INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM INTERSPUTNIK: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030076-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: May 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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f L / f~~ U~ ~/ ~ ~/ ~ ~.~ o~G, ~ ~ ~~..- / 25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
Inteliiger~ce Memorandum
Inters~iutni~: Status and Prospects
Secret
ER IM 72-76
May 1972
COPY NQ... ~~
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W~~Ri~I~~
'1'L-is document contains infal?matior- affecting the national
defense ol~ the United r3tates, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 79~I, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or >icvelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an IInlalthorizecl person is prohibited by law.
- GROUP 1 r
GduJrJ Iwm crolnmulit
Jownry ~'ng anJ
Jrdofuf [olien
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions
1
Discussio~i
. 2
Background
.2
Planning far an Independent System
, 3
USSR Proposes an Independent International System
, 3
The Definitive Intersputnik Agreement
. 4
Prospects
.7
Organizational S4ructure of Intersputnik and Intelsat
. 6
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MOLNIYA-1, FIRS"f GENERATION SOVIET COMMUNICA'T'IONS SATELLITE AT EXPO-67.
MOLNIYA-2, THE SECOND GENERATION COMSAT TO BE USED IN THE INTERSPUTNIK
SYSTEM, WILL PROBABLY BE SIMILAR iN APPEARANCE.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1972
INTI/LI,IGENCE MEMORANDUM
INZ'ERSPUTNIK: STATUS AND PROSPECTS
Summary and Conclusions
1. As a counter to the US-backed Intelsat Consortium, the USSR
is sponso~?ing formation of an independent international comsat system
known as Intersputnik. Although Soviet intent to create Intersputnik was
announced i!r early 1967, the organization did not come -to formal
existence until late 1971. Currently, Intersputnik has only nine members --
all Communist countries -compared with 83 member natioris in Intelsat.
In contrast to Intelsat's seven operable comsats and more than 50 earth
stations, the USSR is only now testing a prototype Intersputnik satellite,
and earth station construction has yet to begin in most of the member
countries.
2. Despite Intersputnik's slow progress, Moscow appears committed
to the deployment of the system. Second-generation Molniya sat~allites in
elliptical orbit probably will reach operational status within the next one
to two years, and most if ;rot all of the current Intersputnik members
probably will have at lea~tt one operational earth station by 1975. Soviet
plans to use geostationary satellites in Intersputnik appear now to be much
less firm than they were earlier. Because of its late start and the geographic
constraints on coverage imposed by use of satellites in elliptical orbit,
Intersputnik has IittIe chance of becoming a serious competitor to the global
Intelsat system. Instead it seems destined to be largely a regional system
for the exchange of television programs and the bolstering of Warsaw Pact
military communications.
3. In forrr-, Intersputnik's management structure is much less
complex than Intelsat's, but in both organizations the effective po?Ner for
decision-malting is concentrated in one body - a governing board. In theory,
Note: This riemorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordir;ated within CIA.
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Intersputnik policies are to be governed by the "one nation -one vote"
principle in contrast to lntelsat's weighted voting formula favoring the
largest users of the system. In practice, however, Soviet monopoly over
launch vehicle and space craft tecltrtology ensures that major Intersputnik
policy will be formulated by the USSR.
4. The Soviet attitude toward Intelsat has rnetamorphosed from open
Soviet hostility to a desire for at least limited accommodation. Moscow's
current view appears to be that excessive US power within Intelsat prevents
formal membership in the Consortium by the USSR and other Intersputnik
countries but does not preclude a cooperative operational relationship with
Intelsat. Tlie Intersputnik Agreement specifies technical coopera~;ion with
other communications satellite organizations. Under ~i revised U~-Soviet
"Hot Line" arrangement, the USSR will build an Intelsat-type earth station
to work with Intelsat satellites positioned ovef~ the Atlantic ocean, and
the United States will b~~ild a Molniya-type station to work with Molniya-2
satellites. In the future the USSR may seek a formal cooperative
arrangement between Intersputnik as an organization anc' the Intelsat
Consortium.
Background
5. Soviet intent to pursue an independent course in interna~ional
satellite communications became evident soon after the formation of the
US-backed Intelsat Consortium in 1964. Moscow frequently denounced
Intelsat as a capitalist venture under the thumb of US business interests
and hinted at the formation of a separate socialist communications satellite
system in which every member would have equal representation and power,
Moscow voiced three main objections to Intelsat. Number ene was Intelsat's
decision-making arrangements under which voting strength was weighted in
proportion t4 a country's investment in the system and utilizaticn of its
communications services. Had the USSR joined Intelsat whin invited in
1964, it would have received only 0.5%n of the total vote compared with
61 %n fc~r the United States. Another Soviet objection was Intclsat's goal
of establislung a "single. global commercial communications satellite
system," a provision interpreted by Soviet authorities as being hostile to
the formation of other comsat systems such as their own Molniya network.
The USSR also attacked Intelsat's requirement that sigriatnries must be
members of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), on the
grounds that it was obviously designed to dr;ny membershup in the
Consortium to East Germany, North Vietnam, North Korea, and the
People's Republic of China, which are not members of the ITU.
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Planning for an Independent System
6. Concrete evidence of Soviet plans to sponsor an international
comsat system independent of Intelsat surfaced in April 1967 at a
conference called by the USSR to discuss space cooperation among the
socialist countries. The Soviet hosts presented a draft proposal to establish
an international comsat organization to be known as "Intersputnik," This
proposal was initialed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Cuba, a,:d Mongolia. Working groups met on Intersputnik
in Sofia in October 1967 and again in Budapest in June 1968, when a
draft Intersputnik Agreement was a;iproved as a working document for
further study.
7. An advance planning paper submitted by tY~e US5R to the
Budapest conference revealed that Intersput~iik was still little more than
a concept at that time and that much groundwork needed to be done before
it could become a reality. The paper proposed that Intersputnik should
evolve.in three stages. The first stage was to be devoted to planning, research,
and design. In the second (experimental) stage, planning would be completed
and a limited number of ground stations would be built and tested, utilizing
Molniya satellites in elliptical orbits. Intersputnik would become operational
in the third stage, employing satellites in geostationary orbits and rossibly
some in elliptical orbits. Ground stations begun in the second stage would
be completed and new ones started. The Soviet planning paper failed,
however, to provide a timetable for implementing the three Intersputnik
stages, leaving this question for a later meeting.
USSR Proposes an Independent I:-ternational System
8. In August 1968, representatives of the USSR, Bulg, ria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Cuba, and Mongolia presented
the Intersputnik draft proposal to the Secretary General of the United
Nations for publication and distribution at the UN Conference on
Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, then in session at Vienna.
The key provision of the Intersputnik proposcl -obviously intended by
the USSR as an eyecatcr~er -was its "one nation -one vote" principle
of representation in the organization's governing body. The proposal invited
all nations to become members of the Intersputnik system, but its sponsors
v:ere almost immediately embarrassed in thz United Nations by the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
9. Between De~;ember 1968 and June 1971 a _*ouiid of Intersputnik
working group meetings conve:!ed in Czechoslovakia, cast Germany,
Romania, and Poland -- a cycle evidently intended to :mphasize the
egalitarian nature of the organization (meetings having alreauy been held
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in Bulgaria and I-lungary). These meetings produced little new information
for public consumption, but the protracted absence of ground station
co?struction in Eastern Europe and Cuba suggested that Intersputnik was
having difficulty in progressiizg beyond the first stage and remained
essentially a paper organization.
The Definitive Intersputnik Agreement
10. In November 1971, some four and one-half years after initial
promulgation of the Intersputnik concept, the participating Communist
countries met in Moscow for the signing of the definitive Intersputnik
agreement. Although it differs little from the earlier proposal to the United
Nations, the agreement formally signed provided Intersputnik with a
juridical personality - an important concept in international law.
Intersputnik riow has the capacity to conclude contracts and other
agreements, to acquire and dispose of property, and to be a party to legal
rroceedings. The signing further legitimized Moscow's claim of an alternative
for ,those countries interested in international satellite communications but
dissatisfied with US domination of Intelsat, even though the hardware for
an operational system is still conspicuously absent.
11. Intersputnik is basically atwo-tier organization consisting of a
Board and a Directorate. (The Agreement also provides for a tlu?ee-man
Auditing Cumm~ssion, but its members can hold no of!'ice in the
organization and it has ?o operational responsibilities.) The Board is the
governing body, in which euah signatory nation has one representative and
one vote; decisions of the Board have the force of intergovernmental
agreements. T}te Board's most imports^*. responsibilities are to approve plans
for the development of the system as a whole, to approve means for
establishing the space segment, to determine specifi~:ations t'or comsats and
earth stations, to approve channel allocations, and to set rates for channel
usage.
12. The Directorate -consisting of a Director General, his deputy,
and a multinational staff - is responsible for Handling the day-to-day
operations of Intersputnik. The Director General implements the decisions
of the Board and, subject to Board approval, draws up plans for the
organization's activities; prepares budget estimates; projects ahead for the
development and improvement of the communications system; and
~tegotiates for the design, manufacture, and delivery of space segment
hardware and satellite launch services. As chief executive, the Director
General represents Intersputnik in relations with member states,
non-member status, and other international organizations. Under delegated
authority from the Board, he is also empowered to conclude internatio~ial
agreements.
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13. The Intersputnik organizational structure, almost certainly shaped
mainly by the USSR, is much less complex than that of Intelsat, which
is the product o? hard-won compromises among a welter o: contending
national and regional interests.* (For a comparison of the Intersputnik and
Intelsat organizational structures, see the chart.) In effect, the functions
assigned to the three top bodies of Intelsat are consolidated within
In;ersputnik's Board, and the Director General of Intersputnik has the
combined responsibilities of Intelsat's Secretary General acid the
Communications Satelli~e Corporation (COMSAT), the operational and
technical manager of Intelsat.
14. Intersputnik's "one nation -one vote" principle for substantive
decision-making contrasts sharply with Intelsat, where "one nation -one
vote" governs only the Assembly of Parties (which represents governments
and has primarily recommendatory powers) and the Meeting of Signatories
(which represents telecommunications administrations and sets general rules
on earth station access to the system, rates, and allotment of the space
segment). In the Board of Governors -the true locus of decision-making
in Intelsat -voting power is weighted according to a member nation's use
of and investment in the system. The egalitarian cha*acter of Intersputnik,
however, is likely to prove more apparent than reel. The permanent seat
of Intersputnik is in Moscow and it will be sui?pt~ising if anyone but a Soviet
official is "elected" Director General. More important, the USSR alone
among Intersputnik members controls the satellite technology and launching
facilities necessary for the organize?ion to function. Acknowledgement of
this fact of life is reflected diplomatically but unmistakably in the language
of the Intersputnik Agreement.
15. The definitive Agreement ~s notably guarded concerning the
timing, deployment, and technical parameters of the Intersputnik system
but does provide a few new details. In the current, or experimental, stage -
scheduled to last until the end of 1973 -members' earth stations will
conduct communications tests using comsat channels provided free by the
USSR. In the next stage, for which no terminal date is given, one or more
Intersputnik satellites will be qualified as operational and channels will be
made available to members on a !ease basis. In the final stage, the
Intersputnik system will be declared in full "commercial operation'' at a
time "considered economically advisable" by the membership. The
Agreement provides no hint as to when the crossover to commercial status
for Intersputnik is likely to be reached.
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ORGAi~:i~AT10NAL S~'Rl!OTURE OF IPlTERSPIJTNI~ ANI~ si~JTELSAT
ntersputnik-9 Members
BOARD
Full Membership
"One Natiolt-One Vote"
Governing Body
AUDITING
COMMISSION
3 Members
DIRECTORATE
Headed by Director General
Executive, Operational, Technical.
ano Administrative Management
ASSEMBLY of PARTIES BOARD of GOVERNORS
Full Membership Approximately 2rJ Members
"One Nation-One Vote" ~ "Weighted Voting"
SATELLITE
MEETING of SIGNATORIES
Full Membership
"One Nation-One Vote"
Establishes General Rules for Approval
of Earth Stations, Allotment of Space
Segment Capacity, and Establishment
of Rates
'Fol/owing transitions/ pedoA, funct/ons to be assumed by a 0/iector General.
COMSAT Corporation may o: may not be refa/ne i on contract basis
(Based on Member's Investment Share)
Sels General Pcricy on Development and
Operation of Space Segment
to provide operational and technical services.
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Pros ects
16. On t4 November 1971 the Soviet Union launched a
second generation comsat called Molniya-2 -the first major advance in
Soviet comsat technology since the first Molniya-1 was success`ully orbited
ir. April 1965. Little is known about the new satellite except that it operates
in a higher frequency band than the Molniya-1 series (4 gigahertz to 6
gigahertz compared with 800 megahertz to l ,000 megahertzl. Use of this
higher band of frequencies (tlie same as that used for Intelsat, satellites)
probably reflects the Soviet desire for a satellite that provides greater
channel capacity and expanded multiple access - ~iecessary featares fir an
international system with a relatively large number of subscribers. However,
Molniya-2, using the same highly elliptical orbit as Molniya-1, gives good
coverage only of the northern hemisphere. Coverage of most of Asia, Africa,
and South America would require a satellite in stationary orbit over the
equator. The USSR first revealed firm planning for a geostationary comsat
(called Statsionar) in 1969, citing December 1970 as a probable initial
launch date. Although the initial Statsi~~:~ar launch could take place at any
time, satellites of the Molniya-2 type will probably be used by Intersputnik
when the system becomes operational, but even this comsat must still
undergo a lengthy period of Soviet testing and checkout.
17. Although the USSR built an Orbita-type earth station in 1969
at Ulaan Baatar in Mongolia, do evidence is available thus far of earth station
construction in the other Intersputnik countries. Soviet authorities have
stated in private discussions with US officials that the first East European
counfry to have an operational Intersputnik earth station probably will be
East Germany. Press releases 1-iave indicated that Intersputnik earth stations
also are to be completed in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and possibly
Poland during the 1971-75 plan period, but no such plans -have yet been
announced for Hungary and Romania. Earth station construction in Eastern
Europe and Cuba possibly is toeing held up pending thorough checkout of
prototype stations in t;ie USSR working with she Molniya? ~ .ztellite. It
is difficul:? to justify the construction of so many earth stations in Eastern
Europe on econornic grounds, given the limited international traffic
requirements that exis~ there. The prirnary civilian use of these stations
will probably be for t}te exchange of black and white and color television
programs. An important bonus, however, will be improved Warsaw Pact
ttulitary communications with dedicated satellite circuits available for use
by Soviet com,nand elements in Eastern Europe.
18. An article in a recent Soviet technical journal (Radio) confirms
earlier plans for Intersputnik's development and pro;~ides additional details.
The first stage of Intersputnik will make exclusive use of Molniya-2 satellites
whose highly elliptical orbits are capable of providing service to all the
?
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present members of Intersputnik, including Cuba. At some future date, when
Intersputnik membership leas expanded to include countries in mire
southerly latitudes, a Soviet stationary satellite will be used, from which
Intersputnik will lease the necessary radio frequency trunks. The stationary
satellite will be located over the Indian Ocean at 60? E longitude. Revised
from the previously announced location of 75? to 85? E longitude, this
location provides coverage cf all of Western Europe, Africa, and Asia, except
for Japan and a portion of the Soviet Far East. Service to Cuba will continue
to be maintained via l4iolniya-2 satellites. Provision is made for a variant
to this stage which would use two stationary satellites, located over different
spots above the equator, when membership expands significantly and would
include countries on different continents. These geographical and technical
constrai:tts, combined with its late start, indicate that Intersputnik will be
essentially a regional rather than global system and cannot Hope to compete
commercially with Intelsat.
l9. Intersputnik's ultimate role is likely to be strongly conJitioned
by its relationship with Intelsat. The Soviet attitude toward Intelsat has
metamorphosed over the years from open hostility to a desire for at least
limited cooperation. For example, under terms of the new US-Soviet Hot
Line agreement, communications satellites are to be used to upgrade the
Direct Communications Link (DCL) between tl;e Soviet Union and the
United States. The USSR will provide DCL circuits via its Molniya-2
satellites and a 11"(olniya-type earth station to be built in the United States.
It has also agreed to parallel DCL channels via Intelsat satellites and an
Intelsat-type earth station on Soviet territory. The ,:ew Hot Line agreement
was drafted in such a way that the USSR, although Basin; Intelsat facilities,
will not have to deal formally with Intelsat as an organization.
2G. The USSR apparently is interested in taking advantage of Intelsat's
impressive technical facilities. Soviet officials have inquired about the
commercial use of Intelsat earth station capacity not reserved for the Hot
Line and have asked for a clarification of Intelsat policy on the use of
its system by non-members. Moreover, the Intersputnik ageement contains
a provision for cooperation with "other organizations concerned with the
use of communications satellites." In :he future the USSR tnay seek a formal
cooperation arrangement between I?tersputnik as ait organization and the
Intelsat Consortium.
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