IMPLICATIONS OF MADAGASCAR'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000120007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 27, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM _ _
Implications of Madagascar's Unfinished Revolution
CIA
OCUMENT SERVICES !RANCH Secret
FiLE COPY 27 1972
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 July 1972
MEMORANDUM
1
SUBJECT: Implications of Madagascar's Unfinished Revo'~ution
This office has seldom examined the problems of
Madagascar.) Indeed, for almost a quarter of a century
this island has seemed an exotic tropical paradise -- a
sort of Francophone Brigadoon -- with few problems, a
benign French presence and a pro-Western foreign policy.
But last month Malagasy students and workers toppled the
12-year old administration of President Philibert
Tsiranana. A temporary government dominated by military
men has agreed -- apparently with some reluctance -- to
administer the country's affairs until a new constitution
is drafted and new elections held. This memo assesses
recent developments, the prospects for a fundamental
change in Malagasy policies, and the significance of
such a shift for French and US interests.
1/ This memorandum was prepared in the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with appropriate offices in CIA, which are in agree-
ment with its principal judgments.
2/ Formally named the Malagasy Republic in 1960.
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Stability under the Franco-Cotier AZZiance (1947-1972)
1. Since 1895, when the French wrested control of Madagascar
from the ruling Merina tribe, the island's local politics have been
dominated by one issue: how to keep the Merina from again gaining
political and economic ascendancy over the island's 17 other tribes.
2. This has not been easy. The Merina -- the People of the
Plateau -- are the most numerous of the island's tribes (1 1/2
million of a total population of 7 million); they also are the most
adaptive, energetic, aggressive, best-educated, and richest. The
island's capital is situated in the heart of Merina tribal terri-
tory. Until 1947, the French drew heavily on the Merina to provide
local administrators. As if all this were not enough to evoke the
fear and undying hatred of the less-favored Cotiers (Coastal Peoples),
the Merina are largely Protestant in a land where most are animists
and Catholics, and they believe that their light-brown, Polynesian.
coloring proves their innate superiority over the darker-skinned
Cotiers.
3. Following a bloody Merina-inspired insurrection against
French rule in 1947 which cost some 80,000 lives, France began grooming
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members of the Cotier tribes to take over major administrative
jobs from the Merina. These efforts intensified as independence
approached. Philiber'. Tsiranana, a French-educated 6tier, was
chosen head of state. His Malagasy Social Democratic Party (PSD),
with close support from the French Socialist Party, swept
Madagascar's first national election in June 1960. After inde-
pendence France supplied some 1,500 permanent advisers to the
government, and sponsored a 3,200-man Gendarmerie, mare up of
loyal Cotiers, to offset the army, whose officers and men are
almost exclusively Merina veterans of the French army. The Cotiers,
with French help, soon monopolized top government jobs and sopped
up the sweet trickle of government patronage.
4. In return for French support, including budgetary subsidies,
Tsiranana's Cotier government followed a slavishly pro-French foreign
policy line, and allowed 30,000 Frenchmen to run the country's banks,
industries, and sugar plantations. The Mer-ina, though excluded from
the upper ranks of the administration, were allowed to organize polit-
ically, and continued to enjoy access to higher education and jobs in
the modern private sector. This arrangement did little to stimulate
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development in Madagascar's stagnant economy, but it maintained
relative peace and political stability -- until '1972. 1/
An End to CStier Dominance (1972)
5. The decline and fall of the Tsiranana regime probably
began with the President's third heart attack in 1970
In a country where politics have traditionally been
conspiratoriai,Tsiranana saw plots even where none existed. The
"plots" were never elaborated for the public, nor did the govern-
2/
ment prosecute any of the accused. Obsessed with such concerns,
Tsiranana instituted an increasingly authoritarian rule, devoting
little time to the country's mounting social and economic problems.
He nevertheless remained active in party affairs, and flagrantly
manipulated national elections to win a third seven-year term as
President ire January 1972.
1/ Until 1972 the only overt challenge to Tsiranana's rule was a
short-lived, bloody uprising in a remote corner of the island
by the Antezndroy, one of Madagascar's most primitive tribes,
in 1971.
2/ The last of these psycho-dramas was staged in 1971, when a com-
petent and ZoyaZ Vice President, Resampa, was jailed and the
removal of US.4mbassador Marshall and five other Americans
was requested, though no specific charges were levelled at any-
one. In gune 1972 Tsiranana admitted he had been gulled in this
matter, and threatened to initiate yet another hunt: to find
those who had falsely accused Resampa and the Americans.
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6. Meanwhile, important elitist groups in the capital were
beginning to air a variety of long-held grievances. University
students, in particular, had for several years been demanding
basic changes in the educational system. Many of their grievances
are real enough: professors from the Metropole insist on taking
long vacations, forcing students to cram for the all-important
"Bac" exam in 7-8 months instead of the usual 10. The course
content in the university is geared to the one student in five who
is French. History and geography courses feature France and Europe,
and the schools of law and the humanities greatly overshadow those
of agriculturp, medicine, and business. In addition to student
unrest -- which Tsiranana dismissed as foreign-inspired, Maoist
plots ??- there was a growing impatience among the populace, and
most noticeably in the capital, with the
performance of the President.
7. The immediate cause of Tsiranana's downfall was a strike
at Befeletana Medical School in the capital in January 1972. The
demand was for standardized medical training -- i.e., upgrading
Befeletana so that its degrees would have the same status as those
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conferred at Tananarive University's medical school. In late
April, after the government attempted to suppress the strikers,
all of Tananarive's university and secondary school students
joined the strike in sympathy, quickly broadening their demands
to include overhaul of the entire educational system.
8. Tsiranana refused to consider student demands. On
May 13 a mass student demonstration led to the killing of 25
students by Tsiranana's special riot police. This event, to-
gether witn Tsiranana's shrill threat on radio to "kill thousands
more if necessary" brought out the capital's workers and civil
servants on general strike. Rioting quickly spread to other
cities. Neither the army, composed mainly of Merina, nor the
Cotier-dominated Gendarmerie took active part in the fighting.
Indeed, both groups showed open sympathy with the demonstrators.
9. By 15 May, when the President at last realized that some
conciliatory gesture was needed to avoid civil war, it was too late.
His removal of the unpopular Minister of Culture and his offer of
immediate dialogue made no impression: the strikers demanded that
Tsiranana resign, and that the army Chief of Staff, General
Ramanantsoa, form a provisional government to rule until a national
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convention could adopt a new constitution and prepare for new
elections. A few days later Ramanantsoa took over, leaving
Tsiranana in place but stripping him of all but ceremonial duties.
10. Who brought the government down? On the surface it would
appear to be a straightforward tribal matter: the Merina, who make
up over 80 percent of students, workers, and civil servants, took
advantage of widespread student grievances and the President's clumsy
response to topple the Cotiers from power. But nothing in Madagascar
is straightforward. Although the student and worker demonstrators
were overwhelmingly Merina, the strikes and demonstrations were
planned, organized, and staged without the participation -- or even
the sanction -- of the established Merina political and labor organs.
For example, Madagascar's major opposition party, the Communist-
dominated AKFM (Congress Party for Malagasy Independence), is 90
percent Merina, and has long advocated a radical political program;
yet it stayed aloof from the strike and opposed the demonstrations.
The work,rs, including a heavy sprinkling of lawyers, teachers, un-
employed youths, and civil servants, in addition to railwaymen and
other trade unionists, by-passed the Formal (and predominantly Merina)
trad. -anion structure, even forming their own executive committee in
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late May to decide future policies. At about the same time the
students' and workers' strike organizations formed a loose
association.
11. Almost nothing is known of the revolutionaries' leader-
ship, organization, or goals. Undoubteily some of their current
leaders come from the radical student associations, both at home
and in France, which over the years have spouted slogans expressing
nationalist, anti-colonialist, anti-Tsiranana,and vaguely anti-French
establishment sentiments. Few, if any, are linked with the old
familiar labor unions or formal political opposition parties. Since
Ramanantsoa took power, the students and workers have not come
forward with a joint program, nor have any lists of demands been
made known. Splinter groups of uncertain representation have variously
called for educational overhaul, revision of the Franco-Malagasy
accords, an end to French domination, expanded relations with Commu-
nist countries, and expulsion of Indian (sic) merchants. There also
are hints that two separate radical programs -- the workers' more
radical than the students' -- are being formulated.
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The Military Regime and Its Prospects
12. It would be hard to find a group of Malagasy with better
credentials than the Ramanantsoa government for prudence, respon-
sibility, and administrative competence. Five of the 11-member
cabinet are military men, who have served with distinction in the
French and Malagasy armed forces. Five are Merina, and the remain-
ing six represent different Cotier tribes. The majority were educated
in France, and none are known to be anti-French or anti-West. For
what it is worth, when General Ramanantsoa was Chief of Staff, a
portrait of Marshall Petain hung behind his desk.
13. In most respects the present government has acted like a
caretaker regime, ruling without any clear program and without
much sense of political direction, and approaching the country's
problems with caution and moderation. To allay provincial fears
of a Merina takeover, Ramanantsoa has retained the Cotier ex-President,
Tsiranana, as a powerless figurehead. Ramanantsoa also named as mi li-
tary chief of each province a man native to that province.
14. Yet the Ramanantsoa regime has also taken some radical new
departures, particularly in foreign affairs. It has renounced
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Tsiranana's policy of dialogue with South Africa and cancelled a
major South-African aided development project. It has called for
revising the Franco-Malagasy economic, m.litary, and cultural
accords, and has privately threatened to leave the Yaounde Conven-
tion, which associates Madagascar and other Francophone countries
with the EEC. In mid-July the cabinet announced that it had re-
opened the question of establishing formal trade relations with
the USSR -- a step which the former government had rejected in
1968 after negotiations had been almost completed. The current
government's few domestic initiatives include abolishing unpopular
cattle- and head-taxes, and raising the basic minimum wage by
five percent.
15. In spite of their generally conservative inclinations, the
new leaders thus seem to be moving to appease the radical student-
worker coalition. This is understandable. The workers have made
it clear that their general strike is suspended, not ended, to give
Ramanantsoa time to "implement their demands". The students continue
to meet in private "seminars" to decide on future courses of action,
particularly at the scheduled constitutional convention. The strike
organizations remain intact, and demonstrators could be put back in
the streets on short notice.
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16. We do not know how far Ramanantsoa will choose to ,o, or
be forced to go, to maintain the support of the non-establishment
radicals -- the student-worker coalition. The students' and workers'
demonstrated political clout is such that Ramanantsoa cannot ignore
them. By keeping Tsiranana on in the face of loud cries for his
dismissal, however, Ramanantsoa has shown that he can reject demands
which seem to him to threaten national unity. Nor can we forsee
the results of a constitutional convention. Clearly diverse tribal
and regional interests would have to be accommodated for any new
constitution to be acceptable. This would be, at best, a long and
painful process with uncertain results. And there is always the
possibility that Ramanantsoa's taste for power may grow with the
eating, although there is no evidence of this yet.
17. Meanwhile, Ramanantsoa seems to be trying first of all to
reduce political tensions so that a constitutional convention can
take place in August, as scheduled. He released several important
political leaders* from Tsiranana's jails so that they and their tribal
constituents could take part in the political process now going on.
Among them Resampa, general secretary of the majority Cotier
party, the PSD (see footnote to paragraph 5) and Mona Jaona,
leader of the 1971 uprising and head of the Monima party.
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This is a gamble. It could lead to disorder, particularly in the
far provinces, where political support is often won by evoking
tribal fears and old enmities. But Ramanantsoa appears to have
the support of Madagascar's armed forces, including the C6tier-
loaded Gendarmerie as well as the Merina-dominated army, navy,
and air force. Moreover, the government's new tougher line toward
France and its slap at South Africa have broad appeal to the latent
xenophobia among many Malagasy.
Implications for French and US Interests
18. We can conceive of various contingencies arising which
could drive Malagasy politics rather abruptly either in a more
radical -- i.e., anti-French and anti-West -- or a more conserva-
tive direction. But such developments seem unlikely. It is far more
probable that the present Malagasy regime, or any likely successor,
will adhere to a "prudence model" of international behavior -- i.e.,
that it will weigh the likely gains vs. the risks of a given policy
and will refrain from rash or impulsive acts. This approach narrowly
limits the range of anti-French policies which might be adopted. It
virtually rules out a complete break with France, because educated
Malagasy -- the people whose opinions should weigh most heavily on
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governmental decisions -- are culturally French, and do not want
to sever their close ties with the former Metropole.
19. The question then is not whether to break with France, but
what sort of forms the relationship should take in the future. Every
active political group, both within and outside traditional Malagasy
politics, is calling for greater independence from France and revi-
sion of the incestuous 1960 Franco-Malagasy accords.* Revised terms
have yet to be formulated. The new government already has demanded
major changes in curriculum and a reduction in the number of French
teachers -- measures which the French tried to persuade Tsiranana to
accept more than a year ago. It is also likely that the Malagasy
will ask a higher price -- probably increased development aid or more
These accords, Zike those with most Francophone African coun-
tries, defined a broad range of post-independence relationships
in military, economic, political, and cultural areas. France
was given control over the naval and military base at Diego Suarez
and an airbase at Ivatovo, near the capital. These rights were
not formally extra-territorial: French and Malagasy form joint
units, and use the base facilities jointly. France, in return,
agreed to defend Madagascar against outside attack, and to provide
training and equipment for Madagascar's own armed forces, which
are under Malagasy command. Frenchmen enjoy dual citizenship in
Madagascar and, until a few years ago, French goods were given
preferred treatment on Malagasy markets. The accords also
provided for French budgetary and development aid, technical and
administrative assistance, and a decisive role in Malagasy
secondary and higher education. Madagascar's exchange reserves
and currency are effectively under French control.
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modern military hardware -- for French maintenance of its naval
base:. The base provides employment for the politically active
dockworkers at Diego Suarez: hence the prudence model would
rule out any attempt to force the French out.
20. Prudence also would make it unlikely that Ramanantsoa
will carry out his threat to sever Madagascar's association with
the Common Market. Loss of EEC trade preferences would cause a
sharp drop in Malagasy exports, some two-fifths of which go to EEC
countries, and would have serious economic and political consequences
for Madagascar. It is probable that Madagascar will expand its trade
ties with Communist countries, but these are not likely to cut deeply
into traditional Malagasy trade patterns.
21. From the French viewpoint, it is hard to see how recent
Malagasy developments, or any likely to occur there in the near
future, could strengthen French influence or enhance French interests
anywhere. Should the Malagasy win substantial concessions from
France, other Francophone states -- several of which are already seeking
revised accords with the ex-Metropole -- would be encouraged tc raise
their own demands. Similarly Madagascar's threat to pull out of the EEC
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comes at a bad time for France, which is trying to keep the
Francophone states in a bloc to strengthen the French hand in
the forthcoming negotiations over Commonwealth accession to the
EEC. Indeed, these concerns probably are more significant than
the direct French economic stake in Madagascar, which is not large:
direct investments worth between $65 and $85 million, and 15-20,000
Frenchmen employed in the modern sector -- primarily industry,
banking, and commerce. And these interests do- not seem seriously
threatened, in any event.
22. The US stake is even smaller. Investments are negligible
IIn a larger context, shifting political
winds in Madagascar are relevant to US interests in the Indian Ocean
area generally. To date Malagasy ports have not been of much
importance to the US, and are seldom visited by US naval vessels.
But the increasing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean,
particularly for the growing flow of Middle East oil through its
waters, could significantly enhance Madagascar's importance.
There is nothing to suggest, however, that even a radical Malagasy
regime would deny its ports to French or US vessels while opening
them to the USSR.
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