THE CHANGING REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110011-1 . 1_ 1. ,q,4 Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
The Changing Revolutionary Process in Latin America
Secret
23 February 1971
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 February 1971
SUBJECT: The Changing Revolutionary Process in Latin America *-
Introduction
1. The concept of revolution in Latin America, though
analyzed and refined in recent years, still leaves r,,rl-~thing
to be said. The aim of this paper is to offer some new
thoughts on the subject. In it we examine the underlying
forces at work in the revolutionary process, suggest a set
of basic propositions about its cnanging nature in Latin
America, and, finally, reassess the impact of the process
upon US interests.
This memorandum was propared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within the Central Intelligence
Agency.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
d~doutfeat,on
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Background
2. In the various estimates and memoranda produced in
this office in the past couple of years,* the position has
been taken that the endless succession of coups, assassi.a
tions, and public disorders within Latin American political
systems have seldom produced basic social change. Similarly,
except for Cuba, insurgent movements did not appear to have
played significant roles in the revolutionary process. The
established order seemed likely, in the short term at least,
to remain stronger than any revolutionary forces arising from
popular discontent. Over the longer term, it was thought,
mounting social and economic pressures, exacerbated by con-
tinuing high birth rates and growing urbanization, would lead
to revolutionary situations in some countries. In such cases
communist and other extreme leftist insurgent groups might
make common cause with stronger revolutionary elements. But
it iiid not appear likely that these extremist groups would
play central roles in the process.
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3. When and if revolutions did occur, it seemed likely
that they would develop first in the overcrowded cities. The
pattern would vary widely. Class origins would be largely ir-
relevant; the personal charismatic qualities of the leaders
would be the important criteria. Reform elements in the Church
and military would probably become more active as engines of
change. But regardless of the motivating force, anti-US
nationalism seemed destined to become an increasingly impor-
tant part of the process.
4. Recent developments in Latin America have generally
borne c zt these conclusions. At the same time, they have
raised new questions about the nature, strength, and direction
of the revolutionary process in Latin America. These ques-
tions are examined in the following paragraphs.
What We Mean by the Revolutionary Process
5. In all but a few countries, the process of change
naturally occurs more or less continuously. The rate and
nature of change vary greatly from time to time and from
country to country. The process covers a wide spectrum from
revolution to evolution. For the purposes of this paper we
think it useful to define revolution as a development which
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within a relatively short time brings about fundamental and
lasting change in the political and social structure of a
country. Thereby we exclude the familiar kind of superficial
Latin American coup on the one hand and long-term evolutionary
changes on the other. A revolution, in the sense we use it
here, may be brought about by forces using either violent or
non-violent means. But in either case it is sure to be a
drastic process.
6. The revolutionary process begins when new social
groups appear on the scene and demand a share of political
power. In the Western tradition these demands were strongly
influenced by a desire for political liberty. In the Russian
case they were impelled in the first instance by social and
economic deprivation (peace, land, and bread). In recent
Latin America history they appear to spring primarily from
social pressures stemming from technological ar,,. demographic
factors and abetted by growing nationalistic urges. As new,
politically conscious groups in traditional Latin American
societies become exposed through modern communications to the
growing affluence of more advanced countries; their expecta-
tions of a better life rise. But the ability to emulate the
industrialized nations is frustrated by cultural habits,
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difficult to reconcile with modernization; by primary-product
economies, not complementary to one another, but geared to
international markets largely beyond their control; and by an
established order whose legitimacy and resistance to change
is deeply rooted in the Iberian tradition.
7. The result is social frustration. On the one hand,
a growing awareness of what might be; on the other, a growing
realization that efforts to reach the goal have failed. When
this cultural-technological impasse is, in turn., subjected to
mounting demographic pressures stemming from unchecked popula-
tion growth and crushing urbanization, the revolutionary im-
pulse is born.
8. As the combination of revolutionary forces becomes
strong enough to challenge the established order, ruling elites
may either resist or adjust to the pressure for change. In
either case, their response will largely determine the depth
and duration of the process. Political structures may be
toppled, as in the Mexican and Cuban revolutions, or they may
merely be altered to serve new purposes, as in Pero'n's
Argentina and Betancourt's Venezuela. The change may be bloody,
as in Mexico and Bolivia, or peaceful, as in Vargas' Braz:.l.
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It may be rapid, as in Castro's takeover, or it may develop
in stages over a considerable period of time, as in Mexico.
The revolutionary process might stagnate, as during Paz
Estenssoro's second administration in Bolivia; or it might
be braked, as in Brazil (in the mid-1940s) and Guatemala
(in the mid-1950s). But it is unlikely to be completely re=
versed. Indeed, the momentum of widening participation by
new mass social groups in the political process is likely to
make it easier, not harder, to continue the revolutionary
process in later stages.
The Conditions for Revolution: A Theoretical Framework
9. Whether and how the revolutionary process occurs
will, of course, vary widely, depending on the political and
social institutions peculiar to each country. But certain
basic conditions appear to be necessary to get, the process
underway in any country. These basic conditions might be
said to be a function of social pressures generated by social-
technological change and of the ability of established govern-
ments to either accommodate or resist such pressures. In this
equation of forces the chances for revolution in any country
will depend on several interdependent factors:
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a. The degree of public awareness of and frustra-
tion over the failure of the established order to meet
growing social needs;
b. The availability of the technological and insti-
tutional techniques -- i.e., the materiel, communications,
and organizational skills -- needed to produce basic
changes in the social order;
c. The ability of the government in power to main-
tain public order and its claim to legitimacy in the face
of the social-technological pressures stemming from the
above factors;
d. ilnd, finally, the willingness of the governi,ient
to risk its hold on power by instituting reforms quickly
enough and of sufficient scope to meet growing demands
for change.
10. With these factors in mind, one might speculate that
the revolutionary process will occur first in those countries
in which social frustration is high and in which the techno-
logical and organizational tools needed to produce basic
changes are becoming available. If in such countries the
government refuses to use its power to meet rising social
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demands, the revolutionary process might end in a violent over-
throw of the system. If the resisting government's hold on
power is precarious, the upheaval could come within a short
period of time. This could happen, for example in Guatemala,
if the Arana government fails to consolidate its rule and neu-
tralize the extremist tendencies in that country. If, on the
other hand, the government is a strong on's, it might be able
to stave off a violent challenge for a long time. If in such
cases, the impasse between revolutionary forces and established
institutions persisted, however, the chances of a violent solu-
tion would probably grow. This La the situation which could
develop in the Dominican Republic, and possibly Brazil and
Argentina, if the present, relatively secure governments in
those countries fail to satisfy demands for political and
social change.
11. Alternatively, the revolutionary process might be
expect.:d to be non-violent -- but in the end Just as thorough-
going -- in countries where social frustration is h7.gh, where
the means necessary to produce change are available, but where
the government shows itself to be responsive to revolutionary
pressures before they reach destructive proportions. The
present regimes in Peru and Chile might be said to fit this
category.
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12. Finally, at the other end of the revolutionary con-
tinuum, there are those countries which, in terms of our cri-
teria, appear to have little potential for revolution --
violent or otherwise -- in the foreseeable future. These are
the countries in which there is relatively little public aware-
ness of the possibilities for change and in which, in any case,
the tools to produce change are still scarce. In such countries,
social pressures are not yet strong enough either to topple
the existing government or to compel it to produce changes in
the status quo. Paraguay and Nicaragua and perhaps Haiti seem
to fall into this category,
13. What we have been talking about thus far are the
basic conditions for revolution. To catalyze these conditions
into actual revolution -- whether violent or non-violent -- a
"triggering" element is needed. In earlier decades, when revo-
lutions were created largely from below by forces outside the
established order, the "trigger" was usually some charismatic
leader who was able to mobilize mass support around an emo-
tionally explosive event or situation -- e.g,, the massive
street actions in Buenos Aires which brought Peron to power in
October 1945, the wide-scale rebellion of Bolivian labor and
campesino groups which launched Paz Estenssoro's first
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administration in April 1952, and the cancellation of the 1958
elections by Perez Jimenez and the ensuing popular uprising
which ousted him from power and ushered in Betancourt's demo-
cratic administration in Venezuela.
14. In the sixties, however, this pattern began to change.
Instead of a Castro descending from the mountains with an armed
band to overthrow a bankrupt regime in the capital, we find
technically more competent, though perhaps less colorful, mili-
tary "organization men" like Velasco in Peru and hard-headed
politicians like Allende in Chile emerging to direct the revo-
lutionary process from within established governmental institu-
tions of the central city itself. As Latin America moves into
the seventies, the ingredients of revolution -- i.e., the social
pressures generated by social-technological change and the ability
and willingness of governments to cope with those pressures --
are likely to remain. But as Latin Americans become more adept
and eager to "get on top" of the process, the launching of revo-
lutions is likely to depend more on the deliberate plans of
determined men within established institutions than on the
actions of individual leaders outside the system seeking to
contrive or exploit a "triggering" event.
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Some Propositions about the Revolutionary Process
15. In the first two-thirds of the century -- roughly to
the mid-sixties -- the following periods and regimes are re-
garded by virtually all observers as full-scale revolutions:
a. The Mexican Revolution, from its destructive
beginning in 1910 through its consolidation under
Cardenas in the 1930s.
b. Paz Estenssoro's National Revolutionary Move-
ment in Bolivia after 1952.
revolution in Cuba from 1959 through the early sixties.
16. As we define the term, the following also appear to
qualify as revolutions:*
a. The radical political changes made by Jose
Batalle in Uruguay in the period 1903-1919.
b. Vargas' rule in Brazil from 1937 to 19145.
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c. Peron's regime in Argentina in the mid-1940s.
d. The Arevalo and Arbenz regimes in Guatemala in
the decade 1944-1954.
e. Betancourt's consolidation of a democratic sys-
tem in Venezuela in 1945-19L8 and after 1958.
17. Two additional cases have now become eligible for in-
elusion in this expanded list:
a. The pattern of change begun by Frei's "revolution
in liberty" in Chile in 1964 and now being acce7.erated by
Allende's more ambitious "people's revolution."
b. The military populist reforms of the Velasco
regime in Peru since October 1968.
18. In light of reports on recent developments in Latin
America, however, one or more of the following candidates might
also qualify over the next several years:
ru. Forbes Burnham's "cooperative" state in Guyana.
In the past year Burnham has established a system of
workers'cooperatives and has moved toward a more authori-
tarian, one-pr.rty system, a more independent stance on
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international issues, and nationalization of US and
Canadian bauxite companies. The mix could lead to basic
changes in Guyana's social and political outlook over
the next few years.
b. Juan Jose Torres' military government in Bolivia.
Caught between military pressure from the right and its
commitment to its original student and labor supporters
on the left, President Torres' "people's revolutionary"
regime has produced much revolutionary noise but little
action. How long Torres can keep up the balancing act is
uncertain. It is possible, however, that at some point
new splits in the military and renewed pressures from the
left could prompt him, or a successor, to back his re-
gime's revolutionary rhetoric with new radical policies.
c. Omar Torrijos' "revolutionary" regime in Panama.
Since taking power in a National Guard coup in October 1968,
Guard Commandant Torrijos has neutralized the political
power of the traditional oligarchy and tightened his grip
on the country. Though still without any clear blue-
print for revolution -- and still unsure about how far he
can go in asserting Panamanian claims to sovereignty over
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the Canal Zone -- he now appears anxious to push ahead
with social and economic programs which could lead to
basic changes in the country's political and social
structure.
d. Colombia after the end of the National Front
system. Though, unlike the three cases above, forces
advocating revolutionary change are not in power in
Colombia, there are signs that they are gaining ground
and will continue to do so. The country's National
Front framework for the established political order is
scheduled to be dismantled over the next two to four
years. At the same time, mounting social problems are
threatening economic progress and creating new pressures
on the Pastrana government. The near victory of Rojas
Pinilla's radical populist movement in the April 1970
national elections is already prompting politicians
across the spectrum to move toward more radical posi-
tions to maintain popular support. Out of the growing
ferment could come far-reaching social and economic
changes in Colombia over the next several years.
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19. If, in light of our theoretical assumption about the
revolutionary process, we now turn to an examination of common
elements among these past, ongoing, and possible future revolu-
tionary situations in Latin America, the following general pro-
positions seem to emerge:
a. The impulse for revolutionary change is gaining
momentum. In the three decades between 1930 and 1960,
though the scope and intensity of the process varied widely
from country to country, the rate at which revolutionary
change was initiated remained fairly steady: Mexico (the
consolidation period) and Brazil in the thirties; Argentina,
Guatemala, and Venezuela in the forties; and Bolivia and
Cuba in the fifties. In the decade since 1960, however,
and particularly since 1968, the pace seems to have quick-
ened. A growing awareness of the widening economic and
technological gap between the have and have-not nations,
and the failure of efforts -- e.g., through the Alianza
-- to narrow that gap, have left Latin America with un-
resolved -- and growing -- economic and social problems.
These, in turn, have produced mounting pressures for
political and social change from groups within and outside
the established order. In the early sixties, as Castro's
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revolution gained momentum in Cuba it provided stimulus
to the revolutionary impulse throughout the hemisphere.
By the end of the decade Peru and Chile seemed well.
along on their own revolutionary roads. Guyana, Bolivia,
Panama, and Colombia may follow. Local circumstances
will dictate the timing and nature of the revolutionary
process -- or the unlikelihood of its occurrence -- in
individual countries. But, overall, the chances of its
coming to fruition appear significantly greater in the
seventies than they were in the sixties.
b. The main impetus in the revolutionary process
is being generated within institutions of the established
power structure. In this respect, the Latin American
pattern differs in significant ways from the theoretical
revolutionary pattern often associated with Third World
countries -- a pattern in which a coalition of middle
class elements and an aroused peasantry, fired by unsatis-
fied social demands and strong nationalist feelings, rises
to overthrow a weakened ruling elite.* In the Latin American
See, for example, the revolutionary scenario developed
by Samuel P. Huntington, in Political Order in Changing
Societies, Yale University Press, 1968.
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process the peasantry is almost completely on the sidelines;
to the degree that the masses become involved at all, they
will be urban masses. Of primary importance -~s uhat is
happening among elite groups and (especially their
younger members) and within institutions which have
traditionally been the strongest defenders of the
existing order: the Church, the military establish-
ments, the professional bureaucracies. As such elite
elements, responding to growing general frustrations
in their countries, become involved as engineers of
change, they become increasingly willing and. able to
assume and use political power to further their objec-
tives. And this tendency is producing within the exist-
ing political systems a variety of new revolutionary
forces and views.
c. Political violence is more than ever a fact of
life in Latin America, but it is becoming less important
as a factor in the revolutionary process. Rural insurgents
in Latin America have proven to be remarkably inept in
their efforts to ferment revolution. For the most part
they have been contained and subdued by increasingly
efficient security forces over the past five years.
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Urban terrorists are causing serious problems in some
cities and putting new stresses on governments, partic-
ularly in Guatemala, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina.
Indeed, in Guatemala terrorist and counter-terrorist
groups are severely straining the fabric of society.
In no case, however, do such groups appear to be able
by themselves to topple the government or to overthrow
the established order. Students continue to challenge
government authority, through demonstrations and violent
activities and, indeed, are major participants in urban
terrorist activities, but they will not be able to bring
about revolutionary change unless they ally themselves
with elite groups within established institutions.
In most countries, pressures on government by organized
labor groups appear, for now at least, to be aimed more
at gaining a larger slice of the economic pie and
participation in the political process than at a revolu-
tionary change in the economic and social order. None
of the countries on our list of candidates for revolution
seems to be moving toward the goal by violent means.
Indeed, if anything, as governments and established insti-
tutions have themselves become more involved in the
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revolutionary process, they have, not surprisingly, tended
to dampen, rather than to encourage or exploit, political
violence, e.g., in Peru, Chile, Panama, and Guyana. In
short, though public disorders by extremist elements will
probably continue to erupt at the surface of political
life in most Latin American countries, the likelihood
of any group creating a revolutionary climate by violent
means seems to be receding.
d. Communist groups in ,eneral have failed to
influence the revolutionary process by insurgent or
terrorist methods. In early 1967 it was suggested that
the potential for communist influence and subversion
might be enhanced by conditions developing in, at most,
six Latin American countries over the coming year or
two. The six countries were Guatemala, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Bolivia, and Haiti (the
latter, as usual, was viewed as a "special case").*
At this writing, communist groups have yet to make sig-
nificant gains in any of these countries. This includes
Guatemala, where the issue is unresolved but where the
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