SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: LONG-TERM DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS IN DROUGHT-AFFLICTED REGIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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en ra intelligence , gencv
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State Dept. review completed
Washington.0 C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 January 1985
Sub-Saharan Africa: Long-term Demographic
Problems in Drought-afflicted Regions
Summary
The current drought and famine in Sub-Saharan Africa will
aggravate the social and political turbulence already generated
by three longstanding demographic trends in the region: rapid
population growth, large numbers of internal and international
refugees, and growing inequities in living conditions between
urban and rural areas. We believe that these demographic
pressures will complicate efforts by political leaders to
maintain popular support and to foster economic development for
at least the next decade.
The population of Sub-Saharan Africa is growing
faster than that of any other continent and of most
LDCs. The rate of growth has accelerated from 2.3
percent a year in 1960 to 3 percent today, and the
United Nations projects it will rise to 3.2 percent
by the end of the century. At these rates the
total population will grow from 415 million people
today to around 690 million by the year 2000.
The approximately 3 million refugees in Sub-Saharan
countries are a constant drain on resources
This memorandum responds to a request by Malcolm Butler, Executive
Secretary of the Agency for International Development. It was prepared by
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includes in ormation available as of 15 January 1985
Comments+andV
.
queries are welcome and m be directed to the Chief, Regional Issues
Branch, ALA F 7
ON FILE USDA RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
ALA M 85-10003
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urgently needed for national development in both
the home countries of the refugees and the
countries that receive them. In combination with
the civil wars, insurgencies, and food deficits
that cause refugee movements, the problems created
by refugee populations strain the economic, social,
and political structures of both sending and
receiving countries.
African governments tend to favor urban over rural
areas because they view unrest in the cities as the
greatest potential threat to internal stability.
They recognize that the rapid growth of
cities--whether the result of natural increase,
economic migrations, or refugee flows--requires
special attention and investment, usually at the
expense of rural services and agricultural
development.
The need for governments to redirect their resources from
economic and social development to crisis relief will, in our
judgment, force some regimes to adopt coercive measures such as
the current resettlement scheme in Ethiopia or the closing of
borders to refugees as has been threatened by Sudan and the
Central African Republic. In the short term, governmental
efforts to resettle refugees or to deny them access to cities
may achieve the desired result of getting the undesirables out
of the public eye and away from the seat of government. Over
the longer term, however, such moves will generate rising
frustration, anger, and in some cases rebellion among those in
both sending and receiving countries who have been the
scapegoat of inefficient and short-sighted policies.
Rapid Population Growth: The Long-term Threat
The statistics on population trends in Sub-Saharan Africa are
discouraging. Rapid population growth will continue at a high level or
even accelerate over the next several decades, according to UN
projections. The rate of growth has accelerated from 2.3 percent a year
in 1960 to 3 percent today, and the UN projects the total population of
the region to grow from 415 million today to around 690 million by the
The population of Sub-Saharan Africa is growing faster than that of
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any other continent and of most LDCs. According to UN statistics for
1984, the average annual growth rate of 37 of the 44 countries in the
region is 3.1 percent, considerably faster than the LDC average of 2
percent. The seven with slower growth represent only 1.2 percent of the
total Sub-Saharan population but also have a relatively high average rate
of qrowth of 1.8 percent. Although the UN projects that the LDC growth
rate will drop to an average annual 1.8 percent by the year 2000. it
expects that of Sub-Saharan Africa to rise to 3.2 percent.
Beyond just the sheer magnitude of the demographic statistics,
however, rapid population growth is the greatest single long-term
constraint on economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the
World Bank. Population growth of 3 percent a year--with rates close to 4
percent in such countries as Kenya and Tanzania--puts extraordinary
pressure on national food systems and reduces the availability of goods
needed for basic welfare. According to estimates by the World Bank, per
capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa is now about 4 percent below the 1970
level, and food production per capita has fallen by at least 20 percent
over the past 10 years primarily because of population pressures on arable
lands and rudimentary farming practices. Cultivators have been pushed
onto more marginal agricultural areas in zones of lower and uncertain
rainfall in parts of East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda), southern
Africa (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), and West Africa (Mauritania and
Niger), according to analysis by the World Bank. Imports now provide a
fifth of the Sub-Saharan region's food requirements.
In our view, there is no lasting "Malthusian" solution to Africa's
population growth. The loss of hundreds of thousands of persons through
starvation and famine-caused illnesses over the past year will slow
population growth only for the period of acute food deficits. The
restoration of food supplies and some semblance of social order should,
however, allow for the quick rehabilitation of populations and the
probable reassertion of pre-existing population growth patterns.
Documented studies of the Dutch famine of 1944-45 and the famine in parts
of Bangladesh in 1974 show a resumption of normal birth and death levels
within months of the amelioration of the food crises. In the case of
Ethiopia:
If famine had not afflicted the country, we would have
expected the prevailing high fertility (crude birth rates of
49 per thousand population) and relatively high mortality
(crude death rates of 21.5 per thousand population) to have
resulted in a population of about 50.3 million in 1990
(assuming the preliminary census figure of 42.5 million in
1984 is correct).
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If we assume a famine-induced decline in the birth rate to
41.5 Per thousand and an increase in deaths equal to the
300,000 estimated famine-induced deaths in 1984, and that
these rates would be maintained for 1984 through 1986 when
normal conditions of growth would return, we would still
expect a population of 48.6 million in 1990.
Refugees: Destabilizing Consequences
In addition to the weight of famine itself, the burden of refugees
and the costs of the other forces that generate them severely strain the
ability of African nations to help themselves. They drain economic,
physical, and human resources that ideally would be assigned to
development projects to upgrade the national standard of living.
International Refugees. Whether generated by civil war, insurgency,
or famine, international refugees tend to cause social and political
instability in both sending and receiving countries. A review of
official, academic, and public literature on refugee movements throughout
the world over the past several decades indicates that:
-- The presence of refugees may draw the receiving country into
the sometimes violent internecine conflicts or international
disputes of the sending country, such as is currently
occurring between Thailand, Kampuchea, and Vietnam.
-- Pressures for refugee assistance tend to aggravate already
existing conflicts, such as those between Ethiopia and Sudan
over suspected aid to insurgent groups under cover of refugee
assistance.
Ethnic and religious tensions can be distorted or heightened
not only at the time of movement and resettlement but even
decades later, as in the continuing impasse between Rwanda and
Uganda over the proposed repatriation of 100,000 Tutsis who
fled to Uganda following the 1959 Rwandan revolution in
exchange for 31,000 Hutus forcibly sent out of Uganda to
border camps in Rwanda in 1982.
Donors of humanitarian aid often demand access to regions of a
country or to institutions deemed politically sensitive by a
government or its political opponents. This has occurred in
Pakistan since the flight of Afghan refugees to Pakistani
border areas began in 1979.
The attention and care given to refugees may engender
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animosities among citizens of the receiving country who live
in conditions not much better than a refugee camp--currently a
major problem in Sudan and Somalia.
The sending country is always under regional and international
pressure to arrange for and accept the repatriation of its
citizens. Such repatriation may be difficult or impossible,
at least in the short term, particularly if civil or social
disorder was one of the causes of the refugee movement,
as in the ongoing conflicts in Chad, Ethiopia, and
In the absence of voluntary repatriation or third country
resettlement, international aid resources are increasingly being shifted
from care and maintenance of refugees to comprehensive programs integrated
with host country development plans. The Second International Conference
for Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) in July 1984 was aimed at
devising programs to help host countries cope with large, semi-permanent
refugee populations while at the same time accomplishing national economic
and social development. Fourteen countries claiming about 2.5 million
refugees or returnees submitted proposals for a total of 128 agricultural,
educational, social, and physical infrastructure projects that would cost
approximately $300 million. Donors expressed interest in about one-third
of the projects, all designed to reinforce the areas most affected by the
arrival or return of refugees such as the provision of secondary,
vocational, and technical education, agricultural improvement,
Internal Refugees. Internal stability and opportunities for
development are also undermined in countries experiencing spontaneous
movements of large numbers of their own citizens seeking food or refuge.
Governments are usually ill-equipped to cope with the physical needs of
refugees and reluctant for political reasons to admit that a serious
problem exists. Spontaneous settlement in and around capital cities and
other major urban centers, where refugees tend to go in the belief food
and security will be available, is usually met by the government's denials
of their plight and alarm at the suggestion of unrest that their presence
signals. This has occurred most recently, for example, in Ethiopia. At
the same time, governments tend to try to force refugees out of cities or
to deny entry altogether, such as currently in Ethiopia and Chad, to
protect the existing urban populations from want and to keep the sight of
hungry or frightened people from international view. Chad has established
five feeding centers in the vicinity of N'Djamena in an attempt to prevent
the major portion of the estimated 80.000 refugees flowing toward the
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While the historical record shows that internal refugees often return
home when conditions permit, there have been increasing instances of
groups staying permanently in their area of refuge, often remaining as
outsiders with no inclination or ability to adapt to life-styles dictated
by the new region. As a result, a new permanent underclass, with few of
the skills necessary for urban living, is being created in several already
overburdened African cities. For example, nomads in Mauritania who
remained around Nouakchott after the 1973 Sahelian drought are still
living in impoverished neighborhoods and have been integrated only
slightly into the life of the city. They have been joined by thousands of
additional nomads made destitute by drought in the oast few years. Nomads
in Mali have followed a similar pattern.
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The Urban-Rural Split: A Worsening Problem
In addition to problems of rapid total population growth and refugee
movements, most Sub-Saharan countries are woefully equipped to manage the
rapid urbanization that is occurring there. Although Sub-Saharan Africa
is the least urbanized region in the world, with only slightly more than a
quarter of its people living in cities, urban growth rates average a high
5.5 percent a year, ensuring a doubling of the overall urban population in
12 years. As is the case with the total population, studies of urban
development patterns show that it is the speed with which the cities are
growing--rather than their absolute ' e--that strains governmental
resources and management.
A look at African demographic and social data indicate that generally
poor rural conditions and the punishing physical drudgery of farming have
led to rural flight even in good economic times, sharpening the urban-
rural split. Numerous demographic surveys have shown that rural migrants
view city life as preferable to rural in part because they expect
greater opportunities to be available to their children if not to
The flight to the cities is intensifying in most drought-stricken
countries and includes in some instances the unprecedented displacement of
entire villages or tribal groups. In Mali, US Embassy officers estimate
that nearly one-third of the 126,000-person population in the Niger River
floodplain has migrated from farms to join extended family households in
major towns or to set up makeshift camps on their outskirts. We estimate
that a large proportion of these destitute people will remain in the towns
and cities, even after the worst effects of the food crises are
ameliorated, because they will be unable to return to rural areas until
complex countrywide rural rehabilitation programs are begun.
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An Anti-Rural Policy Bias. A review of academic literature and the
policies of African states over the past several decades indicates that
nearly all African governments favor urban over rural areas. One reason
is that post-independence African leaders tended to view the agricultural
sector as the source of surplus revenue to finance what they perceived to
be more important industrial development. Consequently, governments
devoted few resources to domestic food crops, preferring to focus
development spending on export crops that could earn foreign exchange.
Another reason is that most governments believe that the main threat to
political stability comes from the demands of politically-active or
potentially disruptive urban residents, not from farmers who are not
organized and are far from the centers of power. One way to reduce urban
discontent is to assure the availability of plentiful, cheap food.
The food pricing and marketing policies of African governments have
reflected these priorities.
In most African countries, prices of key staples are regulated
by the state rather than the free market. Prices paid to
farmers for their crops are kept deliberately low--often at
levels insufficient to cover production costs--to subsidize
politically volatile urban consumers. Farmers, as a result,
have little incentive to expand production beyond the
immediate needs of their families. In our judgment, these
conditions are especially acute in Tanzania, Mali, and
Mozambique.
According to US agricultural analysts, the food policies of
African governments generally concentrate on filling urban
preference for high-quality imported wheat and rice (often at
subsidized prices) rather than relying on local grains and
other foodstuffs. This policy not only discourages domestic
production but drains foreign exchange. Ethiopia, for
example, is using scarce foreign exchange to cover urban food
requirements while using the military to keep the rural hungry
from entering the cities, according to reports from the US
Under prodding from international and Western aid donors, some
African governments are trying to liberalize their state-run agricultural
sectors and to redress the anti-rural policy bias--with solid success in a
few states such as Zimbabwe and Kenya. According to a review of press and
Embassy reporting:
-- Senegal and Somalia have turned over the marketing of many
domestic agricultural products to the private sector.
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Mali has relinquished the government's monopoly control over
sorghum and millet as a condition for receiving an IMF standby
accord.
Since 1980 Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Tanzania have raised
prices paid to farmers for some food crops in order to
encourage production.
In our judgment, these kinds of reforms offer some hope of progress in
meeting the food needs of the rapidly expanding population, but their
immediate impact has in many cases been offset by the effects of
drought.
Outl ook
We expect that the current drought will increase the social and
political turbulence already generated by rapid population growth, refugee
movements, and favoritism for urban over rural areas in the policies of
African governments. In our view, these fundamental, long-term trends
will be underlying determinants of instability in the severely drought-
affected countries for at least the next decade. Moreover, we do not
expect the reconstruction of normally functioning societies with even the
low pre-drought levels of economic activity and public services in this
decade. We expect that education, health, population programs, housing,
public transportation, and other welfare and service sectors will suffer
as a substantial portion of the limited human and monetary resources
available will be drawn off into meeting crises connected with food
shortages and agricultural rehabilitation.
The need for governments to redirect their resources from economic
and social development to crisis relief will, in our judgment, force some
regimes to adopt coercive measures such as the current resettlement scheme
in Ethiopia or the closing of borders to refugees as has been threatened
by Sudan and the Central African Republic. In the short term,
governmental efforts to resettle refugees or to deny them access to cities
may achieve the desired result of getting the undesirables out of the
public eye and away from the seat of government. Over the longer term,
however, such moves will generate rising frustration, anger, and in some
cases rebellion among those in both sending and receiving countries
who have been made the scapegoat of inefficient and short-sighted
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SUBJECT: SubSaharan Africa: Long-term Demographic Problems in Drought-
afflicted Regions
Distribution:
Original - Malcolm Butler, Executive Secretary, Agency for
International Development
1 - Princeton Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of African Affairs, Department of State
1 - Arthur E. Dewey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Assistance and Relief, Bureau for
Refugee Programs, Department of State
1 - Antonio Gayoso, Director, Office of International
Development, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau
of International Organization Affairs, Department of
State.
1 - Richard W. Bogosian, Director, Office of East
African Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Peter W. Lande, Director, Economic Policy Staff, Bureau
of African Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Pierre Shostal, Director, Office of Central African
Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Robert Gelbard, Director, Office of Southern African
Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Edward J. Perkins, Director, Office of West African
Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Jeffrey S. Davidow, Director, Office of Regional
Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Mark L. Edelman, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Africa, Agency for International Development.
1 - Anthony S. Dalsimer, Office of Analysis for Africa,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State.
1 - Lydia Giffler, Office of Economic Analysis, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
1 - Janet Henninger, Office of Global Issues, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
1 - Richard B. Levine, Deputy Director for International
Economic Affairs, National Security Council.
1 - T. Kelley White, Interagency Food Aid Analysis Working
Group, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
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1 - NIC Action Group
1 - PDB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/OGI
1 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
5 - ALA/AF
2 - AF/RI
4 - ALA/RI
ALA/AF,
(24 January 1985)
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