SURVEY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000060021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 15, 1974
• Content Type: STUDY

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e up secret
Survey of Communist
Military Developments in Indochina
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SURVEY OF COMMUNIST
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INUOCIIINA*
(This report covers the period
August 1-14, 1974)
The Key Points
During the past few weeks, Communist tactical activity in northern
South Vietnam has surged to the highest level this year, and several
indicators point to even sharper attacks. A detailed discussion of
the Status of Military Forces in South Vietnam at Annex B
concludes that RVNAF is capable of coping with the expected new
attacks.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Department of Defense.
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This report summarizes evidence received during the reporting period of
(1) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward
and into South Vietnam, (II) significant Communist combat activity, and (I11) other
developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.
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Redeployments
3. A detailed discussion of recent NVA and ARVN deploymr;nts and the
military situation in South Vietnam are included at Annex B.
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H. Communist-Initiated Activity in South Vietnam
10. Military activity slackened somewhat in MR 1 during the past two weeks,
but picked up in the western highlands as the Communists initiated sharp attacks
in Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. Overall, Communist cease-fire violations dropped
during the past two weeks to a daily average of 99 incidents, compared with an
average of 125 the previous two weeks. The casualty rate for government and
Communist forces also dropped to a daily average of 44 and 191, respectively.
11. In MR 1, Communist forces shelled Da Nang Air Base on August 6,
resulting in minor damage and light casualties. They also captured a district capital,
Thuong Due, in the southern half of the Quang Nam Province on August 7 in
heavy fighting, which has caused heavy casualties on both sides. Government forces
have been able to contain the advances of the present NVA force structure in
the province. The Communists also launched ground probes and attacks-by-fire
against government positions in Quang T:n and Quang Ngai Provinces, capturing
several outposts and gradually eroding government influence.
12. Communist forces in MR 2 have increased their pressure on ARVN forces
in the vicinity of Plei Me, about 25 miles south of Pleiku City, through heavy
attacks-by-fire and ground probes. Government forces lost fire support base 711
on August 6, but recaptured it the next day. The segment of Route 1 located
in Binh Dinh Province, which was occupied by Communist forces on July 26,
was reopened on August 7.
13. In MR 3, Communist forces launched several attacks-by-fire against the
Bien Hoa Air Base, but caused little damage. On August 14, Communist forces
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launched tank-supported attacks against government positions in Tay Ninh and Binh
Duong Provinces. These attacks may be the beginning of an expected upsurge by
main force units in MR 3.
14. Activity in MR 4 was at a low level.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities
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 a new military command designated the
u; Region" - probably a reference to another corps - will be formed in
the coastal area of central South Vietnam. The "third corps" will include the NVA
2d Division, the 52d Brigade (reportedly scheduled to be expanded to a division),
and three unidentified regiments. The precise date for the activation of the new
military command and division is not known. Some reporting, however, suggests
that the plan may be completed by early 1975.
Communist Ammunition Expenditures Surge
in Late July and Early August
24. Reflecting the surge in tactical activity since mid-July, reported
Communist ammunition expenditures in South Vietnam jumped to nearly 1,500
rounds daily for heavy weapons during the past four weeks,3 as shown in the
following table. In contrast, Communist forces fired an average of only 430 'heavy
weapons rounds daily during the first six and one-half months of 1974. The
expenditures of the past four weeks, however, remain considerably below those
during the 1972 offensive, when Communist gunners fired several thousand rounds
daily.
25. The recent upsurge in ammunition expenditures has been concentrated
largely in MR 1, where roughly 60% of the countrywide total since mid-July have
taken place. Despite their increased firings, however, the Communists remain
reluctant to use their heavy guns - 122-mm and 130-mm field artillery pieces.
3? re not necessarily complete. The figures, however, can
b^. considered as a rough gauge of the level of fighting In South Vietnam.
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 Appro
Daily Communist Ammunition Expenditures
in South Vietnam, 19741
Region
Jan-Mar
Apr-Jun
Jul 1.15
Jul 16-Aug 12
Total
290
560
470
1,480
MR 1
50
170
70
890
MR 2
70
110
120
390
MR 3
100
200
190
120
MR 4
70
80
90
80
1. Including only artillery, mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle rounds.
Most of their expenditures continue -- as they have since the 1973 cease-fire to be mortar, rockets, and the lighter 105-mm artillery shells.
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May HCS Results
27. The population control situation in South Vietnam changed very' little
during May, according to the most recent Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results.
At the end of the month, about 82% of the country's total population (20 million)
was living in government-controlled areas - virtually the same proportion as in
April. Moreover, there was no overall shift in the percentage of people living in
contested (15%) and Communist-controlled (3%) regions. MR 3 continued to show
the greatest degree of government control (93% of its population) and MR 1, the
least (63%).
U. On the province level, sparsely populated Phu Bon in MR 2 showed the
largest increase in government control (13 percentage points), primarily as a result
of aggressive Regional and Popular Force activity in rural areas. MR 4's Kien Tuong
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Province registered the sharpest decline (10 points) - directly at.ributuble to the
NVA attacks directed against population centers. In coastal Binh Dinh, increased
Communist military initiatives caused a lose in government control of almost 40,000
persons, most of whom came tinder Communist domination.
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ANNEX B
STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. During the past few weeks, Communist tactical activity in northern South
Vietnam surged to the highest level of the year, and other indicators have suggested
even sharper attacks will occur. Even so, the Communists probably have not decided
to launch an offensive approaching the scale of their April 1972 effort. Several
other important indicators normally associated with such an effort are lacking,
including heavy, sustained personnel infiltration from North Vietnam to most areas,
the movement of NVA divisions to South Vietnam, and Communist directives or
propaganda suggesting dramatic escalations in military activity. It is probable,
however, that the type of fighting seen recently in Quang Nam Province will increase
and spread to other areas. A summary of the situation and outlook in each military
region follows.
Military Region 1
2. Thus far, the heaviest fighting has been concentrated in Quang Nam
Province, whcre both sides have sent large reinforcements since the initial
Communist attacks in mid-July. The Communists have now committed their 2d
Infantry Division and at least two additional regiments, the 29th Regiment of the
324B Division and the newly formed 36th Regiment, subordinate to VC MR 5.
Total NVA regular combat farrec in tt,,...raince now number some 18,000 men,
to tea es that the 04th Division is destined for Quang Nam and
that some elements have already arrived.
3. To counter the Communist campaign, the South '%\ ietnamese MR I
commander has moved the 4th Regiment of the ARVN 2d Division north from
Quang Ngai Province and the 54th Regiment of the ARVN 1st Division south
from Thua Thien Province into the Quarg Nam battlefield. 1 hey join the three
regiments of the ARVN 3d Division, which together with supporting ranger and
local forces bore the brunt of the initial Communist attacks. In addition, the
Airborne Brigade, recently assigned to Saigon, has been recalled to MR 1, and
another Airborne Brigade is being shifted to Da Nang from northern MR 1. These
reinforcements will raise to 32,000 the total number of government regular combat
troops in Quang Nam Province.
4. Despite some initial Communist success in Quang Nam, including the
capture of one district capital, ARVN has performed well thus far and now appears
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to have taken the steam from the Communist drive. The government's efforts in
Quang Nam Province, however, have weakened its positions in both northern and
southern MR I and also have deprived these areas of most of their reserve forces.
5. There are some signs that the Communists are preparing further tests
of ARVN's defensive capabilities in MR 1. For example, in early July the NVA
increased its threat to the area west of Hue, augmenting its forces there with two
infantry and one artillery regiments. The NVA now has a total of 20,000 regular
combat trc,ops in six infantry, three artillery, and one armor regiments in Thua
Thien Province and another 9,000 men in two infantry and three artillery regiments
nearby in eastern Quang Tri Province. Manning the defense perimeter of Hue, the
ARVN has a total of 32,000 regular combat troops, including one Marine Brigade,
one Airborne Brigade, and three regiments of the ARVN 1st Division -- one
Airborne Brigade and one infantry regiment fewer than they had several weeks
ago. In adjacent parts of Quang Tri Province, however, there are still another 13,000
marines in two brigades and 3,000 men in regional forces who probably would
participate in any activity threatening Hue.
7. Should the Communists fully commit the 304th Division in Quang Nam
and simultaneously open a second front west of Hue, the ARVN would be
hard-pressed to keep the NVA out of population centers along the coast. Barring
the commitment of additional Communist forces from reserve units in North
Vietnam, however, ARVN defenses probably would prove adequate in preventing
the Communists from seizing and holding major population centers.
8. In southern MR 1, the Communists have already taken advantage of the
withdrawal of the 4th Regiment from Quang Ngai Province by overrunning several
government positions. As in northern MR 1, ARVN defenses here are spread thin.
They consist primarily of the 5th and 6th Regiments of the ARVN 2d Division
and one ranger group, who are opposed by the NVA 52d Brigade and Communist
local forces.
Military Region 2
9. A situation similar to that in MR I appears to be developing in MR 2.
In late July the government's commander in MR 2 moved the 45th Regiment of
the ARVN 23d Division north from Darlac Province to the area north of Kontum
City in response to a round of NVA attacks there. He also deployed the 42d
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 Military Region 3
12. In MR 3 the Communists apparently are also preparing their forces for
increased tactical activity.
COSVN intends to initiate and maintain a fairly high level of activity in MR 3
through the fall.
ARVN
postponed plans to deploy a regiment and ranger group from Tay Ninh City to
Binh Duong Province, where the NVA 9th Division is operating.
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Regiment of the ARVN 22d Division eastward from Plciku to Binh Dinh Province
as the NVA 3d Division and supporting units launched a drive there against
government positions along Route 1. Although the situation in northern Konturn
is now under control and ARVN commanders are also confident they have sufficient
forces in Binh Dinh to push back Communist units, a major Communist threat
is developing southwest of Pleiku City, where government defenses have been
weakened by the redeployments. Several ranger bases have come under sharp attack
since the beginning of August,
1 1. The Communists currently have a total of 21,000 regular combat forces
in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, including the NVA 10th and 320th Divisions
and one independent infantry, three antiaircraft, two artillery, and one armor
regiments. Government regulars now number some 36,000 men, primarily in five
regiments of the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Divisions and four ranger groups. The
Communists' strategy in the highlands apparently is to eliminate a number of
government outposts on the fringe of ARVN's control, forcing ARVN to draw
its defenses around Kontum and Plciku Cities into a tighter circle. Given the present
balance of forces, the Communists probably can capture some of the government's
weaker positions and possibly position their forces for heavier attacks some time
in the future.
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13. Communist combat forces in MR 3,1 total
41,000 men, including three infantry and one antiaircraft divisions. Government
regular combat forces in MR 3 number some 94,000 men in three infantry divisions
and a large number of supporting regional units (see the order of battle map).
14. Any future activity in MR 3 probably would mainly involve the 7th
and 9th Divisions, supported by the 5th Division in Tay Ninh. The 9th Division
currently is deployed along Route 7 in Ben Cat District, and units of the 75th
Artillery Command have been tasked to provide support. The 9th Division is
opposed by four ARVN regiments from the 25th, 5th, and 18th Divisions.
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15. Although Communist units under COSVN have not yet launched an
intensified series of attacks, likely goals possibly could be to recapture An Dien,
to attack ARVN forces along Routes 13, IA, and 16 in Binh Duong and Bier,
Hoa Provinces, and to capture some population centers, interdict lines of
communications, and capture resettlement areas in Phuoc Tuy. Given the present
balance of forces, however, ARVN should contain the threat.
additional pressure could come from the NVA 33d and 274th Independent
Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province.
East of Saigon,
Military Region 4
16. While indications throughout the rest of the country show Communist
plans and activities aimed at a renewed round of attacks, there are no such indicators
in MR 4. Military activity is, therefore, expected to remain for several months
at the low level normally associated with the rainy season in the Delta.
17. At present the Communists have approximately 22,000 combat troops
in MR 4 opposed by three ARVN Divisions and supporting units totaling about
97,000. The expected low level of fighting and the disposition of forces in MR 4
would allow the ARVN to redeploy one division to MR 3 - if the situation there
worsened - without seriously affecting its defensive posture.
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