ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN WEST AFRICA: AN UPDATE ON NIGERIA AND SENEGAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 14, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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~IK
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 May 1985
Islamic Revival In West Africa: An Update on Nigeria and Senegal
Summary
The Islamic revival in West Africa has been felt most
strongly over the past three years in Nigeria and Senegal.
Islamic fundamentalism opposing the traditionally powerful Sufi
brotherhoods is gaining strength in the Nigerian Muslim
community. In Senegal, the traditional brotherhoods themselves
have adopted some fundamentalist trappings, and independent
fundamentalist associations have increased their recruitment
efforts. The Islamic communities in Nigeria and Senegal have
been exposed increasingly during this period to radical and
fundamentalist theologies of the Middle East and North
Africa. Indeed, Iran has emerged as the revival's principal
source of inspiration. Libya, buoyed by military successes in
Chad, is redoubling its efforts to use Islam as an entree to
Nigeria and Senegal. The Saudis, despite their own budgetary
Assistant Secretary or African Affairs, the Department of State. The
paper was written by West Branch, Africa Division of the
25X1 Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It hae been coordinated
wvth the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
State Dept. review completed
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constraints, continue to provide vital economic assistance to
Muslim communities, in part to counter Iranian and Libyan
--rte
In our judgment, the stridency and effectiveness of the
fundamentalists' proselytizing will make it all the more
difficult for West African goverrvnents to manage their economic
crises and defuse rising levels of public frustration over
Living conditions and social changes. Moreover, given each
group's singleminded belief in its own cause, we expect that in
Nigeria, for example, tensions between and among fundamentalist
and traditional Muslim organizations will challenge government
control despite the regime's attempts to preempt some aspects
of Muslim reform and to control religious violence. Although
Senegal has intervened forcefully to restrict extremist
fundamentalist activity, we believe Dakar will find it more
difficult--as its economy contracts-- to maintain the necessary
loyalty of brotherhood leaders whose support is purchased by
government patronage. The growth in Islamic influence will
provide opportunities for Iranian and Libyan inroads. If
recent history is any guide, we can also expect increasing
anti-western sentiment and possible terrorism targeted on US
installations. In the longer term, as numbers of
fundamentalists grow, national political leaders will come
under pressure to incorporate Islamic institutions into what
have so far been secular state structures.
West Africa and the Islamic Revival
According to a variety of published sources, Islam is the fastest
growing religion in sub-Saharan Africa and gains new adherents each year
at the expense of Christianity and African tribal religions. Muslims in
West Africa number some 80 million people, and based on US Embassy and
academic sources, we believe they are becoming more receptive to militant
forms of Islam. Muslim communities in Nigeria and Senegal now comprise
the majority of both countries and are in the vanguard of Islamic revival
s+ AC
.
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in W
e
-
c
Based on a review of US Embassy and press reports over the past
several years, the Islamic resurgence in West Africa is spread by an
effective Muslim missionary effort involving local fundamentalist leaders
as well as Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. According to our Embassies and
press reports from West Africa, proponents of Islamic fundamentalism hope
ultimately to establish Islamic institutions on a national and regional
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scale. Embassy reporting suggests that Islamic proselytizers find a
receptive audience among many Nigerians and Senegalese alienated by the
forces of modernization and rapid urban growth, and disillusioned with
entrenched Western-oriented elites who are faulted for corruption and
deteriorating living conditions.
Nigeria
US Embassy reporting indicates that Islamic fundamentalism is growing
more rapidly than any other section of the Nigerian Muslim community.
Most adherents seek Islamic reform at the expense the traditional
brotherhoods' mysticism and pragmatic mixing of Islamic and local tribal
custom (See Annex A). In their public statements, the fundamentalists
espouse easily grasped prescriptions for national renewal and, according
to Nigerian press accounts, are drawing thousands of young people away
from the brotherhoods. Nevertheless, we believe the fundamentalists have
yet to come up with a leader or doctrine that will overcome the
ideological divisions within Nigerian Islam and enable them to nrndu e
religious or political change on a national scale.
Among the most politically influential, in the opinion of US Embassy
officials are two separate fundamentalist groups, the Izala and JNI. Both
are directed by the same leader--Abubakar Gummi--but serve different
purposes: the Izala operates at the local level and the JNI aims to
promote Islam at the national levels of government. According to US
Embassy reporting, Abubakar Gummi, a Muslim lawyer and preacher at Kaduna
city mosque, has established himself as the intellectual and spiritual
leader of Islamic reform in Nigeria, and comes the closest to exercising
nation-wide leadership within the diverse Nigerian Muslim community. US
officials characterize Gummi as an Islamic purist and political moderate
who is willing to sacrifice immediate political gains for the sake of
Islamic principles. The Izala and JNI are the principal organizations by
which Gummi hopes to reform Nigerian Islam.
-- The Izala. The most influential fundamentalist organization at the
local level is the Jama'atul Izalatul Bid'a (Izala). The Izala was
founded in the 1970s by followers of Abubakar Gummi. Its religious
orientation is Wahabi--the 200-year old form of Islamic revival
that originated in Saudi Arabia--and the group receives substantial
financial and moral support from the Saudis, according to US
The Izala is the fastest growing Islamic group in Nigeria,
according to US Embassy sources. Once an obscure sect, it has
begun to be featured prominently in Nigerian press and academic
publications over the past few years and its meetings are said by
Nigerian press observers to attract thousands of participants.
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According to Nigerian press accounts, the group is intensely
involved in proselytizing members of other Muslim groups and non-
believers. Late last year, US Embassy reporting indicated that the
Izala organized a large meeting in Kano city that the Kano State
military governor agreed to attend before the rally was cancelled
for security reasons. In the view of US government officials, by
trying to involve a government figure, the Izala sought to claim
official sanction for its challenge to the Tijaniya brotherhood in
25X1
The JNI. While Izala has developed a base of grass roots support
in northern Nigeria, another fundamentalist organization- Jama-
atul Nasril Islam (JNI),
has tried to gain in uence from within the government, the 25X6
media, and centers of economic power, according to US Embassy
sources. Nigerian press reporting indicates that the JNI was
established by Abubakar Gummi in 1962 and that the group has both
religious and political objectives. According to Nigerian press
accounts, the JNI draws its membership from northern elites and
speaks through the semi-official regional newspaper, the New
Nigerian, and the regional radio station in Kaduna. The US Embassy
reports that the brotherhoods claim Gummi is using the organization
to seek national political power under the cloak of Islam. Gummi's
influence within the government gives some merit to that claim--
Head of State Buhari sent him on several important missions abroad
after the 1983 coup. includi g Nigeria's first mission to Saudi
Arabia.
25X1
Accounts of JNI activities in the Nigerian press indicate that
the group has close ties with influential northern Nigerian
political and commercial leaders. We, and the US Embassy, believe
that JNI's underlying goal is to bring all Islamic activity in the
country under the control of a small group of northern religious
leaders, senior civil servants, and businessmen led by Gummi. The
Nigerian press reports that the JNI directs the Hajj to
Mecca of some 20,000 Nigerians.
25X1
Islamic fundamentalism is spreading rapidly on school and university
campuses in northern Nigeria, according to US Embass3Creporting. Many
students express disapproval of the Westernized culture of Nigeria's
ruling elites and idealize the values of village life and purified forms
of Muslim asceticism. Embassy reporting indicates that members of the
Muslim Student Association, most prominently at Ahmadu Bello University in
Zaria and Bayero University in Kano, publicly espouse the most radical
fundamentalist theology in Nigeria, and have staged demonstrations to
extoll Iran's revolution and demand a purge of Nigeria's political and
religious leadership. Islamic student radicals have attacked police and
members of conservative Islamic groups, and created tensions between
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Christians and Muslims both on campuses and in surrounding communitites,
Many Muslim students seek ties with fundamentalist groups outside the
universities--particularly the Izala--according to US Embassy sources, who
estimate that nearly one-third of northern Nigeria's Muslim students now
belong to the Izala. These sources also indicate that a student-Izala
nexus could provide a flash-point for civil unrest in the north in the
Reaction to the Fundamentalist Revival
The brotherhoods have reacted violently to the erosion of their
influence at both the leadership and grassroots levels because of the
growing fundamentalist revival. Vigilante groups of young militants from
the brotherhoods have attacked fundamentalist mosques and Abubakar Gummi's
house in Kaduna, according to US Embassy reports. Nigerian press
reporting indicates that hostility to their common enemy has made the
Tijaniya and Qadiriya draw closer together, downplaying differences of
ritual and practice that caused bloody infighting between them during the
1A9A- -.-J --._1.. 1AAA_
For its part, the government has reacted to the fundamentalist
revival by closer association with the brotherhoods and by occasionally
attaching Islamic ideals to government policies. The government has used
the Islamic brotherhoods, particularly the conservative Qadiriya, to rally
support for its policies and to control northern populations during the
past year, according to US Embassy reporting. In addition, the Nigerian
press indicates that the regime has sought to associate its campaign
against corruption, the so-called "War Against Indiscipline", with Islamic
reformist ideals in an effort to rally support at mass meetings on
northern university campuses and among fundamentalist groups.
The brotherhoods and the government are not the only Nigerian groups
affected by the rise in fundamentalism. The revival has nurtured the
growth of an outlaw organization of heretical Muslims called the Followers
of Maitatsine Marwa. The group, which the Nigerian press reports has
caused thousands of deaths in several incidents of magjor violence that
have required Nigerian Army intervention to suppress, is banned by the
government and is universally condemned by other Muslims. According to
its adherents, the Maitatsine criticize the corruption and ostentation of
Nigeria's elites and the effects of Western technology and education on
Nigerian society. They offer their disciples an austere life style and a
xenophobic theology that incorporates unorthodox magical ritual and local
custom. Some members publicly equate the founder, Maitatsine Marwa--a
fugitive Muslim preacher from Cameroon--with the Prophet, which is
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Based on their stated beliefs and goals, the Maitatsine appeals
primarily to foreign migrants in Nigeria who are young, rootless, and
unemployed. We believe many Maitatsine left Nigeria during Lagos's mass
expulsion of foreign Africans in 1983. The Buhari government recently
ordered tens of thousands more illegal West African immigrants to leave by
Maitatsine leader Marwa, and an estimated 7,000 of his followers were
killed during the Kano uprising in 1980. Last year, a rampage by
Maitatsine members in Gongola state in northeastern Nigeria caused some
two thousand deaths, according to Nigerian press accounts. This year, an
outbreak of rioting at Gombe, in northeastern Bauchi State, took over 100
lives but was quickly suppressed by police and Army troops. The Nigerian
press claims that Maitatsine cells have reappeared in virtually every
major city in the north, as well as Lagos and other coastal cities.
Originally, US Embassy reporting estimated the group's membership at
around 10,000. By now, with so many killed and the group outlawed in 1980
mid-May, which will further reduce Maitatsine strength.
and forced underground, we believe it has broken up into largely
i
d
n
ependent cells of no more than a few hundred members each.
brotherhoods--the Muridiya and Tijaniya--have been able to exclude the
fundamentalist revival from Senegal because of the tight hold they
maintain over their followers. Within the last two years, however,
Senegal
Radical Islamic revival has been slower to develop and spread in
Senegal and has taken different forms than in Nigeria. The US Embassy
reports that the Senegalese Muslim community is highly organized and
continues to be dominated by the traditional Sufi brotherhoods. (See
Annex B). Until recently, according to the Embassy, the principal
small, politically radical, fundamentalist
groups are appearing in Dakar. Backed by Iran and Libya
an extremist
,
group of fundamentalists within the Tijaniya has established a cultural
center in Dakar and publishes several journals,
u
al-Zayn, the leader of the Lebanese Shiite community in Dakar. Their" in
followers include students and teachers at the Univer,Sity of Dakar and
civil servants who are reacting the brotherhoods' economic conservatism
and their roadblocks to government Droarams threatening to their
ro er Ahmed--the self-styled "Ayatollah of Kaolack" and 'Abd al' M
Principal figures are' i y amine Niasse his
According to US Embassy reporting, however, the brotherhoods still
dominate the daily lives of the majority of Senegal's Muslims. In
addition to offering their members devotional activity, the brotherhoods
organize agricultural production and marketing, provide access to
political patronage and financial credit, and represent their members to
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state authorities. So far, the fundamentalists, lacking the size and
organizational capabilities of the brotherhoods, cannot begin to deliver
equal services.
Recently, however, the fundamentalists' revival has begun to affect
the mainstream leadership of the brotherhoods themselves. According to
academic observers, the Muride leader Lahat Mbake, for example, has begun
to incorporate aspects of the fundamentalist revival into the
brotherhood's religious observances, requiring his followers to purify
their practices and enforce prohibitions on alcohol and tobacco. Mbake is
building a university devoted to Arabic studies at Touba, the Muride's
principal city. Muride students at the 25X1
university and secondary schools in Senegal's principal towns have formed
an association for the purification of Islam along fundamentalist lines.
The aggressiveness with which the Murides proselitvzp s resentment
among other religious groups (S NF)
Reaction to Fundamentalist Revival
President Diouf--an adherent of the traditional Tijaniya--has tried
to restrict extremist Tijaniya splinter groups and Muride militants,
according to US Embassy reports. He has imprisoned both the Niasse
brothers for subversion and personally warned Lebanese Shiites that ties
with Iran and Libya will not be tolerated. He also has tried to restrain
Muride aggressiveness, meeting frequently with the brotherhood's leaders,
according to US Embassy and press reporting. Nevertheless, in our view,
greater religious activism and competition between Senegal's Muslim groups
poses a growing threat to Senegal's fragile political order as the
government seeks to impose an economic austerity program that has brought
its popularity to an all-time low. As the Senegalese economy contracts, we
believe Diouf will find it more difficult to control inter-group conflicts
and maintain the loyalty of brotherhood leaders whose support is both
necessary and dependent on government patronage. US Embassy reporting
suggests that divisions between Muslim groups have sharpened during the
past few years as militant fundamentalists have sought a following and
brotherhood membership has reached a rough parity. We believe inter-group
violence becomes increasingly likely, particularly in?Dakar where the
brotherhoods' capacity to mobilize the population for strikes or rioting
External Influences
We believe that competition for influence among the Muslim
communities of West Africa between Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran has
intensified the exposure to fundamentalist theologies. In our judgment,
Iran has emerged as the Islamic revival's principal source of inspiration
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in the region. Moroever, we note that Libya--buoyed by its success late
la
t
s
year in getting France to withdraw militarily from Chad--has
redoubled its efforts to establish the~ slamic Call Society and Peoples'
Bureaus in West Africa.
25X1
Nevertheless, the Iranians and Libyans confront important barriers
that slow and frustrate their efforts. According to US Embassy reporting,
still-powerful traditional Muslim leaders and conservative government
officials in both Nigeria and Senegal are hostile to outside radical
influences and seek to limit inroads by the Iranians and Libyans.
Moreover, we expect both countries realize that Western and moderate Arab
governments, which are important sources of aid and investment for Nigeria
and Senegal, vigorously oppose the adoDtion of Iran's and Libya's
funds t 1'
m
n
Iran. We believe that longstanding rivalry between the Saudis and
Libyans or influence in Nigerian and Senegalese Islamic communities has
been partially superseded over the past three years by an increasingly
active Tranizn nv-ne ....
e
a Tst theology.
appears to have assigned a nign priority to carrying its brand of `1
fundamentalism to both Nigeria and Senegal because of their large Muslim
populations and regional influence. In our judgment, the increase in
I
During this period, the Iranians have built networks of sympathizers
in Nigeria and Senegal among Muslim fundamentalist groups, expatriate
Lebanese Shiite communities, and university students. US Embassy sources
in northern Nigeria report that Iranian delegations and embassy personnel
are recruiting candidates for military and religious training in Iran and
introducing propaganda at universities.
,an an activity reflects Tehran s determination to spread its
revolutionary ideology and enhance its international influence.
Tehran has given generous amounts o mantis
support to enega ese us im brotherhoods and, according to the Senegalese
press, has brought a number of brotherhood members to Iran to meet with
Ayatollah Khomeini and visit the Iran-Iraq battlefront.
Dakar has reacted to these Iranian inroads. Early this year the
Senegalese government shut down the Iranian Embassy in Dakar because of
alleged subversive activity, according to the Senegalese press. Since
then, Iranian activity has
receded somewhat. Nevertheless, several Iranian sponsored publications
continue to appear Tehran's
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Islamic Cultural and Social Institute in Dakar still functions. 25X1
25X1 FI
Libya. Libya has become much more active in West Africa over the
last three years after having been diplomatically isolated and on the
defensive following widespread African condemnation of its invasion of
Chad in 1980 and its attempt a year later to transform its embassies into
"Ponn1nel Q----ii
Wort ern us im- ase mi itar General Buhari's
y government as acce e to a Libyan request
to open an Islamic religious studies center in Kano. The city, in the
heart of Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north, has a long-established
community of Libyan traders and has been the site in recent years of
frequent doctrinal disputes and clashes between rival Islamic sects. The
We believe the center will offer Tri
po 1 ,
opportunities to exploit local Islamic rivalries, develop contacts with
Islamic student radicals, and assist Chadian dissidents in northeastern
Ni eria d
g oppose to Chadian President Habre.
In our view, Nigeria is willing to gamble on an expanded Libyan
presence in the north, perhaps in part probably because Buhari is being
pushed by radical elements in the Muslim community to develop ties with
the Libyan government . We believe Lagos also may hope that Tripoli will
breathe life into an agreement signed last year that calls for the
establishment of a joint bank and holding comoanv. thereby providing
Nigeria with much needed fi
n
l
a m. a
aid.
For its part, Senegal has kept Libya at arm's length. The US Embassy
reports that Tripoli is pushing Senegal to accept some form of renewed
official representation after having successfully convinced The Gambia--
Dakar's reluctant partner in the nascent Senegambia confederation--to
accept a Libyan presence last March. Senegal and The--Gambia both broke
relations with Libya in 1980, charging Tripoli with fomenting
subversion. Unable to exploit any official connections, Tripoli continued
to provide financial support to Senegal's small Niassene Islamic
fundamentalist movement, according to US Embassy sources, and has
establ
h d
i
s a ties with the Murides.
The Gambia, a weak ministate enclosed within Senegalese territory, is
particularly vulnerable to Libyan activity, in our view. Although the
Gambian government recently turned down Tripoli's request to open a
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should enhance Dakar's ability to keep close watch on Libyan activities.
Peoples' Bureau in Banjul, it accepted a Libyan-staffed Islamic Call
Society office that will serve Tripoli as a liaison with religious
organizations, according to US Embassy sources. The Libyan Call Society
has grown out of a mandate by the Islamic Conference Organization of
Islamic States in 1970 to promote Islam through peaceful means. Libyan
leader Qadhafi uses the society to support subversion and intelligence
activities, according to US Embassy sources in North Africa. The US
Embassy in Dakar reports that the location of such a Libyan base of
operations in Banjul is worrisome to the Senegalese, who suspect it will
be used to step up funding and support for radical Islamic fundamentalists
in Senegal. We note, however, that Senegal still maintains troops in The
Gambia--introduced to suppress a coup attempt by radicals in 1981--which
Saudi Arabia. US Embassy reporting indicates that the Saudis now
regard ran as a greater threat than Libya to their interests in West
Africa. We have no evidence, however, that Riyadh plans to step up its
activities to counter either Iran or Libya. Instead, the Saudis appear to
be continuing support at previous levels to both the moderate Muslim-based
governments and to politically conservative Islamic groups in Nigeria and
25X1 Despite budgetary constraints caused by the soft oil market, press
reports indicate that the Saudis continue to provide vital financial
assistance to Senegal, including $86 million last year, that helps Dakar
comply with its tough IMF program of economic adjustment and recovery. In
addition, the Saudis provide the Muslim community with scholarships to
universities in Mecca and Medina, and sponsor Tijani mosques and Koranic
schools throughout the country, according to Senegalese press reports.
Furthermore, the Saudis assist financially many of the more than 3,000
Senegalese pilgrims making the Hajj to Mecca each year, according to the
The situation with respect to Nigeria, however, is not as friendly.
Relations between Riyadh and Lagos are strained, according to US Embassy
reporting, because of Lagos's recent recognition of the Polisario Front
and its refusal to abide by OPEC production guidelines. The Embassy
reports that Riyadh nonetheless continues to support Nigerian Islamic
organizations such as the Jama-atul Nasril Islam and the Izala--whose
leadership is sympathetic to the regime and to Saudi foreign policies.
The Jama-atul Nasril Islam works particularly closely with Riyadh in
organizing the annual Hajj to Mecca, according to the Nigerian press.
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Prospects
In our judgment, more radical forms of Islam will find fertile ground
in the poor economic conditions likely to pertain in West Africa over the
next several years. While economic recession per se is not necessarily
destabilizing, the impact of government austerity measures on important
political groups--such as the Muslim communities--will give wider scope
for political instability in countries beset by such problems as
corruption, mismanagement, and ethnic, and religious cleavages. We
believe that the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, with its simplistic
promises of economic and political recovery, will increase the appeal of
radical ideologies, particularly in Nigeria and Senegal, if Western-
oriented leader " elites fail to stem deteriorating living conditions.
Economic conditions are not the only catalyst for a fundamentalist
revival. As in the Middle East, we expect fundamentalist Muslims to rail
against West African governments for following essentially a Western-style
modernization path, which they view as religiously and socially
decadent. The fundamentalists' intense commitment to proselytization will
likely result in increased violence on the local and regional levels. As
other, more traditional, Islamic groups shrink in size and as
fundamentalist numbers rise, we believe national leaders will come under
increasing pressure over the next few years to incorporate Islamic
institutions, such as Islamic courts, into secular political structures.
Eventually, in our view, support for the transformation of Nigeria and
Senegal into Islamic states--which is the militants' announced ultimate
oal - ' 1 1
-wi
e
1
radicals are likely to regard their countries' Political eve s omit nomi military dealings with the West as unwholesome. The Islamicoreviv
c, nd
alais
usually characterized by anti-modern and anti-Western thinking, although
only the fringes go as far as the extremes adopted by Iranian and Libyan
sympathizers. The probability of growing anti-Western bias will increase
as militant followers of Khomeini's revolutionary ideology now in the
universities eventually fill positions of influence in bureaucracies and
cabinet th t d
s
t
g
grow as the number of fundamentalist Muslims increase.
From the perspective of foreign relations we b
1i I
a
ra itionally nave been friendly to the West.
The Islamic revival will provide greater opportunities for Iran and
Libya to extend their activities in the region. In our estimate, Iranian
and Libyan supported terrorism, utilizing Islamic fundamentalist cells and
targeting US Embassies and diplomats, is likely to develop into a more
serious threat than it is now. Moreover, as Islamic radicals in West
Africa acquire international contacts and expertise, they will be able to
advance their interests by initiatina clandestine activities with expert
Iranian and I ihvan
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Annex A
Islam in Nigeria
Nigeria's Islamic community of nearly 50 million embraces over half
the population and is one of the larger Muslim communities in the world.
Its origins can be traced to a jihad (holy war) in northern Nigeria waged
early in the 19th century, which To contributed to the rise of Islam in
parts of neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. A militant tradition has
continued in Nigeria where Muslims are prone to violent means of settling
disputes.
The majority of Nigeria's Muslims claim membership in one of the 25X1
principal Sufi brotherhoods (Darika), including:
-- The Qadiriya to which most northern local traditional leaders and
many senior governmental officials belong. It was founded in the
19th century by the jihad leader, Usman dan Fodi o, who is still
perceived as the source of political and spiritual legitimacy in
the northern region. The present Sultan of Sokoto, dan Fodio's
titular descendent, is aged and infirm, according to US Embassy
reporting, and unable to fulfil his role as the titular leader of
all northern Nigerian Muslims. Intense jockeying is underway to
succeed the Sultan after his death. The most likely successor,
according to US Embassy reporting, is Ibrahim Dasuki, a 62-year old
Oxford-trained businessman born in Sokoto. A high-ranking federal
civil servant in the 1960s, he is now secretary-general of the
Jama'atul Nasril Islam, holds a traditional office in Sokoto, and
is well-known and respected in northern political circles and
Lagos. Since Nigeria's last military coup in 1983, Dasuki has been
the northern-Muslim dominated government's chief intermediary with
northern civilian elites and has direct access to Head of State
Buhari
d
an
other senior regime officials.
-- The Tijaniya was established in Kano City by Islamic missionaries
from Sen-e-957 early in this century. The sect is holding its own as
the largest and mos aggressive of the Nigerian brotherhoods,
make their way weekly to a small town near KanoTforsFridayfprayers
led by the elderly ex-Emir of Kano. The Tijani have drawn on the
considerable financial resources of the wealthy Kano merchant class
to create a paramilitary group known as the Army of God (Jundul-
Lahi), made up of young men among the urban unemployed, according
to US Embassy sources. The Army of God last December, according to
US Embassy reports, threatened to burn down the Kaduna state radio
station that b
roadcasts fundamentalist preaching.
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J L U K L I
-- The Ansar al Islam predominates among Yoruba tribesmen living in
southwestern Nigeria, nearly 40 percent of whom are Muslim,
although ethnic and sectarian differences separate them from
northern coreligionists. The Ansar al Islam, led by educated
southern elites, is the recognized representative of southern
Muslims. The Buhari regime's Chief of Staff and second ranking
official, Tunde Idiagbon is a Muslim Yoruba who regularly prays
with an Ansar al Islam group in Lagos. Nevertheless, US Embassy
reporting indicates that the Ansar s leadership has begun to
criticize Nigeria's northern-dominated military government,
reflecting festering discontents that now prevail in southern
states over the favor shown northern interests and senior level
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S E C R E T
Annex B
Islam in Senegal
According to US Embassy reports, Senegal--with Muslims comprising
over 80 percent of the 6.3 million population--has the most highly
organized Islamic community in West Africa. Senegalese Islam is dominated
by the traditional Islamic brotherhoods. The two largest and most
important sects, the Muridiya and the Tijaniya, grew out of successive
movements for Islamic reform during the last century when Muslim religious
teachers (marabouts) assumed the authority exercised by traditional tribal
leaders.
The Muridiya has attracted, by a narrow margin, a majority of the
Islamic population and has built up a formidabl
fi
e
nancial empir i
en
Senegal based on the commercialization of the peanut trade and a shrewd
investment of the brotherhood's communal assets, according to US Embassy
reports. Its members come mainly from the peasantry, but US Embassy
sources report that university students and young intellectuals are now
joining the brotherhood
as a rebelliot b
,us gesureoth against
d
. a
. -
modernizati
on an
their
Ti
The US Embassy indicates that the Muridiya has undertaken an active
political role in Senegal, under the leadership of Lahat Mbake who claims
to speak for the Murides' estimated 1.5 million adherents and monopolizes
relations between the government and the brotherhood. Embassy sources
report that he is consulted by the Senegalese government on most issues of
internal policy and that he has blocked agricultural reform because he
views social and institutional change as a threat to the special
privileges Muride leaders receive from their peasant followers. To
protect smuggling of peanuts across the border with The Gambia, which pays
higher producer prices for this cash crop, Mbake has tried to prevent
unification under the nascent Senegambia confederation that would
LJA I
Until recently the Tijaniya was the largest Islamic group in Senegal,
with membership estimated at around 1.3 million, according to US Embassy
reporting. The brotherhood's traditions emphasize meditation and
religious orthodoxy. Like the Muridiya, it has attracted a cross-section
of the population--from rural herders and small shopkeepers to university
professors and government officials. President Diouf is a Tijani. The
Tijaniya is divided into three, virtually independent subgroups, and is
less aggressive than the uridiya, exercising a moderating influence in
Se neaa l _ F_ M
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SUBJECT: Islamic Revival In West Africa: An Update on Nigeria and Senegal
Distribution:
Original -- Ambassador James K. Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Phillip Ringdahl, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 -- Robert Cabelly, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State, Department of State
1 -- Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 -- Frank G. Wisner, Africa Bureau, Department of State
4 -- Anthony Dalsimer, Director, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR,
Department of State
1 -- J. Maurice Ealum, Director, Office of Iranian Affairs,
Department of State
1 -- Harlan Robinson, Office of Analysis for Africa, INR
4 -- Edward J. Perkins, Director, West African Affairs, Department of
State
1 -- F. Marshall McCallie, Nigeria Desk Officer, Department of State
1 -- Kenneth Scott, Jr., Senegal Desk Officer, Department of State
1 -- Lt. General John T. Chain, Jr., Director, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs, Department of State
1 -- Noel C. Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs Deoartment of D fanaP
1
1 -- Karen Puschel, INR/SEE, Department of State
1 -- Stephen Grummon, INF/NESA/Iran, Department of State 25X1
1 -- Steven Sestanovich, National Security Council
1 -- Vincent Cannastraro, National Security Council
1 -- DDI
1 -- ADD I
1 -- DDO/Africa
1 -- NIO for Africa
1 -- NIC Action Group
1--PDBStaff
1 -- I LS
1 -- C/DDI/PES
1 -- D/ALA
2 -- ALA/PS
1 -- ALA Research Director
4 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
4 -- ALA/AF
4 -- ALA/AF/W 25X1
2 AL
ALA/AF 14 May 1985) 25X1
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