TURKEY: WINTER OF DISCONTENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Turkey: Winter of Discontent
DUCUWJT SEfl1!iS &MCH
HLL L
!-a NOT DESTROY
Secret
7 January 1971
aI.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 January 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Turkey: Winter of Discontent*
There has been increasing talk in Turkey in the rdst year about
the possibility of a move by the military to take over the government.
This Memorandum assesses the causes of discontent within the military
and the general mood of Turkey. Briefly, it concludes that, though
the discontent is real, and the military are likely to take more
direct measures to influence the regime, the odds 're against an
outright takeover in the short term. The odds will shorten with
time if the government continues to be as ineffective as it has
been in the past year.
* This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates.
It was discussed with representatives of the Office of Current
Intelligence and tha Directorate of Plans who are in general
agreement with its judgments.
GROUP 1
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dalaufflcallon
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1. Recent reporting from Turkey has highlighted the problem
of military discontent with the functioning of the civilian regime.
The military takeover in the 1960 temporarily propelled the armed
forces into the central role in Turkish political life. Because of
such factors as divisions of opinion within the military establish-
ment, the prestige of the remaining civilian leaders, and wide
attachment to the parliamentary process, the junta permitted a
return to civil government in 1961.
2. Nevertheless, the officer corps has since continued to play
an important part in politics. Especially through the National
Security Council provided by the new constitution, the senior
officers acquired a legal mechanism to press their views on the
civilian regime. With the additional device of electing successive
former Turkish military chiefs as President of the Republic, the top
ranks of the armed forces felt well entrenched in the power structure.
Partly for this reason, coup attempts led by middle grade officers
in 1962 and 1963 lacked broad appeal within the services. After the
failure of the second putsch, the top commanders took energetic steps
to shut off plotting among the lower ranks. Until 1969 the risks of
punishnient effectively discouraged open discussions within the mili-
tary establishment of possible moves against the civilian regime.
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3. In the past year or so, however, military discontent has
begun to revive. The main reason for disquiet in the military estab-
lishment has been the administration's failure to transact the
business of government effectively and to keep law and order. The
parliamentary process in Turkey has been in some disarray since
early 1970, when a group of more conservative members of the ruling
Justice Party (JP), long at odds with the majority of the party,
bolted to protest their exclusion from representation in the Cabinet,
by Prime Minister Demirel. Their defection posed a serious parlia..
mentary challenge to Demirel, leaving him vulnerable to concerted
opposition in parliament.* As a result, the JP government has been
unable to enact much legislation and has appeared to be floundering.
This was evident in the lengthy delay in electing parliamentary
speakers. It is also apparent in more substantive issues, such as
Demirel's handling of the opium issue -- a matter in which evident
US interest has aroused charges of American interference in T,irkey.
Today legislation providing for licensing of poppy cultivation
faces rough sledding in parliament.
These defections reduced DemireZ's support in parliament to
the point where in February Z970 his budget bill was rejected.
At present, after further parliamentary shifting, Demirel's party
numbers 228 deputies out of 450 in the lower house; not all of
these party members can be counted on to back Demirel in every
parliamentary vote.
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4. The officer corps is also concerned about what it considers
a deterioration of law and order in recent years. Recurrent student
disorders, involving clashes between rightist and leftist groups,
have led to disruption of higher education. The civilian regime has
found it difficult to handle these outbreaks which have s' n some
18 deaths in the past two years. Labor violence too has become
common. Demonstrations in June impelled Demirel to impose martial
law for several months to restore order. Particularly to the senior
commanders, the prospect of descent into anarchy is profoundly
disturbing.
5. Demirel's personal prestige has also been hurt by the charges
of corruption leveled against his family. Allegations that Demirel's
brother had derived a sizable profit from government favoritism
triggered opposition demands for parliamentary investigation of the
financial situation of Demirel's family. The Prime Minister has not
handled this issue with notable finesse. Instead he has used parlia-
mentary maneuvers to frustrate any real investigation of the charges,
thus feeding the suspicion that there may be some truth to these
allegations. Even the recent vote to exonerate him on this issue
has not ended the dispute. Parliament is already studying new charges.
6. A small but vocal group of civilian extremists have sought
to stimulate military disenchantment with the course of civil rule.
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Following the 1969 elections, a handful of leftist radicals --
civilians and retired officers -- began publishing a weekly Devrim
(Revolution) with the only scarcely concealed purpose of encouraging
a military coup. They apparently believe that even though a military
regime, particularly one led by the generals, might be initially
inclined to move against the left, sooner or later any military
administration would inevitably become leftist in outlook and give
them greater opportunity for influence than they can now hope to have.
Their efforts have been furthered by some young university faculty
members doing their military service. No doubt the suggestions from
these sources have contributed to the restiveness now visible in the
Turkish military establishment.
7. In token of the military di:q uiet, the chief of the air
force has twice in the past six months complained of the deteriorating
political situation. The gist of his recent letter of criticism to
President Sunay has leaked to the press -- adding new impetus to the
questioning of Demirel's future and the future of civilian government,
A New Year's message to the armed forces from General Tagmac, chief
of the general staff, emphasized the essential loyalty of the military
to the constitutional government, but also intense concern over trends
toward "anarchy." It is clear that the senior generals are disillusioned
with parliamentary bickering and inefficiency as well as with Demirel's
lack of decisiveness and leadership. Although these concerns are not
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sharply focused and lack any ideological definition, they raise the
question of what actions the officer corps is likely to take in the
political arena.
8. Within the military establishment two kinds of moves against
the government seem possible. On the one hand, middle grade and
junior officers -- whether of rightist or leftist tendencies -- could
attempt to take over the government. In fact, there is evidence that
some of these elements are already engaged in planning for this
eventuality. By its very nature, of course, plotting on this level
must be tightly held; there is no assurance that the US would hear
about it before an attempt was made. Yet there are many obstacles in
the path of a coup not led by senior generals: it remains difficult
to forge an effective and broad conspiratorial group of middle grade
officers without tipping off their superiors. As in the past, junior
conspirators would probably feel it necessary to seek to recruit a
senior general to use as a figurehead for any action. Moreover, no
clear issue has yet arisen around which a sizable mass of officers
seems likely to coalesce. Hence, all things considered, the chances
do not seem good that such elements will attempt a coup at least for
some time to come; the chances that a coup by these officers would
succeed appear even dimmer.
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9. A more likely prospect would be a move by the senior generals
operating within the chain of command. Indeed, the chiefs of the air
and ground forces have been reported to be preparing actively to inter-
vene to redress the faults they see in the present civilian regime.
The generals might also act in order to head off a coup by their
subordinates or to relieve the pressures they feel from below. The
military commanders have been particularly assiduous of late in
attempting to keep track of the sentiments and activities of their
juniors. The civilian intelligence agencies have been enlisted in
this endeavor as well.
10. Whatever its motivation, a move by the generals might not
be designed to thrust them openly and completely into power as in
1960. In fact, President Sunay's open acknowledgment of the present
restiveness of the senior commanders and his current round of consul-
tations with civilian leaders are themselves a form of pressure on
the political apparatus and a veiled warning of what could ensue if
the mechanism does not provide more impressive government. A further
step might take the form of private warnings to opposition leaders
to cease disruptive activity in parliament. Conversely, military
pressure of this sort could be brought to bear on the JP itself to
impel it to undertake a coalition in order to end parliamentary
paralysis or to take action against the right and left political
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extremes. Although the generals might be given pause by the lack
of any obvious replacement if Demirel should be brought down, they
might throw their weight behind some alternative civilian leader if
Demirel does not give promise of more effective leadership.
11. Military pressures of this sort which did not clearly go
beyond the broad latitude permitted by the constitution would be
tolerated by most civilian politicians. Demirel himself may, indeed,
be not entirely unhappy at seeing the armed forces discreetly flexing
their muscles. The spectre of military intervention -- which Demirel
himself has commented upon -- is sufficiently real in Turkey today
to strengthen his hand in dealing with his troublesome opposition.
This is obviously a two-edged sword, it risks provoking even greater
intervention than Demirel would wish. Nor is it alone sufficient to
cope with his mounting parliamentary problems. Nonetheless, it is
one of the few weapons available to him in his otherwise unpromising
parliamentary position.
12. While there is little that those outside the armed forces
could do to block any concerted action by the top military command,
we think that the odds are against any early take over of the govern-
ment by the generals. Those at the head of the military establishment
continue to respect the senior civilian leaders, especially Republican
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Peoples Party President Ismet Inonu, himself a former military hero,
who is strongly opposed to the ouster of civilian government. Moreover,
President Sunay, a former chief of staff who still evidently enjoys
great prestige in the armed forces, has recently gone on record
rejecting any solution that would violate the constitution. Without
his blessing, many senior officers would be reluctant to shoulder
aside the civilian regime; indeed, a major inhibiting factor continues
to be the desire of the officer corps to avoid a struggle or showdown
within the armed forces.
13. The generals also have doubts about the ability of the
military establishment to govern well. The top commanders are aware
of the poor showing of military rule after '1960 and the breakdown
of discipline within the armed forces which accompanied it. Furthermore,
the generals do not seem certain of exactly what they want to accomplish.
Moreover, the domestic situation, though disturbing, has some strengths.
For example, the economy seems reasonably sound after the devaluation
in August which stimulated a greater volume of emigre worker remit-
tances. In any event, elections normally scheduled for 1973 could be
held within a few months if parliamentary chaos appeared otherwise
insoluble.
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14. Over the longer run the prospects of a military take over
may increase. There seems little likelihood that labor and student
radicalism will decrease significantly. The radical left, which
generally has lost hope that the parliamentary process will bring
it to power, will undoubtedly continue to agitate the political
scene. These fragmented elements are fired by desire to reorder
Turkish society to increase the role of the state, to decrease the
scope for private enterprise, and to cut Turkey's ties with the West.
In time, their message is likely to become increasingly accepted out-
side the narrow confines of their present sympathizers, since it
appeals also to the elite's widely shared aspiration for greater
social justice. This ferment will further complicate the problem
of promoting efficient parliamentary activity.
15. Among the Turkish elite there is a broad undercurrent of
yearning for strong, decisive leadership. If this is not forthcoming
or if there is no prospect that future elections would produce an
effective parliament, the temptation to mount a military coup would
grow. And in this case, the constraints that we now see upon open
military intervention would have less force.
16. US reaction to a military coup in Turkey would probably
not be a factor of great moment in the calculations of the plotters.
Like elements of the civilian elite, some Turkish officers may judge
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that restoration of American military assistance to Greece demonstrates
once again that Washington does not oppose military regimes per se.
The senior generals appear to recognize Turkish dependence on US aid
and would seek to assure its continuance after a coup. They probably
believe that the value of US installations in Turkey could be used as
a bargaining ploy in this effort. The younger officers are probably
more infected with the suspicion of the US that has spread among
the younger intelligentsia in Turkey in recent years. They would no
doubt be far more prickly for the US to work with; their feelings
of national sensitivity might take precedence over the obvious
material benefits of maintaining close ties with Washington.
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