INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 16, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5108122:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD180D01.6
 Approved For Release
Ub5/d~12 A' I-R itT00875R002000180001-6
SECItET I I'-
Q 11410 s /,57fi FYI-' MOai`&._. 6, /
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 January 1961
STUFF DO40RPJJDUf.4 O. 3-61 (Internal OfE I;ori:iri Papcr - CIA
.irtributior. Only)
SUBJECT: Indonesia
1. We have become increasingly disturbed by three developments
in the Indonesian situation: (a) Sukarnots slide to the left in
his domestic and foreign policies; (b) indications o.,' discord
among top army leaders; and (c) the increasing lik.;:i.i_hood that
Tnrknee'IA L?i11 attempt to force its claim to West New Guinea
during 1961.
2. Sukarno's slide to the left. Sukarno has regularly
vacillated in his orientation between the Communist and non-
Communist elements at home and the Communist Bloc and the West
abroad. However, many of his leftward moves since returning
from the UN session last fall appear to go farther and to be of a
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22.:.CI~~RDF!$$Y60875R002000180001-6
C\n +ECR'i,T
more permanent nature than has boon the case in the past.
Although still operating within Indonosi.a's "active independent"
foreign policy, his psychological affinity with the Cn-nnunist
loft appears to be increasing. At home, the army has opposed
many of his policies, while the Communists supported them, and
this has boon a major factor in the favoritism which Sukarno
has boor showing the Communists and tho efforts which he has
mad.o to undercut the position of the army. Similarly, the
por:3onai diplomacy of the USSR and its extensive economic and
military aid program are in marked contrast, in Sukarno's eyes,
to that of the US. He appears to be convinced :,hat the US
would like to see him ousted, and he considers President
Eisenhowerts failure to visit Indonesia a personal affront.
US economic and military aid, in Sukarno's view, is too little
for Indonesia's needs and too difficult to negotiate. Probably
the most significant contrast, inSukarnots eyes, is that batween the
US and Soviet positions on Indonesia's claim to West Now Guinea.
We do not believe that Sukarno has any intention of forsaking
his "active indopendsnt" foreign policy for formal affiliation
with the Bloc or of putting the Indonesian Communists in a position
to dominate the country. However, we see no indications of Sukarno's
present slide to the loft slowing down or reversing?
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/061A:101p#I P8p,T00875R002000180001-6
SF(iI ET
3~ Discord amon top army loaders, The army is the only
element potentially capable of restraining Sukarno or curbing
the Communists. Naeution apparently is convinced that he dare
not initiate a confrontation with Sukarno in the absonco of a
clear cut issue or extreme provocation. In view of the con-
tinuing lack of unity and the diverse loyalties among the regional
commanders and troops, he will probably continue his past
cautious tactics, A number of important officers in his hoad-
quurtors doQ;,ro a more active and militant army position in
opposition to LLukarno and the Communists, and some discussions
among them as to how to deal with the situation are going on,
Those discussions invariably touch upon coup possibilities.
Althcugh we do not believe that an anti-Sukarno coup by these
officers will materialize, continued grumbling and plotting
among them will almost certainly incroaso Sukarno's suspir.;Ions
of the army, undermine Nasutionts r,usition, and lead to further
army factionalism.
!!.. West New Guinea. Sukarno has thrust the west Now
Guinea issue to the fore. On this issue he is supported by
virtually all Indonesian factions and leaders. Indonesian
capabilities for military action against West Now Guinea ara
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/ / ,F P85T00875R002000180001-6
om,
SECRET
increasing as the result of foreign mil'-&ary aid, particularly
from the USSR. Sukarno probably has ro-.-oivod assurances of
Bloc support in an Indonesian attempt press Indonesia's
claim to West Now Guinea. Sukarno probbably believes that, with
such support and, considering the pre;.int climate of opinion among
the A Cr. o--Asian nations, ho can obta;. i a favorable decision from the
UN. We believe that -Indonesia will forcefully push its case during
1961. Primary emphasis will proba'tiy be upon political means, with
sufficient r.O.Iitary action -- in t!1-je form of infiltration parties
and, possib]y;, an invasion effor'r, of up to battalion size and air
and naval encounters -- to incroe.!;o international tensions in the
area ,ind attract LIN consideration.
5. Attached is a more detailed discussion of the trends and
outlook in Indonesia. If it moots with the approval of the Board,
we recommend that this longw? papor serve as a basic draft for
coordination as a special es?,3.mato in the near future.
25X1A
ONE/FE
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/0q/C1,PPT08R002000180001-6
isC Ui1''
0 E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Internal 0/NE
Working Paper
CIA Distribution Only
3.6 January 1961
SUBJECT: Trends and Outlook in Indonesia
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
1. President Sukarno has all but won his long-standing campaign
to emasculate Indonesia's non-Communist political parties and to
strip Parliament of all meaningful powers. He has concentrated
virtually all governmental power in his own hands and has encouraged,
if not initiated, a strong trend to the left in Indonesia's domestic
and foreign policies. He has continued to protect the Indonesian
Communist Party and to use his influence to increase its prestige
and its role in the countryts political life. At the same time he
has been attempting, with some success, to undercut the political
position of Arxj Chief of Staff Nasution and of the army, the only
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/1:9A-RPP8M0875R002000180001-6
ONLY
SECRET
non-Communist element potentially capable of restraining Sukarno
or of curbing the Communists.
2. On the international scene, Sukarno has drawn Indonesia
increasingly close tr, Vii Communist Bloc, He has accepted extensive
Soviet economic and military aid,and, apparently, 1s seeking to
close the rift in relations with the Chinese Communists which dove-
loped over Indonesia's treatment of its Overseas Chinuse population.
Sukarno's foreign policy line now parallels more closely than over
that of the Bloc and it is apparent that he is depending upon Bloc
backing in pushing more forcefully Indonesia's claim to West New
Guinea.
3. Political power is still polarized between the ararV and
the Indonesian Communist Party, with Sukarno holding the er::tidal
balance. However, anti-Communist awry elements are becorr~Lrg in-
creasingly concerned with Sukarno le slide to the left and m,iny
political elements, aware that they are being squeezed out of the
picture, are seeking ways to reestablish their earlier position.
Conseq:iently, political tensions in Indonesia are rising.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
4o Sukarno has viewed Arrgy Chief of Staff Nasution's rise to
eminence over the past few years as a potential threat to his own
position and he has boon uneasy with the growing political powcr
and potoritial of the array. His suspicions of Nasution and the army
havo boon encouraged by the (iomnunist.s, leftists, and anti-army
olcnont.s which now dominate his "palace clique." Sukarno has been
nettled by army resistance to some of his policies, particularly
his docAro to include Corrric.nist representation in his cabinet,
and by the intensive campaign against the Indonesian Communist
Pat-t'y conducted by the ax ny during the summer and fall of 1960.
5. That campaign has now lost momentum. It failed to turn
Sukarno against the Communists, and Nasution did not press the case
in the face of Sukarno s opposition. Nasution apparently Is con-
vinced that he dare not risk a confrontation with Sukarno and
that he cannot successfully move against the Communists unless
Sukarno is on his side, or, at least, neutralizeds While seeking,
unsuccessfully thus far, to turn the President against the Commu-
nists, Nasution's anti-Communist efforts have been little more
than rear guard actions which harass and slow down, but do not
-3-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
Ill Ir I 1-UN
halt or reverse, the steadily growing strength of the Indonesian
Communist Party.
6. Nasution's knuckling under to Sukarno's wishes on a
number of matters -- such as the army's anti-Communist campaign,
the closing down of certain newspapers and, the banishment of
Colonel Sukendro, the array's most vociferous political activist --
may have weakannd Nasution's standing with some segments of the
array. A nun ar. of army leaders apparently have become somewhat
rectless witL Nasution's caution in dealing with Sukarno and his
reluctPnce to associate himself openly with an anti-Communist army
pooition. It is likely that some grumbling, and perhaps even
plotting, is going on among the more forthright anti-Communist
and anti-Sukarno members of Nasution's stall'.
7? We do not believe it likely that Nasution will initiate
a direct confrontation with Sukarno on the Communist issue. He is
too uncertain of full army backing, particularly among the regional
commanders. Except for an extreme provocation by Sukarno or the
Communists, Nasution will probably continue his cautious and
flexible tactics. These tactics may lead to a rupture in the
generally anti-Communist front among top army leaders. It is ap-
parent that certain officers are seeking to force Nasution to take
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
r ,1
,LCZ,T
a more forceful stand. It is likely that important disagreements
over methods and timing in dealing with Sukarno and the Communists
will continue and, perhaps increase at the top levels of army
command. Such disagreements will weaker. Nasution's ability to
continue his war of nerves and maneuver against Sukarno, and if
they become acute, could lead certain anti-Communist and anti-
Sukarno army officers to attempt a coup against Sukarno without
Nasution's support.
8o If the officers under Nasution were to attempt a coup, we
believe that the chances would be less than
even that it could be successfully pulled off and made to stick.
Although there is increasing recognition among array commanders of
the Indonesian Communists as a threat to the army and to their
own personal positions, they are far from united on the Communist
issue and anti-Sukarno sentiment among most of them is probably
not so profound as to cause them to support an anti-Sukarno coup.
The failure of such a coup would further fragment the army and
probably destroy the influence and power of a number of important
anti-Communist officers.
9. For his part, Sukarno probably has felt that he could not
dismiss Nasution as Army Chl.ef of Staff or otherwise reduce Nasutionts
power abruptly without risking; an army revolt. Consequently,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
Sc, ~ u:T
Sukarno has moved gradually to dilute Nasution's army role by
assigning him additional tasks and to box Nasution in with issues
which he could not oppose, such as the reorganization of the legi-
slative branch, an arms purchasing mission to the USSR, and the
West New Guinea issue. Sukarno almost certainly feels that he can
continue to play off the array and tine Communist Party and to con-
trol both. At present ho is more suspicious of the arirly than of
the Communist Party. However, we do not believe that his efforts
to undercut Nasution and to perpetuate a certain amount of disunity
among ariqy commanders are intended to weaken the awry to such an
extent that it could no longer serve to counterbalance the Commu-
nists. WhaL he does desire is to control cued dominate arnbr leader-
ship and thereby eliminate army restraints on his policies.
10. The local Communists are prosper.ng by posing as patriotic,
nationalistic Sukarno supp,)rters. They will certainly continue to
play up to Sukarno's whims and vanity and to support his causes.
Sukarno is anxious for full Communist support in his egocentric
efforts to find solutions to Indonesia's multifarious economic,
political and social problems. The Communists are now strongly re-
presented in every important government body excFpt the cabinet.
Bringing them into his cabinet appears to be a focal point of many
of Sukarno's recent political maneuvers0
SEC ET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
ly
11. Sukarno will probably make some changes in his cabinet
in the near future. However, because of resistance from the army
and a x'umber of sti11 important non-Communist political leaders,
he probably will again postpone bringing well known, leading Commu-
nists into his government and settle, temporarily at least, for the
inclusion of one or two minor Communist figures in relatively un-
important posts. It is likely that Sukarno will attempt to remove
Nasution from the Army Chief of Staff post within the year. Nasution
has already served well beyond the normal four-year rotation period.
Such an eyfc:^;; could lead to strong army opposition if Sukarno ap-
peared to be attempting to weaken the army to Communist advantage
or to remn:.ve key army leaders from positions of Influence and
authority. It is possible that Sukarno may offer Nasution the
Vice-President post. We believe that Nasution wou:Ic1 accept if the
new Amry Chief of Staff appointment were acceptable to h'jn and to
his circle of army colleagues. W believe that Sukarno will not
risk an array confrontation on this issue.
III. FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
12. The Soviet effort to capture Sukarno and Indonesia
through economic aid and personal diplomacy has reached very sub-
stantial proportions and appears to be making significant progress.
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
CIA Ift! L'~'NAL LJ 'L.: ONLY
IEM
Bloc economic and military aid commitments -- mostly from the Soviet
Union -- are now close to one billion dollars. To date less than
one-third of this has been contracted for and about 0250 million
has been delivered. Most of the deliveries have been military
equipment for the air force and navy.
13,. Recently an Indonesian purchasing mission headed by Nasution
concluded negotiations in Moscow. The agreements reached there have
not as yet been made public. However, it is likely that consider-
able a.^~aur:~;:; of army equipment, and possibly training assistance.,
were contracted for. Army spokesmen ha'vi-, made clear their prefer-
ence for US-supplied equipment and training, but they have been
disappointed with the amounts of aid they have received from the US
and increasingly outspoken in their criticism of the delays and.
red tape involved in receiving US equipment. If Nasution has con-
tracted for more than token amounts of Soviet equipment Moscow
will have scored. a potentially significant breakthrough in its ef-
forts to get at the top leadership of the Indonesian array.
14. Khrushchev has assiduously cultivated Sukarno during the
latter's visits to the USSR and at the 1960 UN General Assembly
session. Particularly important from Sukarno's point of view,
Khrushchev supports the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea. At
SECIET
ILY
Approved For Release 2005/56/22: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release I I~-(I!ALRPPi8~ff q'875R002000180001-6
OLCV"T
the same time, Sukarno appears to be increasingly convinced that
he personally does not have the sympathy and support of the US
and that the US not only would be happy to see him replaced but
would be willing -+:o assist a local initiative to this end. His
suspicions of the US are buttressed by his belief that the US was
behind the 1957 rebellion of the outor.islands. He apparently
interprets the failure of President Eisenhower to visit Indonesia
as a, personal snub. Moreover, the ITS policy of neutrality on the
West Now Guin-ia issue has always infuriated Sukarno. These inter-
national fa:;;,ors have accelerated Sukarno's current slide to the
left in domes 1.c and foreign policies.
15. The visit of the Kare: Doormen to West New Guinea and
the Dutch program to reinforce their air, naval, and ground forces
in New Guinea have further antagonized the Indonesian leaders and
rekindled the smouldering West New Guinea issue. In particular,
Sukarno and the PKI are exploiting for their own purposes, the
emotional and nationalistic response which the issue arou:. among
Indonesians. In addition to his own deep feelings on the subject
of West New Guinea and his determination to resolve the issue by
one means or another, Sukarno is using the situat3.on -- as he has
often done in the past -- to divert Indonesian attention from
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22,. i44ilEiO' TQ087$0,Od2000180001-6
domestic problems and to create a psychological and political situ-
ation in which his political antagonists will be forlod to support,
or at least not to oppose, his domestic and international policies
in general.
16. For the Communists, West Now Guinea provides a useful
issue for demonstrating their support of Sukarno, for intensifying
Sukarno's distrust of arty loyalty, and for creating additional
tensions between Indonesia and the West. In such a situation, the
army leaders have little choice but to swing into line behind
Sukarno or face charges of being soft on Irian, a charge which,
on that emotion-packed issue, borders on treason. Although most
top army leaders are more moderate and realistic than Sukarno on
the West New Guinea issue, most, if riot all, of them share Sukarno's
views that the Dutch presence in West New Guinea is a threat to
Indonesian security and that Indonesia's independence will not be
complete until Irian is liberated from Dutch colonial rule and
takes its rightful place as a part of Indonesia. Moreover, there
are a number of army commanders who hare an intensely jingoistic
and activiet attitude toward the West New Guinea issue.
17. The Indonesians almost certainly have political, para-
military, and military plans for achieving their West Anew Guinea
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 20050`6)72':` 'I~-- ~~,85TQ0875R002000180001-6
objectives,
and their capabilities in this regard are increasing as a result
of Soviet aid to their air force and navy.
18. The West New Guinea issue has boon increasingly thrust
to the fore on the domestic political scene and Indonesian activity
on the i.ntc'. ational political scone concerning West Now Guinea has
also been stopped up markedly. The Indonesian reading of the cli-
mate of opinion among the Afro-Asian countries probably leads them
to the conclusion that they can got favorable UN consideration of
their case. In view of these developments we believe that Indonesia
is planning and will probably make a major effort to press its
claim to West New Guinea during 1961.
19. Indonesia will probably continue efforts to infiltrate
and subvert West New Guinea, seeking to create an anti-Dutch move-
ment and to provoke the Dutch. A military incident, either by
accident or design, could thrust the issue into international
prominance. Such an incident could grow out of conflicting claims
- 11 -
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6
 Approved For Release 2005 / 5100875R002000180001-6
, ONLY
""+ h "r
ICJ`
to a number of small islands off the coast of West Now Guinea
which neither side has permanently administerod or garrisoned, nr
result from a clash of air or naval piLrols. We believe, howovor,
that the major Indonesian thrust to achiuVo its objectives in West
Now Guinea will be primarily political. in nature with any military
or pa:'^-military effort being designed to provide an incident of
suffiaiont drama and seriousness to gain international attention.
Although we believe it unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility
Viat Indono-, :a, may try a larger scale (bat;,alion-size, for example)
epora u .on .^;;ainst West Now Guinea.
..12.-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000180001-6