THE NORTHERN VIETNAMESE 'OFFENSIVE' IN FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 26, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5106122:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD190D23.1
 CIA INiIEiNAL ?N OQN(~J~! yy
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R00'000190023-1
SEC1.ET
C I A- /oive./6rAI 1 = a1,E) I /? _ 4 /
CENTRAL INTEL?,LIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 July 1961
STAFF YMM- ORANDUM 40-61 (Internal 0/ Working Paper - CIA
Distribution)
SUBJECT: The North Vietnamese "Offensive" in French-Speaking Africa
1. The Communist regime of North Viet Nam (DRV) has
outfitted some major probing expeditions since the spring of
1960 in an effort to reconnoiter Africa's diplomatic and other
terrain. We feel relatively certain the DRV has concluded that
the French-speaking African nations offer a particularly
inviting target for exchanges which could help to end North
Viet Nam's pariah status in the non-Communist world.
2. Recent DRV exploratory probings indicate that North
Viet Nam's immediate objective -- to secure recognition and
diplomatic exchanges as expeditiouoly as possible -- may not
be too difficult to attain. The French speaking areas offer a
particularly inviting target in this respect since France
itself maintains a diplomatic representative at Hanoi and
T
CIA INTERNAL U-` ,AP
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-IbP'8th.V0875R002000190023-1
 Approved For Release. 40 7ipl~-RDP85T00875R002000190023-1
SECR1 T
probably would not interpose strong ob;je: ctions acaiz,st such
exchanges. However, DRV Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem, who
led a sizoablo delegation to Africa in March-April 1961, met
with rather indifferent success in his initial efforts to secure
recognition. In addition to being received in but a handful
of former French African states, Foreign Minister Ung managed
to extract a promise of diplomatic exchanges only from Morocco
and a rather indefinite expression of interest from Tunisia.
3e For the present, the greatost potential for DRV
influence -- however limited -- is confined to Guinea and Mali,
whore North Viet Nam already maintains small diplomatic missions.
The loaders of both nations have disagreed violently with France
in the recent past and have proved highly receptive to aid offers
and other connections with the Communist Bloc. The DRV concluded
several cultural and trade payments agreements with Guinea earlier
this year, as well as a cultural arrangement with Mali promising
the latter needed teachers, lawyers, and doctors. However,
the ability of North Viet Nam to make any meaningful contribution
to those two African states is quite restricted. After a well
publicized visit to the DRV by Sekou Toure in 1960 and the
existence of diplomatic ties for more than a year, the DRV
CIA /~ ; L:r. ,: .. ,
Approved For Release 2005/0~/Z2'' ;6I % DP85.Tp0875R002000190023-1
 OLoIA /NTCfNAL IJ f fqI yy
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP857'00875R002000190023-1
Embassy at Conakry consists of only three officials who have
not proved very accessible to the Guinean. Moreover, Guinean
President Sokou Toure, as well, as Modibo Keita of Mali, are
quite aware of the limited resources of North Viet Nam and
almost certainly look directly to Moscow, Prague, and other major
Bloc suppliers when in quest of Communist assistance.
4. Despite those negligible bot nnings, the DRV probably
will have more success in the not too distant future in securing
acceptance and recognition among not only French-spoakingr
but other newly independent African states as well. The DRV
makes no protest against concurrent recognition of South Viet
Nam, and present indications are that Saigon has become
reconciled to the inevitability of sharing diplomatic honors
with He Chi Minh in Africa. For their part, the bulk of
conservative African leaders, under mounting pressure by local
radical nationalists to adopt neutralist foreign policies, will
find recognition of the DRV an attractive means of demonstrating
their neutrality in the Cold War.
5. In any sweeping competition with Communist China for
influence in Africa, the DRV is almost certriin to come out second
best, even with Soviet Union backing. While its French language
-3-
CIA 1;\(if. JJ\
Approved For Release 2005/06/~Za~C~4-RpJ~~y -T00875R002000190023-1
 Approved For ReleaseCRAO)N?P/R.LCIA-RDP85TO0875RO02000190023-1
SEC1Z1`r`'
utilteation would be a measurable asset, the D V has only
limited capabilities for oxtendinr; economic, tochnical? cultural,
or other typos of assist,inco to former French controlled African
states. Moreover, while North Viet Nam can trade on its
reputation as the champion of anti-French colonialism ire Asia,
most of the erstwhile French African territories maintain
relatively harmonious relations with France and do not foal
themselves in need of idontii'a ^ation with to DUV.,r This, North
Viet Nam has only one major commodity it can export to Africa --
its experience and willingness to train militant nationalists
in the refined arts of subversion and guerrilla warfare. With
the possible exception of the Algerian Government-in-exile,
there are no indications that any a# the new African novernmonts
is particularly anxious to avail itself of this typo of foreign
25X1
Approved For ReIeas?qP "fA -RDP85T00875R002000190023-1
St' OR ~
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190023-1
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190023-1