CHINA'S MALIPO CAMPAIGN: THE MILITARY BENEFITS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01058R000101300001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
;~
NGA Review Complete
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 April 1985
China's Malipo Campaign: The Military Benefits
The extent of Chinese military pressure along the border with
Vietnam has been a matter of concern and confusion among ASEAN
officials and Cambodian resistance leaders. To many observers, Chinese
assaults ~ against Vietnam have appeared insignificant and, compared with
Vietnam's 1985 dry season offensive in Cambodia, have involved few
casualties and limited damage. In fact, along a 10-kilometer-wide and
5-kilometer-deep front in the remote and mountainous terrain of China's
Malipo County, the opposite has been true. We believe Beijing has
intended the sometimes fierce fighting along this desolate front to press
Vietnam politically, but the reasons for the location and style of the battles
go beyond foreign policy goals. In a period of rejuvenation of China's
outdated armed forces, Malipo has proved an exceptional testing ground
for troops and equipment. But although the Chinese can reap both
political and military rewards from its Malipo campaign, we believe the
cost in lives and economic resources has proven too great for China to
consider creating other similar fronts.
This memorandum was prepared by (Office of
East Asian Analysis, Information available
as of 22 April 1985 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Defense Issues Branch, China Division, OEA, on
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The Malipo Front
Chinese troops initially crossed the Vietnamese border south of Malipo in April
1984-=during President Reagan's visit to Beijing--and took control of at least five
hilltops, some 1 to 2 kilometers inside Vietnam. Since then, in hand-to-hand combat
from entrenched and bunkered positions, Chinese and Vietnamese infantry forces have
attacked and counterattacked for control of the more vulnerable hilltops. In addition, a
senior Vietnamese general, in an interview with a Western journalist, recently estimated
that China has fired half a million rounds of artillery and mortar shells into Vietnam's Ha
Tuyen Province over the past year. Today, Chinese forces retain control of most higher
peaks in this area of the border. Many of the smaller hills have traded hands several
Chinese Shelling: The Daily Pressure
Although the Chinese are using 122-mm, 130-mm, and 152-mm artillery
pieces to shell the Vietnamese the vast majority of rounds are fired from
shorter range weapons such as 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars and
recoiless rifles used by Chinese infantry regiments. The mortars have a
maximum range of six kilometers and are ideal for the close-in fighting typical
The human and materiel price of the Malipo campaign has been considerable. By
casualties have been substantial
A Chinese provincial radio broadcast in June reported on a newly designed
military ambulance that had evacuated 500 wounded from the Malipo front in the first
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The bloodiest fighting took place in February, when the Chinese threw two
divisions--or 24,000 men--into the fray.
Disruptions to the local Chinese economy--with a range of 50,000 to 120,000
men in the field over the past year--also appear to be substantial
If Malipo has been costly for the Chinese, Vietnam also has paid a high price for
its stalwart defense of Ha Tuyen Province. Vietnamese forces--which we roughly
estimate to number 30,000 in the area--have not retreated in the face of overwhelming
Chinese tactical superiority.
China's Strategy of A Thousand Thorns
China's military leaders call these battles and seizures of territory a strategy of "a
thousand thorns" that places military and psychological pressure on the Vietnamese. C
the strategy
calls for the occupation of small segments of Vietnamese territory along the border with
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the Vietnamese then forced to try to dislodge the occupying Chinese forces. By
adopting this policy, Beijing believes it can engage Vietnamese forces in protracted
combat--forcing the Vietnamese to initiate some battles--without the international
condemnation that would result from a major Chinese attack. Moreover, the Chinese
calculate that their poll iy will provide territorial bargaining chips for any future political
But although this strategy suits Beijing's political purposes, it is also motivated by
a pragmatic desire to compensate for China's serious military shortcomings:
o Unlike some of the newly mechanized Chinese infantry forces along the
Sino-Soviet border,2 ground force divisions in southern China are best prepared
for infantry operations and for fighting from heavily fortified positional defenses.
The terrain of Malipo County plays to these strengths, allowing for little use of
tanks or highly mobile, mechanized infantry forces.
o China's military forces are poorly equipped to protect lengthy logistics lines,
particularly in the face of enemy air power, but shallow ground incursions just
inside Vietnam allow for logistics lines on Chinese soil to be protected from
potential airstrikes by stationary CSA-1 surface-to-air missile batteries and
fighter aircraft operating from permanent installations.
o China's air force is ill-prepared to provide close-air support to Chinese infantry
forces penetrating deep into Vietnam. But with Chinese long-range artillery guns
firing from secure positions within Malipo County, ground troops receive the
artillery support needed to soften up Vietnamese fortifications preceding an
...s,...._.. ,..~--~-
f
ire directed at Ha Giang might prompt the Vietnamese to mount major counterattacks
or large artillery bombardments into Malipo County. Thus, the Chinese can wage bloody
Beijing appears to be concerned that artillery
'
fighting south of Malipo, but still control escalation of the conflict.
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Beyond Politics
-.The Chinese military press is increasingly highlighting the value of Vietnamese
border fighting as_ .much as a training ground fore Chinese infantry forces as an
international political statement. A 7 ? April article in the =Liberation Army Daily boasted
that the border fighting has "trained a new generation of reliable soldiers."
Using the Vietnam conflict as a training ground, in fact, appears to be military
policy. China's aging high command is well aware of the tack of combat experience in
the Chinese Army and appears to relish the chance to test the mettle of its recently
rejuvenated officer corps.
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has at least seven. combat divisions
Beijing shows no signs of changing its strategy of "a thousand thorns." China
a total of some 90,000 men field de to ed near Mali o.
hinese engineers, moreover, continue to
improve road networks along the border, and the Chinese have even built all-weather'
roads leading to two contested hilltops just inside Vietnam, suggesting that the Chinese .
intend to keep troops.on Vietnamese soil indefinitely.
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moreover, needs no new southern training ground because it has been able rotate
various units and officers through Malipo. Finally, the tenacity with which the
Vietnamese have fought against numerically superior forces for the hilltops of Ha Tuyen
Province will give the the Chinese leadership pause before contemplating the openina of
Although we believe the fighting at Malipo will continue--intensifying when
Beijing seeks to score political points--we doubt the Chinese are prepared to open up
any new "Malipo salients." There would be little additional political mileage to be gained
because Beijing seeks to avoid :criticism that it is the aggressor; secondly, a new front
would create an add'+tional drain on Chinese economic resources. The Chinese military,
any new running sores" along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier.
We believe that Vietnamese forces will continue to react strongly to Chinese
forays on the tactical level but the "thousand thorns" are likely to have little effect on
overall Vietnamese policy. Beijing's actions did not deter Hanoi's largest dry season
offensive in six years and we detect no effort to move more Vietnamese divisions to the
Chinese border. Indeed, on 13 February Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach told the
Australian Ambassador in Hanoi that, unlike last spring, he had had fewer sleepless
~i h ause of urgent messages from commanders on the Chinese frontier.
Hanoi's leaders appear to be gauging correctly the limits of the Chinese strategy
and display confidence that local commanders can successfully manage the pressure.
The Vietnamese probably will continue to avoid any temptation to match the Chinese
buildup opposite Ha Tuyen Province, an act that would risk escalated fighting in an area
of limited strategic significance. China's policy of keeping border tensions within
carefully controlled bounds--not building up, for example, along traditional invasion
corridors--has not-been lost on Hanoi and aives the Vietnamese little motivation to
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SUBJECT: China's Malipo Campaign: The Military Benefits
Distribution:
National Security Council
1. David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Room 302 EOB
2. Gaston Sigur, Senior Staff Member, East Asia, NSC. Room 302 EO6.
3. Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice-President, Room 298 White House
Department of State
4. Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Room 6205
5. AMB Morton Abramowitz, Director, INR, Room 6531
6. Donald Anderson, Director. Office of Chinese Affairs, Room 4318
7. M. Lyall Breckon, Director for Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, Room 6808
8. LT General John Chain, Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Room 7327
9. Charles Kartman, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Room 7430
10. Charles Martin. INR/EAP%CH, Room 8840
11. Jack Sontag, iNR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
12. Allen Kitchens, INR/EAP, Room 8647
Department of Defense
13. Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA,
Room 4E808 Pentagon
14. James Kelly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, iSA,
Room 4E817 Pentagon
15. Major General William E. Odom, Army Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Room 2E466, Pentagon
16. Major General James C. Pfautz, Assistant Air Force Chief of Staff
for Intelligence. Room 4A931. Pentagon
17. Commodore James D. Cosset', Director, East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
ISA, Room 4C839
18. Edward Ross, ISA. Rm 4/C/840
19. Lt.Colonel Larry Mitchel. AF/XOXXP Plans and Operations. Pentagon, Room 4/D/1034
20. Major Chris Johnson, OJCSJ-5. Far East South Asia Division, Pentagon, Room 2/E/973
21. John J. Sloan. DIO for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Room 2/C/238, Pentagon
22. Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary for Defense for International
Security Policv. Room 4E838 Pentagon
26. Hal Leach, Naval Intelligence Support Center, NISC/DOW/P,
4301 Suitland Road, Washington, DC 20390
Department of Energy
27. Douglas Faulkner, DOE/DP-421, GA-257, Forrestal Building
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National Photographic Intrepretation Center
32. Chief, Asian Forces Division, NPIC/IEG/EAFD,
Central Intelligence Agency
33. DDCI, Rm 7E12
34. SA/DCI/DDCI, Rm 7E12
35. Executive Director, Rm 7E 12
36. Ch/O/LL (HQS REVIEW ONLY), Rm BW09 CHB
m BW09 CHB
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