INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM THE SOVIET GRAIN SUPPLY, 1971

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700020014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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r7l- l&/
Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Soviet Grain Supply, 1971
Confidential
ER IM 71-161
September 1971
Copy No.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
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Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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"OUP 1
Extiudcd Irom ou~amoJt
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE SOVIET GRAIN SUPPLY 1971
Conclusions
1. The preliminary estimate of 1971 grain production, subject to
a more-than-normal degree of uncertainty, is some 140-145 million metric
tons. This level of production falls between the record crop of 150 million
tons of 1970 and the average for the last five years of 135 million tons.
The highly tentative nature of the estimate is due largely to a 10- to 15-day
delay in the ripening of spring grains in selected major producing areas.
A compressed harvesting schedule in the event of a prolonged spell of bad
weather in the last half of September and early October could result in
losses sufficient to reduce total production to or below the average for
1966-70.
2. Even with a near record grain crop of 140-145 million tons the
Soviet Union will be hard pressed in fiscal year (FY) 19'f 2 to meet domestic
needs and, at the same time, to continue supplying its client states at the
level averaged in recent years. The surge in use of grain as livestock feed
in the past year, a consequence of the official campaign initiated in 1969
to alleviate domestic meat shortages, is expected to continue. More
importantly, wheat reserves suitable for consumption as food are believed
to be currently near minimum levels. The drawdown of wheat stocks for
use as feed, in conjunction with new information concerning the utilization
and quality of grain in recent years, has resulted in a sharp downward
revision in the estimated level of reserve stocks of bread grains suitable
for human consumption.
3. Without attempting to be precise in making a revised estimate
of carryover stocks of grain on the eve of the 1971 Harvest, it appears
likely that the USSR is in a shaky position. If, for example, there is a
marked decline in grain production in 1971 - say, to a level less than 140
million tons - the regime will probably choose to import grain beyond
tiie gvantity already contracted for or to face the consequences of a
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research.
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deterioration . the quality of the daily diet, a result of the necessity of
using available grain for bread instead of for livestock feed to produce meat.
4. As an indirect result of the official campaign markedly to raise
output of meat and other livestock products in the short run, the USSR
has already contracted for up to 4 million tons of wheat imports for FY
1972 from Free World suppliers. The heavy feeding of wheat in 1970 -
three times the normal rate - has seriously reduced the buffer stocks
available for use as bread grains. Although the amount of wheat scheduled
for feeding during FY 1972 will probably be more in keeping with normal
levels, the somewhat reduced availability of wheat from the 1971 crop
compared with last year, in conjunction with a continued high level of
commitments for exports to its client states, has prompted the Soviet Union
to increase imports.
5. If, as expected, meat imports from Free World suppliers in FY
1972 reach the level of FY 1971, the total hard currency outlays for wheat
and meat are expected to be at lei:st $315 million, an amount equivalent
to 80% of 1970 Soviet earnings for petroleum - the number one hard
currency earner from the Developed West.
Introduction
6. Despite prospects for an above-average grain crop, the internal
supply position for the USSR is not favorable. An official campaign to
effect a rapid increase in livestock production has led to a sharp rise' in
the use of grain, including wheat, for feeding livestock. This surge in
domestic demand for grain, coupled with a relatively small carryover of
stocks of wheat, much of which is of poor Yuality, has already resulted
in large purchases of wheat from Free World suppliers.
7. The purposes of this memorandum are to describe the status of
the grain harvest as of 1 September and to provide a preliminary estimate
of 1971 grain production, to assess the internal supply position for grain,
and to evaluate the purchase of grain and meat from abroad during FY
1971 and FY 1972.
Factors Affecting the 1971 Grain Crop
Acreage Below Long-Term Average
8. The total area from which the USSR intends to harvest grain
in 1971 comes to about 121 million hectares, roughly 2 million hectares
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above the area harvested in 1970 but about 2 million hectares below the
average for 1966-69. However, the final garnered acreage depends on
growing and harvesting conditions during the balance of the crop season.
If the current delay in maturation of spring-seeded grain crops continues,
inclement weather in the early fall may force the abandonment of some
wheat acreage or the partial harvesting of corn acreage as green fodder
instead of whole grain.
Output of Winter Grains Near Record High
9. A good winter grain crop was harvested in the USSR.(') The
outturn of fall-seeded wheat and rye - normally accounting for roughly
one-half of total bread grain production - may have reached the record
level of production posted in 1970. Slightly lower yields in 1971 were
probably more than offset by a somewhat larger area of harvested acreage.
10. Early sowing and timely precipitation in the autumn of 1970
permitted good development of seedlings over most of the winter grain
area. Winterkill did not exceed normal levels. Furthermore, favorable spring
moisture conditions in major winter wheat growing areas, coupled with an
increased application of fertilizer, were harbingers of record yields. However,
late spring droughts in several relatively minor winter wheat growing areas -
the Central Black Soil Zone, parts of the Volga Valley, and Central Asia -
reduced yields in these areas to well below those of the previous year.
In addition, after the winter wheat had ripened in portions of the major
winter wheat growing areas of the Ukraine and Moldavia, heavy rains and
wind resulted in an above-normal area of lodged grains(2) leading t,; losses
during harvesting. The harvesting of wet and flattened grain in these regions
served to maintain yields at the 1970 level and, in addition, probably
resulted in a lower quality product in comparison with last year. Despite
these minor setbacks, the regime had reason to be pleased with the overall
success of the winter grain harvest.
Production of Spring Grains Below Last Year
11, The seeding of spring grains(3) was carried out under less than
optimum conditions. Cool, wet weather delayed planting and retarded crop
1. Winter grains normally account for about 28% of tota, harvested grain
acreage and 36% of production. Harvesting is initiated in the southern areas
in June and concludes in the northern areas in late August.
2. The term lodging describes the condition resulting when stalks break
or bend and form a flattened or tangled mass which is difficult tu cut.
3. Spring grains normally account for some 72% of total harvested grain
acreage and 64% of production. Harvesting is initiated in the southern areas
in July and normally is concluded in the northern and eastern areas by
early October.
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development in most major spring grain areas. More than one-fifth of all
grain sowings had to be carried out after 25 May, a date considered to
be well past the optimum time of planting for grain crops. Moreover, cool
weather in June and July continued to retard growth and caused some
delay in harvesting in selected areas. On the other hand, abcve-normal
supplies of soil moisture tended to offset the ill effects of the late sowing.
With the exception of parts of the small grain areas of the Volga Valley,
the Central Black Soil Zone, and the corn growing regions of the North
Caucasus and Moldavia, very favorable moisture conditions prevailed during
the critical phases of crop development. These conditions, taken together
with a further boost in fertilizer applications, suggested record yields in
several major growing regions.
12, Tim-, is growing short for carrying out the harvest. By I
September only about 60% of the total grain acreage had been harvested
compared with a long-run average of 70%. At the end of September or
early in October, it is highly likely that harvest conditions will deteriorate
rapidly. the onset of freezing temperatures before the grain has matured
and the occurrence of rain o; snow during harvesting can reduce quality
as well as the amount of grain harvested. Already, the Soviet press reports
that heavy rains and high winds have flattened large acreages of spring grains
in the Urals and the New Lands regions.
Prospects for Total Grain Production in 1971
13. It September-October weather is normal, the outlook is for a total
harvest of between 140 million and 145 million metric tons, somewhat
below the record harvest of 150 million tons in 1970 but the second largest
crop in Soviet history (see Table 1). If, on the other hand, the pace of
the harvest slows further and fall is early, it is likely that above-normal
losses of grain will result. Under such conditions, the outlook would be
for a total harvest not in excess of 135 million tons, a level of production
equal to the average for the last five years.(4)
Internal Supply Position for Grain
14. Even with a near record grain crop of 140-145 million tons the
Soviet Union will be hard pressed in FY 1972 to meet domestic needs
and export commitments to its client states. The current surge in use of
grain as livestock feed, a consequence of the official campaign initiated
4. The estimate of 140-145 million tons is based on the assumption that
all of the acreage intended to be cut as whole grain is threshed (121 million
hectares). The lower estimate postulates that either some acreage is
abandoned or used as green fodder for livestock and/or that grain yields
per hectare are lower.
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USSR: Production of Total Grains J
Official Claims and. CIA Estimates
a. Including pulses.
b. Bunker weight (gross of excess moisture
and foreign matter).
c. CIA estimate of usable grain. Net
usable grain is estimated as the gross out-
put minus excess moisture, unripe 'and
broken kernels, weed seeds, and post-harvest
losses incurred in loading and unloading of
grain between the combine and storage facil-
ities.
d. See discussion in text.
Million Metric Tons
Calen-
dar
Official
CIA
Year
Claim J
Estimate ?/
1963
11964
152
120
1965
121
100
1966
171
140
1967
148
122
1968
170
135
1969
162
128
1970
186
150
1971
N.A.
140-145
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in 1969 to alleviate meat shortages, is the principal source of Soviet grain
problems anti is expected to continue. The use of grain as livestock feed
rose by roughly 50% between the 1968 and 1970 crop years. In addition
to a marked rise in 1969 and 1970 in production of feed grains -- barley,
oats, and corn ?- there has been a spurt in the feeding of wheat. Recent
press reports indicate that 15 million tons of wheat were fed in 1970, an
amount equivalent to about one-fifth of the average estimated total wheat
harvest in the two year period 1969-70.(5) This was made possible in large
part by the release of a considerable quantity of wheat reserves from
government-held stocks.
15. A comparison for recent years of production with domestic
requirements (food, feed for livestock, seed for succeeding crops, and
industrial ase) plus net exports had earlier suggested an accumu'.ation of
bread grain in reserves of 20-25 million tons of grain at the end of FY
1970.(6) Reserves of this size would represent about one-half of the annual
consumption of grain for food and would provide the Soviets with a hedge
5. Although Soviet sources in the past have been notably reticent in
discussing the use of bread grains as feed, enough indirect indicators were
available to suggest that on the average about 6% (roughly 4-112 million
tons) of the annual wheat crop was fed to livestock. The figures on the
use of wheat as feed may be partly inflated insofar as they refer to the
official concept of gross weight - that is, including moisture and dockage.
In addition, some of the siftings from the combine may he included.
Wheat is a clcse substitute for feed grains, but in the United States,
because of a normally higher price of wheat compared with that of corn
and other feed grains, only a minor quantity is fed to livestock. For example,
during the 1960s in the United States, the use of wheat for feeding
fluctuated between one-half and two million tons annually, the upper limit
equivalent to about 5% of annual production. Moreover, most of the wheat
fed to livestock in the United States was below milling-quality standards.
6. Incomplete data are published on the utilization of grain in the Soviet
Union, and statistics on stocks are closely guarded secrets. Given the
structure and use of Soviet grain crops, it can be surmised that grain reserves
are limited almost entirely to wheat. The known uses of rye, the other
bread grain, for food or industrial purposes exhausted the total available
and, hence, did not permit the setting aside of rye for feeding livestock
or as carryover stocks.
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against major shortfalls in grain production.0) Now, it appears that these
estimates of grain reserves suitable for human consumption were too high.
New evidence has come to light indicating that in the last few years (1)
considerably more grain (including wheat) has been utilized as seed than
had been previously estimated, and (2) because of poor quality control,
a sizable proportion of wheat stocks carried over from earlier crop years
is probably unsuitable for human consumption.(8)
16. A drawdown of wheat stocks to supplement regular supplies of
feed grains, coupled with a downward revision in the level of carryover
stocks of wheat suitable for consumption as food, is believed to have
brought grain stocks to near minimum levels.(9) Without attempting to be
precise in making a revised estimate of carryover stocks of grain on the
eve of the 1971 harvest, it appears likely that the Soviets are in a shaky
position. If, for example, production fell to a level below the lower end
of the current estimated range of 140-145 million tons, the regime would
probably be forced to import grain beyond the quantity already contracted
for or face the consequences of a deterioration in the quality of the daily
diet as a result of the available gain being used for bread instead of for
livestock feed to produce meat.
17. In 1969 and 1970 the regime failed to sustain the considerable
progress in per capita meat consumption made between 1965 and 1968.
This stagnation of output in 1968 followed by a drop in 1969 of 3% in
conjunction with the continued rise in personal money incomes since 1969,
which added to the already existing and substantial unsatisfied demand for
meat, led to a lengthening of queues for meat in state stores where prices
are fixed, an increase in the number of reports of complete absence of
7. Relative stagnation in grain production in the years prior to major
crop failures of tho mid-1960s (1963 and 1965) caused a drawdown of
grain reserves to a low level, but it had been assumed that a series of good
to excellent crop years (1966, 1968, and 1970) and the absence of severe
crop failures had led to a substantial replenishment of grain reserves.
8. For a discussion of thy.- evidence that led to a downward revision in
the estimate of grain reserves, see the Appendix.
9. That is, inventories held as buffer stocks to ininimize the effects of
harvest shortfalls. In addition to stocks to cover normal requirements, some
unknown quantity of inventories of grain is held by strategic purposes to
supply the r:>litary forces and the economy with needed food in time of
war. Presumably, at the point when total grain reserves are comprised solely
of strategic stocks, the regime will feel compelled to authorize imports.
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supplies of meat in selected urban centers, and rising prices in the collective
farm market (CFM), where prices rise and fall according to demand and
supply. In early 1970 the regime took steps to augment domestic supplies
of meat by purchasing considerable quantities from the Free World.
Purchases for hard currency last year came to roughly 85,000 tons
(approximately $50 million). However, a moderate improvement in per
capita meat availabilities in 1970 - up 5-1/2% - noticeably failed to reduce
the gap between supply and demand. Severe shortages in state retail outlets
in provincial cities and ri.Ing CFM seat prices in Moscow continued to
be reported throughout the year. But a further boost in meat output in
the first half of 1971, :.,Yle.mented by additional imports, led to a partial
easing of the supply situation.(10)
18. Along with a moderate rise in meat outp"t in 197C, official policy
encouraged the expansion of livestock herds. During the first six months
of 1971, livestock herds rose at an annual rate of 5-1/2%. More importantly,
from the standpoint of grain supplies, the buildup of herds has been centered
on grain-consuming types of meat producers - hogs and poultry - which
respond relatively quickly to a step-up in feeding rates.` 11)
19. The boost in herd size, in conjunction with the estimated rise
in meat output and total livestock products of 5% and 4-1/2%, respectively,
is a modest response to the large increase in grain made available for feeding.
Because of the relative inefficiency in converting feed units to liveweight
in the Soviet setting, it requires a considerably larger quantity of grain to
achieve a given production of meat than it does in North America or Western
Europe. ( 12 )
10. Confirmed and unconfirmed purchases of 90,000 tons (approximately
$50 million) from Free World suppliers have been made so far with deliveries
nearly completed by mid-1971. Meanwhile, international meat trade circles
expect new Soviet orders during FY 1972 to exceed those of the past two
years.
11. All of the increase in meat output between 1968 and 1971 is
attributable to a boost in production of pork and poultry.
12. The ratios for pounds of feed required per pound of gain in weight
of hogs and poultry in the USSR are about double those in the United
States. Broilers are raised from chicks to market weight in 8 weeks in the
United States, compared with 12 to 14 weeks in the USSR; 6 months for
marketable weight hogs in the United States, compared with about 10
months in the USSR. This difference in relative feeding efficiency between
the two : ountries is in part due to the poor quality (low protein content)
of Soviet feed rations, in part to relatively poor breeding stock, and, in
the case of livestock in the socialized sector, to inefficient management
practices.
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20. This and other inefficiencies in the production of meat and other
livestock products not only leads to a relatively high cost compared to
the cost of other farm products but also requires a high and sustained effort
in accelerating grain supplies. In this context, as the official campaign
continues over the next several years to effect large annual boosts in meat
production, the regime will become painfully aware of the resource cost
required. However, the regime has no better alternative.
Outlook for Grain Trade
21. If, as now expected, output of grain in 1971 falls below the record
of 1970, the USSR will be hard pressed to meet its commitments to export
grain to Eastern Europe and to its other client states in FY 1972.
Nevertheless, unless overt:l production falls below the lower end of the
range currently forecast - 140 million tons - the Soviet Union will
probably continue to be a net exporter of grain.( 13
Marked Rise in Grain Imports Scheduled
22. Soviet imports of grain during FY 1972 will probably reach at
least 4 million tons, nearly double the annual average for the period 1967-70
(see Table 2). During 1964-66 the USSR imported unusually large quantities
of grain (averag.ng more than 8 million tons per year) because of the near
disastrous harvests of 1963 and 1965. Exports in the same time period
declined to an average annual level of about 4 million tons. But after the
excellent harvests of 1966 and 1968, annual imports dropped to an average
of about 2 million tons, and the Soviet Union resumed its traditional role
of a net exporter.
23. However, in spite of the record grain crop of 1970 and the
expectations to date of another above-average crop for 1971, the USSR
has recently contracted for the delivery of about 4 million tons of wheat
during FY 1972. On 4 June, before an accurate forecast by Soviet officials
of the size of 1971 domestic wheat production was possible, the Canadian
Wheat Board announced the sale of 3.27 million tons of wheat for delivery
between June 1971 and "the early part of 1972." In addition to the above
firnn commitments, the Soviets have the option to purchase a further
13. This assumes that within the bread grain component of the total
estimated production (supplemented by several million tons of imports)
there will be enough milling-quality grain to meet needs for human
consumption.
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USSR: Exports, Imports, and Net Trade
in Total Grain and Wheat a/
Thousand Metric Tons
Annual Average
1964-66
1967-68
1969
1970
Exports
Total grain
4,228
6,493
8,067
6,798
Of which:
Wheat
2,579
5,473
6,824
5,773
Imports
Total grain
8,275
2,564
1,345
2,841
of which:
Wheat
7,820
1,914
418
2,206
Net trade b/
Total grain
+4,047
-3,929
-6,722
-3,957
Of which.:
Wheat
+5,241
-3,559
-6,406
-3,567
a.. Including f our (converted into grain equiva-
Zents by using a 72% extraction rate), rice, and
groats.
b. A plus sign denotes net imports; a minus sign,
net exports.
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250,000 tons of Canadian wheat for delivery during the period May-July
1972.(14) In mid-August, by which time Soviet officials had a firm forecast
of the size of the 1971 grain harvest, the Australian Wheat Board announced
the sale of 500,000 tons of wheat to the USSR for delivery in the first
six months of 1972. The estimated cost of the recent purchases is
approximately $265 million, to be paid in hard currency at the time of
delivery.
24. In keeping with the usual practice in recent years, the 350,000
tons of Canadian flour (wheat equivalent) will probably be shipped to Cuba
on Soviet account. Although some of the balance of 3.67 million tons may
be used to fulfill Soviet commitments to client states in Eastern Europe,
the bulk of the purchases are scheduled for unloadings in Soviet ports.
Prospects for Grain Exports Remain Uncertain
25. During FY 1971, most of the USSR's grain exports of an
estimated 7.5-8.0 million tons were to its client states in Eastern Europe.
Although the figures remain incomplete, it appears that shipments to the
East European clients may have reached an all time high of nearly 6 million
tons. Moreover, on the basis of the outlook for grain production and
domestic needs, East European requirements for grain imports from the
USSR for FY 1972 will be only slightly below the past year. If the other
major recipients of Soviet grain exports - Cuba, UAR, North Korea, and
North Vietnam - continue to depend on the USSR for the same level of
supplies as in recent years (roughly 1.5-2.0 million tons), total demands
for Soviet supplies to its client states could exceed 7 million tons. On the
other hand, if the projected shortfall in the Soviet grain harvest is at the
lower end of the current estimate of 140-145 million tons, the USSR,
reluctant to expend more hard currency, may force its client states to
depend on the Free World for a larger share of their grain needs.
14. Shipping contracts between the two governments have been signed for
2.4 million tons and cover the balance of calendar year 1971. Contracts
for the balance of 1.25 million tons of "firm commitments" and the
optional 250,000 tons for calendar year 1972 have not been signed as yet.
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Revision in Estimate of Grain Reserves
As indicated in the text, recent evidence indicates that earlier estimates
of the size of Soviet reserves of mi:ling-quality wheat at the end of FY
1971 require a downward adjustment. It now appeals that in the last few
years (1) considerably more grain (including wheat) has been utilized as
seed than had been previously estimated, and (2) because of poor quality
control, a sizable proportion of wheat stocks carried over from earlier crop
years is probably unsuitable for human consumption.
Use of Grain for Seed
Recent information indicates that the officially recommended seeding
rates for various types of grain have been significantly raised in the latter
half of the 1960s and are now nearly two-thirds above the rates promulgated
in the latter part of the 1950s. As a result, the current seed norms imply
the use of several million tons more of wheat each year for seeding than
those implied by norms used in the late 1950s.
The .-eeding norms currently decreed by the USSR Ministry of
Agriculture for wheat are roughly double those used for climatically
analogous areas in the United States and Canada. If it is assumed that the
higher seeding rates for the USSR were in use for the period 1966-70,
the ratio of wheat yields to seeding rates in the United States and USSR
were as follows:
United States USSR
Winter wheat 28 to 1 8 to 1
Spring wheat 21 to 1 4/ to 1
With specifications for quality of seed roughly the same in both countries
(95% germination, 1 % dockage) there is a presumption that the much higher
Soviet seeding rates are primarily due to a poorer quality preparation of
the seedbed leading to a low proportion of seeds developing into viable
plants. Additional reasons may include a slightly shorter growing season
compared with that in the United States and Canada and inherent
differences in the grain varieties used. The higher seeding rates associated
with a shorter growing season were of particular importance in 1969 and
again in 1971 when a cool, wet spring delayed sowings by 10-15 days.
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Problems With Quality
A substantial decline in wheat quality, as measured by the quantity
and quality of protein and gluten present, has a negative effect on the
final baked product, especially bread, Although complaints in the Soviet
press of declining wheat quality cite agronomic practices during both
cultivation and harvesting as well as storage practices as casual factors, the
quality problems that have been of most concern recently have been those
associated with the latter.
Soviet press reports concerning major types of problems that have
resulted in substandard grain suggest that the affected wheat can be
reclaimed only for industrial use (e.g.; alcohol production) or for livestock
feed. The problem is further complicated by the fact that in most cases
of deterioration the protein and gluten quality not quantity is affected.
Therefore, since only quantitative measures are used in testing wheat for
protein and gluten content, a baked product should be observed before
the full extent of deterioration can be assessed.*
Recent press reports identify three major types of damage - insects,
high moisture content, and smut. Official concern over insect damage is
currently centered on the senn pest (Eurygaster integriceps), a pest not
known in the United States but common in the Middle East, Turkey, and
the USSR. This bug attacks the stem of the plant, sucking it dry and,
therefore, reducing yields. Of more importance, howev -, it also attacks
the grain kernel where its feeding processes lead to a deterioration in protein
and gluten quality but not quantity. While infestation of more than 2%
of the crop is reported to make the wheat unusable for a high-quality baked
product, numerous reports of damage far exceeding this amount are cited
in the Soviet press. For example, in the Tatar ASSR senn pest infested
from 1.2% to 21% of the wheat from the 1970 harvest, wish an average
content of such kernels coming to 8.5%. The came source specifically
identified senn pest damage to a "substantial part" of the 1970 wheat
harvest in areas that accounted for more than one-tenth of the country's
wheat harvest in 1970.
Because of a short growing season and the concentration of a relatively
high proportion of annual precipitation in the spring wheat belt during the
harvest period, the Soviets have had a perennial problem of reducing
moisture in grain to acceptable levels for storage. The problem is exacerbated
In contrast to protein and gluten quantity which can be. measured
in the grain, protein a? gluten quality can be determined only from the
milled flour. Potential bread-baking strength can be estimated from the
so-called "dough-ball test, " but a baked product is tho best quality test.
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C014FIDENTIAL
in "wet" years by the failure to provide enough modern high-capacity
mechanical dryers to dry the grain before storage. As a rule, grain with
14%u-15% moisture content can be safely stored as long as the temperature
remains below 40?-50?h. If the temperst.lre increases or the grain has a
higher moisture content, the grain is likely to become moldy, turn color,
produce a flour with a rancid flavor, and perhaps even ferment.'" Recent
evidence indicates that the problem of excess moisture and accompanying
losses of grain was particularly acute after the harvests of 1969 and 1970.
Because of poor harvcst,.rig conditions In the winter wheat belt (1969) and
the spring wheat belt (1969 and 1970), including above-normal levels of
precipitation, a large share of the wheat crop was harvested with a high
moisture content. The case of grain procurements in Tsclinograd Oblast,
the country's tenth largest wheat growing oblast, in 1969 was apparently
not too typical. Nearly one-half million tons of wheat, equivalent to about
one-third of total state procurement; in the oblast, had an average moisture
content of 45% when it arrived at the state elevators. "Under such
conditions the grain-receiving facilities with only grain driers of the column
type were practically paralyzed and were ineffective in saving such grain,"
The majority of the driers in the oblast are of the obsolescent column
type.
Smutted wheat presents still another problem. Lightly smutted wheat
is used in the United States after it has been washed prior to milling.
However, the Soviets state that, "when 1% of the grain is smutted, it is
classified as defective, and its purchase price is discounted by 2570 ... the
state is forced to use such grain for technical purposes only." This implies
that washing capacity at milling points is severely limited or that the types
of smut infecting Soviet wheat are not amenable to treatment. The problem
is further complicated by the fact that, once again, the protein and gluten
quality, not qtw sty, is affected.
The major ot.rtion of the wheat procured by the government from
the 1969 and 1970 crops that is unfit for human consumption has probably
been detected and, if salvageable, ,ubscquently removed from storage and
used as livestock feed. Nevertheless. given the difficulties in detecting grain
with low protein and gluten quality - as opposed to quantity - a sizable
share of the grain remaining in carryover stocks from those two crop year,
may be of substandard quality.
" Most of the mold a:fam,lage Is associated with favorable moisture
conditions for insect damage. The feeding insects create "heat pockets"
In stored grain which, In turn, interact with moisture' to create conditions
favorable for the formation of mold.
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