(SANITIZED)PRODUCTION OF COMPUTERS IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010088-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 88
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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ER IM 71-136
July 1971
Copy No.
64
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ennrn* " / 6
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Production Of Computers In The USSR
MUM
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
13, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
PRODUCTION OF COMPUTERS IN THE USSR
Conclusions
1. The Soviet computer industry is a troubled and lagging sector
of the Soviet economy. The production of computers in the USSR in 1970
amounted to about 800 units compared with about 16,000 in the United
States. During 1955-69 the USSR produced an estimated 5,200 digital
computers; the US total was about 90,000. Soviet computers currently in
production are fitted with obsolescent transisters. Serial production of
third-generation models, using integrated circuits, has not yet been started.
Soviet computers have been designed primarily for scientific uses, and,
because of their relatively small internal memory capacities, even the largest
are not well suited for data processing.
2. Soviet computers have low productivity and are difficult to use
compared with modern Western counterparts. The large divergence in
characteristics of models in use reduces the possibilities for using standard
programs in the USSR. Moreover, because of the large amount of handwork
used in production and assembly, machines c:` the same model sometimes
differ enough in circuitry that they cannot employ the same programs.
3. Because the factories provide little service after delivery, users
frequently must repair or modify their own machines, and, in the process,
they create non-standard computers on which standard programs will not
run. Documentation needed to operate and maintain Soviet computers is
inadequate and unreliable. Soviet computer producers do not provide their
customers with instruction in systems analysis or programming. Often
computers are not put into operation for months, because there is no one
to program them or to devise data management systems appropriate for
their use.
4. Soviet computers are frequently out of service because of
component failure or breakdown of peripheral equipment. Input-output
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office oJ'Economic Research
and coordinated within CIA.
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equipment is slow, and external memories on magnetic tape are troublesome
because of problems in tape drives and the low quality of Soviet magnetic
tape. Central processors, which do well in solving scientific and engineering
problems, lack the large internal memories that are required for efficient
solution of data handling problems. And scientific users, who have the
training and technical experience, have been much more successful in
computer use than financial and business users.
5. The Soviet computer industry is short of modern production
equipment and has a low standard of quality control compared with the
Free World. The electronics industry of the USSR is still unable to supply
computer producers with the numbers of integrated circuits needed to
establish quality production of third-generation equipment. The production
problems in computer assembly are equally severe. Because of years of
neglect of the business machines and communications equipment industries,
the card handling, line printing, and other peripheral equipment that they
supply is not of good quality.
6. In 1964 the computer industry was reorganized in order to
improve coordination among design, production, and using organizations.
Plans were laid to reduce the number of models in production and achieve
a large-scale modern production technology by manufacturing two families
of third-generation computers (containing integrated circuits). These are the
RYAD and ASVT series, to be delivered in different sizes by altering the
number of standard modules incorporated into individual installations. The
design principles of the IBM-360 series were specified because of its success
as a mass produced data handling computer and in the hope of being able
to use IBM-360 programs, now constituting the world's largest collection.
7. The USSR is presently engaged in a campaign to acquire from
the Free World the modern electronics production technology which it
desperately needs to support its computer industry. Special efforts are
directed toward acquiring manufacturing technology for mass production
of integrated circuits and high-precision printed circuit boards. COCOM
regulations and US unilateral export control policy have so far denied the
USSR access to this production technology. Despite the excellence of Soviet
scientists, the Soviet economic system does not rapidly move this knowledge
into developed products which can then be placed in industrial production.
8. If the USSR can purchase modern production equipment and
technical knowhow from the Free World, it may be able by 1975 to proudce
a computer suitable for economic data processing. However, the Soviet
computer would still be a copy of one whose production was mastered
in the United States in 1964.
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Discussion
Introduction
9. The Soviet computer industry is a troubled and lagging sector
of the Soviet economy. Production volume is far below requirements, and
the USSR finds it necessary to obtain computers for high-volume data
processing from the Free World. Soviet scientists devised electronic
computers almost as early as did Western scientists, but Soviet industry
has not been able to keep pace with the United States, Western Europe,
and Japan in either volume of output or quality of product.
10. Soviet equipment design is at least a design generation behind
that of the United States. However, the worst problems are not in design,
per se, but in (1) the backwardness in the technology of mass production
of computers, components, and other associated equipment; and (2) what
might be called the technology of mass utilization, including training,
installation, maintenance, and software.
11. This memorandum surveys the Soviet computer industry -- its
production and product mix, the problems of production technology, and
utilization - and examines Soviet plans and efforts to achieve an efficient
level of computer technology and application.
Production
12. The production of digital electronic computers of all types in
the USSR in 1970 amounted to about 800 units with a total value of
about 150 million rubles (see Table 1). The average annual rate of growth
of the value of output in the period between 1965 and 1969 has been
about 21%. This growth rate is slightly above that of the US computer
industry during that period. Because of slow early development, Soviet
computer output by 1969 was less than 59(, of US output in both physical
and value terms. During 1935-69 the USSR produced an estimated total
of about 5,200 digital computers, compared with 90,000 produced by the
United States. (For a comparison of annual computer production in the
USSR with the United States and other Free World countries, see the chart
and Table 2.)
13. The faster development of the US computer industry was
facilitated by access to widely based and vigorous competitive electronics
and precision mechanics industries as well as by active promotion of the
large market for computers for processing business data. The USSR, on
the other hand, under central planning, experienced excessive delay in
introducing new electronic component technology into commercial-scale
production. Moreover, during the 1950s, the priorities on resource
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Annual Production of Digital Computers in Selected Countries,
1960 and 1969
1,200
r-n
30
US USSR Japan
70
fl None
UK France
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allocations for the computer industry were limited to those necessary for
satisfying the country's scientific and engineering requirements.
14. Only in the early 1960s did the Soviets recognize the usefulness
of large numbers of computers for data processing and substantially raise
the priorities of the industry. The program initiated then to develop and
produce an appropriate data processing computer is only now showing
? promise of fruition. Success in this effort cannot be achieved before the
Soviets solve their current problems with the mass production of integrated
circuits.
15. Eight Soviet plants have been identified as significant producers
of computers (see Table 3). These include the Computing and Analytical
Machines Plants at Penza and Moscow where Soviet digital computer
production was initiated in 1955 (at least three years after production
started in the United States). Both of these plants are old facilities which
formerly produced low-quality electromechanical and manual office
machines.
16. Although the Moscow and Penza plants are still among the most
important computer production facilities, the Minsk plant is probably the
USSR's largest producer. It was the first to establish significant production
of transistorized computers, and, although its products are best suited for
scientific and engineering applications, many Minsk computers are in use
for data processing purposes. The computer plants in Kazan, Kiev,
Severodonetsk, Vilnius, and Yerevan, while significant producers, are
believed to produce on a smaller scale than either Minsk or Penza.
17. The Minsk-22 (and its earlier version, the Minsk-2) probably is
the single most important computer that the USSR has been able to
produce. (For model production, by plant, see Table 3). It is a medium-scale,
transistorized machine, in some ways resembling the IBM-704. Although
developed for scientific use, it is the best medium-scale Soviet computer
for data handling and ij widely used in the USSR for that purpose.
Production of the Minsk-22 is now being reduced in favor of its successor.
Minsk-32. The Minsk-32 has a larger memory and higher operating speed
which better fit it for data handling.
18. The USSR produces only one computer that can be designated
a large-scale machine. This is the B;ESM-6, produced at the Moscow plant.
Thirty-two had been produced by the end of 1970 (see Table 4). This,
too, is basically a scientific computer but has a smaller memory capacity,
slower speed, and less reliable input-output equipment than large-scale
Western computers.
19. Typical of the small-scale Soviet computers, used mostly for
scientific and engineering work, is the Mir-l. This computer, produced from
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1966 through 1969, was priced at 50,000 rubles and compares unfavorably
with US computers, such as the Hewlett-Packard Model 9100-A, which can
do nearly the same -job and costs only about $5,000. Moreover, the Mir-1
is oversized, slow, and unreliable by US standards.
20. The Nairi models and the Promin-1 are small scientific computers
similar to the Mir-1. The Ural-1 is a small-scale scientific computer,
somewhat similar in capabilities to the IBM-650. The Ural-2 is larger, but
both the Ural-1 and the Ural-2 are vacuum tube machines. A major
disadvantage of the Ural-2 stems from its being mostly handmade, with
no two machines exactly alike. As a consequence, standard programs cannot
be used on all Ural-2s.
Level of Technology
21. All Soviet digital electronic computers currently in production
are fitted with transistors. Computers using vacuum tubes were phased out
of production in 1964, and the serial production of third-generation
computers, using integrated circuits, has not yet been established. Compared
with modern US computers, most of which embody integrated circuits,
Soviet computers are much slower, less reliable, and less productive.
22. The logical design of Soviet computers is rather good. In most
cases, however, full advantage of the capabilities of the central processing
unit (CPU) cannot be taken, because of insufficient internal memory and
inadequate peripheral equipment. For example, the most powerful Soviet
computer, the BESM-6, is prevented from operating at full capacity because
of its limited internal memory, the lack of magnetic disc stores, poor
magnetic tape drives, poor quality tape, and slow, unreliable input-output
equipment.
23. Soviet computer performance is weakest in the area of peripheral
equipment. This equipment, which consists primarily of punch card and
tape handling equipment, line printers, magnetic tape handling equipment,
drum and disc memories, and keyboard equipment, suffers from the poor
development in the USSR of the production of precision mechanical
products. It shares its low quality with Soviet office machines, which include
some of the world's most archaic typewriters and bookkeeping machines.
In addition to preventing the central processors from reaching their designed
capabilities, as mentioned above, Soviet peripherals are to blame for most
in-service failures of Soviet computers. This circumstance contributes further
to the low rates of utilization of computers in the USSR. Lack of good
peripherals also retards the development of new computers. Developmental
testing of a new CPU is almost impossible when communications with the
CPU continually break down and interrupt the tests, or are inadequate for
testing the CPU at maximum operating levels.
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24. Serious institutional problems hamper the design of producible
computers and their introduction into production. The typical Soviet
computer is designed by a research institute and, after acceptance by a
government committee, is assigned to a computer plant for production. The
designers pay insufficient attention to incorporating features that will
facilitate the production of the machine in quantity and there is no
systematic cooperation with the producing enterprise during the start-up
period.
Production Technology
25. Most Soviet computers are produced in small batches, with
excessive hand work measured by US standards. (For production by model,
by year, see Table 5.) Careful examination of Soviet computers by US
experts indicates that little advantage is taken of automated techniques such
as machine insertion of electronic components, flow soldering, automatic
back panel wiring, and computerized testing of circuits. Moreover, Soviet
computer producers must fabricate common hardware items themselves.
Western visitors to Soviet computer plants report that true serial production
does not exist, but that batches of 20 or so machines are assembled as
a group.
26. Although it might be expected that a command economy could
standardize computer products and achieve substantial economies of scale
in their production, the USSR does not realize these economies in practice.
Despite the priority now assigned to computer production, too many
different models have been introduced, thus reducing the opportunities for
specialized large-scale output of subassemblies.
27. Because of poor quality control, Soviet computers are delivered
with substantial numbers of defects. Computer plant managers apparently
have been willing to relax the tight quality standards required for the
finished computer to function properly in order to attain planned levers
of output.
28. The seriousness with which the Soviets themselves view their
computer production problems is best demonstrated by their repeated
attempts to purchase from Western firms the complete manufacturing
equipment and technology required to mass produce modern computers.
These attempts have included requests for complete plants for the
production of the integrated circuits used in third-generation computers.
The implication is clear that the Soviet themselves cannot yet supply
sufficient quantities of appropriate integrated circuits to support a large
computer industry.
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...29. Western experts have examined Soviet peripheral equipment and
report that it is not built to sufficiently close tolerances and does not
incorporate modern metallurgy where required for durability under
high-speed operating conditions now demanded of modern computers.
30. The USSR currently purchases peripheral equipment from Eastern
Europe to supplement its own inadequate production capability - for
example, it buys input typewriters from East Germany. In the Soviets' new
production' programs, they plan to rely even more heavily on Eastern Europe
for such peripheral equipment as line printers and punch card .nd punch
tape equipment for input and output purposes. Much of this equipment
is now being produced in Eastern Europe under Western license.
Utilization
Installations
31. A tabulation of all installations of Soviet digital computers,
reported by the end of 1970, contains more than 1,200 entries. Analysis
of this sample, amounting to about 20% of total Soviet computer
production, confirms the view that computers have been used by the USSR
principally for scientific purposes. The following tabulation. arrays known
Soviet computer installations according to the activity they support.
activity
Number of
Computers
Per-
cent
Government administrative organs
168
14
Scientific research institutes
and organizations
601
49
Military organizations
22
2
Production organizations
314
26
Educational institutions
115
9
Total
1,220
100
32. A sample of this size is likely to be representative of applications
of computers in the non-military, activities of the USSR. Because of the
secrecy surrounding Soviet military activity, the figure of 2% probably
understates the military share of Soviet computers. Because both scientific
research institutes and educational institutions, and probably some factories
as well, require computers for problem solving, at least 60% of the
computers in the sample are probably employed as scientific machines. Most
of the data handling applications are made by government administrative
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organs and production organizations. The proposed national' computer
network is designed to tie together many of the data processing machines
of these two groups to expedite national statistical collection and processing.
Computer Performance
33. The performance of Soviet computer installation.; is very
unsatisfactory, even by Soviet standards. Unreliability of equipment leads
to frequent in-service failure and greatly limits its available computing time.
For critical applications the extraordinary precaution., reported by Soviet
scientists as necessary to assure acceptable performance amount to
redundancies of equipment that would be considered excessive in the West.
34. The unwillingness of computer factories to provide service ' and
support creates one of the most serious problems of Soviet computer users.
Many customers even have to install their computers themselves. Since the
equipment frequently comes with numerous defects, this causes serious
delays in getting it into operation. The expedient repairs made by users
sometimes result in changes in circuitry that prevent the repaired computer
from running programs written for similar machines. Factories do not
provide adequate training courses in maintenance or programming of their
products. Operator and maintenance manuals tend to be superficial and
error ridden. Although this deficiency has been noted in the directives for
the Ninth Five-Year Plan and is slated for correction in the new plan period,
it is unlikely that it can be corrected while the Soviet system continues
to reward factories for meeting production targets and gives little financial
incentive to provide after-sales services.
35. The factories also, for the most part, fail to provide a library
of basic programs and sub-routines for their machines. Moreover, they do
not provide a medium for disseminating users' experiences nor take the
initiative in organizing user groups for the exchange of experiences and
programs. This situation contrasts markedly with the organization of the
Western computer market, in which the producers vigorously promote their
machines by developing programming languages, basic programs, and courses
of instruction in maintenance, operation, and programming of computers,
and make available specialists in systems analysis to study the customer's
problems and specify - not just the most appropriate equipment but entire
systems of paperwork management that will be compatible with
computerized data handling.
36. The severe shortage of operators, maintenance mechanics, and
programmers seems destined to continue for some time because the effort
devoted by educational institutes to the training of such personnel is not
yet nearly large enough. Moreover, the shortage of systems analysts and
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the low level of competence of such people in the USSR are equally serious
factors in the inability of Soviet computer users to exact an acceptable
level of performance from their installations. By US standards, many Soviet
computerized information handling and management systems are fairly
primitive and fail to exploit the potential of the installed equipment. Very
few Soviet firms have developed advanced production management systems
based on mechanized data handling, such as would be possible using only
punch card systems, and consequently have little local capability to get
the most out of their new computers.
37. Soviet scientific institutions and other users of computers for
scientific and engineering purposes generally have less trouble putting new
computers into service than do financial and statistical institutions or plant
managements. This reflects the fact that computers were long considered
a tool of science, and scientists got the lion's share of instruction in
computer theory and practice. Moreover, Soviet computers are best adapted
to scientific problem solving. However, Soviet scientists typically express
great dissatisfaction with the quality and capability of Soviet, computer.
hardware. They are particularly dissatisfied with the lack of adequate
internal memories and the slowness and unrealiability of the input-output
equipment.
Remedial Programs
38. The Soviet computer industry has received increased attention
since 1964, and efforts have been made to solve the major problems
hampering the production and applications of computers. A number of new
organizations and committees affiliated with major universities and institutes
were established as a means of increasing the general level of interest in
computers in the Soviet scientific and academic communities. The Soviet
press also referred to user groups, formed to raise the level of application
of computers through the exchange of experiences and' programming
knowledge. Tie design of new models of computers without prior ministerial
approval was forbidden. Some improvement in coordination among design,
production, and using organizations as a result of intensified official interest
in the industry is reflected in the development program of the new RYAD
series of computers.
39. In keeping with the decision to reduce the number of types of
computers introduced into production, the Soviets decided in the mid-1960s
to produce two basic families of third-generation computers. These are the
RYAD series for data processing and general scientific problem solving and
the ASVT series for process control. These computers are to be of modular
design and adaptable to large-volume production.
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40. In designing the RYAD and ASVT computers, a deliberate effort
was made to copy the "architecture" of the IBM-360 series, and, at least
in the case of RYAD, to employ integrated circuits in the CPU. The Soy-.s
moped to avoid much normal development expense and loss of time by
using IBM's designs for computers and software of proven quality. They
hoped to begin producing small and medium-scale computers and associated
peripheral equipment by the beginning of the 1970s and to satisfy their
most pressing needs for computers for data processing and process control
by 1975, T7?,ey also hoped to save large amounts of time and money,
otherwise required to develop programs, by using existing software prepared
for the IBM-360 machines. However, the process of rewriting IBM programs
to run on Soviet ccr:;puters is not likely to be cheap and quick.
41. The decision to copy IBM-360 type machines may have alleviated
design problems? but the production technology is still missing. Even if
they are able to design a reliable series which matches the performance
of the 360 series, they are not likely soon to match the high production
rates of the 360 series, unless they can buy production technology and
equipment from the West.
4J. The Soviets have recognized the fact that the programs for
producing RYAD and ASVT will not solve all of their computer problems
and will contribute little to closing the gap between their computer industry
and that of the United States. If successfully put into production by 1975,
the RYAD and ASVT would still represent a technology new in the United
States in 1964 and far outdated by 1975 standards. The Soviets are making
more frequent and continuing attempts to import modern machines and
teciuwlogy from the Free World, either directly or through their CEMA.
partners. This is especially true of technology for integrated circuits.
However, most of the technology is under COCOM regulations or US
unilateral export control.
44. In addition to importing carefully selected Free World computers,
while the RYAD machines are being perfected, the Soviets are attempting
to adapt available domestic hardware to their current neec's. For the most
part this means attempting to develop data processing systems based upon
ill-suited scientific machines such as the Minsk-22. These applications never
will be wholly satisfactory, and when data processing machines like those
of the RYAD series finally become available, little of the software prepared
for the older machines will be transferrable.
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APPENDIX
Statistical Tables
Methodology for the Tables
Estimated total physical production of Soviet digital computers was
obtained by summing annual production figures, by model. Annual
production figures, by model, were estimated on the basis of highly
fragmented production reports or known installations of computers,
whichever was greater. A great deal of interpolating was done on the basis
of estimated plant capacities, dates when series production began, dates
when series production ended, and occasionally from available total model
production figures.
Values of production figures were derived ~by multiplying the physical
output of each model by the estimated price of that model. Prices of Soviet
computers have been announced in the Soviet press in some cases and in
other cases have been estimated from Soviet offers to export computers.
For computers for which no information on price was available, estimates
of price are based on similarities to Soviet computers for which prices are
known.
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. Because of rounding, components may not add to
the totaZs shown.
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USSR: Estimated Annual Production and Value
of Production of Digital Computers
Total
Production
(Units)
Value of Production
(Million Rubles)
3,955
15
,7
1956
70
16
1957
130
10
1958
160
10
195:
290
22
1960`
280
31
1961
260
45
1962
310
\>i
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M
Table 4
USSR: Estimated Cumulative Production,
Pricoo, and Value of Production
of Digital Computers by Model
Total
Production
(Units)
Estimated
Price
(Thousand Rubles)
Value of
Production
(Th
ou sand Rubles )
ARAGATS
6
250
1
500
ATE-n0
20
60
,
1
200
I3L;SM-l
N.A.
500
,
N
A
IJESM-2
50
350
.
.
17
500
13LSM-2M
105
350
,
35
750
13ESM-3
210
200
,
4-d
000
13ESM-3M
N.A.
200
,
N
A
13ESM-4
70
300
.
.
21
000
I3ESM-6
32
3,000
,
96
000
DNFPR-l
120
100
,
12
800
DNEPR-2
00
125
,
10
000
BRA
100
300
,
30
000
EV-80-3
60
36
,
2
160
M-3
200
10
,
3
600
M-20
00
500
,
40
000
M-220
120
600
,
72
000
MINSK-1
300
70
,
21
000
MINSK-2
310
200
,
62
000
MINSK-22
31J
250
,
77
500
MINSK-23
41
255
,
10
455
MINSK- 32
47
300
,
1.1
100
MIR-1
25)
50
,
12
500
MIR-2
150
70
,
10
500
NAIRI-1
600
70
,
42
000
NAIRI-2
400
no
,
32
000
NAIRI-3
N. A.
90
,
14
A
PROMIN-1
350
25
.
.
8
750
PROM IN-2
'
N. A.
5
,
I.J
A
RA
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400
120
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200
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160
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56
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100
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30
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180
145
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50
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/02 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010088-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/02: CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010088-3
3c. t
1*55
1955
1957
I953
1959
1953
1361
1952
1963
1964
1365
1966
1957
'968
1969
1970 a/
Total
APA :A: i
--
1
1
2
1
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--
--
-
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-
-
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6
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--
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--
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20
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5
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10
10
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5
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--
--
--
--
-
-
-
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50
B-VSm-DI
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5
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15
15
15
15
15
15
-
-
-
105
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--
--
--
'-
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--
--
--
--
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
210
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
70
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--
--
--
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--
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--
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1
2
4
5
10
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32
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--
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--
--
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10
20
20
25
25
20
8
-
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128
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--
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--
--
--
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5
15
20
20
20
80
SPA
--
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10
20
20
20
30
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100
Ev-3:-_
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--
5
10
15
20
10
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60
M-1
51
7
60
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200
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100
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10
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70
90
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310
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20
50
90
100
50
310
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10
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41
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50
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100
100
100
100
100
100
600
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50
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50
75
75
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350
PA.0Aa-t
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2
10
20
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32
PA: DA.", -2
--
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5
23
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75
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10
25
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Pr A-117
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20
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130
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400
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20
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160
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30
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5
10
20
35
50
50
10
180
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--
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--
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--
--
--
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-
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10
10
10
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10
50
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/02 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010088-3