CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #27

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000100580001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OCTOBER 1985
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #27
In mid-October, the Sandinistas expanded their three-year old state of
emergency, providing a legal framework to tighten controls over opponents who
have become increasingly outspoken. The new restrictions include broadened
press censorship, limits on public assemblies and internal travel, and bans on
political organizing by the opposition parties. The Sandinistas have used the war
to justify the decree, stating that it is aimed solely at counter-revolutionaries.
The pro-regime press has emphasized the rights still in force--primarily those
pertaining to criminal judicial procedures--and has tried to demonstrate that the
restrictions have impacted little on daily life.
US Embassy reporting suggests that the Catholic Church hierarchy's
increasingly intense attacks on the regime precipitated the decree. Cardinal
Obando had been drawing large crowds during his domestic tour and many of his
masses were only thinly veiled anti-government rallies, according to US Embassy
observers. A series of other incidents--including the government's decision to
renege on promises not to draft seminarians and threats to expel foreign priests
who supported Obando--further heightened tensions. Just before issuing the
decree, the regime confiscated the first issue of a Church-sponsored newsletter, 25X1
comprised primarily of anti-government articles,
In the wake of the decree, the Sandinistas occupied the curia offices and
Interior Minister Borge summoned the Cardinal to his office for questioning
about the Church's ties to the opposition political parties. The pro-regime press
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South
Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains
information available as of 3 November 1985. Questions and comments are
welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division,
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also issued what the US Embassy calls unprecedented attacks on Obando,
accusing him of supporting the insurgency. Despite these attacks, the Church
has continued to criticize regime policies. The Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference
issued a mildly defiant communique reiterating calls for a national dialogue to
include the armed insurgents. In addition, the Cardinal defied the government's
requirement that he obtain permission for outdoor masses, and, according to the
US Embassy, his first mass following the decree attracted nearly 6,000
worshippers.
The regime intensified attacks on civilian opponents as well. The press
reports that the Sandinistas warned two leaders of the Democratic Coordinating
Board, the main opposition coalition, not to publish any protests or analyses of
the government decree. At least one member political party was also warned not
to publish its newsletter. In addition, in late October security officials raided the
offices of an independent labor federation and arrested three union leaders for
criticizing the emergency decree, according to press reports. The Sandinistas also
continued to harass some private sector leaders.
The Sandinistas' Western supporters expressed chagrin over the emergency
decree, but appear disinclined to criticize the regime harshly. French President
Mitterand, for example, "lamented" the tough measures, but also criticized US
policy in Central America. The Swedes also criticized the restrictions, but the US
Embassy in Stockholm reports no plans for a reduction in Swedish economic
assistance.
The state-of-emergency, in our view, demonstrates the heightened
sensitivity of the regime to internal criticism. While it gives the Sandinistas
broad powers to control internal dissent, we believe they will continue their
policy of selective implementation to avoid charges that they intend to eliminate
,the entire opposition. Managua probably calculates that this strategy will also
defuse broad popular resistance to the law and induce key leaders to go into
exile without prompting a damaging mass exit. The Church, as the regime's most
formidible opponent, will remain its primary target, in our view. The Cardinal is
likely to be able to defy some of the restrictions, but the regime has already
used the travel ban to limit attendance at his masses. More vulnerable second
echelon clerical and lay officials could also pay the price for Obando's resistance.
They could be detained and interrogated by the security services or, in the case
of foreign priests; be expelled by the government. The government suspended
the hierarchy's radio broadcasts for two days in late October, and publishing
facilities could also be closed down permanently. The inability to meet and
publish communiques will further isolate and fragment the political opposition, in
our view. Urban-based opposition political parties and labor unions, for example,
will probably have difficulty continuing only recently renewed organizing efforts
outside the cities.
Western and Latin American countries will probably remain critical of the
state of emergency, but will likely keep their displeasure out of the public eye.
The Sandinistas probably believe they are more vulnerable to internal dissent
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than foreign opprobrium and that the criticism will likely have little lasting impact
on their international standing. Managua probably calculates that its supporters
in the West, while disapproving, will not abandon the regime out of fear that it
would encourage expanded US military pressures against Nicaragua. Further, the
Sandinistas are probably confident that Soviet and Bloc economic assistance
would limit the impact of any cuts in aid by Western democracies. In addition,
there are thus far no indications that the state of emer ency has become an
issue in the Contadora negotiations.
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NICARAGUA: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC EVENTS
The Sandinistas focused their military resources on attempting to bottle up the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) inside Honduras
the
Sandinistas had pulled virtually all heavy artillery away from the northernmost areas
of Nueva Segovia Department, apparently to cover the approaches to Esteli.
Vulnerability to Honduran airstrikes may also have contributed to the decision.
The Sandinistas also intensified their technical collection effort against the
insurgents. Overhead photography revealed the establishment of another high
frequency/direction finding installation in Managua, the sixth countrywide, further
enhancing their ability to identify and locate rebel locations.
Meanwhile, Nicaragua received several donations of grains and other
commodities in short supply this month from the Soviet Union, according to the US
Embassy. The Embassy also reported that manpower shortages and inadequate
prices led to a poor rice harvest, which is compounding other grain shortages in local
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stores. The Sandinistas confiscated some private rice farmers harvests recently,
blaming them for the shortfalls.
EL SALVADOR
San Salvador remained preoccupied throughout October with negotiations to
win the release of President Duarte's daughter, kidnaped 10 September. US Embassy
reporting indicated that the government ground to a standstill and that attention was
deflected from all other issues, including the economy. Although Duarte received
credit for securing the freedom of the hostage mayors as well as his daughter on 24
October, criticism of his handling of the affair continues. Duarte appears to recognize
that he has been hurt politically by the kidnaping and began moving quickly to
restore his image as a strong leader and to mend fences with the military.
The President came under fire from some military officers and civilian
opposition leaders for being too involved in the negotiations, too willing to sacrifice
national interests for personal reasons, and for setting a precedent that could
encourage other kidnapings. Some concern from within Duarte's own administration
also surfaced that the protracted negotiations allowed the rebels to resurrect El
Salvador's checkered human rights record, according to the US Embassy. Chief of
the Armed Forces Joint Staff General Blandon said that the level of discontent in the
military was at its highest following the prisoner exchange in part because rebels had
been freed to return to the field and take up arms.
In the wake of the prisoner exchange, Duarte met with senior military
commanders and influential civilians and announced plans to create a National
Security Council to better coordinate counterinsurgency efforts.1
Duarte also went ahead with his visit to the US in an effort to
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secure additional economic and military aid and publicly win Washington's renewed
support for his government.
In our judgment, the insurgents see recent events as a net plus and are likely to
continue to execute actions that will keep their cause in the public eye. In addition
to the kidnaping, the insurgents attacked the military training center at La Union on
11 October. The attack was the largest guerrilla military operation in more than a
year and resulted in over 40 Salvadoran soldiers killed and some 75 wounded. The
guerrillas, however, publicly called the attack a "failure," since no US military advisers
were killed.
Later in the month--and only 48 hours after the release of Duarte's daughter--a
senior Air Force officer who recently had served as head of the President's personal
security force was kidnaped. The FMLN appears responsible but no group had issued
demands for the victim's release by month's end.
Opposition elements are keeping the murder of Hugo Spadafora in the public
arena despite efforts by General Noriega and the military to discourage them. In late
October, the US Embassy reported that a rally calling for a full investigation of the
killing drew an enthusiastic crowd and the Spadafora family and supporters have
undertaken a series of protest activites that could culminate in a general strike if a
commission is not created. Opposition newspapers have also been keeping the case
on the front page. In addition, the Catholic Church is taking an increasingly vocal
position, permitting demonstrations at the Papal Nuncio's residence, sponsoring
religious activities in support of Spadafora's family, and condemning the military for
accusing its critics of sedition. Meanwhile, the military leadership has tried to
implement a limited form of media repression by demanding a stop to criticism of the
orces and discussion of the murder case,
President Delvalle, demonstrating his allegiance to the military, has publicly
re use o name a special commission on the grounds that it would be
unconstitutional although, according to the US Embassy, prominent lawyers argue
otherwise.
On the economic front, President Delvalle has taken positions designed to
bolster his political base. He boosted price subsidies on selected consumer staples
and indicated a disinclination to adopt austerity measures sought by international
bankers, according to US Embassy reports. Although commercial banks have decided
to reschedule Panama's debt, which will enable the government to meet its 1985
fiscal requirements, a longer term economic policy to respond to international lender
demands remains undefined.
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Since Barletta's ouster, the Defense Forces and leftists in the pro-government
party have moved toward a mutually beneficial alliance. 25X1
Noriega has encouraged pro-government statements by leftist leaders who 25X1
have touted the Torrijos populist economic model and publicly lauded the Defense
Chief. members of the party's left wing 25X1
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have already been rewarded with important second-echelon government posts. We
believe that Noriega's use of the left in the current crisis reflects his efforts to appeal
to nationalist interests in a bid for a stronger political base.
The strong showing by centrist parties in the election on 3 November and the
impartial role of the military in the voting process suggest that Guatemala's transition
to civilian rule remains on track. The center-leftist Christian Democratic Party and
the National Centrist Union--the two top vote-getters--will face a presidential runoff
on 8 December. Moderate parties will form a majority in the new Congress, although
the rightists may remain a strong minority. Preliminary reporting from the US
Embassy indicates that the election was conducted honestly and efficiently.
The election marked the end of a campaign which largely ignored substantive
issues and focused on personalities. Despite seriously worsening economic
conditions, none of the 14 competing parties went beyond offering vague economic
panaceas. Christian Democratic Party leader Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo--a moderate
center-leftist who has taken care to cultivate good relations with the
military--reportedly favors moderate economic reforms, but is unlikely to implement
more extensive and politically risky austerity measures at least in the near term,
according to the US Embassy. Jorge Carpio Nicolle of the National Centrist
Union--a progressive moderate with no coherent economic platform--promised to
cut the country's unemployment rate by creating over 250,000 new jobs, but failed to
say how he would fund the increase. US Embassy reporting indicated that both
frontrunners favor closer ties to the US and are counting on large infu;-Jons of
economic and military aid after the new government takes office in January.
For its part, the armed forces largely remained above the partisan political fray
and stuck to its refusal to endorse a specific candidate.
an effort to counter allegations of interference. On the economic front, the
government continued to pursue temporary measures to stave off even more rapid
economic decline. Meija, for example, according to US Embassy sources, received
assurances from Venezuela and Mexico that they would meet petroleum needs at
least through January.
Recent guerrilla actions--designed in part to disrupt elections--were confined
largely to hit-and-run tactics, roadblocks and propaganda. The military responded
aggressively and suffered a number of casualties. In clashes in western departments
the US Defense Attache reported that two officers and at least six soldiers died in a
mid-October ambush in El Quiche Department.
In addition, rebels in Suchitepequez Department mined an airstrip that
caused a plane carrying a Norwegian official and three other passengers to explode
when it landed, Meanwhile, guerrillas in the Peten
burned the Ocultan oil camp and continued to occupy farms and distribute
propaganda. Despite an increase in rebel activity, the guerrillas have fallen short of
their announced goal of disrupting the elections. Nevertheless, they are likely to
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continue their efforts during the runoff and the period prior to the inauguration of the
new regime.
The military--with strong public backing--thwarted yet another attempt by
lameduck President Suazo to scuttle elections scheduled for 24 November. In his
latest maneuver, Suazo sought legislative approval to cancel elections, convert
Congress into a Con extend his term for two ears, according
to the US Embassy. the high
command responded strongly by first applying private pressure on individual
Congressmen, then publicly threatening to arrest the sponsors of the bill, and finally,
if necessary, by planning to replace Suazo with a civilian-military junta. Public
opinion reportedly ran strongly in favor of the military's position, according to the US
Embassy. The President's long record of political intrigue indicates that he probably
cannot be dissuaded from trying again to disrupt elections, but we believe the armed
forces' decisive handling of this latest challenge increases the chances of smooth
elections in November
Nevertheless, complex and confusing election rules could be pushing Honduras
toward post-election problems.
many military officers prefer National Party candidate Rafael Callejas over Liberal
each party can run several candidates and the leading candidate from the. party with
the most votes wins--could give Azcona a victory even if Callejas is the top
individual vote-getter. Under this scenario, Callejas would likely ask the Supreme
Court to rule whether the law violates constitutional provisions for direct elections by
simple majority, and the armed forces--which helped craft the law last spring--would
be forced to choose between supporting Callejas or abiding by the electoral
procedures they designed. Such a debate, in our view, could offer Suazo and other
election losers new opportunities to try to derail the democratic transition.
REGIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
Little progress was made during the two rounds of talks on security issues in
October and US Embassy reports indicate that the Contadora mediators are again
increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for agreement. Nicaragua adopted a
hard line, arguing that the mediators' most recent draft differed significantly from the
September 1984 version, which it had accepted. Managua demanded that military
maneuvers be proscribed and that formulas for arms reduction take into account its
need to defend itself against all of its neighbors and the US. The Sandinistas again
rejected talks with its armed opposition and insisted that the US must sign a protocol
to respect an agreement.
Core Four commitment to improving the draft is faltering, reinforced by the
perception that Nicaragua will never sign a treaty. Costa Rica announced its
willingness to sign the current draft with only minor modifications at the same time it
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has been secretly exploring a bilateral accomodation with Managua. Guatemala
remains on the sidelines and its only initiative was to gain postponement of the next
session until 7 November, after its election. Honduras and El Salvador bore the
burden of suggesting improvements to the security section of the draft, including
continued foreign military maneuvers, parity in military force levels, and negotiation
of arms limits before signature of the treaty. Nevertheless, Honduras--fearful that
continued objections to the Contadora draft will give it an obstructionist image--told
US officials that it has achieved 70 to 80 percent of what it wants and will agree to
sign with only a few more modifications
NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILDUP
26 September Military camp at Nueva Guinea is being upgraded for additional barracks
or open-air storage shed, according to photography from U-2 flights.
Nearby facility previously thought to be agricultural cooperative appears
to be military installation. Construction of large omni-directional radio
transmitting antenna begun, and at least eight underground petroleum
storage tanks with total capacity of some 112,640 gallons being installed.
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4 October
5 October
6-7 October
8 October
11 October
11 October
capacity of over 42,000 gallons, also dete ;t.e.d.
Photography reveals that grading operations for possible new
construction is underway at Juigalpa in Chontales Department.
Excavation from three underground petroleum storage tanks, with total
Six-meter wide segment being added to each side of 45-meter wide
runway at Sandino Airfield--possibly to counter erosion caused by heavy
rains last May. 25X1 25X1
two Soviet arms carriers arriving in Cut25X1
this week carrying air surveillance and fire control radars. Some or all of
the radars may be transferred to Nicaragua. 25X1
Aracely
in port with Soviet arn25X1
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carrier that brought air defense radars and other military equipment from
Radio intercept and direction-finding site identified at the Cuajachillo
Barracks in Managua that consists of eight-element circular Tall Rod
antenna array.
communications.
is to be installed at Masaya radar station
complex, enabling Nicaraguan high command more secure
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Photography shows new area of some 10,000 square feet being cleared
near pier in Puerto Cabezas for future equipment/vehicle pnr4 huilding.
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1-3 October Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference appoints Cardinal Obando y Bravo its
president. 25X1
7-9 October Contadora and Central American vice foreign
& 17-19 October ministers meet in Panama. 25X1
11 October Ecuadoran President Febres-Cordero breaks diplomatic relations with
Managua after President Ortega calls Ecuador a "US puppet." 125X1
Cardinal Obando y Bravo forms Human Rights Commission under Church
auspices to protest government repression and lack of basic necessities
of life. 25X1
15 October President Ortega expands national state of emergency, suspending many
civil and political rights. 25X1
Nicaraguan Interior Ministry forces occupy Catholic Church curia officies,
interrogate employees, and confiscate copies of new catholic Church
newspaper, Iglesia. 25X1
18 October Defense Minister Ortega announces males between 25 and 40 years will
be called for service in the military reserves. 25X1
At the UN General Assembly, President Ortega challenges President
Reagan to end US a ression in exchange for suspension of Sandinista
state of emergency.~g 25X1
NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY
In mid-October the Sandinistas expanded their three-year old state-of-emergency,
suspending numerous civil liberties. At the same time, the regime stepped up harassment of
dissidents. Meanwhile, the independent human rights organization in Nicaragua suffered internal
difficulties that pose a serious threat to its effectiveness in monitoring abuses. The Catholic
Church intends to fill the void with its own human rights organization. 25X1
Alleged Insurgent Abuses
1 October
Sandinista press reports rebel troops kidnaped a civilian in Nueva Segovia. 25X1
1 October
Pro-regime press accuses insurgents in the far south of abusing residents near their
safehavens in northern Costa Rica.
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3 October
Pro-regime press reports that rebels abducted 20 farmers near Wiwili.
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9 October
Pro-Sandinista press reports that 18 farmers escaaedjfrorn an insurgent camp in Honduras
after suffering four months of forced labor. 25X1
17 October
Pro-regime press carried the testimony of several youths, including a 12-year-old bo , who
escaped rebel captivity. They attested to insurgent abuses and forced recruitments. 25X1
17 to 23 October
In weekly summary of rebel atrocities, pro-regime press reports that the insurgents killed one
civilian and kidnaped two others in Chontales, kidnaped three farmers near Boaco and two others '-
Jinotega. 25X1
Alleged Sandinista Abuses
1 October
Rebel troops in the south publicly accused the Sandinistas of murdering 72 civilians, includin
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The US Embassy reports that the Peoples' Anti-Somocista Tribunals meted out stiff sentences
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to men convicted of anti-regime activities. The court, however, showed leniency in several cases
as a way of improving its image. Also according to the US Embassy, the courts routinely convict
90 percent of those brought to trial and due process is almost totally ignored. 25X1
8 October
essentially control both sides of the San Juan River that forms the boundary between Nicaragua
and Costa Rica. The source says they harass local farmers, stealing their cattle and firing on
unarmed civilians with their heli
t .
cop
12 October
The Permanent Commission on Human Rights reports that 10 independent labor leaders
remain imprisoned for their union organizing activities. 25X1
16 October
Blaming the US support for the insurgency, President Ortega promulgates a decree
significantly expanding the three-year old state-of-emergency. Under the prn.,,, o,,s, 11 articles of
the Sandinistas' original governing charter of 1979 are suspended, including: the right of habeas
corpus, protection against search and seizure, and the right to freedom of assembly. Press
censorship was also expanded, and new restrictions on internal travel were imno d. In the days
following the decree, the regime stepped up pressure on dissidents. 25X1
21 October
troops fired upon a house they believed occupied b reb I k'
The troops refused to take responsibility and blamed the insurgents for the) kil ngsd two adults. 25X1
29 October
Vice-President Ramirez tells a group of visiting South American journalists that there are no
political prisoners in Nicaraguan jails--the Permanent Commission on Human Rights claims there 25X1
are 5,000.
31 October
International press service reports that the Sandinistas have decided to restore several of the
legal rights suspended under the expanded state of emergency. The measure affects only criminal
acts and does not apply to those accused of counterrevolutionary activity. 25X1
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22 September
29 September
30 September
7 October-
15 October
9 October
9 October
11 October
20-21 October
York for 40th UN General Assembly.
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NICARAGUAN TRIPS/VISITS
October 1985
Vice Foreign Minister Tinoco travels to Mexico and Venezuela. 25X1
Foreign Minister D'Escoto and vice foreign minister Astorga visit New
Trade union delegation concludes visit to Poland. I 25X1
Vice President Ramirez returns to Nicaragua after meetings with
President Betancur in Colombia and President Delvalle in Panama where
he urged formation of commission to review presence of anti-Sandinista
rebels in Honduras. 25X1
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe visits
Nicaragua.
Vice President Ramirez visits Uruguay to solicit agricultural products and
to disucss Contadora. 25X1
President Ortega meets with Mexican President de la Madrid during stop
in Mexico City enroute to New York 25X1
Ramirez visits Presidents of Peru a and expresses concern
over US assistance to insurgents. 25X1
President Ortega attends UN General Assembly.
COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING NOVEMBER
3 November National elections in Guatemala.
11 & 12 November Contadora and Core Four meeting in Luxembourg with EC
representatives
9 November - Nicaraguan Foreign Minister E'Escoto to travel
3 December to Luxembourg, Ireland, India, Australia, and Mexico.
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13 November - Nicaraguan vice foreign minister Astorga to travel
30 November to Luxembourg, Egypt, and Mexico.
24 November National elections in Honduras.
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CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #27
Distribution
Copy #
41 & 42 - ALA/PS - 3F38
43 - ALA Research Director - 3F44 /,~ //
44 - 47 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07 '
zT-~ ~`V-4
48 - DDI/CPAS/ISS - 7G40
49 - CPAS/CDPB/CC - GH25
50 - DC/RIG/SOYA - 5E25
40 - C/LAd
39 - C/DDO/LA~~ - 3B44
34 & 35 - D/ALA - 3F45
36 - C/DDO/LA - 3C3203
37 - DDO/LA/C - 305309
38 - C/DDO/LA/ 3C3203
31 - Legislative Liaison - 7B04
32 - DDI Rep CINCLANT
33 - PDB Staff - 7F30
30 - Director, Legislative Liaison - 7043
29 -
27 - Daniel Childs, Comptroller - 7C21
21 - Executive Registry - 7E12
22 - DDI - 7E44
23 - DDO - 7E26
24 - IAD/SAG/SOIC - 1 E4846
25 - NIO/LA - 7E62
26 - NIC/AG - 2G40
20 - SA/DCI/IA - 7E12 (.
14 - Ambassador Elliott Abrams
15 - Doug Mulholland
16 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
17 - DCI - 7060
18 - DDCI - 706011
19 - Executive Secretary - 7
8 - Lt. Gen. James A. Williams
9 - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
10 - Mr. Ray Berghardt
11 - Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
12 - Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau
13 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
6 - HPSCI
7 - SSCI
5-
1 - Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
2 - Mr. William Walker
3 - Mr. Donald Gregg
4 - Ambassador Shlaudeman
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/29: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100580001-2
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/29: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100580001-2
51 -
52 -L(7MCD
53 - DC/MCD
54 - C/CAN
55 - C/MX
56 - C/CAR
57 - C/CU
58 - C/CAS
59
60
61
62
63 -
64 -
65 -
66 -
67 -
68 -
69 -
70 -
71 -
72 -
73 -
74 -
75 -
76 -
77 -
78 -
79 -
b C/LE/OCR - 1H39 25X1
80 - ilUD Files
81 - CAN Files
82 - CAS Files
DDI/ALA/MC/CAS
(1 November 1985)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/29: CIA-RDP85T01058R000100580001-2