THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB OIL WEAPON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001900010074-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: December 11, 1973
• Content Type: MF

25X1
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73
1). December 1973
Cr: aThe Soviets and the Arab Oil Weapon
The attached briefing notes were prepared for the?DCI's Briefing
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) on
6 December 1973. The responsible analyst is
of this Branch.
The notes were discussed with the Soviet Branch of OCI and coordinated
I I
hie-,
International Energy F, Resources Branch
Attachment:
as stated.
Distribution: (S-5760)
1 - D/OER
1 - SA/ER
r---- ST/PC
1-Sid Z.
2 - D/I
3 - I/IE
OER/I/IE (11 Dec 73)
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'I'I(E: SOVII:'i'S A\NI) 'I'I(f: ARAB OIL W'E'APON
A. The Russians, have little or no control over the
oil weapon.
1. We have no evidence to indicate that the
Soviets had any hand in the planning or
implementation of the Arab oil cutbacks.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both states with
conservative, anti-Communist governments,
initiated and are leading the Arab action.
2. The Arabs alone will decide when to abandon
their embargoes and restore prrduction.
B. The Soviets appear to be of two winds about the Arab
oil weapon.
1. On the one hand, they see-some advantages
a. They welcome the split in Western
unity caused by oil cutbacks.
b. They applaud the reduction of US
influence in the Middle East as
reflected in the nationalization
of US oil interests in Iraq and
the possibility of nationalization
in other countries.
c. They profit from higher prices for
their own oil exports.
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2. On the other hand, the Arabs' use of the oil
weapon has created some problems for them.
a. Conservative, ;inti-Communist Saudi
Arabia has become a leader in the
Arab World at the expense of the
radical, pro-Russian states. If
the Arabs are successful in
achieving some of their goals
regarding Israel, more of the
credit will go to Saudi oil than
to Russian arms.
b. Communist nations are not on the
Arabs' favored list, and some cut-
backs in Arab deliveries to Eastern
Europe have resulted. Russia feels
obligated to maintain East European
supplies by diverting some of its
own exports from Western Europe.
c. The Soviets fear that they may be
blamed by West Europeans. for part
of their oil shortages.
d. The Soviets are concerned that their
support of Arab actions could have
an adverse effect on US-Soviet
detente.
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C;. Because of the reasons cited above, Soviet actions
and statements have been ambiguous.
1. In order to maintain credibility in the
Arab World, they have supported the Arab
action in the press.
2. They have restricted oil shipments to
Western Europe, but they are stressing
that,these restrictions are necessary to
supply Eastern Europe and should not be
considered. as support for the Arabs.
The Soviets are obviously worried
about maintaining their hard-won
reput.tion as reliable trading
partners.
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