INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM CHINA: AGRICULTURE IN 1971 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030107-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 107
• Publication Date: July 1, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
China: Agriculture in 1971 and Prospects for 1972
Confidential
ER IM 72-107
July _19.7.2
Copy No. 83
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CTUNA: AGRICULTURE IN 1971 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1972
Conclusions
1. In spite of poor weather, grain production in the People's
Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 probably equaled 1970's record harvest
of 215 million to 220 million metric tons. Improvements in, the management
of water resources and further increases in chemical fertilizer and agricultural
equipment offset the effects of floods, droughts, and insect infestations.
2. Agricultural production in 1972 probably will exceed production
in 1971 by a good margin simply because of the continued rapid increase
in industrial inputs into agriculture. Moreover, the margin could be raised
substantially if weather proves better than average. Finally, the Chinese may
be entering a period when their investment in water control measures will
begin to pay off handsomely.
3. In the first half of 1972, Peking has reaffirmed its pragmatic
policies toward agriculture, notably its permissive attitude toward private
plots, traditional handicrafts, and petty trade. Within the commune, the
production brigade and the production team retain their power to decide
on day-to-day details. Further evidence of the regime's tacit
acknowledgement of the importance of incentives is a series of recent price
c,cts in industrial inputs coupled with increases in agricultural procurement
prices.
4. Starting in 1961, the PRC has imported 4 million to 5 million
tons of wheat each year to feed cities in the northeast and, incidentally,
to reduce the strains in the domestic procurement system. In 1971, imports
were cut to 3.1 million tons, partly because of the need to reduce trade
unbalances and partly because of an unwarranted anticipation of a sizable
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research.
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increase in grain production. Now in 1972, Peking has signed a new contract
with Canada to bring imports back up to more normal levels.
5. China's main agricultural policies at mid-1972 are appropriate to
its general economic strategy of vigorous military-industrial expansion
combined with reasonable prov'3ion for the population.The well-entrenched
policy of supplying increasing industrial inputs for agriculture and the
moderat,,- approach to agricultural organization and incentives should result
in enough food and clothing to meet the basic needs of a rapidly growing
population during the remainder of the Fourth Five-Year Plan period
(1971-75). At the same time, no dramatic technological breakthrough is
in the offing nor will agriculture generate large new quantities of export
goods.
6. The long-term economic strategy of the PRC has focused on the
rapid expansion of military-industrial strength. Fundamental to this strategy
has been austerity iii consumption and a comparatively low priority for
agriculture. Originally, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and his associates believed
that, collectivization and socialist incentives were most of what was required
for agriculture to meet its goals. The disaster years of 1959-61 dispelled
thin belief, and beginning in 1962, Peking began to inject resources into
agriculture in ever-increasing volume. This turnabout in policy helped
overcome the immediate food crisis and enabled the agricultural sector to
expand in line with China's population over the past decade.
7. This memorandum first describes the performance of the
agricultural sector in 1971. It examines weather conuitions, the availability
of inputs, and agricultural policy. The memorandum then reviews the results
of agricul' aral performance on food consumption and on grain imports.
Next, agricultural prospects for 1972 and the remainder of the Fourth
Five-Year Plan are examined. The Appendix gives a breakdown, by province,
of official claims for grain production in 1970-71
Agricultural Perf:)rmance in 1971
8. Agricultural performance in the PRC in 1971 was a
disappointment to the regime. Although Peking initially claimed that grain
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production exceeded production in 1970, the regime has since backed off
from this claim. Production of most industrial crops and soybeans
apparently fell short of production in 1970. According to an official
announcement in December 1971, hog numbers increased by 14% - the
most optimistic percentage production claim. Even this claim was revised
downward to 11% in March 1972 The Chinese press has singled out poor
weather as the main problem in agriculture in 1971. Independent
information on growing conditions confirms that agriculture indeed suffered
from widespread floods and droughts as well as abnormally high rates of
insect infestation.
Grain Production
9. In late 1970, Premier Chou En-lai told the American writer Edgar
Snow that grain production in 1970 was more than 240 million tons. At
year-end 1971, the Chinese press reported a new record crop of 246 million
tons. However, subsequent down-grading of provincial claims and the failure
of the regime to repeat this national claim suggest that the initial claim
was a preliminary estimate.
10. As Chou himself has frankly conceded, the Chinese statistical
apparatus has serious gaps in its coverage of the economy. The series for
grain production used in this memorandum puts production in 1971 at
the same level as in 1970 - 215 million to 220 million tons (see Table 1).
The beneficial effects in 1971 of larger amounts of chemical fertilizers and
improved water management were offset by extensive poor weather. The
grain area affected by serious drought, water-logging, windstorms, and insect
pests was said by the Chinese press to have been three times as large as
in 1970.
The Spring Harvest
11. The spring harvest normally accounts for about one-third of the
annual harvest of grain, the fall harvest for the remainder. The spring harvest
of 1971 exceeded the good spring harvest of 1970. Most of the increase
stemmed from an increase in early rice output in the south, which is
normally one-half of the spring harvest and which be_iefited from a 20%
increase in acreage. But for this acreage increase, the early rice output would
not have been as good as the excellent harvest of 1970. Early rice production
in Kiangsu, Hupeh, Szechwan, Fukien, Hunan, and Anhwei was said to have
increased by 20%; these provinces also reported the largest increases in early
rice acreage. However, these provinces normally account for only about
one-third of the total early rice acreage. Most of the remaining early rice
provinces - Chekiang, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi - reported little
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(SUN r'IJ)ENl'IAL
People's Republic of China:
Production of Grain
Year
Production
Year
Production
1964
180-185
1965
190-195
1957
185
1966
195-200.
1958
200
1967
210-215
1959
165
1968
195-200
1960
160,
1969
200-205
1961
160
1970
215-220
1962
175-180
1971
215-220
1963
175-180
or no increase over 1970. Drought lowered the early rice output in South
China - particularly in Kwangtung, which accounts for about.20% of the
early rice acreage.
12. Early harvested crops in the north - primarily winter wheat -
did not do as well as the mediocre 1970 crops. Below average precipitation
in the winter and spring over the major winter wheat region retarded plant
growth, and heavy rains in June caused high harvest losses. In sum, a good
early rice crop outweighed a mediocre harvest of winter wheat; giving the
regime a small margin above the good spring harvest of 1970.
The Fall Harvest
13. The Chinese made no overall claims for the 1971 fall harvest
except to note that it was affected by serious drought and waterlogging.
Only Shansi Province was cited by the Chinese as having a better fall harvest
than in 1970. In 1970, China's fall harvest was excellent in the north but
only average in the south.
14.. During the month of June 1971, extensive rain fell on the entire
North China Plain. The extent of this rainfall is shown on the map, Figure 1.
Although this rainfall did not lead to widespread flooding, it was sufficient
to cause local flooding and extensive waterlogging. The lack of information
from either Chinese or independent sources makes it difficult to judge the
severity of this waterlogging and its effect on crop yields. However, a
comparison of provincial year-end statements with statements made at the
time of the harvest suggests that the fall harvest was probably less than
in 1970.
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People's Republic of China
Above Normal Rainfall, June 1971
15. In July, widespread drought hit Eastern, Central, and Southwest
China as well as Fukien Province in South China. This drought area is shown
on the map, Figure 2. interruptions to
planting schedules in areas with inadequate water conservation. Many of
the crops, weakened by drought, succumbed to insect damage. In addition,
the expansion- of the early rice acreage had been at the expense of
intermediate rice and may also have resulted in a reduced acreage of fall
harvested rice. As a consequence of the drought and a possible decline in
fall rice acreage, the harvest of late rice was at best. only equal to the
output of 1970.
16. The only other important fall harvest area is in Northeast China.
No harvest statement was issued for Liaoning. The harvest was reported
to have been "fairly good" and "good" in Kirin and Heilungkiang Provinces,
respectively. These signal words mean the harvest was below average in the
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People's Republic of China
Drought, July 1971
~6eu
;Rlc:o Predaml nn nl
Northeast. Insect pests and unfavorable weather - windstorms, drought,
waterlogging, and hailstorms - appear to have been responsible for the
lackluster performance.
17. In short, the fall harvest of grains was not quite up to the fall
harvest of 1970. Grain production for 1971 as a whole is estimated as
approximately the same as in 1970, with the spring harvest slightly ahead
and the fall harvest slightly behind.
Industrial Crops and Soybeans
l8. The performance of industrial crops in 1971 was unimpressive.
Only sesame and rapeseeds, tea, and silkworm cocoons did better than in
1970. The other industrial crops - cotton , other fiber crops, tobacco, sugar,
and the other oil seed crops - fell behind those of 1970. The dearth of
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information published on the acreage planted to these crops and the
indications of expansion in food crop acreage in 1971 suggest that the area
sown to industrial crops may have decreased.
Soybeans
19. Soybeans - traditionally one of China's leading crops - have not
received much attention in the Chinese press in recent years. In 1970,
weather conditions were exceptionally good in Northeast China, where more
than 40% of China's soybeans are produced. In contrast, in 1971, the
weather in his area was quite poor. Increases in soybean production in
the other producing areas were not sufficient to offset the decline in
production in the Northeast.
20. The tight soybean situation has been reflected in a marked
decrease in soybean exports to Japav, the PRC's principal soybean customer;
see the following tabulation (in thousand tons):
Year Exports
1968 417
1969 377
1970 291
1971 283
The Japanese; hoped to import at least 250,000 tons in 1972; the Chinese
have madc? available less than 100,000 tons.
Cotton
21. Cotton production fell from 1.7 million tons in 1970 to 1.6
million tons in 1971 because of unfavorable weather and, probably, a decline
in acreage. Drought conditions in July in Central and East China and heavy
rains during the last ten days of June in North China seriously damaged
the crop. Substantial increases, in production in Shensi (20% over 1970)
and in Szechwan (18% over 1970) almost certainly were insufficient to
make up for the deficit.
Sugar Crops
22. Output of, both sugar beets and sugar cane was lower in 1971
than in 1970. In. Heilungkiang, China's major sugar beet area, drought
damaged the sugar beet crop. In Kwangtung, which accounts for more than
40% of China's sugar cane acreage, a series of typhoons caused severe lasses.
Only Szechwan - China's second most important source of sugar cane -
claimed a substantial increase in sugar cane production of 25% above that
of 1970.
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Factors Affecting 1971 Performance
23. Whereas weather was a negative factor in the agricultural picture
in 1971, technological inputs - such as chemical fertilizers, improved water
control, and increased mechanization - were offsetting factors on the
positive side.
24. The supply of chemical fertilizers available to agriculture has
increased every year since 1961 (see Table 2). Although imports of chemical
fertilizers remained unchanged in 1971 compared with 1970, domestic
output reportedly increased by 30%. Most of this increase came from the
growir,,,- number of small and medium-size plants that came into production
in 1 971. Because there was no increase in imports, the overall increase in
chemical fertilizer availabilities in 1971 (when measured in nutrient content)
was only about I S% over 1970. This was a smaller percentage increase than
the 20% increase in nutrient content in 1970 but was still substantial.
25. To reap the greatest advantage from present and future increases
in chemical fertilizers, high-yielding farmlands with dependable systems of
water supply and water control are essential. Because natural conditions
in China are highly variable, the improvement of water management has
been singularly difficult, particularly in the large and poorly drained areas
of the North China Plain.* Earlier attempts at water conservation during
the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) were of little or no value. In 1970 and
1971, plans that are more rational - involving smaller projects - have been
emphasized. The claims for these projects have been reserved compared with
claims during the Leap Forward. In 1971, for example, the Chinese claimed
that 1.8 million hectares - about 2% of the total cultivated land - were
added to high yield farmland. Although the small size of these projects
suggests that they may not be effective under extreme weather conditions,
they undoubtedly are.adding to the capacity of China's agricultural sector.
26. The mechanization of Chinese agriculture is slowly proceeding
from a narrow base. Sources of energy for agricultural use - electric power
and petroleum - have expanded in concert with the increased inventory
of agricultural machinery. In 1971 the Chinese claimed that the total value
of farm machinery production was 21% above that of 1970 and that the
production of tractors, walking tractors, internal combustion engines, and
rice-transplanters topped previous annual records. The use of additional
machinery during peak harvest periods when the labor supply sometin,. s
becomes a critical element has erabled the Chinese to gather crops in more
timely fashion and to reduce harvest losses. In some cases, the use of
machinery ha.. enabled the Chinese to increase the effectiveness of their
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Table 2
People's Republic of China:
Estimated Availability
of Chemical Fertilizers a/
Year
Total Supply
Production
Imports
1961
0.50
0.27
0.22
1962
0.65
0.41
0.24
1963
1.11
0.57
0.54
1964
1.04
0,68
0.36
1965
1.52
0.88
0.64
1966
1.80
1.08
0.72
1967
1.94
0.78
1.16
1968
2.18
0.94
1.24
1969
2.45
1.14
1.32
1970
2.95
1.46
1.48
1971
3.38
1.90
1.48
a. Actual weight of rrimary nutrient content --
nitrogen, phosphoric acid, or potassium oxide.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
limited land resources through the introduction of more intensive cropping
patterns. In still other cases, machinery has relieved some of the most
burdensome physical toil of the countryside -- the observer- often can see
one bulldozer and hundreds of basket carriers on rural construction projects.
In summary, even though the PRC would be ill-advised to substitute
machinery for (the abundant) manpower on a wide scale, the gradual
increase in rural mechanization can add an element of flexibility to
productive capacity and eliminate at least a portion of the backbreaking
tasks.
27. Whereas the increasing flow of inputs gives an upward slope to
the long-term trend line, the success of agricultural production in China
in any given year still depends heavily on weather conditions. During 1971,
for example, poor weather offset the beneficial effects of the increased
inputs made available during the year. Weather patterns are notoriously
unstable over large portions of China's farmland, and the twin problems
of too little or too much water continue to plague Chinese agriculture.
One of the instructive features of Peking's programs for better water
management is the potential for reducing the effects of bad weather - that
is, reducing the size of the troughs in agricultural production.
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Agricultural Policy
28. The Chinese have been pursuing their new agriculture investment
policy for a decade. The policy almost certainly is being continued as a
key element in the Fourth Five-Year Plan, whose details are yet to be
unveiled. The new policy is an "agriculture first" policy only under certain
circumstances. Military-industrial expansion is the priority economic goal
of the regime; agriculture has first call on resources only when food supply
dips below that needed to maintain productive efficiency and popular
morale, as happened in 1959-61. The added investment in agriculture has
resulted in substantial increases in production of grain. Industrial crops have
fared less well, partly because acreage had to be diverted to grain crops.
The minimum aim for industrial crops has been to keep output up by
increasing average yields on the reduced acreage.
29. The "agriculture first" policy has also a more or less stabilizing
effect on agricultural institutions. Throughout the past decade, the
cultivation of .private plots has been permitted and private hog raising has
been positively encouraged. In addition, the production team - the smallest
unit of the three-tier organizational system in rural areas - has remained
the locus of economic decision making and control. For most of the period,
farmers have been paid more in accordance with work done than need or
political attitudes. These pragmatic policies - which cut against the grain
of the more radical cadres - have contributed substantially to the increase
in agricultural production, particularly of vegetables, meat, fish, and other
non-grain foods. During 1971 these policies received further emphasis. Thus,
side-line activities such as pottery-making and woodcrafts were encouraged
as sources of supplementary income for both individuals and production
teams. Collective units, such as communes, were urged to plow back the
funds earned through these activities in agriculture.
30. Finally, during the second half of 1971, the central authorities
chose to stimulate agricultural production further by decreasing the price
of some technological inputs and by increasing the price paid for industrial
crops. According to the Chinese press, the prices of chemical fertilizers and
ins?cticides were reduced by 9.7% and 15%, respectively; kerosene and diesel
fuel, by 20.8% and 9.7%, respectively; and various types of agricultural
machinery, by an average of 15.7%. At the same time, the regime increased
the price paid for sugar by 15.3% and for oil-bearing crops - peanuts,
sesame, rapeseed - by an average of 16.7%. Little information is available
on the specific types and grades of commodities affected. The price changes
came too late in the year to have great effect on 1971 performance. they
are likely to have a considerable impact on rural income in 1972 and a
lesrsr impact on aggregate production.
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Food Consumption and Agricultural Import Patterns in 1971
31. The level of consumption varies widely from locality to locality
and from occupation to occupation. Communes, production brigades, and
production teams in the more richly endowed areas usually are better fed
than those in the poorer areas. For example, vegetable farmers outside
Shanghai eat better than grain farmers in northern Shensi Province. Energy
needs, and consequently rations, vary greatly with occupation. Thus,
workers engaged in heavy labor may received as much as 3,000 calories
per day, whereas students may receive as little as 1,600 calories per day.
In contrast to the urban population, the farmers consume larger amounts
of less desirable and nutritionally deficient grains - such as kaoliang at 1
barley - and starchy roots to meet their energy requifements. On the other
hand, the farmers consume slightly larger amounts of nutritionally valuable
vegetables from their private plots than do their urban counterparts who
must purchase such commodities in retail markets.
32. Caloric consumption has remained fairly stable in recent years
and did not change significantly in 1970-71 and the first half of 1972.
This level, about 2,000 calories per person per day, is adequate to meet
the Chinese people's minimum energy requirements. In general, the Chinesr,
people can be said to be reasonably well fed. Although the Chinese have
set up an efficient rationing system that prevents dangerously low food
levels from developing, local food shortages have occurred in areas where
weather conditions have been particularly poor. For ins', nce, the summer
drought in Central China in 1971 was accompanied by reduced grain rations
in that area. Even though the caloric level has not increased substantially
in the recent decade, the last few years have witnessed a gradual
improvement in the quality, variety, and availability of foodstuffs. This
improvement is due to a combination of factors, especially the permissive
attitude toward private plots and petty trade, the steady rise in supplies
of traditional specialty foodstuffs, and steady increases in real incomes.
Grain Imports
33. Over the past 18 months, Canada has been the sole foreign
supplier of wheat to the PRC. In 1971, China imported 3.1 million tons
of wheat, the lowest amount imported in any year in the last decade. In
1972 the Chinese have contracted to import from 3.75 million to 4.0 million
tons, and Peking has already arranged to import 750,000 tons in the first
quarter of 1973.
34. Chinese grain imports have been used to maintain rations in
northern cities and thus to reduce the domestic strain of procuring grain
for grain-deficit areas. In 1970, Peking claimed that the chronically
grain-deficit provinces of Shantung, Hopeh, and Honan - the provinces that
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normally supply much of the grain for these cities - were basically
self-sufficient in grain output. This claim was repeated in 1971, although
qualified as having "initially" been accomplished. These claims, when read
between the lines, mean that the problem had been only partly solved.
Nonetheless, the government apparently thought that imports could be
safely reduced in 1971, particularly since the harvests were expected to
rise above the record level of 1970. In addition, Peking was determined
in 1971 to increase exports and to rein in imports to redress the trade
imbalance created in 1970.
35. The higher wheat imports of 1972 may be the result of several
factors:
A lower than expected harvest in 1971.
Acreage shifts. The regimes's decision in late 1971 to
increase the price paid to farmers for some industrial crops
and the prominence given to increasing industrial crop
output in 1972 may be the harbinger of a shift in acreage
from grain crops to industrial crops.
Changed trade outlook. PRC export performance in 1972
has improved and the regime may have decided that grain
imports can be increased to more normal levels.
Consumer welfare. Increased grain imports could also be
a reflection of the increased attention being given to
consumer welfare in 1972. Wages are being raised for
selected categories of workers; farmers apparently are
getting bigger shareouts; and discussions of improvements
in the "livelihood of the masses" are becoming more
common in the press.
Non-Gran Imports
36. The poor performance in industrial crop production in 1971 helps
to explain the current Chinese interest in increased imports of Come of
these products. For instance, the Chinese have resumed cotton imports from
Mexico - after a lapse of six years and are now negotiating with Brazil for
cotton imports. On the other hand, the recent increase in Chinese imports
of sugar from new suppliers is probably more a reflection of the decreased
availability of Cuban sugar than evidence of low levels of domestic sugar
production.
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Prospects for 197 2
37. Preliminary indications are that the spring crops of 1972 should
be at least average. Precipitation in most of the winter wheat gr_'wing area
has been above normal throughout most of the growing season. Thus, winter
wheat output should exceed the poor harvest of 1971. In the south and
southwest, early spring drought has appeared and, to some extent, has
delayed or prevented the transplanting of early rice. It is too soon, however,
to judge the severity of this drought and its effect on crop production.
38. As for agricultural policy, in February 1972, Peking strongly
reiterated the pragmatic policies of the past few years. Apparently, the
regime is not going to let its priority concern with military-industrial
expansion override the need for increased investment in agriculture. The
price reductions for technological inputs and the higher procurement prices
for industrial crops exemplify a concern for increased production in 1972.
In particular, the increased prices paid for industrial crops should stimulate
their production. In the cases of sugar cane and jute, acreage has been
expanded, largely on marginal hillside land. The new incentives for growing
industrial crops increase the pressure for shifting acreage from grain to
industrial crop production. The price changes should be seen ? also as the
means for financing the increased flow of chemical fertilizer and agricultural
equipment currently moving into the countryside and for seeing that the
inputs go to the most successful production units.
39. Individual incentives to produce also appear to be somewhat
stronger this year than in the past. In 'addition to continued regime tolerance
of private plot cultivation and petty trading activity, there are some
indications that the guidelines governing distribution at harvest time have
been loosened to give the farmer a larger return for his labor. Current press
discussions of the workpoint system -- the basic system for 13termining
peasant remuneration - emphasize payment according to work done and
tend to downplay such criteria as payment determined by political attitude
and payment according to reed. Similarly, there are also signs that
workpoint scales for auxiliary farm labor - women and youth - are being
made more generous than in the past. In sum, the fundamental policy of
"taking grain as the key link" remains in force, and, given these improved
incentives and good weather, both gain and industrial crop production
could increase.
A Farther Look Ahead
40. In this memorandum, the past decade in agriculture has been
characterized as a period of higher investment, pragmatic policies, and
increased production. Ideological trumpeting, especially during the Cultural
Revolution (1966-69), raised the specter of renewed rural radicalism, yet
the private plots remained essentially undistributed. The present pragmatic,
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incentive-oriented policies continue to contradict Communist ideology. Thus
a new dose of radicalization always rertiains a possibility. As of the moment,
however, such policies as private plot cultivation, private hog raising, and
side-line light industrial activity seem well entrenched. A revival of radicalism
in agriculture in 1972 seems highly unlikely. The possibilities for such a
revival will increase as the PRC moves into the mid-1970s, largciy because
an aging leadership must soon be replaced with unpredictable results.
41. Assuming average weather conditions, prospects for a continuation
of a 2% to 3% growth rate of agriculture during the next few years are
good. The potential for further increases in chemical fertilizer and other
industrial inputs is' excellent. The industrial facilities that supply the
increased inputs to agriculture over the next' few years are now being
commissioned or are at advanc.-d stages of construction. The ability to
extend modern water management techniques to create additional high-yield
acreage will continue. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that grain production will
increase dramatically in the next few years. Greater contributions from
agriculture to overall economic development - for example, a sizable
increase in supplies of raw materials for light industry and an expansion
of agricultural commodities for export - are also ur.likely to be forthcoming
in the near future. For one thing, there is a lack of emphasis on developing
high-yield seed varieties - i necessary condition for such increases. This
fact - plus the steadily increasing costs of developing high-yield areas -
makes dramatic increases in agricultural production unlikely. Finally, the
new Maoist-style system of education emphasizes the immediate and the
practical at the expense of the future and the theoretical. A revival of
long-term agricultural research would be a signal that Peking is alert to
the agricultural development needs of the mid-1970s.
14 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Provincial Claims for Grain Production in 1970-71
As indicated in Table 3, the 1971 grain production in 15 provinces,
normally responsible for about three-quarters of the total annual grain
production, exceeded 1970's output. Since the Chinese are apparently
reluctant to report decreases in production, it is presumed that the remaining
provinces suffered decreases in production. In 1970, in turn, 18 provinces,
normally responsible for about 80% of the total grain production, claimed
that production increased over 1969, and, in addition, that 12 of these
provinces - normally responsible for about one-half of the total annual
production - had increased grain production by 10% or more. Here again,
it was assumed that in the remaining provinces production had been down
over the previous year.
Even with these assumptions, these percentage increases suggest that
total grain production in 1970 and 1971 may have been higher than our
estimate. However, there is reason to believe that these figures represent
the Chinese preliminary estimates and that the final figures, for the most
part, are apt to fall short of these estimates. Thus in 1571, seven provinces
claimed an increase in production over the previous year without claiming
a record despite the fact that in the precious year these provinces had
claimed a record. This logical inconsistency strongly suggests that the 1970
results had subsequently been revised downward without public
acknowledgement of these revised results. In a few instances, revised figures
were published that were higher than the preliminary estimate. Thus a late
revision of the results of the 1971 crop in Sinkiang changed the preliminary
statement from an "all-round success" in agricultural production to a "10%
increase in grain" production. This suggests that revised results are generally
published only if they are an improvement over the preliminary
announcement.
CONFIDENTIAL is
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Shansi
Shensi
Sinkiang
Shantung
Fukien
Anhwei
Hunan
Kweichow
Szechwan
Kiangsu
Yunnan
Hupeh
Kwangtung
Honan
Kwangsi
Chekiang
Kirin
Xiangsi
Kansu
Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Pegion
Hopeh
Heilungkiang
Tsinghai
Ningsia
Liaoning
Percent of China's
Normal Total
Grain output
23
2..4
0.9
6.9
2.3
6.5
6.3
2.2
12.9
6.6
3.5
5.8
7.0
6.1
3.3
3.8
2.4
3.9
2.5
1.6
3.4
3.5
0.3
0.3
3.3
100.0
Output 16% over that of 1970
Output 10% over that of 1970, record crop
Output 10% over that of 1970
Output 8% over that of 1970
Output 5% to 10% over that of 1970
Output 7% over that of 1970
Output 10% over 1969, record crop
No report
No report
Gross output of grain and cotton was a record
Output 30% over 1969 record crop
A record crop
Output 5.2% over that of 1970 A record crop
Output 3.0% over that of 1970, record crop Output more than 10% greater than 1969
Output exceeded previous record Output 10% over 1969, record crop
Output was highest yet Output 20% over 1969, record crop
Best grain harvest this year Output 20% over 1969, record crop
Output and yield best ever A record crop over 1969, record crop
Output greater than 1970 A record crop
Output greater than 1970 Output 14% over 1969, record crop
Good output of grain and oil-bearing crops Output 10% over 1969, record crop
Fairly good agricultural harvest a/ Output 30% over 1969, record crop
Good harvest a/ 33 (of 85) hsien fulfilled target
Good harvest a/ No report
Comparatively good harvest
Very close to that of 1970
Good agricultural harvest a/
Relatively good harvest a/
Grain yield increased compared with 1970
No report
All round rich harvest
Output 10% over 1969, recurd crop
Record yield and production
Output 20% greater than 1969
No report
Output 30% over 1969, record crop
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