CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #26

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100510001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SEPTEMBER 1985
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #26
The forced resignation of Panamanian President Barletta after less than a year
in office attests to the fragility of Central America's evolving democracies. While
elections in November in both Honduras and Guatemala remain on track, the civilian
regimes scheduled to take power next January face a broad array of political and
economic problems that will quickly challenge the new leaders. In both cases, the
history of politically active militaries and the lack of democratic traditions coupled
with serious economic problems could undermine the legitimacy of new civilian
governments--just as they undercut Barletta.
In Honduras the military's--and particularly Armed Forces Chief
Lopez's--commitment to keep preparations for the 24 November elections on
schedule thus far has thwarted attempts by civilian politicians to derail the process
or tamper with electoral rolls. The current military leadership has assumed the role
of guarantor of democratic progress given the failure of the civilians to build strong
political parties and to reform weak and corrupt government institutions. Although
the current high command probably will be able to see the transition process
through to comp) ti n we believe the democratization process will remain subject to
sudden reversal.
*Beginning with this issue, the Central American Monthly includes a Chronology of
Alleged Human Rights Abuses: Insurgent and Sandinista. This summary will appear
each month.
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South
Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains
information available as of 1 October 1985. Questions and comments are welcome
and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
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The current election campaign has highlighted the deep divisions and factional
infighting within Honduras' two major political parties and underscored their inability
to address the major problems facing the country. With neither the Liberal nor the
National Parties able to unite behind a single candidate--the two parties have
submitted a total of seven presidential nominations to the National Electoral
Tribunal--the victor is likely to win with considerably less than an absoulte majority.
US Embassy reporting indicates that the campaign so far has been little more than a
series of personal attacks among the candidates. No contender has seriously
addressed the.dismal state of the economy, while some faction leaders--including
President Suazo and former National Party chairman Ricardo Zuniga--have
concentrated on encouraging the military to suspend the election or disqualify
competitors.
Armed Forces Chief Walter Lopez has been successful in keeping electoral
preparations on track despite the machinations of the political parties. The
corruption of the government's electoral oversight agencies and confusion about the
constitutionality of the election reform law, however, may yet allow civilians an
opportunity to force a postponement, despite broad public support for holding
elections as scheduled. Although the military curbed President Suazo's ability to
manipulate the political process last May, the US Embassy has reported that he may
retain enough influence over the Supreme Court--through the Chief Justice, a
political ally--to win favorable judgments on legislation that could disrupt elections
by disqualifying certain candidates or scrapping complex voting procedures.
In our judgment, the successful completion of elections in November will
provide a psychological boost to those committed to Honduras' democratization. The
new administration, however, will have a difficult task strengthening democratic
institutions, keeping the military on the political sidelines, and reviving the sagging
economy. Constant political infighting could easily lead to pressure from civilians
and officers alike for the military command, once again, to either become more
directly involved in policy formulation or end the latest experiment in civilian
government altogether.
In Guatemala, the transition to an elected civilian government next January, is
taking place amid an increasingly serious economic crisis that will threaten the
stability of the new administration. The new President will either have to implement
economically necessary but politically risky austerity measures or risk even further
economic decline. Although the military at least temporarily appears to have
overcome its historical reluctance to cede power to what it sees as inept and corrupt
politicians, its longterm commitment remains questionable.
With elections set for 3 November, the outgoing military regime is opting for
quick economic fixes that will quell further outbreaks of unrest like those that
followed a bus fare hike in late August. Chief of State Mejia has raised public sector
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wages, maintained consumer subsidies and enacted price controls, but the US
Embassy reported that even these measures fell short of worker demands and
provoked grumbling in the private sector. Later in the month, the government's
inability to pay petroleum suppliers produced long gas lines and disrupted bus and
trucking services..In a more recent development, the US Embassy reported that Mejia
fired his key economic advisors--for the second time this year--including those who
counseled the need for deci
i
s
ve economic steps.
On the political front, none of the 14 legally registered parties has put forward
comprehensive economic plans or attempted to build support for future economic
austerity. Both front running parties--the Christian Democratic Party and the
National Centrist Union--reportedly are acceptable to the military in part because
their candidates are seen as moderates who do not represent, as of yet, a serious
threat to the militar
or t
G
'
y
o
uatemala
s economic elite.
The new civilian government--concerned about not alienating powerful interest
groups--is likely to count on infusions of foreign aid to alleviate deteriorating
economic conditions. Such outside assistance, however, almost certainly will require
the government to sign an IMF agreement that requires currency devaluation, tax
increases and reduced consumer subsidies. In addition, the new leaders must
contend with the military, which probably will resist any attempt to diminish its
control over the insurgency campaign
civil defens
t
,
e pa
rols, military spending and
institutiona~ matters including officer promotions and naming a defense minister]
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On the political front, the Sandinistas touted the "democratic character" of the
forthcoming constitution while stepping up harassment of some opposition sectors.
Consultations with legally recognized members of the political opposition proceeded while
pro-regime public interest groups continued to comment on the proposed constitutional
provisions. The drafting commission, organized last month, traveled throughout South
America and Europe to consult various governments on its contents, although its
reception was less than enthusiastic. The regime hopes to present a final version for
roval bef
ap
ore
p
Although President Ortega reaffirmed publicly on 5 September that the draft
constitution under review would institutionalize a "pluralistic" system of government, he
accused members of the unrecognized opposition--political parties that boycotted the
1984 election--of serving as an internal front for the armed insurgents. The next day the
government banned a long-planned businessmen's meeting intended to cap a series of
local rallies and to mark the birthday of a nrivaro cen+,r -- .. .
security forces in 1980.
7GV-I
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As Catholic Church leaders also stepped up anti-regime criticism, the Sandinistas
have countered with increased pressure on the hierarchy. Cardinal Obando y Bravo
continued to draw huge crowds as he toured Nicaragua and reiterated his call for national
reconciliation. To mute his impact, security officials--selectively enforcing a law
requiring prior censorship of broadcast sermons--entered the Catholic radio station in
Managua and disrupted the transmission of two of Obando's sermons. In another effort
to undercut the traditional Church hierarchy, the regime moved to bolster the
pro-Sandinista "popular Church" with a week-long "World Meeting of Christians"
dominated by sympathetic clergy from abroad. In response to criticism from the
president of the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference while traveling in Europe, Managua
levied a veiled threat against the hierarchy, which it accused of supporting the insurgents'
internal front
Mounting economic woes also have prompted tough rhetoric and strong-arm tactics
from the Sandinistas. In the face of growing rice shortages, the Ministry of Agriculture
seized 2,500 tons of rice from several private processing and distribution facilities as well
as from some private producers who were withholding supplies to drive u rices
sufficiently to cover costs, according to the US Embassy.
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government is
preparea to nationalize private holdings, especially in the agricultural sector, at any time.
In mid-September, Nicaraguan Minister of Agriculture Wheelock told a group of
businessmen and government officials that the role of the riv to sector is to produce
more at a lower cost, The Minister further stated that that auditors would be tasked to check each riva nterprise frequently to ensure full
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September was also punctuated by several other signs of continuing discontent.
The size of the private sector meetings--some of which attracted up to 400 disgruntled 25X1
businessmen--und
d
h
erscore
t
e gradually increiilli
asng wngness of some Nicaraguans to
2bAl
1,000 state employees were tired from their jobs f
f
or re
using to
participate in required political marches in late August. Although renewed conscription
has not yet led to the resumption of anti-draft demonstrations, the induction of 11
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COSTA RICA
In early September, President Monge proposed a plan for regional economic
integration to include reduced regional trade barriers, joint negotiations with the IMF and
other multilateral organizations to increase funding and modify stabilization conditions,
and generous financial support to the area. The scheme specifically excluded Nicaragua
and blocked any participation by the Contadora countries--Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico,
and Panama. Monge's proposal, in our view, is intended on the economic side to
revitalize the private sector and find a common position in dealing with foreign creditors.
On the political side, we believe San Jose is seeking to isolate the Sandinistas further and
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to signal the Contadora mediators that the other Central American countries would resist
any bias toward Managua in regional peace talks. Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala
responded favorably and Monge apparently hopes the plan could be implemented within
six months. San Jose intends to forge ahead by seeking a bilateral trade agreement with
San Salvador, although technical negotiations and internal elections in Honduras and
Guatemala will likely delay regional approval. Closer economic ties among the Core Four
could help to boost regional trade and financial flows but not sufficiently, in our view, to
spur significant area economic growth.
The kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter on 10 September and the seizure by
guerrillas later in the month of eight town mayors underscored the insurgents' current
focus on urban terrorism and may signal a new wave of kidnapings designed to extort
money or win release of captured prisoners. Nearly three weeks after the kidnaping, the
perpetrators have admitted belonging to the insurgent alliance but have refused to link
themselves to a specific faction, probably fearing retaliation. Although we believe the
kidnaping probably has provoked considerable discussion--if not dissension--within the
insurgent movement, the guerrillas so far have managed to keep such disputes out of the
public eye.
The Duarte government has moved cautiously and indicated a willingness to release
at least some two dozen prisoners in return for his daughter. Although the
government--with the concurrence of the military--met several guerrilla conditions for
negotiations it has not ceased military operations in the countryside or cities, as
demanded.
Although we believe the insurgents hope to drive a wedge between Duarte and the
military, the President has been careful to keep the military apprised of his strategy. For
their part, the security forces publicly have backed the President in his decision to
negotiate, although some officers reportedly have disagreed. We believe the military
probably will insist that the captured mayors as well as military personnel taken this year
also be released. By so doing, they can portray any swap as a prisoner exchange rather
. than a capitulation to rebel demands.
the guerrillas are continuing to plan terrorist attacks
against US personnel and Salvadoran civilians in the captial. US dependents reportedly
have been under surveillance since early September by unknown persons, according to
the US Embassy, and counter surveillance teams are now trailing Embassy vehicles.
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Defense Chief Noriega late last month pressured President Barletta to resign, and
First Vice President Eric Delvalle assumed office on.29 September. Noriega apparently
believed Barletta did not adequately protect the military from opposition demands for a
special commission to investigate the murder of Hugo Spadafora--a former Vice Minister
of Health and longtime critic of the Defense Chief--after his detention by Panamanian
border guards at mid-month. Noriega accused the opposition of exploiting the incident
for "seditious" purposes,
Delvalle has quickly addressed military concerns, implying he would not appoint a
special commission. Nonetheless, because he lacks a political base and the confidence of
the Defense Forces, we believe his position remains fragile. In addition, Noriega himself
ma be at some risk. While he was traveling in Europe,
Although the military
appears to have united behind Noreiga for the moment, plotting might resume if the
Spadafora case sparks widespread demonstrations or violence.
The new administration also faces immediate economic problems. According to US
Embassy reporting, World Bank officials say Panama will not receive an expected $60
million structural adjustment loan this year because of insufficient progress on labor and
industrial reforms. Failure to obtain this loan will jeopardize an IMF standby arrangement
and additional private-sector lending. Nonetheless, Delvalle already has backed away
from Barletta's austerity package, and Noriega is unlikely to push for unpopular measures
while the military is under fire.
REGIONAL NEGOTIATIONS
Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica were encouraged, although probably
somewhat prematurely, by the Contadora mediators' presentation of a new draft treaty at
the mid-September meeting and their call for renewed multilateral negotiations. Despite
indications last month that the Contadora countries--Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and
Venezuela--believed the three countries were posing obstacles to the process, a
Honduran foreign ministry official told the US Embassy that many of their concerns were
met by the new initiatives, reversing the pro-Managua bias of the mediators. The
Hondurans cited as positive the limitation of the talks to treaty implementation and
verification on security and political issues, arms control, and military
maneuvers--believing that Managua will be prevented from demanding agenda changes.
Some Costa Rican officials claim the treaty is virtually complete and will effectively
constrain the Sandinistas. Similarly, the Salvadorans predict the Nicaraguans will be on
the defensive. Guatemala remains on the sidelines, skeptical that any progress will be
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made. Managua, for its part, views the mediators now as more responsive to the others'
concerns, and feels it faces some pressure from
the support group--Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay--on political liberalization.
Nevertheless, both sides may be overplaying the situation. El Salvador, Honduras, and
Costa Rica are unlikely to impose significantly tougher treaty provisions, and the
mediators probably will press for concessions and final treaty approval from both sides.
Although the Sandinistas would prefer the more favorable terms of the September 1984
draft, they probably would accept this version and its still weak verification terms.
NICARAGUAN TRIPS/VISITS
22 August Nicaraguan Misurasata leader Brooklyn Rivera, along with Indian
leaders from other countries, speaks out for rights of Central
American Indians at press conference in Norway.
30 August
2-15 September
13 September
20 September
20 September
20-28 September
23 September
Former Costa Rican President Figueres visits Nicaragua on "peace
mission."
Nicaragua's planned new constitution.
Six-member Nicaraguan delegation visits Colombia, Panama,
Argentina and other Latin American countries seeking support for
Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto and Vice Foreign Minister
Tinoco attend Contadora meeting in Panama.
Austrian State Secretary Dohnal visits Managua for talks with
regime leaders.
Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto travels to New York to
attend 40th UN General Assembly.
Nicaraguan delegation visits Cuba and Mexico for discussions on
the constitution.
Vice President of World Peace Council visits Managua to express
solidarity with regime.
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SIGNIFICANT NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS
September 1985
30 August Delegates of Seventh Miskito Assembly agree to establish unified
organization known as Kisan. Unity of All Nicaraguan Coastal
Indigenous People.
31 August
12-13 September
12-17 September
12 and 25
September
Period for comments on draft constitution extended until the end
of September.
Contadora and Central American Foreign Ministers meet for
continuation of peace talks.
actions against Nicaraguan Government.
Nicaraguan Chief Counsel Carlos Arguello, Deputy Interior Minister
Luis Carrion, and former FDN leader Edgar Chamorro speak before
International Court of Justice alleging US involvement in military
Regime blocks rebroadcast of Cardinal Obando
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NICARAGUA HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY
At the International Court of Justice (ICJ), witnesses called by Nicaragua--including
a former anti-Sandinista guerrilla leader--devoted considerable attention to human rights
abuses allegedly committed by the rebels. Meanwhile, the insurgents reiterated their
determination to respect human rights, and a Sandinista defector, who had served as an
Interior Ministry investigator, came forward with details of the regime's institutionalization
of human rights abuses.
Alleged Insurgent Abuses
5 September
According to the US Embassy in Managua, "Americas Watch" claims to have
confirmed the execution of 11 Sandinista soldiers by insurgents operating in Chontales in
early August.
10 September
The pro-Sandinista press accuses Misura rebels of kidnaping local residents.
10 September
The government press reports that two guerrillas who accepted the Sandinistas'
offer of amnesty went public with accounts of rebel human rights abuses.
11 September
According to the Sandinista press, a peasant from the Bluefields area claims that he
and others were kidnaped and forced to raise crops for the rebels for nearly a year before
they escaped.
12 September
In the ICJ case, Edgar Chamorro, a former FDN leader who was removed from the
FDN directorate in 1984, testified that on entering a town the guerrillas routinely executed
anyone suspected of collaborating with the Sandinistas, including teachers, farmers, and
health workers.
12 September
Managua radio reports that insurgents attacked a truck driven by civilians in the
north, killing the driver and injuring a passenger and his 10-year-old son.
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Pro-regime press reports that two Army deserters who briefly stayed with the
insurgents alleged that the rebels kidnaped peasants and forced them to carry heavy
loads.
14 September
In an interview with the US press, the FDN's new attorney general in charge of
investigating abuses denied Sandinista charges and reiterated his determination to punish
troops guilty of hurting civilians
16 September
The Nicaraguan press claims that rebels killed 100 civilians during recent fighting in
the north.
23 September
The FSLN press reports that a mine placed by insurgents along a northern road
destroyed a truck on 22 September, killing 13 civilians.
23 September
Sandinista press claims that the insurgents had assassinated 11,000 Nicaraguans
since 1980.
Alleged Sandinista Abuses
4 September
The regime releases an independent labor union leader who had been held illegally,
according to the US Embassy.
5 September
The US Embassy reports that children born of Nicraguan parents but holding US
citizenship have been denied ration cards, which are necessary to obtain milk and other
staples.
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10 September
The US Embassy reports that the popular tribunals, which have traditionally meted
out long prison terms to those convicted of counterrevolutionary activities, have started
giving shorter sentences to reduce international criticisms.
12 September
Sandinista troops operating
in Chontales attacked a group of young people, beating the men and raping some of the
women.
17 September
The US Embassy reports that after six months the Sandinistas released the wife and
mistress of a prominent defector, who were being held to force his return. Both women
were physically abused while in custody.
18 September
According to a Costa Rican newspaper, FDN Commander Enrique Bermudez says
that the regime uses civilians and prisoners as "human shields" to ring towns and that
they are placed on lead trucks in convoys, which are always the first attacked. The dead
bodies are then displayed for propaganda purposes.
18 September
A Sandinista defector who had served as an Interior Ministry investigator publicly
implicates Interior Minister Borge and Vice Minister Carrion in the deaths of thousands of
civilians, including east coast Indians killed in mass executions.
21 September
told him
Sandinista soldiers had shot a government worker for refusing them a ride in his truck.
25 September
The US Embassy in Managua reports that statistics compiled by the independent
Permanent Commission for Human Rights indicate 480 Nicaraguans disappeared between
1981 and mid-1985. The commission claims the Sandinistas were implicated in all but 17
of the incidents.
26 September
Church officials in Managua tell the US Embassy that security officials disrupted the
rebroadcast of a sermon by Cardinal Obando V Bravo. The head of the government
censorship office told the clerics that tapes would have to be submitted for clearance
before broadcast.
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COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING OCTOBER
30 September
7 October
9 - 11 October
. Salvadoran Vice President Castillo Claramount begins state visit to
US and United Nations in New York.
Contadora negotiating session opens to discuss third draft treaty.
20 October Nicaraguan state of emergency comes up for renewal.
CHRONOLOGY OF ARMS FLOW INTO EL SALVADOR
Nothing to Report.
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TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR CENTRAL AMERICA MONTHLY
Copy 1 - Mr. William Walker
2 - Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
3 - Mr. Donald Gregg
4 - Ambassador Shlaudeman
5 -
6 - Mr. Nestor anc ez
7 - Mr. Philip, Hughes
8 - Mr. Ray Burghardt
9 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
10 - Mr. Doug Mulholland
11 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
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