NICARAGUA: THE INSURGENT LOGISTICS PIPELINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100250001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 8, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET 215-1, V "W
Central Intelligence Agency
Washin ton. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 July 1985
Summary
The anti Sandinista guerrillas have demonstrated considerable
resourcefulness in coping with chronic supply problems since R5 Government
funding ended in 1984. They have turned to a variety of sponsors for
funds to underwrite purchases of military supplies on the international
market and to cover local operating expenses in their effort to sustain a
strong military presence inside Nicaragua. Other Central American
countries have assisted in various ways while trying to avoid provoking
the Sandinistas or offending domestic political sensitivities. Honduras
has been particularly helpful-channeling foreign arms deliveries to the
This memorandum was requested by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, International Security
Aff i s D rtment of Defense. It was prepared by 25X1
and of the central America South Branch, ALA. It 25X1
was coordinated by the Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America and contains information
available as of 5 July 1985. Questions and comments are welcome
and should be Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA, 25X1
ALA-M-85-10056
Copy of 28
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SECRET
rebels, loaning ammmition from its own stocks, and providing safehaven
and logistic support
Despite this backing, anti Sandinista operations have suffered from
inefficiencies in the procurement process and problems in getting supplies
to tactical units inside Nicaragua. Managua's increased pressure on the
battlefield since January and the Honduran military's insistence on
shifting insurgent support bases away from the border in May further
strained the rebels' fragile ground logistics system. Recently, the
insurgents appear to have overcame many of these difficulties, and new
ands and materiel deliveries have permitted them to step up infiltration
and ocmbat operations in the northwest. Over the long term, however, the
Sandinistas' ability to make more extended deployments in the border area
and to entrench their fortifications will make the insurgents' effort
i nf i I rrar~ operate in the northern zone a more costly undertaking.
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The FDN
Rebel groups have turned to a variety of sponsors in efforts to
obtain funding and cover supply shortfalls. r this year, we
calculat estimates of expenses-
that the largest guerrilla group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN),
had raised about $8-12 million since US Government fundi was halted last
May. Fundraising apparently has picked up
IAt an estimated $1 per day per man, it would
cost $450,000 per month to provide minimal amounts of ammunition,
clothing, and food to maintain 15,000 FDN troops. Transportation costs
and attendant expenses, plus contributions to other rebel groups, could
increase the overall outlay to approximately $1 million per month, and the
acquisition of heavy support weapons and surface-to-air missiles would
boost expenses even higher.
Best estimates are that FDN leaders have used their extensive private
business contacts to garner most of the funds from US corporations and
conservative action groups, but information on identities of donors or
amounts provided is unavailable. There has been little evidence of direct
foreign government financial assistance to the FDN, although Honduras,
Guatemala, and El Salvador reportedly have donated or loaned sane
munitions and supplies of non-US on in and provided transportation and
storage,
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Forced to rely solely on overland logistics, the insurgents were
hardpressed to infiltrate supplies during Managua's intensive
counterinsurgency campaign from January to May. Sandinista deployments,
constant attacks, and the mining of infiltration trails forced the
guerrillas to use circuitous routes, delaying the arrival of supplies to
combat units and limiting the number of operations that can be conducted
deep inside Nicaragua. For example, even under optimum conditions, it
takes 30 days to carry supplies by foot to units operating in central
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Jxl.t(t.1
Zelaya. Combat pressure forced some rebel units closer to Honduras to
fight their way out to resupply. Moreover, the government's removal of
civilians from combat zones began to deprive the guerrillas of vital local
sources of food and shelter, increasing the burden on the external
logistics system.
The rebels have proved resourceful in obtaining material support, and
the FDN's success in reinserting units into Nicaragua in June indicates
that the Sandinistas still are unable to control the northern border
zone. Over the long term, however, the Sandinista buildup-troop and
artillery deployments, air defense improvements, and use of hP1i mnrer
gunships--will make the insurgent effort a more costly one.
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SUBJECT: Nicaragua: The Insurgent Logistics Pipeline (C)
DISTRIBUTION:
Copy 1 - Mr. Nestor Sanchez
2 - Mr. Elliott Abrams
3 - Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz
4 - Mr. Richard Melton
5 - Col. James Bosch
6 - Lt. Col. Oliver North
7 - DCI
8 - DDCI
9-DDI
10 - DDO/TA
11 - OLL/Cli
12 -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17-18 -
19 -
20-21 -
22 -
23 -
24 -
25 -
26 -
SA/DCI/IC
C/DDI/PES
DDI/CPAS/ISS
D ALA
ALA/PS
ALA Research
CPAS/IW-/.CB
C/MCD
C/CAS
C/CAN
28 -
DDI/ALA/CA.S k8 July 1985)
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