CYPRUS: IMPENDING COMMUNAL CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000200051-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: December 23, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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C ENTii AL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 December 1963
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 87-63:
SU&TECT: Cyprus: Impend1r, Communal Criais
The determination of President Makarios to abolish the special
constitutional privileges of the Turkish minority has brought
the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus to the verge of
violence. If the Greek Cypriots find Turkish counter proposals
unacceptable, Makarios seems likely to take such unilateral actions
as amending the Constitution or denouncing the Treaty of Guarantee.
These acts would create the danger of widespread conflict betteen
the r..avily armed paramilitary forces the two communities have
organized throughout the island and could even lead to direct
Greek and Turkish military involvement. Even if general violence
does not occur, attempts by Makarioa unilaterally to change the
Constitution would heat up the political situation. Without some
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effective international intervention, which io unlikely until
Greece and Turkey themselves are at the verge of confrontation,
this wounting bitterness will make an ultimate solution more
difficult. Should violence occur, return to peaceful coexistence
within a single state might become impossible, leaving scars that
would trouble Greek-Turkish relations for a long time to come.
1. In Cyprus brinkmanship has brought the Greek and Turkish
communities to the verge of violence. Preexdent Makerios the
Greek Cypriot leader, has taken the initiative in provoking a
direct communal confrontation by his determination to abolish the
special constitutional privileges of the Turkish minority. In
1959 he accepted the London-Zurich Accords, which established
virtually autonomous Greek and Turkish communities, in order
to secure British withdrawal from Cypr"s. But the Accords
represented for him, as for the Greek community at large, only a
way station toward attaining unrestricted Greek freedom of action.
Even though the taste of power has made union with Greeco -- the
Turks' greatest bugbear -- no longer seem palatable to Makarios,
he has exerted little effort to overcome Turkish suspicion of
his intentions.
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2. Since the fall of 1962, he has beeii actively working to
prepare both domestic and foreign opinion for radical revision of
the constitutional gur.rantces of the Turkish community. Indeed,
once openly committed to rapid achievement of this desire,
Makarios has appeared to believe that his leadership would be
significantly damaged should he turn from this course. It is
likely that in this frame of mind Makarios has construed as
support British suggestions that any demands to the Turkish
community be posed as interpretations rather than amendments of the
Constitution. Moreover, with the accession of Greek Foreign
Minister Sophocles Venizelos in November 1963, the restraint
previously urged from Athens has given way to outright encourage-
ment for Makarios' aims.
3. The Cssue has been joined since 30 November 1963, when
Makarios presented a memorandum to Turkish Vice President Kuchuk
calling for a swo.:ping reduction in the rights of the Turkish
minority, but few concessions from the Greek community. The
uncompromising tone of these demands, which were soon leaked by
The uza n Provisions of this memorandum were that the constitution
be amended to end (1) the veto right of the Turkish deputies on
matters of foreign pol icy, der'er:se, and security; (2) the right
of Turkish deputies to sit as a ++eparate body to consider laws
relating to taxation,, the municipalities, or the electoral system;
(3) separate municipalities; (14.) the separate Turkish judicial
system; (5) the Turkish community's right to have specified
proportions of t?io security forces and civil service; ar.d
(6) the veto power of the Turkish members on the Public
Service Commission. These rights had been guaranteed in the
London-Zurich Accords.
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the Greek Foreign MJ.nister to the Athens .~ .,coo, Posed a direct
challenge to the Turks. Although Kuchuk, on advice from Ankara,
did not reject these proposals out of hi;d, his initial reaction
was strongly negative. For its pert, t:,c.e Turkish government, in
the midst of a serious governmental cr7'-?.is, categorically rejected
the proposals, which Makarios insisted hews presenting for their
information, not for their approval.
Rising Communal Tensions
I+. For the present, Turkish t>?-.-rategy seems to be t,-, use
delaying tactics. Khchuk indicate; that he would need some time
for a response, ant A* Turkish Am.Tassador to Cyprus estimated
that Kuchuk'a reply would take a month. The Turkish communal
leaders probably want to undercut possible accusations that they
were unwilling to negotiate, given the temper of both Ankara
and the Turkish community, KucI.J: can hardly be sufficiently
forthcoming to provide the bas.-lrs for fruitful negotiations.
Kuchuk is almost certain to r ject the need for the changes proposed
by Makarios and may counter -w:_th seine extreme proposals of his
own, such as territorial partition -- itself of tortured concept
in view of the indiscriminate intermingling of Greek and Turkish
inhabitants on the island. These counter proposals will almost
certainly be unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots.
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5. In the absence of strong prescuru from Athena and Ankara,
which appears improbable at the present stage, neither the Greek
nor the Turkish community is l:LL.ely in back down or consider
realistic compromises. Their resolve 'as been strengthened by
the presence on the island of garrisons of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish
soldiers in accordance with '.;lie Treaty of Alliance. Such has
been the temper of the protagonists that both sides have long
been developing heavily armed and we.11 organized paramilitary
organizations throughout the island against possible resumption
of intercommunal struggle. Indeed, despite his disclaimer of
blame if violence should ensue, Makarios has evinced willingness
to commit all forces at his disposal to achieve success. At the
same time, the Turkish Cypriots are preparing to resist by force
if necessary, backed up by the Turkish military contingent which,
like the Greek contingent, is already engaging in preparations
and training for this eventuality. Both communities are aware
and
of the other's activity/aze spurred to greater efforts by this
knowledge.
The Treaty of Alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
was an integral part of the London-Zurich Accords and provides
for the joint defense of Cyprus against direct or indirect
aggression. Under its provisions, contingents of Greek
and Turkish soldiers are responsible for training the Cyprus
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6. Although this charged atmosphere has been further
electrified by incidents, such as the bombing of a statue to an
ROICA hero and a counter-demonstration, neither side apparently
wnats to initiate any organized armed action, at least until
the Turkish decision whether or nit to negotiate is announced.
Yet the ability of the responsible loaders in Cyprus to control
their -followers is becoming 1.ncr~:asirgiy questionable. Further
inciueuutr.. , ould easily occur as ';;em ers flare during the present
period of uneasy expectancy and these incidents could precipitate
widespread communal conflict. In this event, the police and
security forces are likely to split along communal lines. This
would contribute to genera- chaos that neither the Greek and
Turkish governments nor the communal leaders probably desire. 11
Attitudes of Other Powers
The London-Zurich Accords proviaca for a Treaty of Guarantee
signed by the Republic of Cyprus, the UK, Turkey, and Greece.
The Treaty calls for consultation among Greece, Turkey, and
Britain in case of infringement of any of the basic articles
of the Constitution. If concerted action is not possible,
each of the guarantors reserves the right to act alone to re-
establish the st9te of affairs established by this treaty.
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8. The Soviet Union has seized the opportunity to fish in
these troubled waters. Wholeheartedly supporting Makarios, the
Soviets may encourage him to bypass the Guarantor Powers by
taking the communal problem to the UN in hopes that many of the
Afro-Asian nations would accept the Greek Cypriot argument. At the
same tire, the Communist Party of Cyprus (AKEL) is also following
a similar line. It is well organized, well leu3, and commands the
allegiance of a substantial proportion of the Greek community.
Indeed, its ability to exploit present tensions to set off communal
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clashes is particularly dangerous in view of the doubtful control
that the non-communist communal leaders can now exert on their
followers.
9. When Makarios does receive the Turkish replay, he may
decide that further negotiations with them are useless. in this
event there is a wide variety of moves he could make. lie might
attempt unilaterally to amend, the Constitution or as a preliminary
stop denounce the Treaty of Guarantee. Also he might dissolve
the House of Representatives, call a special Constitutional
Assembly, call for early presidential or parliamentary elections
(with a built-in referendum or. the Constitutional amendment issue),
and even take his case to the UN if need be. Almost any of these
would probably provoke a bitter Turkish response, greatly enhancing
the changes for open communal conflict and total disrupt'on of
Cypriot life. While it seems unlikely that such conflict would
occur by calculation, once initiated, it would be difficult for
the Greek and Turkish contingents to stand aside. In this case,
both countries would be under heavy pressure to augment their forces
with the consequent danger the conflict could spread. Despite these
dangers, we believe that Makarios is likely to press forward as he
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appears aisinclinea. to accept a defeat to his prestige. Also,
thanks to the encouragement he has received from Venizelos, he
probably counts on ultimate Greek support.
10. Even if widespread violence does not occur, any attempt
by Makarios to change unilaterally the Constitution would heat up
the political situation. The Turkish community would almost
certainly appeal to Turkey for protection according to the Treatar
of Guarantee.
While the presont Turkish
civilian leadership has been somewhat more relaxed in its view
of Cyprus, there would be strong compulsion from both the military
and public opinion to acceed to any request for Assistance from
the Turkish minority in Cyprus. Yet the Tumish government would
feel itself torn by concern over its position in NATO and in the
first instance would almost certainly put heavy pressure on
the United States to intervene with the Greek government and
with Makarios. The Turks would also probably seek to convene a
meeting of the Guarantor Powcrs (the tUKC, Greece, and Turkey) to
force Makarios to retreat. But if this international pressure
were not successful, the Turkish government might encourage the
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Cypriot Turks to attempt some sort of partition of the island
and might as a last resort use its military forces to assist in
this endeavor.
11. Any such moves would lace the present precariously
balanced Greek government with a series of difficult choices.
Greek public opinion has never fully accepted former Premier
Karama.nlis' agreement to the provisions of the London-Zurich
Accords, and thus the present government is strongly tempted to
disavow the sober restraints of the earlier period. Yet despite
the apparent willingness of the present Greek Foreign Minister to
consider dispatching Greek troops if forces were sent from Turkey,
it seems unlikely that any Greek government would accept the risk
of hostilities with Turkey. Indeed, ire believe that if an armed
conflict between the communities on Cyprus broke out, the Greek
government would probably prefer to work through the Guarantor
Powers to decide on a solution. But once this stage were
reached, the Greek leaders would encounter heavy domestic pressure
to oppose accommodatio:i with the Turks. In this situation it would
take the strongest representations from the UK, backed by the
United States, to impell the present Greek leaders to disavow
Makarios and return to their policy of discouraging the Cypriots
from unilateral action.
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12. Withou some effective international intervention including
both Greece and Turkey, the bitterness between the Turkish and
Greek communities on Cyprus will probably mount rapidly. As such
Joint intervention seems at Present for off, time will thus work
against arriving at any solution acceptable to both sides. Already
the situation has deteriorated to the point where restoration of
mutual confidence in any meaningful extent will. be exceedingly
difficult. Widespread communal violence, should it occur,
might render return to peaceful coexi.atence within a single state
impossible. In this event, some form of territorial partition
or population exciange might become necessary, leaving scars 'hat
would trouble Greek-Turkish relations for a long time to come.
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