THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 21, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret 39
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
The USSR and Eastern Europe
Secret
21 March 1968
No. 6-68
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 March 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 6-68
SUBJECT: The USSR and Eastern Europe
SUMMARY
A. Eastern Europe is alive with political movement once
again. Recent weeks have seen the overthrow of the established
"conservative" order in Czechoslovakia, the outbreak of
widespread student violence in Poland, and an open clash between
Romania and the USSR at Budapest. While all these develop-
ments have had essentially anti-Soviet implications, the
pattern of events in each of these three countries varies cow.
siderably. The newly dominant forces in the Czechoslovak party
are committed to substantial internal reform and a more independent
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence.
GROUP 1
Excluded from eutomatic
downgrading and
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course in foreign policy. Party leaders in Warsaw, thoLgh other-
wise divided into contesting factions, seem uniteA in their
determination to oppose popular demands for similar changes in
Polish policies. And the regime in Romania, though also hostile
to liberal reform, is largely free of any such domestic pressures
and concentrates instead on its running baztle for independence
from the Soviet Union.
B. The odds are against any explosion in Eastern Europe
comparable to that which occurred in 1956. Political circum-
stances and public moods have changed greatly in the intervening
years. There is now a real prospect that Czechoslovakia will be
able to set itself on a path denied to it in the past, toward a
meaningful degree of liberty at home and sovereignty abroad and
eventually a place of its own, somewhere between East and west.
C. It is true nonetheless that a restive nationalism,
reminiscent of 1956, is an ingredient common to the most
dramatic recent developments in Eastern Europe. It is true
also that, as in Hungary in 1956, a popular uprising would almost
certainly be a spontaneous event and thus would be essential4
unpredictable. Some of the unusual political conditions which
existed in Hungary before the revolution are visible today in
Czechoslovakia, and the flash point could yet be reached.
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D, Among the Soviet leaders, there is probably considerable
apprehension about idle trend of events in Eastern Europe and per-
haps some disagreement as well. Beyond this, however, the Soviet
attitude remains somewhat obscure. Moscow has lost its man in
Prague (Novotny) but has not adopted a clear attitude toward his
successor (Dubcek). The Soviets apparently were not displeased
to see the Romanians walk out of the Budapest conference, which
suggests that they may adopt a less conciliatory approach to the
Romanian problem. They might resort to heavier political pressures,
subversive efforts and economic blackmail in an attempt to curb
Czech or Romanian excesses, but they probably have little con-
fidence that such methods would prove very effective.
E. Should events gat completely out of hand in Eastern
Europe -- e.g., a complete collapse of Communist authority in
Czechoslovakia -- the Soviets would, of course, once more face
the hard choice of whether or not to intervene with troops. Though
they would be even more reluctant to Co so than they were in
1956, in the end they would probably decide that they could not
tolerate such a setback and would intervene. They might think this
feasible, however, only if their supporters in Prague first
succeeded in provoking violence,
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DISCUSSION
1. The great post-Hungarian settlement in Eastern Europe --
so painfully improvised and constructed in the wake of the events
of 1956 -- is today ea the verge of dissolution. Romania, long
the Bloc maverick, has dramatized its denial of Soviet hegemony
over its foreign policies by stalking out of the Communist con-
ference in Budapest. Czechoslovakia, for years the docile ally,
has successfully defied the USSR and is now cmbarking on a new
and much more nationalist road. And Poland, under Gomulka the prime
example of the proper Soviet ally, could be ignited by a shower of
sparks from neighboring Czechoslovakia. To the leaders in Moscow,
especially to men such as Rrezhnev and Suslov,, whose political
fortunes at home will not remain untouched by the course of events
in Eastern Europe, the picture must appear bleak indeed. By
the same token, the temptation to intervene forcefully may become
very strong.
Shades of 156
2. It is over eleven years since the revolution in Hungary
and the political upheaval in Polend. Much has changed in Eastern
Europe and in the world in that time, and the present situation
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should not be seen as one likely to produce merely a repeat per-
formance. The situation today is vastly more complex. In 1956,
the countries of Eastern Europe, taking advantage of the throes
of de-Stalinization in the USSR, reacted against Stalinism and
the Stalinist bonds which held them in thrall to Moscow. Each
state, of course, behaved in its own fashion, but everywhere the
issues were essentially the same and, in Poland and Hungary,
it seemed for a time to be a case of nationalist heroes V5.
Moscovite villains.
3. IL 1968, though tne spirit of Stalin is in some instances
still alive, and though the name of Stalin is still inveighed
in partisan cause, the issues are more diffuse and the political
situations in the various countries are more complicated.
The heroes are less conspicuous -- Dubeek does not seem an entirely
suitable replacement for Imre Nagy. The villians are also less
obvious. The Rakosis -- the brutal and heavy-handed local
Stalins -- are gone, and (Ulbricht aside) the Rokossovskys
the visible Soviet agents at the highest levels -- are gone too.
The national leaders, even the loyal Gomulkas and Kadars, are for
the most part precisely that. The politicians now quarrel over
the kind of support, if any, to give to the Soviet Union in its
struggle with China, the treatment accorded the Hungarian minority
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in Romania, and the most desirable timing for diplomatic recognition
of the Federal Republic of Germany, all matters of substance
quite inconceivable in Stalin's time. For their part, the people
at large probably feel that they now have some stake in the pre-
servation of public order and may in general be in a better frame
of mind -- they now eat more and suffer less at the hands of the
secret police.
4, Finally, Europe as a whole has changed greatly since 1956.
West Germany has framed new and more flexible policies toward
the East. And many of the East European states, moved by economic
considerations and encouraged by the USSR's own policies of
detente, see in improved relations with West Germany and Western
Europe an opportunity to lessen their dependence on Moscow and
ultimately- a chance to participate as sovereign equals in a
community of Europe. Thus there is now in view a plausible
alternative to perpetual Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, a
prospect which was not at all visible in 1956.
5. In some ways, the differences between 1956 and today could
work to keep matters from reaching the flash point. In Romania,
the party is united, is firmly in control, and is not opposed by
the people. In Poland, the party -- though otherwise divided --
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appears at least to be united against the demands for liberal
reform. In Czechoslovakia, the protesters are not simply beating
their heads against Soviet and local Communist obduracy and
stupidity; with Novotny removed, the dominant force within the
party appears to be seriously intent on reform and thus enjoys
meaningful public support. Moreover, among many patriots (perhaps
especially in Czechoslovakia) there is now the feeling, based on
the experiences of 1956 and what has happened since within the
Communist movement, that their cause will surely win in the end
if it is in the meantime pursued with persistence and patience but
not with passion.
6. There are, however, some notable similarities between
1956 and 1968. In both years, the roots of discontent have
flourished in nationalist soils enriched quite inadvertently by
the Soviet Union. In both years much of the ferment was stirred
up by intellectuals, in and out of the parties, and by students,
intolerant of compromise. In both years, the way was shown, in
spirit if not in letter, by countries which had already success-
fully defied the USSR, Yugoslavia in 1956 and Romania in 1968.
And, finally, in both years, the USSR was ruled not by a single,
purposeful leader but by a collective of concerned and uncertain
men.
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7. The situation today may thus be building toward a situation
comparable to that of, say, the spring and summer of 1956. The
arguments being joined today in Eastern Europe are potentially explo-
sive; they are ultimately concerned not with the degree of Soviet
control and the degree of popular freedom, as in 1956.* On the
contrary, the purport of the Romanian experiment is the termination
of Soviet control, and the issue in Czechoslovakia is democracy
in the Czech tradition, not merely in some hybrid Marxist-Leninf.ct
form. Moreover, as demonstrated by student riots in Poland and the
public outcry in Czechoslovakia, these societies are in a state
of great agitation. As in 1956, emotions are running high and
are spilling over into neighboring states.
8. Czechoslovakia. From the look f.4: things at the moment,
It is tempting to conclude that only the thin red line of Novotny
and his cohorts now stands between Czechoslovakia and freedom.
Even without the USS, looming massively in the background, it is
not, of course, quite that simple. Novotny's resignation -- which
now seems likely -- would represent another grave setback for
* Except, of course, for those few hectic and heady days in
Budapest when a free Hungary withdrew from the Warsaw Pa .t.
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the forces of conservatism but it wculd not necessarily mark their
final defeat. Some of the current exuberance in Prague should
probably be discounted as only the natural outgrowth of a sudden
(and perhaps temporary) removal of tight censorship; one is un-
happily reminded of the out-pourings of conscience and the mis-
guided enthusiasms of the "revisionists" in the first flush of
the Gomulka triumph in Poland in 1956. The people have so far
displayed good temper, but if their high hopes were suddenly
dashed, the mood could become ugly, even violent. It is true
nonetheless that the omens so far are that the Dubcek regime is
seeking to effect reforms without unleashing uncontrollable popular
demands. At present, there is reason to foresee significant
changes in the quality of the regime at home and promising develop-
ments in its policies abroad. At a minimum, barring a rush toward
anarchy and an unexpected return of the conservatives, Moscow's
relations with Prague will probably never again rest on an easy
assumption of ready Czechoslovak compliance.
9. Poland. There have long been wheels within wheels in
the confused and tight little world of Polish politics. In some
ways, this has perhyps made Gomulka's task all the easier; only
he has been able to spin these wheels more or less in the same
direction when national momentum seemed to require it. More and
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more of late, however, he has found that the track he has chosen
to follow -- straight down the Soviet line -- is of little liking
to elements in the party. More important, perhaps, are the
current signs that political strife is no longer confined to the
party. Gomulka's policies have finally provoked the students
and, at least for a time, the intellectuals to move with courage
and determination. It may be that a long period of popular
acquiescence and apathy is coming to an end.
10. For years, the Polish regime has been sustained by a
general feeling that Gomulka, while a disappointment, was probably
the best olis could hope for under the circumstances. Now,
apparently, two things are happening. First, Gomulka is severely
compromising his awn reputation as a patriot and some Poles
though probably unclear as to what the alternatives might be
01111,
are wondering if some other leader should not be tested. Second,
and certainly related, the circumstances which seemed to require
Gomulka's special abilities to nandle the Soviets may in the public
mind be changing; students and intellectuals, for example, may
be coming to feel that, as Poles, they can hardly do less than
the Czechs and the Romanians, nd that the time is now ripe for e
new try against the Russians,
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11. Romania. The scene in Romania i, of course, quite
different, comparable in some ways to thct in Belgrade in the early
19501s: a domestic stability resting very largely on popular
support of the regime's defiance of the Soviet Union. This is
nationalism turned to Communist advantage, and it is no doubt a
lesson widely dbcerved elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In any case,
mainly because of this nationalisms to ponder what next in Romania
is often to consider the far-fetched. It often seems that the
Romanians have gone about as far as they can go; just as often,
of ccurse, the observer may be surprised. It is now clear that --
beyond the n:quirements of a simple prudence -- the Romanians have
never set any particular limits, on what they plan to do;
it is the Soviets who must set the limits, or at least try.
The Ceausescu regime, in fact, considers the USSR in many ways
to be the chief obstacle to the achievement of Romania's national
goals and behaves accordingly.
12. That is to say:, there is more to Romanian ambitions than
the straightforward achievement of national independence (which
has for the most p,rt already been accomplished in any case).
Bucharest also acts at times in ways which undercut Soviet policies
in areas only very indirectly related to the question of its
sovereignty. (This seems to be the case, for example, in the
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Middle East.) And in instances of some bearing on the question of
independence, such as its policies in Eastern Europe, Bucharest's
resolve is not simply to min its autonomy but to protect, advertise,
and expand it. Bucharest refuses to join in the campaign against
China, not because it likes the Chinese or sees other than madness
in the cultural revolution, but because Mao -- mad or not -- is a
useful counterweight to Brezhnev. Ceausescu and company would like
other Eastern countries to follow the Romanian lead, and welcome
signs of incipient Czechoslovak support, not out of any concern
for the purity of doctrine and the future of the cause, but largely
because this seems a good way to embarrass Moscow, complicate its
policies, and forestall its plans, if any, to set things aright.
The Soviets
13. There is sirply no sur? way of knowing at this point
just how alarmed the Soviets mit-fit be about the trends of events
in Eastern Europe. For all their awareness of the dangers of
nationalism and probable anxieties over current upsets, some of
the Soviet leaders are probably still given to rationalization
and some may still be half blinded by an ideology which discourages
the perception of socialist serbacks. Nevertheless, as indicated
earlier, the Soviets can scarcely derive any comfort from what is
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now taking place. Soviet preferences in Czechoslovakia, for
example, were quite clearly rebuffed and, according to some
accounts, direct Soviet efforts in Prague to enforce those pre-
ferences were just as clearly defeated.
14. Perhaps athe best clue we now have as to current Soviet
preferences was the USSR's behavior during the recent Communist
conference in Budapest. The Soviets at Budapest were little
inclined to calm or negotiate with the Romanians; in some ways,
in fact, it seemed that the Soviets egged the Romanians on and
were not at all displeased with their departure. It may be too
early to read in this attitude a firm declaration of Soviet
policy, but years of compromise and of diffident attempts to
pressure the Romanians into a more "constructive" course have
brought the Soviets naught. It is beginning to look as if the
Soviets feel that a smaller unified bloc of parties -- capable
of issuing resounding communiques on a variety of subjects and
susceptible to firm Soviet leadership -- is better than a larger
body willing to deal only in irresolute generalities and in part
hostile to Soviet dominance. Perhap6 they have decided, in fact,
that it is time to try somehow to isolate Romania, or at least
to seek in some way to contain Romanian influence on the policies
and desires of the other Eastern European states. Xf so, the
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Soviets have cut for themselves a rather large order. The new
Czech leaders, for xample, have already strongly hinted of their
sympathy for Bucharest's attitude and -- largely because they would
see in it a threat to their own independence -- would not be likely
to go along with any such Soviet campaign against Romania
15. The present position of the Soviets toward the Dubcek
regime in Czechoslovakia is obscure. So far, Moscow has been
sLlent and has remained very much in the background, unable or,
burned once, unwilling to try again to intervene. In any case,
and not surprisingly, the Soviets have chosen publicly to ignore
much of what is now going on in Czech politics, presumably hoping
that much of the hue and cry will soon die down. Certainly they
have not seemed at all anxious to endanger their position in
Prague (whatever that mLght be) and the party's position in
Czechoslovakia (already in decline) by mounting an all-out cam-
paign to bring Novotny back. They must be wondering, however,
when Dubcek -- presumably a proper Communist -- is going to take
charge and silence the extremists in the Czech press and sit on
the radicals in the Czech party. At least some Soviet leaders
must fear not only that Czechoslovakia could become another
Romania, independent and difficult in its foreign affairs, but
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also that the Czechoslovak party, lacking effective leadership,
could disintegrate and leave the country in the hands of "dark
reaction".
16. The events in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere have probably
by now created some controversy and perhaps same heat within the
Soviet leadership. Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Suslov have been
especially close to developments in Eastern Europe and are probably
vulnerable to charges of having mishandled their responsibilities.
In any case, the options now available to the Soviets, especially
In the event of an explosion in Eastern Europe, are of a character
almost certain to breed disagreement at the top.
25X1
Some of the leaders may be advocating preemptive action -- say
an ultimatum to Dubcek to arrest the dangerous drift in Czechoslovakia,
through force if necessary, or face strong Soviet countermeasures.
Others, however, may be less concerned with the USSR's ability to
control the destinies of these states and be apprehensive that clumsy
Soviet interference might only provoke resentment, threaten Soviet
Influence, and create problems for the USSR elsewhere, especially
in Western Europe.
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17. To be sure, the mood of the post-Khrushchev collective
has been predominantly conservative. This has meant in Eastern
Europe that Soviet policy has in most instances followed the
familiar and careful path. Thus the Soviets gave their support
to Novotny not only because he was their man but also because,
good, bad, 02 indifferent, he was a known quantity. Similarly,
concerning Romania, the Soviet leaders have at least until recently
tried to play it safe, avoiding confrontatimis even when seemingly
invited not to do so by Bucharest.
18. But Moscow's caution (or its conservatism) is not with-
out its limits, as was suggested this month in Budapest when
Moscow used hard-line spokesmen, such as Bakdash of the Syrian
party and Honecker of the East German, to attack Romania and to
extol Soviet-led (or Soviet-imposed) unity. As always, the
Soviets are certain to use a variety of pressures and even induce-
ments to try to influence the course of events in Eastern Europe.
Should they become sufficiently alarmed or angered by developments
in, say, Czechoslovakia, they would probably bring to bear very
heavy prssures indeed: direct intervention in Czech political
affairs, to the point perhaps of working for an internal party
coup; interference with the normal flow of trade and economic
negotiations, perhaps selective at first but increasingly disruptive
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over time; and, eventually, hints and warnings of military inter-
vention, perhaps with related troop movements designed to lend
substance to the threats.
19. It is worth noting that the Soviets have, in fact, used
all of these methods in the past against obstreperous allies and
that -- with the possible exception of Poland in 1956 -- they have
in each known instance failed of their purpose. The Soviets no
longer seem to have the resources within individual parties to
set policy or to determine the composition of the leadership, as
recently demonstrated anew in Czechoslovakia. In most instances,
the Eastern European Communist leader must count on domestic
bases of support to preserve his position; reliance on Moscow is
risky (because there can be no assurance that Soviet support
will not evaporate or suddenly shift to someone else) and --
as again demonstrated in Czechoslovakia by Novotny -- is unlikely
to save him in any case. Economic pressures do not appear to be
any more promising -- perhaps less so. They failed dramatically
when used against Yugoslavia, China, and Albania, all countries
which, on rational economic grounds alone, should have succumbed.
Threats of military intervention have, in the past, had questionable
ccnsequences; in any event, Moscow probably understands that, to
be effective, they must appear genuine and, in the end, be carried
out.
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20. The Sowlets were reluctan'L to VISO their armies against
a defecting state (Hungary) in 1956. They would probably be even
more so today, largely bocmase it would at one stroke destroy
their political investment in Western Europe, so much larger now
than in 1956, and severely damage their prestige in the world at
large, significantly improved over 1956. It is true nonetheless
that -- no matter this generally enhanced reluctance to use
military force -- the Soviets could someday find themselves faced
once more with the question -- whether to intervene with troops or
to allow one or another state and perhaps ultimately all of Evstern
Europe to go its own way. Where then are the limits of Soviet
tolerance and where would they likely be in the event of an explosion?
How well, in fact, can we, or they, define them?
21. It has been felt, at least since 1956, that the USSR
would not tolerate in any of the Bloc states either an internal
collapse of Communist authority or a withdrawal from the Warsaw
Pact. Up to those two points, Soviet reactions might be equivocal,
but once they had been reached the Soviet response would be swift
and sure, as in Hungary in 1956. This estimate, in effect made
both in Washington and in Eastern Europe, was probably sound for
many years. But, as indicated, it should today be subject to
some further examination because its first proposition -- concerning
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Communist authority -- may be put to serious test. And it is
subject to some qualification because the second of its pro-
positions -- concerning the Warsaw Pact -- has already been at
least partly tested and found wanting.
22. There ore in any given situation "special" circumstances
which help to explain national behavior which departs from a
posited norm. Thus there were special circumstances in the case
of Albania's de facto withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact which helped
to explain why the Soviets did virtually nothing about it, viz.
Albania's size -- which meant that it was unimportant -- and
Albania's remoteness from the Soviet Union -- which created
major problems of movement and supply for the Soviet armed forces.
It is true, however, that had Moscow been so pained by the principle
of withdrawal from the Pact, it could have moved militarily to
crush the offending regime (which would have, inter alia, saved
the Soviet submarine bases on the Adriatic). This is important
because Romania has been heading toward the Albanian position,
i.e. toward a discontinuation of active participation in and
cooperation with the Pact, and it too has gotten away with it.
So far, presumably in part because they have been fairly careful
to keep up some of the appearances of Pact membership -- which
allows the Soviets to save face -- the Romanian have not been
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confronted with the prospect of Soviet military intervention.
All of which suggests that meaningful membership in the Warsaw
Pact is no longer necessary for survival for some of the states
of Eastern Europe (presumably at least the southern ones).
23. The question of the continuation of Communist rule --
rather than the perpetuation of the Warsaw Pact and what it
symbolizes -- may thus be the key one in Moscow. Conceivably, the
Soviet leaders could come to feel that the Bloc, qua Bloc, was
not all that vital. As, in fact, they have learned to live with
a truly independent socialist Yugoslavia, so too they could bring
themselvcs to try to get along with an equally independent socialist
Czechoslovakia. But the collapse of Communist control in any of
the Bloc countries would damage the USSR's prestige, embarrass
Its ideology, and threaten its vital interests (including even
the security of its frontiers). It could lead to chaos and counter-
revolution, tempt similar developments in other Bloc states,
(e.g. most ominously for the Soviets in East Germany), and even
invite Western involvement. The stakes would 'h. ;53 seem extraordi-
narily high and the hazards of inaction extremely gr.lre. Unless,
as seems most unlikely, the Soviets concluded that their intervention
would be actively and forcibly opposed by the West, they would
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probably believe that the disadvantages of intervention -- by
no means inconsiderable -- would simply have to be suffered.
This certainly was their conclusion in 1956 and though they now
have more to lose than they did then, its message seems apropos
even today.
Whither
24. The Hun3arian revolution, as such, was not predictable.
The initial uprising was spontaneous, and the regime's immediate
eagerness to compromise, and then its desperate haste to capitulate,
came as a shock to practically everybody, on both sides. The
revolution was preceded, however, by a number of developments which
created a favorable climate for spontaneity and prepared the way
for the collapse of the regime. These developments were visible
(and observed) at the time. They were: (1) the gradual dis-
appearance of effective restrictions on the expression of dis-
content and communications among the dissidents; (2) the subsequent
discovery by the dissidents of their own determination and strength
and the concomitant realization that change was not only desirable
but also possible; (3) the uncertainty, ignorance, and callousness
of the CPR); (4) the related confusion of a Hungarian party torn
between factions and without a coherent program; and (5) the
disorgAnization and demoralization of the party as a whole which
attended all of the above.
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25. There is, as far as we know, no organized group in
Eastern Europe which is now seriously contemplating a revolution.
But again, if it is going to happen, it will be spontaneous and
thus no more predictable than in 1956? Many of the circumstances
listed above exist today in Czechoslovakia and others seem ready
to make their appearance. This is not the case in Poland, but the
potential for mindless violence in Warsaw is probably greater than
in Prague. Hungary has remained calm, but a major increase in
intellectual fe=ent there is probably inevitable, and this, in
turn, could sorely tax the patience and the resources of the Kadar
regime. Far to the south, Bulgaria too has been quiet; neither
the party nor the army(which is politically potent) is completely
immune to movements elsewhere, and the people are not above venting
their displeasure with a repressive regime and a backward standard
of life.
26. Finally, even the little world of Walter Ulbricht could
be shaken by unsettling developments in Eastern Europe, especially
in Poland and Czechoslovakia. There are already signs that
Pankow is greatly disturbed by events in Czechoslovakia, largely
perhaps because of what they may portend for Czech-West German
relations but surely also because it is aware that they are of a
contagious character, East Germany had its own share of "revisionists"
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in 1956 (Schirdewan, etc.) and its own brand of trouble with the
Soviets in 1953. And if, in East Germany, the Soviets have the
wherewithal to contain or control events, they also occupy an
especially conspicuous and sensitive position, there and in Berlin
as well.
27. We can, and do, estimate, of course, that the odds are
against explosions in Eastern Europe this year. People with guns
are still stronger than people without. An explosion, furthermore,
would probably have tragic consequences and few East Europeans
are anxious to provoke the re-entry of Soviet forces. More likely
than explosions, in, for exampLI, Poland, are less dramatic inter-
nal difficulties: sporadic rioting, intellectual protest, inter-
mittent repressions, some changes at the top, and a diminution
(but not a breakdown) of party authority. More likely in Czechoslovakia
is non-violent political turmoil attended by impressive progress
toward limited goals of democratization.
28. Eventually, in the best of all plausible worlds, Eastern
Europe will have avoided Soviet intervention and be well on the
way to a new and more promising future. In fact, a country such
as Czechoslovakia now has a chance, fully recognized ia Prague
to set itself on a path denied to it in the past, toward a meaningful
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degree of liberty at home and sovereignty abroad and eventually
a place of its own in Europe, somewhere between East and West.
The USSR will surely at times seek to curb and contain. It may
resort to economic sanctions, bluster and threat, political inter-
ference. But the instruments of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe
are not what they once were and are unlikely in the long term to
be effective. Unless it is willing to use military force, the
USSR, sooner or later, will probably have little choice but to
accomodate itself to changes of great significance in Eastern Europe.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
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