SPECIAL MEMORANDUM: THE SEPTEMBER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000150007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 8, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
The September Presidential Election in South Vietnam
Secret
8 August 1967
No 7-67
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8 August 1967
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 7-67
SUBJECT: The September Presidential Election in South Vietnam
1. The merger of the rival presidential candidacies of
the two principal military leaders, Chief of State Thieu and
Premier Ky, into a single slate headed by Thieu has caused
significant changes in the atmosphere of South Vietnamese
politics. The combined military slate itself is likely to
end military factionalism, at least until after the election.
Moreover, ache withdrawal of Premier Ky's candidacy for the
top post has lessened the prospects that north-south regional
rivalries will affect the coming campaign. At th 3 same time,
however, the joint slate portends a sharpened military-civilian
clash during the election period, and raises some questions
about effective cooperation between the two groups in the
future.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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Military -Jnity
2. The formation of the joint ticket, which was announced
in late June, reoi.ted from the efforts of the four military
corps commanders and the joint general staff chief. They
insisted that the Thieu-Ky rivalry, which was generating
increasing bitterness between th!' two men and between their
supporters, had to be resolved in favor of military unity.
The Thieu-ISy merger underscores the influence of the corps
commanders and a few other senior officers. The actions
of these men represent an effort. to ensure their collective
voice in any future military government, and somewhat reflect
their belief that General Thieu, who has tended to act as a
first among equals,will be responsive.
3. The merger has obviously -;oa impoicant implications
for Thieu and Ky personally. Before, General Thieu was
generally given little chance of winning the election; with
the military establishment officially united behind him, he
is now the odds-on favorite. Ky has of course lost none of his
current governmentP,l authority, but is quite concerned about
his status should the Thieu-Ky slate be elected. According to
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the constitution, the vice president is almost entirely
dependent upon the president for any authority. There is
apparently broad agreement among the leading generals that Ky
will have a "d?trong voice" in the cabinet of the future
government, but the details probably will be spelled out only
in actual practice. Should the Thieu-Ky ticket be elected,
it seems likely that rivalry betv;een the two could again
become a source of serious trouble.
4. Ky is already facing the problem of preserving
his political influence among civilian groups. His previous
success in building such political assets probably depended
to a large extent upon expectations that he would become
president. Ky in effect must now approach these groips anew
and ask their support for a Thieu-Ky ticket. Although Ky
is obliged to campaign for the military ticket, he has not
yet fully committed himself in this direction. Ky's campaign
organization, however, is a valuable asset to the military slate,
and by using it to help ensure a military victory at the polls,
Ky can probably enhance his ability to bargain for influence
in the future government. Despite his concern about his
future status and his suspicions of Thieu, Ky probably feels
he has little choice but to work for the election of the
military slate.
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5. The possibility remains th:it a residue of the friction
between Thieu and KY suppoxers dur,iag the past several months
will impede the smooth functioning of the military's campaign
organization. Nevertheless, a breakdown in military unity
between now and the election seemA unlikely.
The Civilian Contenders
6. In addition to the military slate, there are ten
ctfilian tickets officially erv',tered in the presidential race.
Some of the lesser known cand.`date.s may withdraw before
the election. In ar.? case, there are only three civilians whose
candidacies are significant. Tran Van Huong, a southerner and
a former premier, is widely regarded as the strongest of the
three. Phan Khac Suu, enother southerner and chairman of the
provisional national assem6'ly, is also respected, but he will
be competing for the same a,outhern votes a.- Huong. The third
notable civilian candidate is the Dai Viet party leader from
central Vietnam, Ha Thuc Ky. He is not seriously regarded as
a potential w-it ner, but he does control a fairly solid bloc
of votes which he could probably swing to another candidate
if he desired.
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7. In view of the military's recent move towards unity,
the leading civilian contenders may be influenced to work
towards corresponding civilian unity. Although it is now too
late to make changes in the actual composition of slates,
candidates can still disavo their candidacies and pledge
their support to someone else. Representatives of the lead-
ing civilian contenders reacted to the joint military slate
by agreeing not to criticize each other's candidacies, but
reportedly went no further in terms of mutual cooperation.
However, should they arrive at the joint conclusion that they
stand no chance of winning as individual candidates and that
a future military government offers them little, if any voice,
they might opt for some kind of coalition among themselves.
For example, if either Phan Khac Suu and Ha Thuc Ky withdrew
their candidacies in favor of fl^rmer premier Tran Van Huong,
he would pose a serious challenge to the military ticket.
If both withdrew in favor of Huong, the election would then
become a virtual two-man contest, and it would be even more
sharply defined as a clash between civilians and the military.
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The Pre-Election Period
8. What course the civilians do fellow depends to a
great extent on the climate of their relations with the
military during the next month. Over the past year, military-
civilian frictions have not prevented the formulation of a
constitution or agreement on electoral laws. However, mutual
suspicions caused several, near crises during the process.
In addition, there is a considerable difference tatween
agreeing on ground rules and actually selecting a president.
9. Political excitement is bound to rise in any event,
since a large segment of the Vietnamese elite will be deeply
immersed in politics until the election. For example, there
are nearly 500 candidates for the 60-man senate, which will be
elected concurrently with the president. Included in this
total are many high ranking civil servants, over 50 military
officers, and a majority of the current provisional assembly.
Ordinary, day-to-day issues which arise in such a highly
charged political atmosphere are bound to be magnified and
distorted, and some will certainly tax the political talents
and wisdom of the government during the campaign period.
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10. The actual campaigns of the various civilian
presidential candidates will most likely be based on general
opposition to the continuation of the military government,
and will probably devote little attention to other competing
civilians. The military will be attacked for existing problems,
such as corruption and inflation. The military will of course
try to discourage votes for civilian candidates by stressing
the fact that the armed forces must play a leading role in
present day Vietnam.
11. The question of'which candidate is likeliest to
bring about a satisfactory end to the war, however, could
emerge as the central underlying theme of the campaign.
Tran Van Huong in particular is likely to hammer at the point
that only a broadly based civilian government can win the
peace, implying that a vote for the military is a vote for
more war. Huong will probably not offer any radical or unique
peace formula, but by championing the cause of peace and
putting the military on the defensive, he could score some
sizable gains among the voters.
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12. The election could also be influenced by the Viet
Cong and by the militant Buddhists of central Vietn::an. Last
year, Viet Cong propaganda and threats had little effect on
the Constituent Assembly elections. It is not yet clear
whether they will employ the same tactics -- which would
probably be no more successful than last year -- or try a new
approach this ti:ue, possibly including the use of such
clandestine assets as they may have within the non-Communist
framework. Tri Quang's Buddhists have remained relatively
inactive since last year's "struggle" movement, but they remain
a formidable force in Central Vietnam. If Quang does take
an active role, however, he will undoubtedly oppose the
military ticket.
13. As things now stand, the military slate has to be
the favorite in the coming election because of its large
and relatively united organization, the finances available
to it, and its control cf the government. However, it is not
unbeatable, and the civilian candidates will in any event
play a key role in the election process. Even if the civilians
do not unite, there is just enough uncertaiuity about the
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strength of military unity and enough uncommitted groups of
voters to make for some fluidity.
14. The chances that the election will be held on schedule
appear fairly good. The generals would probably consider
postponing the election only if they felt their chances at
the polls were so poor that even extralegal pressures would
not tip the voting in their favor. It is conceivable that
such a situation might develop, but not likely.
15. We can be less confident about the chances for
fair elections. If the leading civilians continue to pursue
their individual candidacies and no crisis develops, the
military slate should be able to win honestly. However, an
attempt by the civilian candidates to unite would probably
cause the military to react by exerting questionable pressures.
If unfair tactics by the military began to affect campaigning
seriously, the civilian contenders might withdraw in protest,
thus rendering the election largely meaningless. If illegal
tactics were employed on election day or immediately prior
to it, the civilians could refuse to acknowledge the results,
and instead charge fraud. Even if the civilians do not
unite, the generals may tend to underestimate their own prospects
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and thus feel compelled to exert unnecessary pressures.
Additionally, some province chiefs and other local government
officials may independently become overzealous and
ultimately do more damage than good. Further complicating the
general issue is the possibility that the elections may be
widely regarded as having been unfair even though the military
leaders make no deliberate efforts in this direction.
16. Whether or not it were well-founded, a general
belief that the elections were rigged would thwart the major
purpose of constitutional development--- that of establishing
a legitimate mandate for the government which in turn would
improve its prospects for rallying popular participation
and support. To dispell such suspicions, the civilian
contenders at a minimum would have to acknowledge tacitly
that the elections were fair, and the constituent assembly --
now acting as a provisional legislature -- would have to
ratify the election results without reflecting much doubt.
E'd'en more effective would be the appointment of the candidate
who runs second as prime minister since it would considerably
strengthen the government's claim to legitimacy. There
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are, however, many problems -- including the question of military
rivalries after the election .-- which are standing in the way
of such a development, and it constitutes little more than
a possibility at this point.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1A
Acting Chairman
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