REPORTED COMMUNIST COASTAL SHIPMENTS INTO SOUTHERN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001900010082-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: December 14, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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Approved For Release 2006/09/26 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001900010082-7
 Approve 7 7 ea 06 9/ 6- 1IA 85T00875ROO1900010082-7
14 December 1973
FROM
SUBJECT
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/SEA
chief, S/LM
Reported Communist Coastal Shipments
into Southern South Vietnam
1' ISouth
Vietnam's vationa olice seized four ocean-going vessels
and 14 members of a Communist transportation group which
reportedly has been operating a sea resupply system Communist troops in the Delta. 25X1
since a uary ceasefire
agreement the Communists have made regular coastal
deliveries of arms and munitions picked up from North
Vietnamese supply vessels off the northern coast of
Quang Tri Province in northern South Vietnam. The ships
used in transfering the supplies southward each had a
capacity of about 100 tons, a length of 25 meters, a
beam of 5 meters, and all were legally registered in
South Vietnam. In addition to the--four already captured,
police are searching for 7 other ships -- all owned by
the same individual -- which may have been used in suooly
2. This evidence indicates a strong possibility
that the Communists have been able to infiltrate a
substantial amount of supplies into South Vietnam's Delta
by sea over the past yeaz. Although no confirmed
successes have been reported recently, the high volume
of fishing traffic and the control by the Communists of
numerous enclaves along the coastline of MR-4 make
detection of off loading activities extremely di:.;ficult.
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 4. Despite their limited success over past years,
the Communists have continued their program with no letup
in intensity, and there is no reason to believe that they
have abandoned their efforts since the ceasefire. The
Communists' overland transport system into MR-4 remains
by a considerable extent their least developed in South
Vietnam,and one that is vulnerable to ARVN interdiction.
Moreover, Communist resupply requirements in the Delta
are small, and the relatively large amount of equipment
that can be delivered by one successful coastal mission
make this method extremely attractive. Finally, the
Market Time surveillance has recently been handed over
to the South Vietnamese, who probably are not as efficient
as the U.S. Navy.
25X1 5. The information on recent coastal deliveries to
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P0010082-7
3'. Historically,- MR-4 has been the primary target
for Communist sea infiltration attempts. Following the
initiation of the bI rkeL Time sea interdiction program
in February 1965, however, these attempts were largely
unsuccessful. Most missions were conducted by North
Vietnamese 100-ton trawlers, which sailed southward at
a considerable distance, from the South Vietnamese shore.
This made detections by air and sea patrols relatively
easy. Between August 1969 and August 1971 a 'total of
20 attempts were detected, of which 16 aborted, two
were destroyed, and two were successful.
MR-4 is generally
consistent wan o ier evidence receive urin the cease-
fire period. For example,
F IVi nh Binh Arovi nce f...,r, .,,.,,, .. ..
received reports that the supplies originally come from
China, and are delivered to coastal MR-4 by fishing
vessels which obtain the cargo from larger ships at sea.
6. In addition, there were several indications
that-the Communists intended to step up sea deliveries
to South Vietnam following the ceasefire agreement.
This desire was manifested in the attempt to capture
Sa Huynh in southern MR-1 during February. Also, the
Communists' control of the Cua Viet area in northern
Quang Tri and the high level of shipping activity
observed there support the possibility that North Vietnamese
vessels may be off loading supplies to ships involved in
clandestine operations in the south. Finally, other instances
- -- --- -..- .- - L W. L.'. L11CLt .L U- Uu.Lng
resupplied with weapons and ammunition by sea. He has
Approved Fo
 Approved For Rel
of Communist use of ships bearing GVN legal registration
numbers to deliver supplies to MIR-4 have been noted, although
these ships were considerably smaller than the 100-tons
vessels recently captured. This use of GVN registration
numbers would allow the ships to use corridors close-to
shore and mix with fishing traffic, thus increasing the
Communists' chances of eluding Market Time.
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 Approved For Release 2006/09
Distribution: (S-5774
Orig and 1 - Addressee
1 - D/OER
1 - D/S
1 -.SA/ER
1 - ST/P
1 - S/LM
OER/S/U1:I
Approved.
yI0 SEA
copy)
I (19 Dec .73)
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