertight bags were frequently Si sighted floating down these
rivers. has revealed that
the enemy has apparently abandoned the Sc Bang Hieng as a logistics route.
Its elaborate channel guide system and earthen dams have largely been
washed away or destroyed by air strikes, and no attempts at repair are
visible. This development is somewhat out of step with
reports which indicate that the North
Vietnamese were able to move a greater portion of their supplies safely
through interdicted areas when using waterways such as the Se Bang Hieng
in comparison with movement by truck. this waterway
was a preferred route because it required little manpower, eliminated worry
over fuel supplies, and did not require roads to be built or maintained.
A possible explanation for the apparent abandonment of this waterway
could be that proliferation of new roads cut through the western DMZ
over the past year, the damage and disruptions caused by Lam Son 719,
and iiaproved bombing techniques against river traffic have caused the
enemy to shift to speedier truck transport. Although the channel guide
system in the Se Kong south of Ban Bac remains intact, we have little
evidence on the extent of its use during the last several months. The only
significant sighting since 12 January was of some 200 bags in the river
on 26 March - suggesting that the river is either being used only at night
or in times of special need.
Petroleum Pipelines
12. the North Vietnamese
are expanding their petroleum pipeline system in North Vietnam and
probably in southern Laos as well.
traces of new pipeline, totaling some 15 miles, being
constructed southward along Route 137 in North Vietnam toward the Ban
Karai Pass.
it apparently will extend from the recently built spur line
connecting the twi independent pipeline systems leading from the ports
of Vinh and Quang Khe. Several times during the current dry season, FACs
have reported seeir.:* short segments of pipeline in the area of Ban Karai
Pass in Laos. While these have not been confirmed by other sources, the
construction of the two other cross-border pipelines followed a similar
pattern of construction from either terminus toward the mid-point. The
completion of a petroleum pipeline through Ban Karai Pass will give the
North Vietnamese an abundant, year-round fuel source on each of the three
cross-border corridors, largely eliminating the perennial problem of gasoline
shortages in the Panhandle.
13. The reliance which the enemy has placcii on pipelines for fuel
transport was underscored during Lam Son 719-. To keep fuel supplies
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flowing into the Tchcponc and Muong Nong areas, the Communists quickly
built a lengthy spur off the main pipeline sonic distance north of Tchcponc,
arcing north and west of the battlefield to new bunkered fuel storage
facilities near the junction of Routes 9110 and 911 where tank trucks
apparently were loaded for shipments farther south.
Supply Movements
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SECRET SPOKE
Panhandle in April averaged 1,056
a day, 5611r. above the level of April 1970 (see the chart). The high traffic
levels plummeted late in the month coincident with heavy rains. Since
SECRET SPOKE
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was still light: western Route 110 connecting with Route 97 in C-"mbodia
registered an average of only four detections of southbound movement per
day in April, up from two per day in March. Through 15 May, the daily
average dropped to less than three a day, reflecting heavy intermittent rains.
activity in the extreme southern Panhandle increased but
23. Historically, the logistic forces in the northernmost pass area --
Mu Gia - shut down dry season operations well in advance of the heavy
rains. Last year, detections J at Mu Gia began to fall off sharply in March,
averaging only one per day southbound in April and virtually none in May.
This year, however, detections of southbound movements averaged 26 per
day in April and 18 per day through 15 May. Detections of southbound
movements in the Ban Karai Pass also have been higher recently. Detections
averaged 60 a day in April and 52 a day through mid-May, compared with
23 and 12 detections per day, respectively, for these months in 1970. The
entry roads at the western DMZ also have remained fairly active, registering
a total of 25 detections of southbound movements per day this April,
compared with 4 per day in April 1970.
emphasizes the input roads from North Vietnam, the western route network
in the Muong Phine area, the roads between Tchcpone and Ban Bac, and
those - particularly Route 922 - leading to GVN Military Region 1.
24. Other significant logistical activity has been evident
on Route 23 south of Muong Phine. Segment I, which extends
30 miles south of Muong Phine, has been one of the most active roads
segments in the Panhandle,
of traffic reflects the recent increase in the number of NVA troops in the
general area and the fact that the enemy is using this alternate route
structure to move supplies to the Route 233 junction and also further south
into the Ban Laongam and Ban Thateng areas.
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25. also reflect
continued supply movement in Apri!. Sightings averaged 275 a day in
April - 27'%, above the level observed in April 1970 -- although part of
the increase may be attributable to a 15% increase in attack sorties in the
same period.
Wet Season Intentions
27. Although the level of logistical activity which the North
Vietnamese will attempt to carry out during the summer remains unknown,
two factors almost certainly point to a sizable logistical force remaining
in the Panhandle this wet season - Hanoi's presumed desire to get an early
start on the 1971 /72 dry season resupply and the necessity to provide
against the possibility of new Allied ground incursions. At the very least,
some local shuttling and waterway activity and the maintenance of a supply
flow directed at supporting enemy forces in GVN Military Region I should
not be too difficult and seems, therefore, a strong probability. Whether
Hanoi will also attempt to maintain a substantial level of supply activity
throughout the Panhandle wil! be determined largely by how it views its
performance this dry season and its requirements for the coming year.
28. Throughout May, no indications of logistical force withdrawals
have been noted. gives some indication of enemy
preparations for wet-weather operations.
that the roads in the three entry corridors and the routes
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linking them with the Tchepone area were being improved and resurfaced
with crushed rock. Subsequently, numerous piles of gravel were observed
along these roads. According to FACs, wet-weather preparations have been
more pronouncedin the Ban Karai Pass and western DMZ entry corridors;
this suggests that these two corridors will be use(.' extensively this rainy
Vulnerable portions of Route 99 and exit Routes
922 and 966 have reflected measures taken to ensure their continued rise,
but the numerous piles of gravel and logs (for corduroying purposes)
observed along these roads may be used to keep them open only long enough
to guarantee completion of this dry season's supply push. The limited
amount of' wet-season prej.'rations noted along the major north-south route
systems expending from Tchepone and 1Vi!iong Nong and the fact that early
rainy season thunderstorms have already deteriorated parts of these roads
suggest that Hanoi may not feel it necessary to maintain a significant supply
movement capability south of Ban Bac during the coming rainy season.
Conclusions
29. As Operation Lam Son 719 wound down in late March, the enemy
moved swiftly to restore and improve its logistic capabilities in the area
of the Operation. Supply movements on previously interdicted Route 92
south of Tchepone were stepped up, and a logistical organization
was reestablished on the route. By early April, iMc logistical apparatus
on the western road structure - Route 23 -- had also been strengthened,
and the road was being used as an important adjunct of the traditional
north-south route structure. In the southern Panhandle, the logistical system
also has continued to develop.
30. indicated traffic
flows in April which, while somewhat under the levels of previous months,
were considerably above those of April 1970. The entry roads continue
to reflect unusually high traffic for this time of year (particularly compared
with last year).
mid-May the Panhandle road system, which had been strengthened by the
construction of new connector and bypass roads, was able to weather
sporadic heavy rains and continued bombing and was sustaining moderate
use.
Through
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31. All sources suggest that the enemy will probably maintain most
of his logistic forces in the Panhandle through the wet season months and
will continue to move supplies through the Panhandle at least through May.
Whether these forces will merely maintain the system during the rainy season
or seek to maintain an active flow of supplies is not yet clear.
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