JAPAN AFTER TANAKA: THE END OF AN ERA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000101190001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency 25X1
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 March 1985
Japan After Tanaka: The End of an Era?
Summary
The sidelining this month of Kakuei Tanaka, the
undisputed kingpin of the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party, because of a.stroke could affect the tenure
of Prime Minister Nakasone and, in the worst case,
the cohesiveness of the party that has governed
Japan for the past 30 years. At best, the LDP faces
uncertainties in the next few months that could
divert its attention from al-1 but the most pressing
issues and sidetrack efforts to find solutions to -
problems important to the United States.
If Tanaka is permanently incapacitated or dies,
the political shifts inside the LDP are certain to
change the roster of Nakasone's supporters and
opponents, and perhaps produce new challenges to his
leadership. We do not believe Nakasone is in
immediate political jeopardy. But, even if his
position remains intact, an end to the 10-year-long
power struggle between Tanaka and his LDP rivals
would precipitate changes in the party that would
surround Nakasone with a new cast of senior Japanese
political leaders, perhaps before the year is out.
If such a leadership realignment goes on the rocks,
the LDP could fracture.
This memorandum was prepared by Northeast Asia Division, Office
of East Asian Analysis. Information available as of 22 March was
used in its preparation. Questions and comments are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Japan Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA,
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Tanaka's Condition and the Near Term
Tanaka's physicians are uncertain about the damage caused by
his stroke on 27 February and will be unable to give a solid
prognosis until sometime in late March. As the most powerful
politician in Japan, the LDP's kingmaker, and Nakasone's shadow
shogun, Tanaka remains the focus of intense attention for
politicians, the press and Japanese public opinion. Despite his
conviction in the Lockheed bribery scandal and the troubles that
has caused the party, Tanaka himself is still popular, and his
illness has increased public sympathy for him. In 1973 and 1981
he bounced back from periods of hospitalization--admittedly less
serious episodes--and at this point, no member of his faction
will make a fast grab for control. That would not only risk
Tanaka's retaliation, but also invite the charge of political
betrayal from the public as well as political insiders.
Although most everyone regards the former Prime Minister as
a fighter, a quick recovery does not seem likely. We expect
little to happen in the next few weeks. If Tanaka fails to
improve this spring, however, political maneuvering at the top
will pick up steam, and LDP decisionmaking at senior levels will
be greatly impaired at least until a succession in the -Tanaka
faction--numbering one-third of the LDP Dietmen--is worked out.
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The Forces at Play
We cannot predict at this point just how contentious the
transition to a post-Tanaka era may become, but several
fundamental facts of Japanese political life will sha
e
p
developments if Tanaka cannot recover or reassert his power
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Most important, Tanaka's political demise will break the
geriatric logjam in the LDP produced by his decade-long feud with
former Prime Minister Fukuda. Fukuda was bested in the 1972
party election by Tanaka, who upset the prearranged succession
following the retirement of Prime Minister Sato. A political war
between the two and their allies has continued ever since.
Tanaka's role in the Lockheed scandal of the 1970s and his
subsequent conviction fueled both Fukuda's efforts to disgrace
him permanently and Tanaka's drive to retain real power. The
effect of that rivalry on the LDP leadership produced the string
of often ineffectual, one-term prime ministers in the 1970s and
has sometimes immobilized the party's decisionmaking.
Inside the factions, the bitter Tanaka-Fukuda rivalry has
blocked the rise of new party leaders. Unlike previous senior
LDP faction chiefs who have taken their turn as prime minister
and then stepped aside, neither Tanaka nor Fukuda has been
willing to turn his faction over to younger leaders after his
term ended. If Tanaka goes and his heir apparent, Finance
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Minister Takeshita, moves into a senior position, we believe this
will put pressure on Fukuda to turn over the reins to Foreign
Minister Abe. Former Prime Minister Suzuki, who has never been
regarded as a strong leader of the old Ohira faction, also almost
certainly would feel the same heat to step down.
Tanaka himself could decide to set in train the transition
to a younger leadership. He is a decisive man, and if he
recognizes his physical condition will not allow him to exercise
real control over his faction, he may choose to hand it over to
Takeshita. Indeed, he could do so in order to force his old
rival, Fukuda, out with him. If Tanaka chooses that course,
however, he almost certainly would exact a price, perhaps the
tacit concurrence from other party leaders giving him the largest
voice in setting up a long-term plan for the LDP's leadership
succession.
Events of the last 10 years offer no guarantees that a
transition triggered by Tanaka's departure will proceed
smoothly. At its most dramatic, a simultaneous departure from
the political scene of all major faction leaders would be
unprecedented and therefore difficult for the party to manage
efficiently. At a minimum, the transition to new leadership is
certain to involve maneuvering for power and support, lasting
perhaps until the LDP presidential election in 1986. Moreover,
the transfer of any faction intact from an old to a new leader is
not a sure thing. Factional ties within the LDP are looser than
they were in the 1950s and 1960s. The long-delayed change to
younger leadership itself has led many faction members to hedge
their loyalty to their chief by supporting aspiring new
leaders.
Younger LDP Dietmen, who are not deeply entangled in the
Tanaka-Fukuda feud, also have contacts--and options they can
exercise--across factional lines. They will look for the best
deal--in terms of campaign funds, opportunities to influence
decisions, and ultimately senior party and Cabinet posts--and may
well find it outside their home factions. In short, the breakup
and realignment of factions historically have been central to
leadership transitions and they are likely to be so again. As a
case in point, even though he is a skilled fundraiser, Takeshita
will be hard put to hold the mammoth Tanaka faction together over
the long haul.
However politically messy this transitional process may be,
we do not believe in the final analysis it will necessarily
produce an ineffectual or radically altered LDP. In our view,
the vast majority of LDP leaders, as well as the rank and file,
recognize the compelling reasons for working out differences.
And, the LDP's bitter internal rivalry has not destroyed the
political resilience that has enabled the party to control the
government, even at times with--literally--a bare legislative
majority.
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Nonetheless, the fact that the LDP almost split over the
choice of a new party leader after Tanaka's last, and most
dramatic, abdication of formal power in 1974--when he stepped
down from office over real estate scandal allegations--makes it
prudent to examine whether that danger could arise again. A
failure of the new leadership to put together an internal
majority that can agree on the choice of a new party president--
and hence prime minister--could prompt one or another ambitious
faction leader to seek backing outside the party. That tactic
could result in a new coalition government dominated by the LDP
or a more damaging division the party that denied the LDP a
controlling hand.
From one perspective, the prospect of an LDP split is indeed
greater today than even a few years ago because it would be
easier for a splinter group to lash up with the opposition to
create a new party. Various factions already have ties to. the
moderate opposition parties, which themselves have moved toward
the middle-of-the road in their effort to increase the
possibility of entering a coalition with the LDP. Some of the
centrist parties have even changed policies on such key issues as
defense in order to make themselves more attractive to the ruling
party. As one harbinger of these stronger potential ties, last
fall a senior Tanaka faction leader took the initial steps to
make a bid for the party presidency with backing from the
centrist Komeito party.
An aborted leadership transition conceivably could bring the
party to the breaking point, but we believe it is more likely the
LDP would hold together. Overall, policy differences with the
opposition, in our view, still are too strong to make an LDP-
opposition party alliance either truly attractive or effective.
Most LDP politicians today still bridle at sharing power and are
increasingly disenchanted over their current alliance with the
New Liberal Club, even though that small party is really an LDP
splinter group.
The Nakasone Factor
Nakasone's options and powers as Prime Minister make it
difficult for even Japanese political insiders to predict the
effects his political tactics could have on the shape of a post-
Tanaka party. None of the potential new leaders can compare to
Nakasone as a risk taker, and the Prime Minister's strong public
support will make potential challengers reluctant to take him
on. Nakasone in fact could be in a better position to demand
stronger support now in exchange for his promise of backina for a
successor in the 1986 LDP presidential election.
Nakasone also could try to capitalize on the political
situation by calling elections. His popularity with the voters,
as well as a possible sympathy vote because of Tanaka's illness,
could help the party at the polls. At the same time, the end of
the Tanaka era--presumably replete with,the suggestion, if not
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the outright claim, of a born-again, post-Lockheed, "clean LDP"--
might win other votes. If the LDP did well in a post-Tanaka
election Nakasone could claim to be his own man as a result of a
victory without Tanaka's active involvement. The Prime Minister
could put to rest the allegation that he is Tanaka's puppet--a
claim made by his LDP rivals as well as the opposition parties--
and strengthen his hand in determining his successor. By
regaining a solid majority, an election victory would also
eliminate the need for the LDP's alliance with the New Liberal
We do not expect an election-related personal strategy for
Nakasone to be an early choice. This tactic has some real
dangers for the Prime Minister and the party, including a poor
showing at the polls that could devastate the LDP and perhaps
cripple its unfinished transition to new leadership. At this
point, press speculation, which often reflects what the
politicians are saying to each other, points to the possibility
of a fall election. If a transition in leadership is on track at
that time, Nakasone could see an election as beneficial.
The US Angle
As post-Tanaka maneuvering heats up, senior politicians'
attention will focus on their own political futures. Because
party politicians are playing an increasingly important role in
government policymaking, this would tend to slow the pace of
movement on current bilateral problems--centering on the lumber,
electronics, telecommunications, and pharmaceutical/medical
equipment sectors. If sorting out the political scene in the
post-Tanaka era. must await 1986, no political leader will risk
sacrificing an important support group--like the lumber industry.
for example--when the leadership race is undecided.
On the other hand, a relatively swift transition to a new
top LDP lineup would work to Washington's advantage. In addition
to its political continuity, a younger, more internationally
minded leadership--albeit initially perhaps less politically
secure at home--could seek some "foreign policy successes" in
Washington to demonstrate its capabilities. At worst, an LDP
that split in two or more pieces because of an unsuccessful
transition would put Tokyo in uncharted postwar political waters
and probably initiate a period of prolonged immobilization on
critical US-Japan issues.
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Japan After Tanaka: The End of an Era?
Distribution:
- NIO/EA
- D/OMPS
- C/DO/PPS
- OEA/NA/Japan
- OEA/NA/Korea
- C/OEA/Northeast Asia Division
- C/OEA/Southeast Asia Division
- C/OEA/China Division
- Research Director/OEA
- D/OEA
- DDI
- Executive Director
- PDB Staff
CPAS/ILS
CPAS/IMC/CR
- OCR/DSG
NIC Analytic Group
- C/EA
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e
1 - James Murphy, Office of the United States Trade Representative
1 - Michael B. Smith, Office of the United States Trade
Representative
1 - The Honorable David C. Mulford, Department of the Treasury
1 - D o u g Mulholland, Department of the Treasur
Vice President
1 - The Honorable W. Allen Wallis, Department of State
1 - The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Department of State
1 - William Sherman, Department of State
1 - Desaix Anderson, Department of State
1 - Bill. Brooks, Department of State
1 - Gaston Sigur, National Security Council
1 - William Martin, National Security Council
1 - Roger Robinson, National Security Council
1 - The Honorable Richard Armitage, Department of Defense
1 - Cdr. James Auer, Department of Defense
1 - James rtment of Defense
1 - Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Byron Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - The Honorable Lionel Olmer, Department of Commerce
1 - Clyde Prestowitz, Department of Commerc
1 - ona Gregg, Office of the
1 - Joe Massey, White House
1 - National Security Agency y 25X1
1
- The Honorable Daniel Amstutz, Department of Agriculture
DDI/OEA/NA/Japan/MAM?mem f,),) ,,,,,25X1
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