(SANITIZED)NORTH KOREA: FOREIGN TRADE AS A FORCE FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010071-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Dec/ale,.
~v /o / ,i-, a7/-119
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
North Korea: Foreign Trade As A Force For Industrialization
Secret
ER IM 71-119
July 1971
Copy No.
6
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended,
Its tra. ssmission or revelation of its contents to or re?-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
C*CIud,d from culomclit
downpradinq and
declm~ifmiion
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SI UREI'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
NORTH KOREA: FOREIGN TRADE
AS A FORCE FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION
Summary and Conclusions
1. North Korea's foreign trade has been a major force in the step-up
in industrialization since 1967. Trade turnover jumped from $450 million
in 1967 to $680 million in 1970 as increased amounts of foreign machinery
were used to bolster the industrial sector. The rise in imports has outstripped
the rise in exports with the result that North Korea has run a trade deficit
of about $260 million in the three-year period 1968-70. Of this deficit,
about $225 million was accumulated in trade with the USSR and reflected
the renewal of Soviet credits. Imports from the Free World roughly balanced
exports except for 1969, when North Korea incurred a $40 million trade
deficit primarily with West Germany, the Netherlands, and France.
2. With the aid of these accelerated imports, North Korea's gross
industrial production rebounded to an average annual growth rate of 14%
from 1967 through 1970 after a drop to 9% in the mid-1960s. Imports
of machinery and equipment were the key items and included Soviet
equipment for complete plants in the electric power and the metallurgical
industries, two refrigerated fishing ships from the Netherlands, textile
equipment from Japan, a semiconductor plant from Japan, and, perhaps
most important, metalworking machine tools - predominantly from West
Germany - which greatly enhanced the technological and productive
capabilities of North Korea's machine building industry.
3. Further increases in imports will be necessary to support the
ambitious industrial goals of the new Six-Year Plan (1971-76). The USSR
has pledged additional help for the expansion of such major industries as
petroleum, machine building, and iron and steel. Furthermore, the recent
friendlier relations with Communist China have led to the extension of
economic aid, which will help sustain a higher inflow of capital goods. And,
finally, North Korea is looking to Japan and Western Europe for additional
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.
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machinery and equipment to augment its industrial expansion program.
Successful expansion here will depend on North Korea's continued ability
to expand its exports to the Free World, which have recently been growing
at an annual rate of 13% since 1968 and on the willingness of Free World
countries to extend long-term credits.
Discussion
Pattern of Trade
4. During the past decade, North Korea's foreign trade has reflected
the state of political relations with its two giant neighbors - the USSR
and Communist China - as well as the needs and capabilities of the domestic
economy. Imports and exports grew steadily but slowly during the early
and mid-1960s, and trade was roughly in balance. Since 1967, three factors
have combined to accelerate North Korea's foreign trade - renewed Soviet
credits for economic construction, the government's investment drive to
achieve the goals of the lagging Seven-Year Plan which had been extended
three years through 1970, and successful negotiations with Japanese and
West European firms for purchases of capital goods. As Table I shows,
trade jumped in 1968-70. Imports outdistanced exports, and large trade
deficits were registered in each of the three years, reaching a cumulative
total of $260 million by the end of 1970.
5. Trade with other Communist countries, which comprises more
than 80% of North Korea's t; ade, accounted for most of the surge in imports
and thus for most of the accumulated trade deficit. The data in Table I
show how trade with the USSR, North Korea's largest and most important
trading partner, rose rapidly in 1968 after credits had been reinstated for
major industrial projects. By the end of 1970 a trade deficit of about $225
million had been accumulated with the USSR. On the other hand, trade
with Communist China continued to stagnate during 1968-69 as political
relations remained chilly. In 1969, relations began to improve, and trade
with China showed moderate gains in 1970. Trade with Eastern Europe
increased substantially after 1967, with imports and exports in rough
balance.
6. Trade with the Free World took a new turn during 1968-70. In
1967, North Korea began an unprecedented drive to negotiate purchases
of industrial machinery and equipment from Japan and Western Europe.
Thee negotiations quickly bore fruit. Imports began to increase in 1968
and then nearly doubled it, 1969, the peak year. In 1970, imports from
Japan held steady while imports from Western Europe fell off to slightly
above the 1968 level. Except for 1969, exports to the Free World roughly
equalled imports. The bulge in imports in 1969, especially from West
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North Korea: Foreign Trade, by Country a/
North Korean Exports
1967
1968
1969
1970
226
253
272
295
189
206
221
235
USSR
108
121
127
137
Communist China
50
45
45
50
Eastern Europe
22
'32
40
40
of which:
Bulgaria
1
1
1
N.A.
Czechoslovakia
7
7
9
11
East Germany
5
6
13
N.A.
Hungary
2
2
3
4
Poland
3
9
8
10
Romania
5
6
5
N.A.
Other Communist c/
9
9
9
9
Free World
37
47
51
60
East Asia
32
36
36
39
Of which:
Japan
28
32
31
33
Western Europe
5
10
14
20
Of which:
France
9
1
/
1
West Germany
1
2
5
11
Netherlands
2
3
2
1
Italy
d/
1
d/
N.A.
Other Free World
1
1
2
1
Of which:
iustralia
0
0
0
0
a. The data in this table place North Korea's
Million US $
North Korean Imports
1967
1968
1969
1970
224
305
385
387
192
256
291
330
110
172
202
237
50
45
45
50
28
36
41
40
1
1
1
N.A.
4
4
3
5
8
9
10
11. A.
2
3
3
3
8
12
12
9
6
7
12
N.A.
3
3
3
3
32
49
94
57
7
25
29
27
7
22
25
25
15
15
61
18
9
4
10
6
4
8
32
9
1
d/
16
d/
1
_1
2
N -.A.
10
9
4
12
7
9
1
4
trade
on
an
export
f.o.b.
and import c.i.f. basis. Because of rounding, components may not add to
the totals shown.
b. Preliminary estimates.
c. Includes Cuba, Mongolia, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.
d. Less than $500,000.
3
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Germany and the Netherlands, yielded a trade deficit of more than $40
million. This deficit was financed by gold sales ($15.9 million in 1969 and
$10.5 million in 1970), credits for two ships from the Netherlands, some
commercial bills, and perhaps some drawing down of foreign currency
holdings.
Commodity Composition
7. North Korea primarily exports semifinished manufactured goods
(steel, pig iron, magnesite, zinc, and cement) and food products (rice, fish,
apples, and tobacco). Imports feature machinery and equipment, fuels
(mainly petroleum products), and finished manufactured goods that cannot
be produced domestically in sufficient quantities or at all. The commodity
composition of exports has not changed significantly in recent years. The
commodity composition of imports, however, has changed in line with
North Korea's requirements especially for fuels and machinery and
equipment, and with Soviet and Chinese willingness to supply economic
credits. Imports of machinery and equipment have zoomed while the other
categories have remained fairly constant. (See Table 2 for the commodity
composition of foreign trade and the Appendix for a detailed breakdown
of trade with the USSR and the Free World.)
Economic Significance
8. The accelerated imports during 1968-70 were designed to -- and
did - improve the sagging industrial performance of the mid-1960s. J
Machinery and equipment accounted for three-fourths of the increase in
North Korea's imports, rising from $40 million in 1967 to $160 million
in 1969. The USSR and the Free World were the most important suppliers,
with Eastern Europe and Communist China providing supplemental
quantities. Preliminary data for 1970 suggest that the 1969 level was
maintained, with the expansion in imports of machinery and equipment
from the USSR offsetting a drop in these imports from the Free World.
9. The USSR continued to be the major foreign supplier to North
Korea's industrialization program. In 1966 the USSR agreed to resume
deliveries under the 1961 aid agreement; imports of machinery and
equipment rose to $47 million in 1968 and $63 million in 1969, compared
with $20 million in 1967. The largest increase came in complete plant
shipments; in 1968 these shipments regained the level of the early and
mid-1960s (to $17 million compared with $3 million in 1967), in 1969
4 _
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. Table 2
North Korea:
Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade
Million US $
Imports
Exports
1967
1968
1969
1967
1968
1969
Total
224.1
305.4
384.6
225.8
253.2
271.5
Cn
Food and tobacco
47.3
33.9
26.1
34.6
30.1
39.8
n
Crude materials
14
1
9
19
2
23
23
0
21
0
28
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
71
Fuels
38.7
57.7
56.6
6.4
4.6
3.8
H
Chemicals
10.0
19.9
21.9
15.7
15.2
15.8
Manufactured goods
Machinery and
38.1
40.6
43.8
126.5
164.1
161.9
equipment
40.4
93.8
159.8
7.4
8.1
9.4
Unidentified
35.5
39.6
53.2
12.2
10.1
12.8
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almost doubled to $30 million, and in 1970 - to judge from official Soviet
statements regarding total imports - increased further.
10. This inflow of complete plants and other machinery and
equipment upgraded North Korea's industrial capacity. The 1961 Soviet
aid agreement called for the supply of equipment for major projects such
as the Pukchang Thermal Powerplant at Sunch'on, additions to the iron
and steel complex at Ch'ongjin, and the construction of an oil refinery.
Of these major projects, the Pukchang Thermal Powerplant, under
construction since mid-1967, is now operating at 25%-50% of its planned
400,000 kilowatt capacity. The Ch'ongjin iron and steel complex has been
expanded with the installation of blast, and possibly basic oxygen furnaces;
however, there is no evidence of the large rolling mill originally planned
for this complex. The oil refinery is only now under construction at Unggi;
full-scale operation of the 2 million ton refinery is called for by the end
of the Six-Year Plan. In spite of delays in implementing the renewed Soviet
aid, sufficient industrial capacity was generated by the end of 1970 to
achieve major Seven-Year Plan goals in both steel and electric power.
11. Imports from the Free World also were a part of the North Korean
drive to install new industrial capacity. 2/ Imports of machinery and
equipment from Japan and Western Europe rose sharply to $67 million
in 1969, more than ten times the level of 1967, and in that one year
exceeded the value of such imports from the USSR. Preliminary trade data
for 1970 indicate that this 1969 level was a bulge in imports in support
of the Seven-Year Plan; in 1970 imports of machinery and equipment from
the Free World dropped back almost to the level of 1968.
12. The most important component of the Free World machinery was
the metalworking machine tools, which hit a peak level of $35 million in
1969. West Germany supplied more than 90% of the 1969 total while Japan
and Italy shipped most of the remainder. Machine tools imported from
Western Europe and Japan included lathes and grinders for machining
crankshafts and camshafts, gear cutting machines, copy milling machines,
jig borers, and possibly some tape-controlled machine tools. These machine
tool imports gave a sizable boost to North Korea's metalworking technology
and improved capabilities to manufacture both military and industrial
equipment. As the following tabulation shows, the machine. building
industry - where most machine tools are used - was able to expand
production rapidly in the past few years and to exceed some of the major
Seven-Year Plan goals.
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Thousand Units
Estimated
Production Production
Goal
Commodity 1960 1965 1970 for 1970
Machine tools 2.9 4.0 10.4 7.5
Freight cars 0.6 1.6 3.6 2.0
Trucks and buses 3.1 4.5 14.7 10.0
Tractors 3.0 4.4 13.0 17.1
13. The rise in imports of nonelectric machinery and equipment
shown in Table 3 reflects, first, the purchase of six 800-horsepower marine
diesel engines from France to power domestically produced naval and
maritime ships. Second, as part of the program to expand textile production,
North Korea purchased a $7 million 100,000-spindle textile plant from
Japan; a portion of the deliveries under this contract were made in 1969.
Finally, imports of heating and cooling equipment helped expand capacity
to treat materials to withstand extreme temperature ranges.
14. Imports from the Free World also raised capacity in the electronics
and the fishing industries. Electronic equipment accounted for most of
North Korea's imports of electric machinery during 1967-69. J The most
im
ort
t
i
p
an
s
ngle item in these deliveries was a semiconductor plant
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j. iniovenjeriL
in the fishing industry resulted from the purchase of two refri
ge ated fishing
vessels, valued at about $13 million, from the Verolme Shipyards of the
Netherlands. These two ships, each with a capacity of 7,000 tons, are the
largest of this type owned by North Korea; the fishing fleet now boasts
a total of ten refrigerated fish-processing ships.
Support for the Military Forces
15. In 1965, some two years before its push in the industrial area,
North Korea began to modernize its military forces under the slogan
parallel economic construction and defense building." The USSR assisted
this drive by supplying about $200 million worth of military equipment
during 1966-68. Deliveries dropped in 1969 to less than $5 million and
15 VIdAIL
and technology for production of integrated circuits and transistors,
North
Korea has substantially improved its small electronics industr I
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North Korea: Machinery and Equipment
Imports from the Free World
Thousand US $
1967
1968 1969
Total
6, 298
18,205
66,605
Cn
C)
H
I
I
Metalworking machine tools
Nonelectric machinery and equipment
Of which:
Power generating equipment
222
2,006
1,235
7,670
3,335
139
34,967
10,877
3
567
Textile equipment
H
25
100
,
1
558
eating and cooling equipment
630
897
,
1,313
Electric machinery and equipment
883
5,450
4,607
Of which:
Electronic equipment
602
1,716
3,459
Transportation equipment
3,187
1,750
15,623
Unidentified
531
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were perhaps even lower in 1970. Soviet deliveries since 1965 have .11 included MIG-21 jet fighters, SA-2 surface-to-air missile equipment, W-class
submarines, Osa-class and Komar-class guided missile patrol boats, and
ground force weapons and materials. Communist Chinese deliveries over the
same period have amounted to about $15 million.
Petroleum Products
16. As North Korea's industrialization and military modernization
progressed, so did its requirements for petroleum products. As the tabulation
shows, these imports surged ahead in 1968, continued to increase in 1969,
and probably were even higher in 1970:
Thousand Metric Tons
Supplier
1967
1968
1969
1970
USSR
446
714
770
N.A.
Free World
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
90
a. Communist China may have supplied
small quantities of petroleum products.
During 1968-69 the USSR filled these rising needs, supplying primarily
gasoline, kerosine, diesel fuel, and fuel oil. In 1970, Soviet deliveries may
have held constant or even declined as North Korea began to purchase
petroleum products from India and Kuwait. These latter purchases may
represent a North Korean desire to diversify sources of petroleum products
as well as to expand trade relations with Third World countries. With the
completion of the Unggi oil refinery, scheduled for 1972, the composition
of North Korea's petroleum imports will begin to change from petroleum
products to crude oil.
4. These estimates of Soviet deliveries of military equipment are derived
from order-of-battle estimates for North Korea. The data on So viet exports
to North Korea suggest the possibility of a higher level of deliveries of
military-related goods in 1969 (Soviet trade data for 1970 are not yet
available). Soviet export data usually do not identify all of the specific
commodities shipped, and it has been hypothesized that the category of
unidentified commodities contains Soviet military shipments to other
countries under credit or current account. Deliveries under grants are not
included in Soviet trade statistics. The value of unidentified commodities
shipped to North Korea was $40 million in 1969, compared with $9 million
in 1967 and $24 million in 1968.
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North vs. South Korea in Industrial Performance
17. Even though industrial growth in North Korea picked up with
the infusion of foreign machinery and equipment, it was still below the
growth rate of South Korea's industrial sector. According to the official
index of gross industrial production, the North Korean annual growth rate
recovered to an average of about 14% from 1967 through 1970 after a
drop to 9% in the mid-1960s. By comparison, South Korea's industrial
production achieved an average annual growth of 24% since 1965. (The
official statistics of both countries probably overstate growth to a certain
extent.) As the tabulation below shows, North Korea - even with renewed
Soviet assistance - was unable to match the South's capabilities for
obtaining imports of machinery and equipment, the prime resource of the
industrialization programs of both countries.
Million US $
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
South Korea
73
172
310
533
593
North Korea
50
48
40
94
160
Trade Prospects
18. Foreign trade almost certainly will continue to play a major role
in North Korea's industrialization program throughout the new Six-Year
Plan (1971-76). A growth rate of 14% in gross industrial production is
planned, an increase over the 12.8% reportedly achieved during the extended
Seven-Year Plan. Moreover, North Korean officials have stated that the new
plan may be completed one year ahead of schedule. Among the ambitious
goals are the srbstantial expansion of capacity in electric power, metallurgy,
chemicals, and machine building. Therefore, given domestic limitations in
the production of machinery and equipment, a large volume of imports
will be required from North Korea's trading partners.
19. As long as North Korea continues to maintain its present neutral
position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, imports from the Communist world
should increase. In an aid agreement signed in 1970, the USSR agreed to
supply North Korea with plant equipment and technical assistance for the
Six-Year Plan; key Soviet aid projects of the plan include the Unggi oil
refinery, the Ch'ongjin iron and steel complex, and the Sodu-su
hydroelectric powerplant. Likewise, in October 1970, China and North
Korea signed agreements on long-term trade and on economic and technical
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aid for the plan period. Soviet equipment and technical assistance will still
outweigh assistance from other sources. Expanded imports from China could
also be an imports n, factor. Finally, although North Korea has had problems
meeting its contract obligations for exports to some of its East European
allies, notably Poland and Romania, trade should continue to expand above
present levels.
20. North Korea's trade with the Free World will undoubtedly
increase above the 1970 level. North Korea has expressed interest in
purchasing equipment for 0 industrial facilities from Japan and
Western Europe. A wide range of whole plants are under consideration
including a truck assembly plant, a television plant, an acrylic fiber plant,
a semiconductor plant, and a petrochemical complex. To judge from recent
import patterns, North Korea is likely to be interested in metalworking
machine tools, some types of electronic equipment, and a variety of
industrial machinery. Also, North Korea may continue to expand its interest
in Free World petroleum and widen its imports of manufactured goods from
Japan and Western Europe.
21. The expansion of imports from the Free World will be limited,
however, by the capability of the export industries to earn foreign exchange
and by the credit restrictions of the Free World trading partners. Exports
to the Free World have been growing at a rate of 13% per year since 1968.
Continuation of this rate of export expansion would permit a comparable
rise in imports but would not finance plant purchases of the size noted
above. These purchases would require a further easing of Western credits.
Moscow i'4orodny Bank, London, recently helped by agreeing to purchase
North Korean commercial paper with a two-year maturity whereas it
previously refused to guarantee bills for longer than one year. North Korea
was also able in 1969 to obtain five-year credits for the two Netherlands
fishing ships.
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APPENDIX
North Korea: Commodity Com osit>',on of Trade
with the Free or an tha USSR
Free World
USSR
Free World
USSR
Total imports
49,039
172,222
93,015
201,554
Foodstuffs
8,3i~5
10,052
2,472
15,626
Of which:
Wheat and wheat flour
8,158
8,233
1,523
10
130
Refined sugar
0
7,589
0
,
5,302
Crude materials and edible ails
6,026
16,153
6,750
12,833
Of which:
Cotton
0
10,683
2
?000
8
209
Vegetable oils
254
2,810
_
189
,
2,657
Petroleum products and fuels
182
43,440
45
43,644
Of which:
Petroleum product:
171
25,528
45
27
388
Coke
0
4,527
0
,
5
513
Coal (bituminous)
0
12,879
0
,
10,743
Chemicals
5,509
5,423
5,617
6,542
Of which:
Fertilizers
0
1,118
180
1
101
Organic chemicals
1,126
0
1
353
,
0
Medicines and pharmaceuticals
299
917
,
1,010
873
Manufactured goods
9,729
20,131
10,955
19,979
Of which:
Rubber tires
251
5,409
123
4
582
Textiles and synthetic fibers
1,305
1,072
3
500
,
1
487
Ferroalloys
390
2,992
,
206
,
2
966
Iron and steel products
2,276
3,103
894
,
3
294
Aluminum
768
1,137
2,330
,
1
139
Timber products
644
1,832
1,160
,
1,773
Machinery and equipment
18,205
47,217
66,605
62
846
Transportation equipment 1,750
8,942
15,623
,
11
920
Nonelectric machinery and equipment 3,335
23,243
10,877
,
36
890
Electric machinery and equipment 5,450
6,186
4,607
,
6
393
Unspecified machinery and equipment 0
5,050
531
,
6
673
Metalworking machine tools 7,670
3,796
34,967
,
970
1,003
23,806
1,371
40,074
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1968
1969
Free World
USSR
Free World
USSP.-
Total exports
46,914
120,888
50,923
126,654
and beverages
tobacco
t
ffs
d
2,757
19,114
2,790
27,878
,
,
u
s
Foo
Of which:
Fish
1,938
0
1,835
0
Rice
0
8,237
0
13,720
Corn
419
0
942
0
Apples
0
(;,169
0
6,889
Tobacco
0
4,080
0
3,991
Crude materials and edible oils
11,770
4,325
19,869
2,752
Of which:
Silk
2,248
0
2,537
0
Iron ore
5,775
0
5,546
0
Other minerals and ores
875
4,303
6,212
2,617
Petroleum products and fuels
0
785
0
Of which:
Coal
1,419
0
785
0
Chemicals
363
5,316
182
3,769
Of which:
Calcium carbide
294
1,516
180
1,144
Manufactures
29,584
85,088
24,383
82,798
Of
which:
Pig iron
12,590
4,470
7,405
3,392
Rolled steel products
3,772
40,661
1,694
29,801
Zinc
7,239
1,136
7,544
4,019
Lead
2,186
5,777
6,077
984
Other nonferrous metals
2,912
127
1,650
154
Magnesite powder
37
11,890
0
15,431
Cement
0
4,307
0
5,354
Other construction materials
0
4,112
0
4,102
Clothing
0
6,321
0
10,629
0
2,654
26
51531
1,021
4,391
2,888
3,829
- 14 -
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/02 : CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01700010071-1