CONGO- POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING MILITARY ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: November 2, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5106122:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD190D36.7
 C'/41 wje / T 1T~~
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : g6rRPP85T00875R002000190O'36-7
DUI IN ILi N11L U(`L VNI Y
C E N T It. A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E NC Y
OFFICE OF NATIONM, ESTIMATES
November 1961
STAFF MIIAOIIANDUM NO. 68-61 (Internal ONE Working Paper - CIA
Distribution 0riy)
SUBJECT: Congo -- Possible Developments Involving Military Action
1. Military action in the Congo has been limited for the most
part to minor skirmishes thus far despite a proliferation of "armies"..
and a chronic crisis situation. The presence vL upwards of 16,000
UN troops with a mandate to prevent civil conflict, and the ro-
luctance of the Congolese troops to fight have combined to dis-
courage widespread armed conflict. The failure of the recent UN
military action in Katanga, however, and Katanga's insistent re-
fusal to accept the authority of the Central Government have
created a new situation in which the prospect for civil. war is
probably greater than it has been at any time since Coni,olcsc
independence.
2. The Central Government feels under pressure to assert its,
authority over Katanga or risk the loss of its position? Central
Covei'nmeno forces are now on the Katanga border the Premier Adoula
has announced that they will engage in a police action against
r ii 'AITE`'~i`1i L U~- U''1LY.
Approved For Release 2W5/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
CIA INII:IiN/~4,)(. ONLY
Si,
secessionist Ktitangn. Gizenga, who wont to Loopoldvillo and aknowl-
edged the Arioula government, is now in Stanloyvillo and shows signs
of wishing to rebuild Stanloyvillo as a power base for the Lumumbist
faction in the Congo. Ho might believe he could do this by a
military blow against Katanga. For his part, Tshombe in Katanga
might take the initiative and strike at Central Government troops
in the Luluabourg area and along the provincial border, or he
might break the recent cease-fire agreement and attack UN troops
in Katanga in order to assert his independence. Recently acquired
UN Jets are now patrolling the Katanga border apparently seeking
to separate the antagonists rather than helping the ANC.
3. The Armee Nationale du Congo (ANC), which totals about
18,000 men, under General Mobutu provides the Central Government
with the largest military force in the Congo. It is relatively
well equipped with light arms and transport. Four battalions are
located in Kasai and some forces are on the Katanga frontier.
These troops are ill-disciplined and their main concerns are food
and pay. Many of them come and go from one unit to another at will.,
some of them switching back and forth not only between units in the
ANC but between the ANC and other armies in the Congo in search
of better quarters, pay, food or more indulgent commanders. Their
Approved For Release 2005/662 1:! biA-~ D 85 T00875R002000190036-7
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22~I,.f p DP85T00875R002000190036-7
CIA 1I IL.I:1')i . fl
loyalties rare ephemeral and it is uncertain that they would follow
the orders of General Mobutu or other ANC officers if they required
sustained fighting or hardship.
4. Tho force of 7,000 men under General Lundula in Stanloyvillo
is thoorotically part of the Central Government's forces General
Lundula has pledged his aflogianco to Adoula's government and he
has boon offered a Major Generalship :n the condition that he come
to Leopoldville. He has not done so. If GizenL,.a were to l^uzuch
an effort to take Katanga and bring it back into the Congo he would
have to make a deal with General Lundula and use his men to do the
marching and the fighting. stimate 5,000 25X1
of Lundula's force is in the border area of Kivu province near
Katanga. The willingness of Lundula's men to obey orders in a
situation that involved hardship and danger is even less certain
than in the case of Mobutu's troops.
5. The effectiveness of the nearly 10,000-man Katanga force
remains dependent upon the role of some 600 white mexce-
narioz. The Katanga troops may be somewhat better disciplined than
those in other Congolese forces, and their belief that they defeated
UN troops might contribute to their confidence. Furthermore, apart
from some units in northern Katanga, they would be likely to
be fighting a defensive action and have less of a transportation
and supply problem than forces sent against them.
-3-
CIA , >
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
SECRET
I_ I AL
6. In Kalonjits 3atrapy of South Kasai, in which there are
nearly one million Baluba rofugoos, the military forces do not
consider themselves under the ANC command. Those forces (about
2,800 men) may become involved in factional disputes within South
Kasai or in now outbreaks of Lulua-Baluba warfare x-hieh has cost
several thousand lives over the past three years. They are un-
likely to become involved in wider conflicts except as ANC,
Stanleyville, or Katanga troops pass through their territory.
7. In the event of an attack by Central Government troops on
Katanga the UN would be faced with the necessity of deciding
whether to (a) place its troops between the Congolese forces; (b)
stop aside and countenance civil war; or (c) support the Contra].
Government in its effort to intoq,,rato Katanga by force. At present
it seems to be trying to use its jet aircraft to accomplish the
first of these alternatives. Current UN forces in Kasai acid
northern Katanga are probably insufficient to halt at least an
initial thrust by Ceutral Government forces. Should the UN st': p
or hamper ANC actions it would further entangle the UN with t',%
Central Government which Is already critical (as are most otI', rr
African states) of its role in negotiating the current cease-fire
agreement. Hostilities betweEnn the UN and ANC forces could :result,
-4-
c,; IN1ERNI+i' L ;
'r
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : 1RMP85T00875R002000190036-7
CIA II`I*I":(Ji\L :.
and the Adoula government might decide to undertake its throat-
ened review of relations with the UN.
8. Even if General Mobuta's i._urz-rically superior forces should
enter Katanga the outcome would be highly uncertain. Mobutu would
be heavily dependent upon assistance from the enifmatic General.
Lundula in Stanleyville (recently attacked by one of his own men
while attempting to quell a disturbance) pushing down from Kindu
in Kivu province. The Leopoldvj forces would also run the risk
of opposition from the South Kasai "array" before entering Katanga
from Luluabourg and elsewhere. The activities of the poorly-supplied
ANC troops might soon degenerate into brigandage and fighting with
local tribes.
9. In this case or in the event of setbacks at the hands of
the Katanga forces, Mobutu might ucll be dismissed, and the military
capabilities of the Central Qovonnmont diminished. Adoula's
position would suffer grave damage. In this extremity Adoula
might request direct US assistance in the form of military equip-
mont and supplies. Failure to obtain such assistance would probably
bring about a sharp improvement in the fortunes of the Gizongists,
and possibly lead to a request for Bloc military aid.
-5-
CIAA IN TEfiNAI., l ; k
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
 (;1A 11"111Afl"'AL 11,,i
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 ?PgIDP85T00875R002000190036-7
10. T3hombo, uncourat;eud by' K: tan~~a extrcunliit3 and white
"ul,tz-an" ma.t-lit break the cea:.e !'.i.ru and ones again embroil the
UN in fi(?Ihtint; Africans. The K 'tan['a military and air forces hove
undor1;ono a steady buildup in recent work;;,. 13oll;iari, French, and
South African riorconaries remain, and the ritren[;th of K,:ctant;anu3o
forces may have been increased by the m:inglini.r of Union iiinicre
[ ar.rd units with the a r,t;ular Kat2Yit,a u.iitc.
U. The fate of the estimated 50,000 Baluba tribesmen now
in camps -- principally in Elisnbuthirille ??- supervised by n few
UN troops !.s an issue which may prccipitntu new clashes. Lumumbist
at4itntors ins de the camp are whipping up anti-Katanga sentiment
and ur[;ing a mass break out; inside the Katanl;n Govornru:nt anti-
Baluba extremists urge Tshombc to st;:_mp out this threat by
taking; over the carips. Such action might involve breaking the
cease-fire,. The UN forces might once a[-ain be called on to
police action and UN iii. .adquarters would be confronted ;;ith a
decision.
12. In Stanleyvtlle. Jizonga. is once ajain seeking arms from
external sources. It is possible that Gizenga could induce Lurdula,
who favors a tough police toward Tshombe, to Lunch an attack across
CIA
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : C11?85T00875R002000190036-7
CIA IN I HMAI_ Ij;;'L Uf;j_Y
nn,. i-Dorn Katanga.
The purpose of such a venture might range
frnms (a) a now play by Gizonga to achieve tho ascendency of
Stanloyvillo in the Congo, bringing down Tshombe in the process,
or (b) a desire by Gizenga to bolster his position within the
Central. Government?
13o In sum, there is little prospect that the use of
military force '_n the Congo might lead to a clean-cut military
victory with easily discernable political consequences. On the
consrary, military action would probably lead to an indecisive
civil war characterized by brigandage, disorganized tribal war,
or some combination of the two. In concert with deteriorating
economic and social conditions, these results would probably
encourage sharply increased meddling by external forces. However,
it is unlikely that even then would any domestic or outside group
grasp sufficient control of the confused situation to gain domi-
nation over the Congo as a whole over the next several months.
The most likely consequence of large-scale military conflict would
be the discrediting and undermining of Adoula's Central Government,
25X1A
CIA INTER'N'AL U "SL' 01'11-Y
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190036-7