THE UK AND RHODESIA: LAST CHANCE FOR A SETTLEMENT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000110034-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 29, 1998
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The UK and Rhodesia: Last Chance for a Settlement?*
To carry out a campaign promise that he would
seek a settlement of the UK's long-standing dispute
with Rhodesia, Prime Minister Heath sent Lord Good-
man to SaZibsbury early this year to reopen talks
with the Smith regime. The talks have been low-
keyed and unpublicized: neither side wanted to
raise the sort of false hopes generated before the
Wilson-Smith meetings aboard HMS "Tiger" in 1966
and the"Fearless" in 1968. In the past few weeks,
however, it has become clear that the two sides are
closer to a settlement than ever before. On 14 No-
vember British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home
flew to Salisbury for a' critical phase of the nego-
tiations.
issues involved;
Whatever the outcome of the talks, it will
have implications for future relations among the
UK, Rhodesia, and black Africa; and we would hope
to take this up in more detail in a later memo.
Meanwhile, this piece is an attempt to define the
This Memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates
and coordinated within CIA.
U 1
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iz;^.d to touch on some of
those major consequences which would most likely
flow from a settlement, as well as those that
would result from a collapse of the talks.
1. In 1965 the white settler regime in SalisDury pressed
the UK to grant Rhodesia its independence. Zambia and Malawi --
the two other members of the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland -- were already indepo?ndent. It was abundantly clear,
however, that the Rhodesian petition was made in behalf of Rhodesia's
small white community, whose leaders sought independence as a way
of assuring continued white minority rule over the country's blacks.
2. In October the Wilson government reiterated the now-
famous "five principles", first laid down by Lord Home in 1964 when
he was Prime Minister, on which the UK would have to be satisfied
before gre.nting independence:
(1) Unimpeded progress toward majority rule,
as enshrined in the 1961 constitution;
(2) Guarantees against retrogressive amend-
ments of the constitution;
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(3) Immediate improvement of the political
status of Rhodesia's Africans;
(4) Progress toward ending racial discrim-
ination; and
(5) HMG satisfaction that the basis for in-
dependence was acceptable to Rhodesians as
a whole.
3. A sixth was added later by the Labour government: that
there be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the
minority by the majority.
4. The UK's declaration was followed by a flurry of proposals
and counter-proposals, none of which were mutually acceptable; and
on 11 November 1965 Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence. The rest is a chronology of failure. Wilson, persuaded
that Rhodesia could be brought to its knees in "a matter of weeks,
not months", applied sanctions on 12 November; UN sanctions were
applied a year later. Two interim meetings between Smith and
Wilson came to nothing; indeed, following the talks aboard HMS
Fearless in late 1968, the disagreement -- it was "narrow in
content but very deep", said Wilson -- was so great that neither
side thought it worthwhile to resume discussion. Prospects for
settlement did not revive until the Tories won the UK's general
election in June, 1970.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE TODAY
5. Since UDI the Smith regime has moved even further
away from Britain's five principles. The new Rhodesian con-
stitution, enacted in June 1969, established separate black
and white voting rolls, prcviding 50 Assembly seats for non,-
Africans and 16 for Africans. Representation of the races is
based on shares of income tax assessed each: as -- and if --
the African share grows, blacks are assured of larger representa-
tion up to a maximum 50-seat parity with non-blacks. According
to optimistic estimates about .raises in black income, the blacks
are unlikely to achieve parity under this formula in less than
200 years.
6. The Smith regime: also has moved away somewhat frcm
the UK's fourth principle, progress toward ending racial
discrimination. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 divides Rhodesia's
land almost equally between the 230,000 whites and the black
population, now grown to 4.8 million. The 1969 constitution
also eliminated judicial review of constitutional questions,
thereby removing the last legal obstacle to discriminatory
legislation by the dominant white minority.
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7. In spite of Rhodesian measures which widened the
gap with the UK, substantial progress seems to have been
made in the UK-Rhodesian talks which have been going on inter-
mittently during the past year. According to press reports --
no official resume of the talks has been issued by either
government -- Lord Goodman and 'pis Rhodesian counterpart
have moved toward compromise along the following lines:
(1) On "unimpeded progress toward maj., 'ity
rule": Smith has accepted this in principle,
and the U will not insist on any time limits.
The British want the Rhodesians to broaden
the bas -s of franchise to include the criteria
of property ownership and levels of education,
as alternatives to tax assessment levels.
(2) "Guarantees against retrogressive amend-
ment to the Constitution P? would include, first,
stipulation that amendmeits must be approved
by two-thirds of the elected African assembly
members; and, second, the Rhodesian Supreme
Court must review citizens' appeals on breaches
of the constitution or charges of discrimination
(presumably onl "legal" discrimination). This
would represent important concessions by each
side -- the UK to relinquish its review functions
over Rhodesian legislation (as outlined in the
pre-UnI constitution), and Rhodesia to place
limits on the whites' pcwer1s to change the
constitution.
(3) and (4) "Immediate improvement in Africans'
political status", and "progress toward ending
discrimination" -- are said to be giving the
most trouble. No formulas, either for African
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representation or for voting qualifications,
have yet been agreed to.
(5) "Genei'aZ acceptance of the terms of
independence" apparently is to be deter-
mined by a Commonwealth Commission. Ori-
gina ZZy the UK had demanded a referendum,
while the Smith government wanted a 'onvo-
dation of chiefs (who, not coincidentally,
receive their appointments and salaries
from the- government).
The two sides have thus come nloser together. But
III. THE URGE TO ACCOMMODATION: HOW STRONG?
A. Rhodesia's Declining Stake in a Compromise Settlement
9. After five years of sanctions, Rhodesia's economy is
alive and well. Economic growth has averaged 4 percent a year
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in real terms, in spite of two poor crop years. Exports, which
fell drastically in 1965-1966, last year climbed back to the
1965 level and beyond. Tobacco farmers were the hardest hit by
sanctions; they turned to other crops, however, thereby giving
Rhodesia a well-diversified, much stronger agricultural base.
10. Rhodesia's successful defiance of sanctions has been
due in no small hart to external help, particularly from the
South Africans, in acquiring such essentials as oil, and. in
arranging to sell Rhodesian chrome and other products under
false certificates of origin, etc. Moreover, West European
countries (excluding Britain) and Japan have bought increasing
quantities of thinly-disguised Rhodesian minerals, while paying
lip service to UN sanctions.
11. But the Smith government's successful effort to keep
the economy going in the face of sanctions has not been with-
out its long-term costs, some of which are only now being felt.
The severe drop in imports has caused a gradual deterioration
in Rhodesia's capital stock -- particularly railway equipment.
This means not only an ever-growing volume of deferred imports
as a future charge against foreign exchange holdings but, more
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importantly, a constraint on Rhodesia's future economic growth.
Rhodesia is also hurting from the scarcity of development capi-
tal and external loans. In July the finance minister predicted
a slowing in the economic growth rate. Rhodesian export earn-
ings, adversely affected by the slump in world mineral prices
and by the costs of evasion, are not growing fast enough to re-
plenish depleted foreign exchange holdings.
12. While these problems neither singly nor together are
likely to have a serious impact in the next 12 or 18 months, the
continuation of sanctions ultimately will suppress economic growth
and -,ring a reduction in white Rhodesians' living standards. Smith
thus remains under some economic pressure to seek an end to sanctions.
13. Smith must ze alert, above all, to (white) political
pressures; and here there may no longer be quite so clear a con-
sensus in favor of defiance. The first heady days of independence
have passed into a long winter of annoyance over the continuing
absence of normal intercourse with the outside world and over the
absence of luxury imports which once were considered commonplace.
For many, Rhodesia's prolonged role of pariah among nations must be
deeply dist>>rbing --- particularly because it has meant hostility be-
tween Rhodesia and the mother country.
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111. In Rhodesian politics, however, an understudy is
always waiting in the right wing. Indeed the Rhodesian right
already has begun twitching uneasily at the possibility of a
sella;it by Smith, and the Prime Minister has been criticized
in the Assembly for what he is merely suspected of being
willing to settle for.
15. Smith thus has to take account of two different
constituencies; on the one hand, those -- probably the majority
of whites -- who feel, for economic or sentimental reasons,
that an effort should be made to reach a settlement with the UK
and, on the other, the extremists of the right whose sensors are
alert to the least sign of capitulation. In fact, this is no
dilemma for Smith. If he can get an agreement that leaves intact
white domination for the indefinite future, all of his white
constituents will be content. If, failing to win such a settle-
ment, he breaks off the talks, the right will applaud his tough-
ness and the others probably will accept the fact that he tried,
and will hope that some future round of talks will find the British
~~t~c~pared to concede more ground.
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The UK's Position: Sanctions Are a Costly Embarrassment
16. The Heath government would like to put an end to the
annoying Rhodesian situation. From Heath's standpoint, there
is almost nothing to be gained in the current star-doff. Sanc-
tions cost money -- perhaps $100 million a year in toto -- but
accomplish almost nothing. The Smith regime has grown tougher,
The US -- the only other important country to take sanctions
seriously - now seems about to resume buying Rhodesian chrome.*
* The Byrd Amendment to the military procurcmeni bill, which
has now passed both houses of Congress, in effect enjoins
the Administration from doing anything to prevent US im-
ports of chrome from "Free World" -- i.e.,, Rhodesian --
sources. This will mean an end to US sanctions on
Rhodesian chrome, thus placing the US in violation of UN
sanctions.
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The Rhodesian issue fits the UN atmospherics very well, and a
number of the black African states would be likely to urge a
tougher posture, by the US and others, in response: to a UK-
Rhodesian settlement.
23. British recognition of Rhodesia's independence would,
of course, greatly enhance the status of the Smith regime, both
at home and abroad. The regime and its white constituency would
begin to enjoy the perquisites of nationhood again -- state visits,
professional exchanges, renewed commercial relations, etc., with
the UK and other European countries -- and no longer would feel
like international outcasts. The Rhodesian economy would soon re-
sume its rapid growth, although it would be many years before black
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Rhodesians would benefit much from this, Smith probably would
have a some'what'freer hand to oppose the racial policies of the
far right, at least for a time. A settlement would be a set-
back for the Rhodesian black liberation movement, which would
remain -- for the next few years, at least -- about as effec-
tive as it has been so far, which is to say almost nil..,
24, If the two sides fail to come to terms, what then?
Heath will be.able to say with honesty that the (Government
tried to reach an agreement, but could not do so without
compromising the five principles. It will be a disappointment
to the Tories, but pot a significant political setback; and it
will virtually rule out the possibility of a settlement for at
least the nr:;t few years, unless some unforeseen crisis should
cause one or both sides to move toward the other.
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26. In the event there is no settlement, the impact will
be far greater in Rhodesia than in Brita.in. The Rhodesians,
even more than the UK, will be seeking ways to end or ameliorate
the sanctions, as well as to gain recognition from other countries
and generally reach some semblance of normalcy in domestic and
foreign affairs. It won't be easy. Indeed, a third break-off in
talks, this time with a supposedly more friendly regime in
Westminster, could cause within Rhodesia's white community a
polarization on racial matters similar to that which has developed
among South African whites. The Rhodesians also would have no
choice but to continue their considerable economic dependence on
South Africa.
27. Rhodesia's blacks stand to gain little either way.
Neither an independent Rhodesia, with laws no longer subject
to British review, nor the extension of UDI for an indefinite
period, augurs well for black political progress. A settlement
would at least offer the possibility of outside influences
exerting some effect on Rhodesian white public opinion and
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government policies. In the event no settlement is reached,
tendencies toward a closed and highly segregated society, like
South Africa's, will be strengthened. The failure of the UK
and Rhodesia to reach an agreement also would stimulate black
African countries into more vigorous efforts to develop and
support Rhodesian black liberation movements; and more Rhodesian
blacks to look toward a violent solution.
28. In sum, a UK-Rhodesian settlement, even along the
lines Smith wants, would at least leave the door open a crack
to the possibility of peaceful change; but a failure to settle
will slam it shut for a long time.
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