THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, APRIL 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700070007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 1, 1974
• Content Type: IM

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1 94 -May 74
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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence Memorandum
The Situation in Cambodia A ril 1974
p
Secret
ER iM 74-7
May 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
r Classified by 015319
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption( categoryt
? 5B(1)i (2), and 3)
Automatically eclassiftad one
Date Impossible to Determine
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No Foreign Dissem
The Situation in Cambodia
April 1974
During the last quarter, the Khmer Communists (KC) launched their expected
major offensive against Phnom Penh, but it failed, despite heavy pressure on FANK.
Amid the fighting, the government's policymaking apparatus was reorganized, but
only limited progress was made in solving a wide range of military, economic,
and political problems. At the same time, the Communists began a diplomatic effort
designed to increase foreign support, but they, too, were beset by military and
political problems.
The drive on Phnom Penh stalled because the Communists failed to coordinate
their attacks effectively and were plagued by supply shortages. On the government
side, FANK was hampered by critically low unit strengths and command
indecisiveness, but their relatively more mobile ground units and air force performed
well. Both sides suffered extensive casualties during the thrust and have found
it difficult to replace those losses. Overall, however, the heavy fighting during the
first quarter did not significantly alter the military balance in Cambodia.
Late in the quarter, Lon Nol again realigned the power structure at the
government's highest echelons, abolishing the High Political Council and creating
a new Executive Council. To date, however, the change has had little impact on
the government's effectiveness. Some limited success was achieved in ameliorating
teacher unrest, and, by increasing stockpiles of critical commodities, the government
made important progress in one of its key problem areas. Little progress was made,
however, in coping with rampant inflation or mounting income distribution
problems.
On the Communist side, Sihanouk maintained his hard line on negotiations
with the government, but he was eclipsed by Khieu Samphan, who embarked on
extensive diplomatic travels apparently designed to improve the KC's political
standing and to garner additional military aid from Communist countries.
Domestically, the KC suffered a setback in the countryside as popular disaffection
with harsh controls mounted, FANK relocated 45,000 to 60,000 villagers from
Communist-held areas.
Note: Comments j i ries regarding this memorandum are welcomed. They
may be directed to of the Office of Economic Research, Code 143,
Extension 4121.
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ocret
1. This memorandum is the eighth in a series of quarterly reports designed
to review military, political, and economic developments in Cambodia and covers
the first quarter of 1974.
2. Care has been taken in the selection and processing of the data used
in this memorandum, but even the most authoritative information from Cambodia
frequently is unreliable. For example, military statistics covering FANK strength,
casualties, and other factors are based on largely unconfirmed field reports.
Likewise, the significance of economic data is clouded by uncertainty over the
methods used by the Cambodians to calculate their statistics.
3. Because of the method of disseminating field reports, some of the military
data for March were not received in time to be included in this memorandum.
The Military Situation
Developments
4. Combat activity intensified in December 1973 and remained heavy
through the first quarter of 1974. The KC's principal objective in the early fighting
was Phnom Penh, but following major setbacks there, they shifted their attention
in late February to outlying provincial capitals. Countrywide, the number of combat
incidents reached the highest level of the war in January (see Figure 1), while
activity in the Phnom Penh area peaked in February (see Table A-1 in the
Appendix). Consistent with past experience, about 70% of all combat occurred
within 5 kilometers (km) of major lines of communication.
5. Although the KC launched several major atta -,ks against the capital's
defensive perimeter, their failure to coordinate those efforts allowed FANK to
deploy major units from sector to sector to thwart each initiative. The most serious
thrust began in December and gained the KC a short-lived foothold near Pochentong
Airport. A subsequent KC drive in early January was blunted when a reinforced
FANK division was dispatched to the area, and by mid-February the KC were
withdrawing from their positions under intenr.11 ?ANK pressure after suffering heavy
casualities.
6. South of Phnom Penh, following a FANK retreat north of the Prek Thnot
River, the KC established artillery positions within 10 km of Phnom Penh in late
January. They then shelled the city with captured 105-mm howitzers for several
weeks. (One particularly heavy attack on 11 February killed 200 civilians and left
10,000 homeless.) After numerous delays, the three FANK divisions committed
to the battle moved south across the river in mid-February, and the firing tapered
1
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Secret
CAMBODIA: Combat Incidents
off as the KC withdrew. FANK forces defending the east bank of the Mekong
achieved similar success in quieting KC rocket attacks on the capital.
7. Following the KC failure to breach Phnom Penh's defenses, they changed
their attention to outlying towns in late February. The KC launched a major attack
against the seacoast provincial capital of Kampot, and by early March the perimeter
had been subs.antially reduced and the city was in danger of falling. FANK's
reaction to tFis threat was slow but effective, and the decline was reversed by
extensive rein, forcement, heavy air strikes, and effective fire and logistic support
from the Navy in March and early April.
8. On 16 March the KC launched a major, unexpected attack on the
provincial capital of Oudong, 35 km northwest of Phnom Penh. FANK pledged
to hold the 17th century royal capital at all costs, but despite an extensive relief
effort, it was abandoned on 28 March, after a fortuitous KC shelling destroyed
most of the garrison's ammunition. Subsequent to the fall of Oudong, the KC
overran FANK's beachhead east of the town and increased the pressure on the
garris.: at Lovek just to the north.
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9. As was the case during the previous quarter, the KC failed to mount
major, sustained attacks against Phnom Penh's most crucial line of
communication - the Mekong River. The first seven convoys of the quarter received
light attacks without suffering major damage. Subsequently, five consecutive
convoys were attacked in mid-February, but only one ammunition barge was lost -
the first since September. During the rest of the period, attacks were less frequent,
and only three of the nine convoys in March were harassed. (Mekong convoys
and the status of Cambodia's three principal highways during the last 12 months
are shown in Figure 2.)
10. Throughout the quarter, the KC maintained their relatively low-cost
interdictions on Cambodia's major land lines of communication. FANK made no
effort to reopen Route 1 to South Vietnam or Route 5 and, after heavy fighting
in January, seemed content to allow Route 4 to remain closed. Although one
convoy made it through from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh, the road was never
opened for continuous travel between the two cities.
Disposition of Forces
11. FANK, with an estimated combat strength of 110,000 to 130,000 men,
continues to hold a two-to-one manpower advantage over the KC, who are now
estimated to have a combat force of 46,000 to 56,000. (Comparative combat
strengths, by military region, are shown in Figure 3.)
12. The largest concentration of combat forces remains in the Phnom Penh
area, despite the upsurge in fighting elsewhere in the country. By pulling in
additional units and replacements from outlying areas, the KC have managed to
maintain about 10,000 troops around the capital -- somewhat lower than the earlier
peak of 12,000 to 15,000. FANK also has brought in reinforcements to the capital
area and now has a larger combat force there than at the first of the year (35,000
to 40,000 troops, compared with 27,000 to 29,000 in January). On both sides,
however, some of the best units engaged near Phnom Penh in previous months
have been shifted to other battlefields.
13. Reinforcement in this and other areas has been at the expense of Military
Regions (MRs) II, III, and IV in the north, west, and southwest. Both sides have
drawn on their forces there, and the KC in particular have drastically reduced
their strength in MR II to reinforce in the Phnom Penh area and at Kampot. More
recent movements have focused on the Lovek area, Prey Veng, and Kompong Thom.
Elsewhere, the KC can achieve localized superiority if they choose to, but they
are unlikely to mount a major threat without extensive redeployments. FANK has
the opportunity to exploit its manpower superiority in many outlying areas but
is unlikely to attempt to surpass the limited operations already undertaken to
expand defense perimeters or resettle population.
a
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ec
Figure 3
FANK and Khmer Communist Combat Strength,byFANK Militar; Region
thousands
l FANK 5-8 ouprp ~' h ?y Rump
\ KC'5-6
Gulf of.,
Thei(Snd
FAUA 6-8
_ Kempp p tn,mf3C 2-3
a ePnR
Phnom Penhdt` 0 nmpenp Pooh
ltpmppn0 i,.
Sptp: ts-FANIC40=~dP1er Ytny
FAN W20-24 KC 20 1.
KC 2-3 ~i i FANK
KC^6-
Total Combat Streng th~,
FANK 110.130 ; .;'.
KC 46 56
Sou
So,ah China
Sen
Cambodia
15 50 Yih,
75 5050 NRpmetu,
4
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SECRET Status of Government Supply Routes
(Second Quarter, 1973)
MEKONG CONVOYS
(Fourth Quarter, 1973)
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
From Phnom Penh
(Closed)
Rte 1
(Phnom Pont, to SVN Border)
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(Third Quarter, 1973)
OVEMBER
DECEMBER
First Quarter, 1974)
JANUARY
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AUGUST I SEPTEMBER
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