RUMANIA AND THE WARSAW PACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210047-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: June 25, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

C A/ ON F / STtAF F ME Mr C. Lt- u ei~6AlOBIb4:'R Nf f ?` z AN D H WA SAW PACT
~ECKEI Al r Ull~ JUN 65
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x'!141 NC,1'm'i
CENTRAL I N T E L L I GENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 June 1965
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STAFF MLMORANDTJM NO. 24-65: (Internal ONE Working Paper --
CIA Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Rumania and the Warsaw Pact
1. Rumania is showing signs of a rapidly growing interest in
altering its relations with the Warsaw Pact.
Chances of such
a move in the foreseeable future are probably less than even, but
we believe that the possibility exists and should be taken seriously.
Certainly the evidence suggests that Bucharest would at least like
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to leave the Pact, and certainly, if it should do so, the repercussions
would transcend the purely local; the world, it need hardly be
said, is rarely granted the luxury of ignoring problems in the
Balkans.
2. Accordingly, the paper which follows reviews the background
of Soviet-Rumanian relations, brings the question of Bucharest's
attitude toward the Pact up to date, examines Rumanian timing and
motives, and assesses Sovi(.t attitudes and possible reactions.
Background
3. Our knowledge of Rumania's diser_chcr:tment with the Warsaw
Pact goes back tc last fall, and we have the Rumanians themselves
to thank for it. At that time, two Rumanian officers told our
military attache in Bucharest that their country's participation
in the Pact was reluctant and that, if their government had its
own way, Rumania would not involve itself in any pacts but would
defend only its own frontiers. Gheorghiu Dej told our ambassador
much the same thing when he claimed that Rumanian forces were wanted
or.'y for the defense of Rumania. He also stated that his primary
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interest in the military was to minimize the expense of main-
taming it.*
4. The general thrust of public Rumanian policy is wholly
consistent with such private statements. Since at least April 1964,
when the Rumanian party issued its so-called declaration of indepen-
dence and followed this up with a flurry of explf.citly anti-Soviet
speeches, Bucharest has time and again sought to demonstrate its
disagreement with aspects of Soviet policy. Most dramatically, it
refused to bend to SoviL_t pressures to attend the international
Communist meeting held in Moscow last March.
5. Gheorghiu Dej's successors lost no time in reaffirming
the leadership's determination to protect and expand Rumanian
independence. Gheorghiu Dej's death could have provided the leaders
with an opportunity to approach problems of concern to the Soviets
with greater caution and tact. But, if anything, the new party
leader, Ceausescu, has accelerated Dej's independentist policies.
x During the same period, the central press emphasized Rumania's
opposition to the concept of power blocs and military alliances,
Rumanian officers deliberately snubbed the Soviet military at
a Bucharest reception, and the Rumanian government, almost
certainly unilaterally, greatly reduced the term of service of
conscripts.
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The le _erchip's interest in Austrian independence and neutrality
has be -i publicly demonstrated and will be further advertised
early this fall when Premier Maurer is scheduled to visit Vienna.
Its c'_termination to maintain good relations with China has led
to a lumber of good-will gestures, including at least one (in
Ind-:iesia) which must have greatly annoyed the Soviets. And its
dec:.re to present to the Communist world an image of ideological
1( itimacy has resulted in the declaration that Rumania is now a
f721-fledged "Socialist Republic." All of these developments, of
t:.;u_rse, have implications of concern to the Soviets.
6. Specifically concerning the Warsaw Pact, the ^.eausescu
regime has indicated its attitude privately by telling our embassy
(through a foreign ministry spokesman)that the Soviets had sent
an emissary to Bucharest to put pressure .3n the Rumanians (an
apparent reference to the recent vis.ts of Marshal Grechko, of
which more later). It has demonstrated its attitude publicly in
a speech to army political officers by Ceausescu himself. Speaking
on 15 Jure, Ceausescu, declared that the armed forces are "ready
to carry out any mission" and decried "any interference by any
state in the internal affairs of another state." Then, in an
unusual reference implying a campaign for greater self-reliance,
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Ceausescu stated that the "working class and Rumanian people make
sustained efforts for equipping the army, efforts which will
continue in the future." Significantly, as our embassy observes,
Ceausescu made no mention whatsoever of the Warsaw Pact or even
the USSR.*
The Pact Problem
7. This background, together with such specific matters as
the regim:e's intense campaign to de-Russify all aspects of Rumanian
culture, serves to point up both the delicacy of relations with
the USSR and its own determination to win a significant measure of
national sovereignty. In this content, Rumania's unhappiness with
close military ties with the USSR becomes in general terms fully
understandable. It is more difficult, however, to assess the specific`
of present Rumanian intentions concerning the Warsaw Pact.
*
Ceausescu made this speech on 15 June. Two days after he
spoke, it was revealed that the Rumanian Chief of Staff had been
relieved of his duties for reasons not stated. A similar move
in P..land several months ago has been attributed to Soviet
pressures; the Chief of Staff fired there had apparently been
accused of anti-Soviet tendencies. The same is possible in
Bucharest, particularly in view of Grechko's visits. But, per-
haps more likely, the Rumanians have rid themselves of an officer
who was pro-Soviet, or at least inclined to go along with the
USSR's proposals for strengthening the Warsaw Pact.
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8. Soviet attitudes toward the Warsaw Pact have changed
appreciably over the past few years. One general policy change is
to be inferred from Soviet willingness to re-eq:iip Eastern
European forces with more modern weapons and to grant the member
states some additional say-so within the Pact. This willingness
may have been intended in part to respond to the desires of some
of the member states, but in the main, it seems to reflect a Soviet
decision to give the Pact a greater role in overall strategic
plans. Initially conceived as a political counter to Western
plans and organizations and as a device to further cz.nsolidate
Soviet controls in Eastern Europe, the Pact as it now stands more
closely resembles a traditional alliance system with both military
and political implications.
9. The Rumanians disapprove of the concept of multilateral
military alliances and have said so puhl icly. Their attitude stems
from a variety of considerations. In the first instance, they
have little incentive to remain within the Pact; unlike Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, which are still preoccupied with
the "threat" of West Germany and feel some need for Soviet "pro-
tection," Rumania is not faced with a potentially hostile and powerful
neighbor (unless it is the USSR itself ). Further, unlike at least
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East Germany, Rumania foresees no internal security problem of
sufficient scope to require Soviet assistance. Finally, while the
Rumanian armed forces are dependent on the USSR for weapons and
equipment, the regime probably believes that an alternative supplier
(France?) would become available in t:ie event that Soviet sources
were cut off. in any case, Bucharest's drive for independence in
no way rests on the maintenance of a strong military force.
10. In addition, the Rumanians have a variety of
reasons for shunning a supranational organization of the Pact
variety. Most important, membership does not accord with their
not, ons of sovereignty and nati, nalism. iunong other things, they
almost certainly view the Pact as another Soviet dev::ce for insuring
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and as another i trument for
bringing pressure to bear on the member states. Indceu, it would
be surprising if the Rumanians did not see the Pact in this
light; certainly it is at least potentially a more effective in-
strument of Soviet control than CEb'A, which the Rumanians objected
to on similar grounds (and successfully so).
:tea: %her, continued
membership does not jibe well with Rumania's efforts to improve
its relations with the West, or even to carry on good relations
with Communist China. Finally, though of only theoretical
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importance, Rumania's membership could provide the Soviets with
a "legal" pretext for military intervention.
Rumanian Intenticas
11. Rumania's negative attitude toward the Warsaw Pact,
and its apparently increasing willingness to act on the basis
of that attitude, raises questions about both tha Rumanian mood
and Rumar.:an intentions. Does, for example, Bucharest's current
approach reflect a determination to proceed with even more national-
istic poli c.es, a growing alarm over possible Soviet moves against
Rumania, or Machiavellian maneuvering calculated to preserve
Rumanian autonomy but to avoid undue risk? We are inclined to
believe that all three elements are present to one degree or
another.
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12. Rumanian intentions may not, of course, be faithfully
reflected in reports of Bucharest's interest in withdrawing from
the Pact. The Pmanians' emotional and political predisposition
to cuddle up to France and De Gaulle may, for example, have moved
them to exaggerate both their intentions and their bravado. Perhaps
more likely, it could be that the Rumanians are using various
channels to issue warnings to the Soviets to refrain from pressure
tactics. Bucharest has used such tactics in the past under
similar circumstances, viz. notice to loccccr that things could get
a lot worse if Soviet "errors" persist.
13. It could also be that what the Ru aniauis have in mind
is not a uiilateral Rumanian move at all but at scme point in
the fairly distant future a voluntary agreement among all Pact
members that the Pact organization -- as a result of Frencli
departure from NATO -- had served its purpose and could bp
dissolved. (tts a matter of fact, the Warsaw Pact treaty specifies
that the Pact will automatically dissolve upon the achievement of
true collective security in Europe.) But the are in
fa-.t. counting on score form of voluntary disbandment, rather
tro,n some specific move of their own, they are almost ccrtainly
going to be disappointed. From all indications, Soviet strategy
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goes not allow for the dissolution of the Pact, now or in the
future. Perhaps what the Rumanians really have in mind in this
regard is the g_ad:al develorment of sufficient Eastern European
pressure to force the USSR to disband the Pact, the alternative
being the accession of Rumania and some other member states.*
But, if so, the distinction between this kind of approach and a
purely unilateral Rumanian move is simply that, in contemplating
a radical move against the USSR, the : tinanians -- like everyone
else -- would like to have some atliec.
14. in any case, it seems likely teat. R man an concern over
Soviet intentions has beccooc very much ctroZ,C'-r in .c cart mocths.
The Rumanians have been seriously discenfittcd by the
harshness of Soviet foreign policy in general., and have probably
become highly suspicious of Soviet policies toward the Warsaw
Pact in pry-?ticuL^.r. Indeed, there ran be little doubt
that, partly as a consequence of the Vietnamese crisis, the
USSR has of late stepped up its pressure on the P.unani.an regime
to conform to Bloc policies. Specifically, Rumanian reluctance
fully to Join the Communist hue and cry against US actionc and
* The Rumanians have little reason to count on other Pact
members at this time but probably expect support for Rumanian
positions to develop over time.
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policies in Vietnam has apparently occasioned private Soviet
and North Vietnamese protests to the Rummnian party secretar -
general, Ceausescu. Moscow's displeasure has also been expressed
cpenly; Suslcv, speaking in neighboring Bulgaria in early June
sharply warned against the dangers of national separatism and,
almost certainly including Rumania among his targets, cauticned
that no socialist state can exist in isolat!c*i from the Bloc.
15. Some recent developments affec t-i!:g the Warsaw Pact
have also probably heightened Rtuanian anxiety. Ambitious plans
for this organization may have been unr-peed by the Soviets
at the high level Pact meeting in Wcrsaiwr last January;
Gheorgiaiu-Dej was present at that meeting and was said to eve
rec.sted some of the Soviet proposals, including one which
calle3 for an integrated Fact command over some military units.
More recently, in April, growing Soviet interest in the Pact
seems to have been demonstrateu anew by an uiprccedented
con~cati-.. of Past defense minis..ers in the (,'nrp,athc_T Tkro ne.
-- r
Precisely what the Soviets have in mind for the Pact is not
# According to the TASS account of this meeting, "tactical
exercises" were held, new weapons- were demanctrated, a.-id
"views on different questions of military development:"
were exchanged.
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known. But something is apparently in the wind, and whatever
that is, the Rumanians are likely to be uneasy about it.
16. The co. Wander of the War sa' T Pact, ?arshal Grechko,
has recently been in 3ucharest, perha_ s to press Soviet plans on
the reluctant Rumanians. His return, only a few weeks after
an earlier visit, suggests that his initial con.ersaticrs had
not been well received.
there is a plan afoot to station "symbolic units" of the
Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German armies on one another's
territory. If true, It is conceivable that something similar
may be proposed for H:u-:gary, R?umcmia, and Bulgaria, a i ro: pect
which would greatly agitate at least the Rumanians.* Not call
does Bucharest dis_ike the Hun-Z=rians and hold the Bulg arc in
contempt, it would immediately and instinctively fear that such
a plan would merely represent the first step of a scheme to
occupy the country with Soviet or satellite forces, in this
way to insure permanent Rumanian fidelity to the Bloc and the
USSR.
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* It is nlso possible, of course, that the USS:t intends only
t- press such a plan on the ctrate- ical more im r':.ant
northern countries. tt:e GPI?, 25X1 C
Poland, and Czpchos' , a -a Tom e corino_rs ?one o the
Soviet empire; the other Eastern European states (they would
no doubt be surpr1u d to learn)are esscr.t,iaLly'in God's hands."
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17. But Grechko may have been in town to press somewhat
less dramatic proposals. There are some signs that Soviets hope
to estabilah a direct Warsaw Pact command relationship under
which the national ministries of defense would, in effect, be
bypassed.Tucharest reportedly expressed its opposition to this
proposal at the January Pact conclave in Warsaw. Grechko might
also have discussed a Soviet plan to answer the MLr; program
with some kind of joint Pact nuclear wea cns control system --
he publicly hinted of such a plan in May. Because any such
proposal would almost certainly involve Soviet control over
nuclei.-: weapons on Rumanian ooil, it would be unlikely to appeal
to the Rumanians.
18. Still a_lother problem may have added to Rumanian
concern -- the particularly sensitive issue of Soviet-controlled
Bessarabia. Both Bucharest and Moscow have indirectly expressed
their positions on this issue in recent months, the former by
citing Marx's defense of the Rumanian claim to the area, the
latter by openly discussing the evils of the administration of
the area by Rumania when it "occupied" the territory,/ between
the two world wars. It has been reported that, in addition,
the Soviets have in the last year or so quietly deported great
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numbers of Rumanians still living in Bessarabia to rem::te areas
of the USSR. At a minimum, this issue provides Bucharest with
a provocative talking point; at a maximum, it contains within
it all the emotional explosiveness of any terra i=cdenta.
In any case, Moscow's willingness to pursue a tough policy in
Bessarabia, even to resort to large-scale deportations, would
suggest to Bucharest a general hardening of the Soviet lire
toward Rumania.
Soviet Reactions
19. Moscow almost certainly does not view the current
Rumanian attitude toward the Pact with equanimity, as is
indicated by the aforementioned visit:, to Bucharest of
Marshal Grechko. But Moscow's ability to alter the Rumanian
attitude is probably quite limited. Should Bucharest reduce
its participation in the Pact to a purely formal level, refuse
to tcticipate in Pact exercises and make only a minimal
contribution to Pact forces, Moscow would either have to
tacitly acknowledge Rumania's sovereign right to do so, change
its plans for the Pact as a whole (as in fact it did for CFMA
when faced with comparable Rumanian opposition), or seek some-
how to compel the Rumanians to acquiesce in Soviet plans.
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20. The latter would be most difficult to accomplish.
The Soviets almost certainly do not possess sufficient assets
within the Rumanian party to overthrow the present regime.
Nor do they possess a throttlehold on the Rumanian economy.
Bucharest is probably in a better position to resist Soviet
economic pressures than either China or Yugoslavia were; in
any case, a Soviet boycott would almost certainly tun the
Rumanians toward. the Sdest for help. A withdrawal of Soviet
military aid would probably have the same effect. A Soviet
bribe, such as a major economic aid progaam, would also be
unlikely to work. The Fc:.manian leaders are not the sort who
would be likely to barter their independence, even were they
in great need of outside economic assistance.*
* Aside from their probably genuine nationalist convictions,
the Rumanian leaders have deliberately cultivated (and won)
important political support on the basis of their indepen-
dentist program. They would be most reluctant to jeopardize
this support by making major compromises with the Soviets.
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21. Ultimately, if all else should fail, the Soviets would
have to consider as a last resort the question of military inter-
vention. In broad terms, there is one very telling reason why the
Soviets might actually use force in the event that Rumania was,
in effect, defecting from the camp (by withdrawing from the Pact
or in some other way): to preserve their empire, not z)nly in
Rumania but throughout Eastern Europe. A failure to intervene
would signal to the other Eastern European states and, indeed, to
the world at large, that the USSR had either deliberately decided
to let the empire break up or that it was powerless to prevent it.
22. On the other hand, there are also reasons why the USSR
would seek to avoid such intervention. The Vietnamese situation
or any comparable situation in the future, would have a bearing
on Soviet considerations. If the international scene is tense,
for example, Moscow might fet,;,r that a move against Rumania would
raise tensions to an unacceptable level. Further, their commitment
in Vietnam might persuade some Soviets that it would be a poor time
in which to engage in new adventures on another front, in Eastern
Europe or anywhere alse. Finally, a Soviet invasion of Rumania,
at a time when Moscow was decrying the US "invasion" of Vietnam,
would badly damage the USSR's international prestige and perhaps
seriously harm their policy toward the underdeveloped areas.
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23. Central to the Soviet consideration would be the question
of the effects of Rumania's actions on the other Eastern European
states, including Yugoslavia. The rature of the General Soviet
dilemma is most clear in this context. An invasion of Rumania
would in many respects damage Soviet interests throughout the area
and wou1_d carry with it at least some risk of trouble elsewhere in
the Bloc.
24. The USSR would face a similar problem within the Communist
world as a whole. Communist China would denounce Soviet intervention ,
both because its relations with Rumania are good and might improve,
and because the Chinese would welcome the opportunity to point to
Soviet perfidy. Yugoslavia, on the opposite end of the Communist
ideological spectrum, would be equally -- and more genuinely --
appalled. Belgrade not only would fear an eventual Soviet military
move against Yugoslavia, or any other offending Eactern European
state, it would also see in jeopardy many of the objectives it
has so long sought to obtain: Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement,
more flexible Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, and peaceful co-
existence in general. The Communist parties of Europe, of both
left and right, would also be greatly dismayed, but with added
reason -- their political strength would inevitably decline.
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25. Many elements would influence the Soviet attitude, not
the least of which would be the degree of unity within the Soviet
leadership. Certainly the Rumanian issue would tend to aggravate
existing tensions and stimulate new ones at the top; the military
might advocate intervention, some politicians would be likely to
oppose it. Daring the Hungarian crisis there was considerable un-
certainty within the leadership and a great deal of discord as
well. 'there was also a considerable amount of wishful thinking
(by Khrushchev a.mng others), and faced with imminent Rumanian
withdrawal, the present leaders would probably try to find srme magic
"middle way" cut of the dilemma. In any case, in a crisis generated
by a Rumanian withdrawal from the Pact, the leadership would be
faced with a great many pros and cons, and, -c nhatever its decision,
it would not be easy to agree on.
Postscript
26. The dilemma posed for the Soviets by a Rumanian with-
drawal from the Pact, or even -- short of formal withdrawal -- a
Rumanian refusal to cooperate with the Pact, would probably be at
least as clear to the Rumanians as to the Soviets. Indeed, the
full awareness that it could create such terrible problems for
Moscow gives Rumania a certain assurance and courage in its
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pursuit of independence. The Rumanians almost certainly count on
a strong Soviet desire to avoid a direct conflict of major inter-
ests.
27. Of late, however, Bucharest has some reason to be con-
cerned about just how lone, it will be able to count on this; the
omens are not entirely encouraging. The Rumanians do not know
at what precise point the Soviets would be willing to assume the
rl,'c of forcing the issue and at what point the Soviets might
find Rumanian actions intolerable. Bucharest thus ha; substantial
reason for continuing to b, `r_ve with some measure of caution. A
radical move against the Warsaw Pact does not seem likely _nless
the Rumanians had good reason to believe that the USSR would not
oppose it militarily; or unless the Rumanians were seeking through
such an act somehow to forestall Soviet intervention.
28. The Rumanians may not make marvelous soldiers, but
their national character -- despite the a:ivent of Coa..:.snicm --
does seem to promote political cunning. When this particular
t elent is combined with a clear objective, the Rumanians can be
formidable adversaries indeed. This, at any rate, would be the
likely Soviet testimony.
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Approved For Release 2004/08/04: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000210047-2